Author Archives: McEwen

Ms. Found In A Bottle – Edgar Poe

Qui n’a plus qu’un moment à vivre
N’a plus rien à dissimuler. Quinault — Atys [1676]

Of my country and of my family I have little to say. Ill usage and length of years have driven me from the one, and estranged me from the other. Hereditary wealth afforded me an education of no common order, and a contemplative turn of mind enabled me to methodise the stores which early study very diligently garnered up. Beyond all things, the works of the German moralists gave me great delight; not from any ill-advised admiration of their eloquent madness, but from the ease with which my habits of rigid thought enabled me to detect their falsities. I have often been reproached with the aridity of my genius; a deficiency of imagination has been imputed to me as a crime; and the Pyrrhonism of my opinions has at all times rendered me notorious. Indeed, a strong relish for physical philosophy has, I fear, tinctured my mind with a very common error of this age — I mean the habit of referring occurrences, even the least susceptible of such reference, to the principles of that science. Upon the whole, no person could be less liable than myself to be led away from the severe precincts of truth by the ignes fatui of superstition. I have thought proper to premise thus much, lest the incredible tale I have to tell should be considered rather the raving of a crude imagination, than the positive experience of a mind to which the reveries of fancy have been a dead letter and a nullity.

After many years spent in foreign travel, I sailed in the year 18——, from the port of Batavia, in the rich and populous island of Java, on a voyage to the Archipelago of the Sunda islands. I went as passenger — having no other inducement than a kind of nervous restlessness which haunted me as a fiend.

Our vessel was a beautiful ship of about four hundred tons, copper-fastened, and built at Bombay of Malabar teak. She was freighted with cotton-wool and oil, from the Lachadive islands. We had also on board coir, jaggeree, ghee, cocoa-nuts, and a few cases of opium. The stowage was clumsily done, and the vessel consequently crank.

We got under way with a mere breath of wind, and for many days stood along the eastern coast of Java, without any other incident to beguile the monotony of our course than the occasional meeting with some of the small grabs of the Archipelago to which we were bound.

One evening, leaning over the taffrail, I observed a very singular, isolated cloud, to the N. W. It was remarkable, as well for its color, as from its being the first we had seen since our departure from Batavia. I watched it attentively until sunset, when it spread all at once to the eastward and westward, girting in the horizon with a narrow strip of vapor, and looking like a long line of low beach. My notice was soon afterwards attracted by the dusky-red appearance of the moon, and the peculiar character of the sea. The latter was undergoing a rapid change, and the water seemed more than usually transparent. Although I could distinctly see the bottom, yet, heaving the lead, I found the ship in fifteen fathoms. The air now became intolerably hot, and was loaded with spiral exhalations similar to those arising from heated iron. As night came on, every breath of wind died away, and a more entire calm it is impossible to conceive. The flame of a candle burned upon the poop without the least perceptible motion, and a long hair, held between the finger and thumb, hung without the possibility of detecting a vibration. However, as the captain said he could perceive no indication of danger, and as we were drifting in bodily to shore, he ordered the sails to be furled, and the anchor let go. No watch was set, and the crew, consisting principally of Malays, stretched themselves deliberately upon deck. I went below — not without a full presentiment of evil. Indeed, every appearance warranted me in apprehending a Simoon. I told the captain my fears; but he paid no attention to what I said, and left me without deigning to give a reply. My uneasiness, however, prevented me from sleeping, and about midnight I went upon deck. As I placed my foot upon the upper step of the companion-ladder, I was startled by a loud, humming noise, like that occasioned by the rapid revolution of a mill-wheel, and before I could ascertain its meaning, I found the ship quivering to its centre. In the next instant, a wilderness of foam hurled us upon our beam-ends, and, rushing over us fore and aft, swept the entire decks from stem to stern.

The extreme fury of the blast proved, in a great measure, the salvation of the ship. Although completely water-logged, yet, as her masts had gone by the board, she rose, after a minute, heavily from the sea, and, staggering awhile beneath the immense pressure of the tempest, finally righted.

