The problem we are facing here (…) is the fundamental problem of each science: the establishment of identity of its phenomena.¹ That this problem still awaits its solution, and that the science of culture still lacks real criteria of identification — that is, criteria of what to observe and how to observe, what to compare and how to carry it out, of what to trace in evolution and diffusion — will hardly be disputed by anyone acquainted with the controversies of history²…  (69-70)³

Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or an extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, partly material, partly human⁴ and partly spiritual, by which man is able to cope with the concrete, specific problems that face him. (36)

Again, in his whole outfit of artifacts and his ability to produce them and to appreciate them, man creates a secondary environment. (…) This environment, which is neither more nor less than culture itself, has to be permanently reproduced, maintained, and managed. (…) Cultural tradition has to be transmitted from each generation to the next. Methods and mechanisms of an educational character must exist (…) All these primary problems of human beings are solved for the individual by artifacts, organization into cooperative groups, and also by the [ongoing] development of knowledge (…) these new needs impose upon man and society a secondary type of determinism. (36-38)

We shall be able to reject the view that “No common measure of cultural phenomena can be found” (…) [Instead,] the scientific analysis of culture (…) can point to another system of realities that also⁵ conforms to general laws, and can thus be used as a guide for field-work, as a means of identification of cultural realities, and as the basis of social engineering.⁶ (38)

Unless the anthropologist and his fellow humanists agree on what is the definite isolate in the concrete cultural reality, there will never be any science of civilization. (39)

In order to understand [cultural] divergencies, a clear, common measure of comparison is indispensable.⁷ (40)

in any (…) comparative research, the problem of identity first has to be faced and solved (43)

The concept of institution (…) is, I submit, the legitimate isolate of cultural analysis.⁸ (51)

Each institution, that is, organized type of activity, has a definite structure. In order to observe, understand, describe, and discourse theoretically upon an institution, it is necessary to analyze it in the manner here indicated, and in this manner only. This applies to field-work and to any comparative studies as between different cultures, to problems of applied anthropology and sociology, and indeed, to any scientific approach in matters where culture is the main subject matter. No element, “trait,” custom, or idea is defined or can be defined except by placing it within its relevant and real institutional setting. We are thus insisting that such institutional analysis is not only possible but indispensable. (54)

The institutional structure is universal throughout all cultures, and within each cultural manifestation…  (54)

[The prerequisite need is] to establish (…) that our institutional types are not arbitrary or fictitious, but represent clearly definable realities. (66)

All cultures have as their main common measure a set of institutional types…⁹     (67)

What still remains to be made clear is the relation between form and function. We have insisted that each scientific theory must start from and lead to observation. It must be inductive and it must be verifiable by experience. In other words, it must refer to human experiences which can be defined, which are (…) accessible to any and every observer, and which are recurrent, hence (…) predictive. All this means that, in the final analysis, every proposition of scientific anthropology¹⁰ has to refer to phenomena which can be defined by form, in the fullest objective sense of the term. (67)

At the same time, we also indicated that culture, as the handiwork of man and as the medium through which he achieves his ends — a medium which allows him to live (…) a medium which (…) allows him to create goods and values beyond his animal, organic endowment — that culture, in all this and through all this, must be understood as a means to an end, that is, instrumentally or functionally. Hence, if we are correct in both assertions, a (…) definition of the concept of form, of function, and of their relations, must be given.  (67-68)

No organized system of activities is possible without a physical basis and without the equipment of artifacts. (…) There is a constant interaction between the organism and the secondary milieu in which it exists, that is, culture. In short, human beings live (…) the result of an interaction between organic processes and man’s manipulation and re-setting of his environment.  (68)

The problem we are facing here (…) is the fundamental problem of each science: the establishment of identity of its phenomena. That this problem still awaits its solution, and that the science of culture still lacks real criteria of identification — that is, criteria of what to observe and how to observe, what to compare and how to carry it out, of what to trace in evolution and diffusion — will hardly be disputed by anyone acquainted with the controversies of history…¹¹ (69-70)

For reasons theoretical and practical, anthropology, as the theory of culture, must establish a closer working cooperation with those natural sciences which can supply us with the specific answer to [some of] our problems.¹² (79)

