Wright: ‘Ethics and Social Philosophy’

Henry Wilkes Wright: ‘Ethics and Social Philosophy‘, The Monist, 36:4, October, 1926, pp. 627-644.

ethical theory of the present period is less interested in the rational grounds of moral judgment than in the interaction of the human individual with his natural and social environment. As a consequence, the boundaries between ethics and sociology, politics and economics (…) are not as well-observed as formerly; much present-day thought on these subjects proceeds on the assumption that the philosophy of practice is fundamentally one field within which ethical, social, political, and economic theory represent merely differences of interest and emphasis. (627)

But we do also, I think, get decided help from a consideration of the outstanding position occupied by three motor responses in the behavior of man as an intelligent and social being. These three responses, depending upon structures peculiar to man are those of articulate speech, of manual contrivance and technical invention, and [artistic] expression.1 (643)

the [three motor] responses mentioned become, as I have shown in a recent book,2 media for the communication and expansion of intelligible meanings and satisfactions. Through speech, ideas, beliefs and opinions are exchanged, accumulated and correlated ; through practical contrivance, industrial methods and appliances, social procedures and institutions are invented and put to social uses; through emotional expression with esthetic perception, meanings strongly felt but inarticulate are embodied in, and transmitted through, sense-imagery. These three activities are the basis of human association because through them men are able to participate in a common experience: to share in a common fund of knowledge, to co-operate in a common world-task, and to respond sympathetically to the salient features of our common human lot. (…) The accumulated products of these activities,  scientific and historical writings, industrial art and social institutions, and creations of fine art in all its branches,  constituting the sum-total of social culture, furnish the individual with a means of translating the facts of his life into terms of universal human experience… (644)

  1. Wright has ’emotional expression’ here, but he means ‘artistic expression’, since he enlarges on this as “creations of fine art in all its branches”. (644)
  2. The Moral Standards of Democracy, 1925.