By what miracle I escaped destruction, it is impossible to say. Stunned by the shock of the water, I found myself, upon recovery, jammed in between the stern-post and rudder. With great difficulty I gained my feet, and looking dizzily around, was at first struck with the idea of our being among breakers; so terrific, beyond the wildest imagination, was the whirlpool of mountainous and foaming ocean within which we were ingulfed. After a while, I heard the voice of an old Swede, who had shipped with us at the moment of our leaving port. I hallooed to him with all my strength, and presently he came reeling aft. We soon discovered that we were the sole survivors of the accident. All on deck, with the exception of ourselves, had been swept overboard; the captain and mates must have perished as they slept, for the cabins were deluged with water. Without assistance, we could expect to do little for the security of the ship, and our exertions were at first paralyzed by the momentary expectation of going down. Our cable had, of course, parted like pack-thread, at the first breath of the hurricane, or we should have been instantaneously overwhelmed. We scudded with frightful velocity before the sea, and the water made clear breaches over us. The framework of our stern was shattered excessively, and, in almost every respect, we had received considerable injury; but to our extreme joy we found the pumps unchoked and that we had made no great shifting of our ballast. The main fury of the blast had already blown over, and we apprehended little danger from the violence of the wind; but we looked forward to its total cessation with dismay; well believing, that in our shattered condition, we should inevitably perish in the tremendous swell which would ensue. But this very just apprehension seemed by no means likely to be soon verified. For five entire days and nights — during which our only subsistence was a small quantity of jaggeree, procured with great difficulty from the forecastle — the hulk flew at a rate defying computation, before rapidly succeeding flaws of wind, which, without equalling the first violence of the Simoon, were still more terrific than any tempest I had before encountered. Our course for the first four days was, with trifling variations, S. E. and by S.; and we must have run down the coast of New Holland. On the fifth day the cold became extreme, although the wind had hauled round a point more to the northward. The sun arose with a sickly yellow lustre, and clambered a very few degrees above the horizon — emitting no decisive light. There were no clouds apparent, yet the wind was upon the increase, and blew with a fitful and unsteady fury. About noon, as nearly as we could guess, our attention was again arrested by the appearance of the sun. It gave out no light, properly so called, but a dull and sullen glow without reflection, as if all its rays were polarized. Just before sinking within the turgid sea, its central fires suddenly went out, as if hurriedly extinguished by some unaccountable power. It was a dim, silver-like rim, alone, as it rushed down the unfathomable ocean.

We waited in vain for the arrival of the sixth day — that day to me has not arrived — to the Swede, never did arrive. Thenceforward we were enshrouded in pitchy darkness, so that we could not have seen an object at twenty paces from the ship. Eternal night continued to envelop us, all unrelieved by the phosphoric sea-brilliancy to which we had been accustomed in the tropics. We observed too, that, although the tempest continued to rage with unabated violence, there was no longer to be discovered the usual appearance of surf, or foam, which had hitherto attended us. All around were horror, and thick gloom, and a black sweltering desert of ebony. Superstitious terror crept by degrees into the spirit of the old Swede, and my own soul was wrapped up in silent wonder. We neglected all care of the ship, as worse than useless, and securing ourselves, as well as possible, to the stump of the mizen-mast, looked out bitterly into the world of ocean. We had no means of calculating time, nor could we form any guess of our situation. We were, however, well aware of having made farther to the southward than any previous navigators, and felt great amazement at not meeting with the usual impediments of ice. In the meantime every moment threatened to be our last — every mountainous billow hurried to overwhelm us. The swell surpassed anything I had imagined possible, and that we were not instantly buried is a miracle. My companion spoke of the lightness of our cargo, and reminded me of the excellent qualities of our ship; but I could not help feeling the utter hopelessness of hope itself, and prepared myself gloomily for that death which I thought nothing could defer beyond an hour, as, with every knot of way the ship made, the swelling of the black stupendous seas became more dismally appalling. At times we gasped for breath at an elevation beyond the albatross — at times became dizzy with the velocity of our descent into some watery hell, where the air grew stagnant, and no sound disturbed the slumbers of the kraken.

We were at the bottom of one of these abysses, when a quick scream from my companion broke fearfully upon the night. “See! see!” cried he, shrieking in my ears, “Almighty God! see! see!” As he spoke, I became aware of a dull, sullen glare of red light which streamed down the sides of the vast chasm where we lay, and threw a fitful brilliancy upon our deck. Casting my eyes upwards, I beheld a spectacle which froze the current of my blood. At a terrific height directly above us, and upon the very verge of the precipitous descent, hovered a gigantic ship, of perhaps four thousand tons. Although upreared upon the summit of a wave more than a hundred times her own altitude, her apparent size still exceeded that of any ship of the line or East Indiaman in existence. Her huge hull was of a deep dingy black, unrelieved by any of the customary carvings of a ship. A single row of brass cannon protruded from her open ports, and dashed from their polished surfaces the fires of innumerable battle-lanterns, which swung to and fro about her rigging. But what mainly inspired us with horror and astonishment, was that she bore up under a press of sail in the very teeth of that supernatural sea, and of that ungovernable hurricane. When we first discovered her, her bows were alone to be seen, as she rose slowly from the dim and horrible gulf beyond her. For a moment of intense terror she paused upon the giddy pinnacle, as if in contemplation of her own sublimity, then trembled and tottered, and — came down.

At this instant, I know not what sudden self-possession came over my spirit. Staggering as far aft as I could, I awaited fearlessly the ruin that was to overwhelm. Our own vessel was at length ceasing from her struggles, and sinking with her head to the sea. The shock of the descending mass struck her, consequently, in that portion of her frame which was already under water, and the inevitable result was to hurl me, with irresistible violence, upon the rigging of the stranger.