Form and function (…) are inextricably related to one another. It is impossible to discuss the one without taking account of the other. (83)

In every human society each impulse is remolded by tradition. It appears still in its dynamic form as a drive, but a drive modified, shaped, and determined by tradition. (85)

In short, it would be idle to disregard the fact that the impulse leading to the simplest physiological performance is as highly plastic and determined by tradition as it is ineluctable in the long run, because it is determined by physiological necessities. (…) Simple physiological impulses can not exist under conditions of culture. (87)

We must not forget biology, but we can not rest satisfied with biological determinism alone. (89)

This is the point in which the study of human behavior takes a definite departure from mere biological determinism. We have made this clear already in pointing out that within each vital sequence the impulse is refashioned or co-determined by cultural influences. (94)

It is always necessary in the integral definition (…) to determine (…) essential nature and relate to it the other subsidiary functions.¹³

And this really is the hallmark of scientific definition. It must principally be a call to a scientifically schematized and oriented observation of empirical fact.¹⁴ (115)

Culture supplies man with derived potentialities, abilities, and powers. This also means that the enormous extension in the range of human action, over and above innate abilities of the naked organism, imposes on man a number of limitations. In other words, culture imposes a new type of specific determinism on human behavior. (119)

If our concept of derived need or cultural imperative is correct, certain new types of behavior are implied in all cultural responses, which are as stringent and ineluctable as every vital sequence is in its own right. (120)

We have to show that man must economically cooperate, that he must establish and maintain order; that he must educate the new and growing organism of each citizen; and that he must somehow implement the means of enforcement in all such activities. We have to show how and where these activities come in and how they combine. Finally, in order to make the processes of derivation and the hierarchy of need clear, we shall have to show how economics, knowledge, religion and mechanisms of law, educational training and artistic creativeness are directly or indirectly related to the basic, that is, physiological needs.¹⁵ (120)

Can we say, however, that the submission to cultural rules is as absolute as the submission to biological determinism? Once we realize that dependence on the cultural apparatus, however simple or complex, becomes the conditio sine qua non, we see immediately that the failure in social cooperation or symbolic accuracy spells immediate destruction or long-run attrition in the plain biological sense. (121)

The moment that such [cultural] devices have been adopted, in order to enhance human adaptability to the environment, they also become necessary conditions for survival. And here we can enumerate, point for point, the [cultural] factors on which human dependence becomes as great as dependence on the execution of any biologically dictated vital sequences. (121)

Thus, the material equipment in its economic production and technical quality, the skills based on training, knowledge and experience, the rules of cooperation, and symbolic efficiency are one and all as indispensable under the ultimate sanction of the biological imperative of self-preservation as are any purely physiologically determined elements. (122)

We have (…) shown the process of derivation, and thus linked up the instrumental determinism of cultural activities with the basic source of this determinism, that is, biological requirements. (126)

Symbolism is an essential ingredient of all organized behavior; (…) it is a subject matter which can be submitted to observation and theoretical analysis (…) to the same extent to which we can observe material artifacts (…) or define the form of a custom. The central thesis here maintained is that symbolism, in its essential nature, is the modification of the original organism which allows the transformation of a physiological drive into a cultural value. (132)

The cultural equivalent of the vital sequence.¹⁶ (137)

The organism, in short, reacts to the instrumental elements [supplied by culture] with the same or at least similar appetitive force as it does to objects which reward it directly by physiological pleasure. We can define this strong and inevitable attachment of the organism to certain objectives, norms, or persons who are instrumental to the satisfaction of the organism’s need, by the term value, in the widest sense of the word. (138)

In reality, however, we have to remember always that the drive¹⁷ is integral¹⁸ and that it works right through the sequence, controlling all its phases. (140)

What we have defined as charter, that is, the traditionally established values, programs, and principles of organized behavior, correspond once more, fully and directly, to our concept of drive, insofar as this is culturally reinterpreted. This cultural reinterpretation, again, means that the drive operates in a two-fold manner, first by the establishment of the value of the [cultural]  apparatus, and (…) then by reappearing as (…) culturally determined [by that value matrix].¹⁹ (140)

The understanding of any cultural element must imply (…) the satisfaction of essential needs, whether these be basic, that is biological, or derived, that is, cultural.²⁰ (142)