As I fell, the ship hove in stays, and went about; and to the confusion ensuing I attributed my escape from the notice of the crew. With little difficulty I made my way, unperceived, to the main hatchway, which was partially open, and soon found an opportunity of secreting myself in the hold. Why I did so I can hardly tell. An indefinite sense of awe, which at first sight of the navigators of the ship had taken hold of my mind, was perhaps the principle of my concealment. I was unwilling to trust myself with a race of people who had offered, to the cursory glance I had taken, so many points of vague novelty, doubt, and apprehension. I therefore thought proper to contrive a hiding-place in the hold. This I did by removing a small portion of the shifting-boards, in such a manner as to afford me a convenient retreat between the huge timbers of the ship.

I had scarcely completed my work, when a footstep in the hold forced me to make use of it. A man passed by my place of concealment with a feeble and unsteady gait. I could not see his face, but had an opportunity of observing his general appearance. There was about it an evidence of great age and infirmity. His knees tottered beneath a load of years, and his entire frame quivered under the burthen. He muttered to himself, in a low broken tone, some words of a language which I could not understand, and groped in a corner among a pile of singular-looking instruments, and decayed charts of navigation. His manner was a wild mixture of the peevishness of second childhood and the solemn dignity of a God. He at length went on deck, and I saw him no more.

*****

A feeling, for which I have no name, has taken possession of my soul — a sensation which will admit of no analysis, to which the lessons of by-gone time are inadequate, and for which I fear futurity itself will offer me no key. To a mind constituted like my own, the latter consideration is an evil. I shall never — I know that I shall never — be satisfied with regard to the nature of my conceptions. Yet it is not wonderful that these conceptions are indefinite, since they have their origin in sources so utterly novel. A new sense — a new entity is added to my soul.

*****

It is long since I first trod the deck of this terrible ship, and the rays of my destiny are, I think, gathering to a focus. Incomprehensible men! Wrapped up in meditations of a kind which I cannot divine, they pass me by unnoticed. Concealment is utter folly on my part, for the people will not see. It was but just now that I passed directly before the eyes of the mate; it was no long while ago that I ventured into the captain’s own private cabin, and took thence the materials with which I write, and have written. I shall from time to time continue this journal. It is true that I may not find an opportunity of transmitting it to the world, but I will not fail to make the endeavor. At the last moment I will enclose the MS. in a bottle, and cast it within the sea.

*****

An incident has occurred which has given me new room for meditation. Are such things the operation of ungoverned chance? I had ventured upon deck and thrown myself down, without attracting any notice, among a pile of ratlin-stuff and old sails, in the bottom of the yawl. While musing upon the singularity of my fate, I unwittingly daubed with a tar-brush the edges of a neatly-folded studding-sail which lay near me on a barrel. The studding-sail is now bent upon the ship, and the thoughtless touches of the brush are spread out into the word Discovery.

I have made many observations lately upon the structure of the vessel. Although well armed, she is not, I think, a ship of war. Her rigging, build, and general equipment, all negative to a supposition of this kind. What she is not, I can easily perceive; what she is, I fear it is impossible to say. I know not how it is, but in scrutinizing her strange model and singular cast of spars, her huge size and overgrown suits of canvass, her severely simple bow and antiquated stern, there will occasionally flash across my mind a sensation of familiar things, and there is always mixed up with such indistinct shadows of recollection, an unaccountable memory of old foreign chronicles and ages long ago.

*****

I have been looking at the timbers of the ship. She is built of a material to which I am a stranger. There is a peculiar character about the wood which strikes me as rendering it unfit for the purpose to which it has been applied. I mean its extreme porousness, considered independently of the worm-eaten condition which is a consequence of navigation in these seas, and apart from the rottenness attendant upon age. It will appear perhaps an observation somewhat over-curious, but this wood would have every characteristic of Spanish oak, if Spanish oak were distended by any unnatural means.

In reading the above sentence, a curious apothegm of an old weather-beaten Dutch navigator comes full upon my recollection. “It is as sure,” he was wont to say, when any doubt was entertained of his veracity, “as sure as there is a sea where the ship itself will grow in bulk like the living body of the seaman.”

*****

About an hour ago, I made bold to thrust myself among a group of the crew. They paid me no manner of attention, and, although I stood in the very midst of them all, seemed utterly unconscious of my presence. Like the one I had at first seen in the hold, they all bore about them the marks of a hoary old age. Their knees trembled with infirmity; their shoulders were bent double with decrepitude; their shrivelled skins rattled in the wind; their voices were low, tremulous, and broken; their eyes glistened with the rheum of years; and their gray hairs streamed terribly in the tempest. Around them, on every part of the deck, lay scattered mathematical instruments of the most quaint and obsolete construction.

*****

I mentioned, some time ago, the bending of a studding-sail. From that period, the ship, being thrown dead off the wind, has continued her terrific course due south, with every rag of canvass packed upon her, from her trucks to her lower studding-sail booms, and rolling every moment her top-gallant yard-arms into the most appalling hell of water which it can enter into the mind of man to imagine. I have just left the deck, where I find it impossible to maintain a footing, although the crew seem to experience little inconvenience. It appears to me a miracle of miracles that our enormous bulk is not swallowed up at once and for ever. We are surely doomed to hover continually upon the brink of eternity, without taking a final plunge into the abyss. From billows a thousand times more stupendous than any I have ever seen, we glide away with the facility of the arrowy sea-gull; and the colossal waters rear their heads above us like demons of the deep, but like demons confined to simple threats, and forbidden to destroy. I am led to attribute these frequent escapes to the only natural cause which can account for such effect. I must suppose the ship to be within the influence of some strong current, or impetuous under-tow.

*****

I have seen the captain face to face, and in his own cabin — but, as I expected, he paid me no attention. Although in his appearance there is, to a casual observer, nothing which might bespeak him more or less than man, still, a feeling of irrepressible reverence and awe mingled with the sensation of wonder with which I regarded him. In stature, he is nearly my own height; that is, about five feet eight inches. He is of a well-knit and compact frame of body, neither robust nor remarkable otherwise. But it is the singularity of the expression which reigns upon the face — it is the intense, the wonderful, the thrilling evidence of old age, so utter, so extreme, which excites within my spirit a sense — a sentiment ineffable. His forehead, although little wrinkled, seems to bear upon it the stamp of a myriad of years. His gray hairs are records of the past, and his grayer eyes are sybils of the future. The cabin floor was thickly strewn with strange, iron-clasped folios, and mouldering instruments of science, and obsolete long-forgotten charts. His head was bowed down upon his hands, and he pored, with a fiery, unquiet eye, over a paper which I took to be a commission, and which, at all events, bore the signature of a monarch. He muttered to himself — as did the first seaman whom I saw in the hold — some low peevish syllables of a foreign tongue; and although the speaker was close at my elbow, his voice seemed to reach my ears from the distance of a mile.

*****

The ship and all in it are imbued with the spirit of Eld. The crew glide to and fro like the ghosts of buried centuries; their eyes have an eager and uneasy meaning; and when their fingers fall athwart my path in the wild glare of the battle-lanterns, I feel as I have never felt before, although I have been all my life a dealer in antiquities, and have imbibed the shadows of fallen columns at Balbec, and Tadmor, and Persepolis, until my very soul has become a ruin.

*****

When I look around me, I feel ashamed of my former apprehensions. If I trembled at the blast which has hitherto attended us, shall I not stand aghast at a warring of wind and ocean, to convey any idea of which the words tornado and simoon are trivial and ineffective? All in the immediate vicinity of the ship is the blackness of eternal night, and a chaos of foamless water; but, about a league on either side of us, may be seen, indistinctly and at intervals, stupendous ramparts of ice, towering away into the desolate sky, and looking like the walls of the universe.

*****

As I imagined, the ship proves to be in a current — if that appellation can properly be given to a tide which, howling and shrieking by the white ice, thunders on to the southward with a velocity like the headlong dashing of a cataract.

*****

To conceive the horror of my sensations is, I presume, utterly impossible; yet a curiosity to penetrate the mysteries of these awful regions, predominates even over my despair, and will reconcile me to the most hideous aspect of death. It it evident that we are hurrying onwards to some exciting knowledge — some never-to-be-imparted secret, whose attainment is destruction. Perhaps this current leads us to the southern pole itself. It must be confessed that a supposition apparently so wild has every probability in its favor.

*****

The crew pace the deck with unquiet and tremulous step; but there is upon their countenances an expression more of the eagerness of hope than of the apathy of despair.

In the meantime the wind is still in our poop, and, as we carry a crowd of canvass, the ship is at times lifted bodily from out the sea! Oh, horror upon horror!—the ice opens suddenly to the right, and to the left, and we are whirling dizzily, in immense concentric circles, round and round the borders of a gigantic amphitheatre, the summit of whose walls is lost in the darkness and the distance. But little time will be left me to ponder upon my destiny! The circles rapidly grow small — we are plunging madly within the grasp of the whirlpool — and amid a roaring, and bellowing, and thundering of ocean and of tempest, the ship is quivering — oh God! and — going down!

 

Note.—The “MS. Found in a Bottle,” was originally published in 1831; and it was not until many years afterwards that I became acquainted with the maps of Mercator, in which the ocean is represented as rushing, by four mouths, into the (northern) Polar Gulf, to be absorbed into the bowels of the earth; the Pole itself being represented by a black rock, towering to a prodigious height.

 

McLuhan’s realism 5: Cambridge 1934-1935

In two letters to his family from Cambridge at the turn of the year, 1934-1935, McLuhan offered advice to his younger brother Maurice (‘Red’) on the question of “Plato and Aristotle”. Tellingly, the two modern authorities cited in the letters are Chesterton and Maritain. In both letters McLuhan ends by advocating “Aristotle”, aka, a “fleshly” realism.

Now I can heartily recommend GK [Chesterton]’s book on St Thomas as being of use to you in your philosophy. He deals with Plato and Aristotle and their influence on Christendom — incidentally there is a very clear exposition of their theories of knowledge (how we know and know we can know). (…) In any case these ideas are not simple. I remember what difficulty I had. I never understood the importance or meaning of Plato and Aristotle until I read Kant a year later. (…) It is useful broadly to distinguish PI. and Arist as tending towards Bhuddism [sic] and Christianity respectively. Plato was an oriental in mind (…) Aristotle heartily accepts the senses just as Browning did and says: (…) “All good things / Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul”. [“Rabbi Ben Ezra”, #12, 1864]. And that is why great Aquinas accepted Aristotle into Christian theology. (McLuhan to Elsie, Herbert & Maurice McLuhan, November 10, 1934, Letters 39)

As a handbook on Philosophy with especial regard to its historical development I strongly commend Maritain’s “Introd. to Phil.” to you Red. He is the greatest living French thinker and is one of the foremost students and interpreters of Aquinas. Like most French texts it is a marvel of lucidity and order. I have read or dipped into numerous histories (all of which supposed Augustine and Aquinas were spoofers) and which therefore misunderstood everything that happened in society and philosophy after them. It is for his sympathy in this matter, as well as his general account, that I recommend him to you as certain to prove most coherent and stimulating. Lodge is a decided Platonist and I learned [to think] that way as long as I was trying to interpret Christianity in terms of comparative religion. Having perceived the sterility of that process, I now realize that Aristotle is the soundest basis for Xian doctrine.  (McLuhan to Elsie, Herbert & Maurice McLuhan, February 1935, Letters 53)

Rupert Lodge, chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Manitoba, had been one of McLuhan’s favorite professors there.  He had helped McLuhan obtain his scholarship for Cambridge with a glowing review. Lodge practiced what he called “comparative philosophy” in which he treated issues as originating in one of three possible basic outlooks: materialism, idealism and a middling position he sometimes called ‘pragmatism’. In rejecting “comparative religion”, McLuhan was denying that this approach was applicable to religion. Instead, as he came to think at this time (and would continue to do for the rest of his life), it was necessary to hold to a foundational realism with Aristotle, but in such a way that other basic positions were admitted and even justified — exactly in their undeniable reality.1

  1. “Far from turning his back on it (all the “arrogant confusion” of modern thought) he (Joyce) invaded it and took it up into the analogical drama of his art.”  (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters)

McLuhan’s realism 4: Meredith and “mystical materialism”

McLuhan appears to have come to his realism as a self-conscious position in the years 1933-1935 when he was still in his early twenties (age 22-24). Hardly incidentally, these were the years in which he moved decisively toward his 1937 conversion.  His realism tended in theological and ontological directions from the start, as well as in the inevitable epistemological one.1 But ‘theological and ontological’ never implied only ‘intellectual’ or only ‘spiritual’ for him. As he wrote to his Mother at this time:

My hunger for “truth” was sensuous in origin. I wanted a material satisfaction for the beauty that the mind can perceive. (MM to Elsie McLuhan Sept 5, 1935, Letters 73)

His bent towards “material satisfaction” valorized communication both because it (material satisfaction) entailed real engagement with the material world and because the means of communication were themselves material. Indeed, it was exactly because we finite, material, “fleshy” beings are in real communication with the real world that we can appreciate the “beauty” of our endowment:

Now the Catholic religion (…) is alone in blessing and employing all those merely human faculties which produce games and philosophy, and poetry and music and mirth and fellowship with a very fleshy basis. (…) The Catholic Church does not despise or wantonly mortify those members and faculties which Christ deigned to assume. They are henceforth holy and blessed. Catholic culture produced Chaucer and his merry story-telling pilgrims.(…) Catholic culture produced Don Quixote and St. Francis and Rabelais.  What I wish  to emphasize about them is their various and rich-hearted humanity.  (MM to Elsie McLuhan Sept 5, 1935, Letters 72)

Although his Cambridge years (1934-1936) certainly sharpened his understanding of the grounds and implications of such realism, it was already clearly present in nuce in his master’s thesis on George Meredith which was written in Winnipeg in 1933-1934:

Meredith is not a philosophic speculator (…) He has not the philosopher’s interest in disembodied thought or thought uninformed by any practical issues. He has rather the poet’s concern (…) with human passions and motives. He has an attitude (…) rather than an hypothesis which is amenable to logical demonstration (40)

It is not brain or thought alone… (41)

Now for Meredith the road to this excellence, and to joy in Earth is through action rather than through speculation. (…) Not at all “Shall man (…) learn the secret of the shrouded death / By lifting the lid of a white eye.” He has no sympathy with the spirit of perpetual enquiry… (44)

But in effect Meredith says: Man’s spirit and brain, no less than his body, are earth-born. We are not dropped down from heaven above. We are autochthonous. Earth of which we are a part is spirit as well as matter, flame as well as clod. What is spiritual comes out of Earth as well as what is fleshly. It is the unusual sympathy that Meredith shows (…) that caused G.K. Chesterton to write: “The presence of soul and substance together involves (…) things which most of the Victorians did not understand – the thing called sacrament. It is because he had a natural affinity for this mystical materialism2 that Meredith (…) is a poet…” (46-47)

These two, “blood” and “brain”, come first. But the “spirit” or “soul” (…) cannot exist without the other two. (48)

Life is to be lived, rather than examined (59)

Hegel develops a most convincing thesis that we can understand reality only by taking it in all its concreteness. Reason is not an external criterion but exists only as embodied in the phenomena of experience. We have only to observe the facts of experience as they unfold, and detect, if we can, the laws involved in them. (…) His principal effort was aimed to show that truth was embodied in the actual [and] that, between thought and reality, between the ideal and the real, there is no separation. (72-73)

[McLuhan citing a Meredith letter to Augustus Jessopp from Sept 20, 1862] “Between realism and idealism there is no natural conflict. This completes that. Realism is the basis of good composition: it implies study, observation, artistic power, and (in those who can do more) humility. (…) A great genius must necessarily employ ideal means, for a vast conception cannot be placed bodily before the eye, and remains to be suggested. Idealism is as an atmosphere whose effects of grandeur are wrought out through a series of illusions — [illusions] that are illusions (…) only when divorced from the ground work of the real. Need there be exclusion the one of the other? The artist is incomplete who does this. Men to whom I bow my head (Shakespeare, Goethe; and in their way, Moliere, Cervantes) are Realísts au fond. (…) For my part I love and cling to earth, as the one piece of God’s handiwork which we possess.”3 (73-74)

Furthermore, he had already begun to consider these issues (implicated in any attempt at “understanding media”) as they are developed by Coleridge :

The poet plants himself upon his instincts and permits his temperament sovereign sway. And he has quite as much right to do this as the philosopher has to trust his thought processes. In his table talk, Coleridge noted that all men (…) are born either Platonists or Aristotelians. There are similarly, in all times and places, definite types of temperament displaying consistency of conformation. The literary or artistic expression of such temperaments has properly the same validity as has the philosophizing of the Idealist and the Realist. (43)

The next year at Cambridge McLuhan would hear I.A. Richards lecture on his just published Coleridge on imagination, which considers the same passage from the table talk. Along with other discoveries at Cambridge, like Hopkins and Maritain, McLuhan’s existential interest would be engaged through Coleridge and Richards even more in the question of our “fleshly” access to the real and “the thing called sacrament”. 

  1. In a letter to his family from November 10, 1934, McLuhan recommended Maritain to his brother for his exposition of “theories of knowledge (how we know and know we can know)”. (Letters 39)
  2. Two years later, McLuhan would use this notion from Chesterton in the title of his first published paper on GKC himself: ‘G.K. Chesterton: a practical mystic’.
  3.  George Meredith Letters, collected and edited by W. M. Meredith, 1912, 156.

McLuhan’s realism 3: against perceptual engineering

In ‘Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press’ and ‘Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters’ (both 1954) McLuhan blasted the pretense of the artist who would be “the signer of a forged check on our [own] hopes and sympathies”. Instead:

The artist has merely to reveal, not to forge the signatures of existence.  (…) All those pseudo-rationalisms, the forged links and fraudulent intelligibility which official literature has imposed on existence must be abandoned. (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press) 

In this angelic view [“that school of thought for which the external world is an opaque prison”] the business of art has nothing to do with the analogy of cognition nor with our miraculous power to incarnate the external world. It is a means rather to lift us [angelically] out of our [imprisoned] human condition (…) Reality is not to be trusted or revered but to be remade by social engineers. (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters)

He recognized that the class of such “social engineers” included many of those whom he himself regarded as the greatest artists of the century:

Talk about blind spots in regions of maximal impact! Looking at The Diabolical Principle [Wyndham Lewis, 1931] just now, I read loud and clear that art must be totally environmental. It must be the content of nothing whatever. (…) Lewis wants nothing less for Art than the power to create total environments for Life and Death. (…) I find it a bit staggering to confront Lewis as a man who really wanted to be Pontifex Maximus of a magical priesthood. I suppose Yeats, Joyce and Pound had similar aspirations. Their priesthood was to create new worlds of perception. They were to be world engineers who shaped the totality of human awareness. (…) The environment as ultimate artefact. (McLuhan to Wilfred Watson October 4, 1964, National Archive Canada)

With the characterization that such art “must be the content of nothing whatever”, the implied charge was that it aspired to be the ground of everything, including itself: “nothing less (…) than the power to create total environments for Life and Death”.  But not only was genuine art called on the contrary “merely to reveal, not to forge the signatures of existence”, but all art needed to be assessed as figure. As a type of finite human making, its ability to express was in the first place a reflection of the prior environmental ground enabling it to do so and even to be at all. This was the conviction at the heart of McLuhan’s realism.

 

McLuhan’s realism 2: “the real things, exactly as they are”

McLuhan did not believe that communication and knowledge (knowledge being communication with certain objects of practical or theoretical interest) can be perfected; but neither did he believe that they can ever entirely fail.1 Instead his notion was that communication and knowledge are always to some degree successful, although always also subject to all the limitations and blindnesses and misunderstandings that inevitably beset our mortal coil.

The Catholic has never underestimated the value or the mystery of ordinary human perception and consciousness. Nor is he likely to overestimate them today. (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, 1954)

The creative imagination in the Christian tradition is an intellectual power, not a super-human emanation from “spirit” or from the uncreated divine spark in the human soul. (Nihilism Exposed, 1955)

The miracle of communication is that it happens at all.  If it always happens to some degree, however restricted it may be at times, it becomes somewhat understandable (although never without its mystery) that infants learn language (or that the species does so in the first place) and that humans develop all the arts and sciences that they do. For communication always to succeed, the enabling environment and the potency to function within it must be already present, always and everywhere.  What is called for, and enabled, is to try out different possible avenues arising from this culture medium, to give up the false trails we are always taking in it and to learn with others (itself through communication, of course) how these probing actions can be — and are! — carried out socially as well as individually.

McLuhan particularly considered this sort of fallible but at the same time successful realism in the first half of the 1950’s:

all existence cries out to be raised to the level of scientific or poetic intelligibility. (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press 1954)

For Joyce and Eliot (…) every artist is dedicated to revealing, or epiphanizing the signatures of things, so that what the nous poietikos is to perception and abstraction [subjectively realizing what is given to it] the artist is to existence at large [objectively realizing what is given to it] . (Joyce, Aquinas, and the Poetic Process 1951)

Impressionism and symbolism alike insisted on attention to process in preference to personal self-expression. Self-effacement and patient watchfulness preceded the discovery of the creative process. Poets and artists literally turned their own psyches into laboratories where they practised the most austere experiments in total disregard of their personal happiness. Gradually it dawned on Mallarmé that pure poetry was impossible — a poetry which would have as its theme the poetic process itself [as if the cause and ground of itself]. Henceforth the subject and framework of a poem would be [in the investigation of what must already be the case for “the poetic process” to take place at all:] the retracing of a moment of [ordinary] perception. (…) And so we arrive at the paradox of [= reached by] this most esoteric of all art doctrines, namely that the most poetic thing in the world is the most ordinary human consciousness. (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters)

For that school of thought for which the external world is an opaque prison [cf, The bubble of life in Tolstoy, Nietzsche, Havelock and Innis], art can never be regarded as a source of knowledge but only as a moral discipline and a study of endurance. The artist is not a reader of [the existing] radiant signatures on materia signata but the signer of a forged check2 on our [own] hopes and sympathies. (…) [In contrast] the job of the [genuine] artist is not to sign but to read signatures. Existence must speak for itself. It is already richly and radiantly signed. The artist has merely to reveal, not to forge the signatures of existence.  (…) All those pseudo-rationalisms, the forged links and fraudulent intelligibility which official literature has imposed on existence must be abandoned. (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press 1954)

In this angelic view [“that school of thought for which the external world is an opaque prison”] the business of art has nothing to do with the analogy of cognition nor with our miraculous power to incarnate the external world. It is a means rather to lift us [angelically] out of our human condition (…) Reality is not to be trusted or revered but to be remade by social engineers [and other artistic constructionists]. Joyce is the single poet voice in our century raised not not merely against this view but in wild laughter at its arrogant confusion. Far from turning his back on it he invaded it and took it up into the analogical drama of his art.  (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters)

If communication and the possibility of knowledge are always present, it must be the case that these are to be detected even in “arrogant confusion”.  This is one more reason that McLuhan refused value judgements and their associated points of view.

McLuhan found a particularly revealing expression of his understanding of “a direct approach to everyday reality”3 in a 1952 interview of Cesare Zavattini. He quoted it at length in ‘Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters’:

The most important characteristic, and the most important innovation, of what is called neorealism [in film], it seems to me, is to have realised that the necessity of the “story” was only an unconscious way of disguising a human defeat, and that the kind of imagination it involved was simply a technique of superimposing dead formulas over living social facts. Now it has been perceived that reality is hugely rich, that to be able to look directly at it is enough; and that the artist’s task is not to make people moved or indignant at metaphorical situations, but to make them reflect (and, if you like, to be moved and indignant too) on what they and others are doing, on the real things, exactly as they are. (…) to have evaded reality had been to betray it. (…) We have passed from an unconsciously rooted mistrust of reality, an illusory and equivocal evasion, to an unlimited trust in things, facts and people. Such a position requires us, in effect, to excavate reality, to [reveal in] it a power, a communication, a series of reflexes, which until recently we had never thought it had. It requires, too, a true and real interest in what is happening, a search for the most deeply hidden human values — an act of concrete homage towards other people, towards what is happening and existing in the world — Substantially, then, the question today is, instead of turning imaginary situations into “reality” and trying to make them look “true,” to take things as they are, almost by themselves, creat[ing] their own special significance. Life is not what is invented in “stories”; life is another matter. To understand it involves a minute, unrelenting, and patient search. (…) The world goes on getting worse because we are not truly aware of reality. The most authentic position anyone can take up today is to engage himself in tracing the roots of this problem. The keenest necessity of our time is “social attention”. 4 

Here was the project to which McLuhan would dedicate the rest of his life: engaging himself in “social attention”.

 

  1. Many different sorts of investigations in the twentieth century explored areas that had previously been assumed to be uncommunicative and therefore lacking in knowledge interest: dreams and other unconscious phenomena (Freud), relativity (Einstein), psychoses (Jung), mythology (Frazier), suicide (Durkheim), etc. etc.
  2. It was because a “forged check” must ultimately be seen to be worthless that Nietzsche maintained: “With the true world we also have abolished the apparent one!!”
  3. Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters
  4.  Zavattini cited from ‘Some Ideas on the Cinema’, Sight and Sound, 23:2, Oct-Dec 1953, pp 64-69 — an interview translated from La Revista del Cinema Italiano, December 1952.

McLuhan’s realism 1: St Louis 1940

If you can put your five fingers through it it is a gate, if not a door. Shut your eyes and see. Ulysses, 3: 8-9

“We have passed from an unconsciously rooted mistrust of reality, an illusory and equivocal evasion, to an unlimited trust in things, facts and people.” (McLuhan, Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, 1954, citing Cesare Zavattini, 1952)1

Our point of departure must remain that which constitutes the work of fine art as we know it when we know it most thoroughly (…) The distinctive kind of act whereby we apprehend this (…) play or picture or piece of music Gilby has called “poetic experience”, which he describes as “knowledge that seems in immediate contact with the real.” (Walter Ong, 1940, citing Thomas Gilby, 1934)2 

the drama of ordinary perception seen as the poetic process is the prime analogate, the magic casement opening on the secrets of created being.  (McLuhan, Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters)

When in 1940 Walter Ong published his first substantial scholarly article, ‘Imitation and the Object of Art’, his M.A. adviser at St Louis University was Marshall McLuhan.  At the same time, Ong was taking graduate English courses with McLuhan.  There is no doubt that Ong’s paper reflected common concerns with his same-aged teacher (the two were born 16 months apart in 1911-1912). Indeed, almost two decades later, Ong would dedicate his Ramus and Talon Inventory, one of his two ground-breaking Ramus books published in 1958, to McLuhan “who started all this”.3

Ong’s 1940 article ends with a reference to:

Bernard J. Muller-Thym, ‘Music’, Fleur de Lis (St. Louis University), XXXVIII (Nov 1938), 50-52. 

Muller-Thym’s 1938 article, in turn, cited Gilby, and was doubtless the source of Ong’s reference:

And we have often wondered whether (…) we should not have to invoke John of St. Thomas’s theory of the way love can act on the mind as formal cause (…) (we referred the reader to Gilby, Poetic Experience, p. 43, since we do not know another work in English which mentions that theory).

Thirty years later, in his 1970 review of The Interior Landscape, Ong recalled this time around 1940:

Muller-Thym in particular was concerned with philosophical and psychological interpretation of sensory activity. The Fleur de Lis, the University literary magazine, in which he regularly did sophisticated music reviews, in November, 1938, published an article of his undertaking to show that in listening to music the object of specifically intellectual aesthetic contemplation was the movement in one’s own senses, which he likened to discourse.4

Now Muller-Thym (born 1909 and so very close in age to McLuhan and Ong) was the best man at McLuhan’s wedding in 1939 and would be the Godfather to his first child in 1942.5 Ong was taking graduate philosophy courses from Muller-Thym at the same time as he was taking English courses with McLuhan. And Ong’s other 1958 Ramus book, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, was dedicated “For Bernhard (sic?)6 and Mary Muller-Thym”.

What can be seen in this mesh of biographical and intellectual relations around 1940 between Muller-Thym, McLuhan and Ong is a common concern with the possibility of articulating the Catholic tradition in terms of a realist account of perception and experience. This was an account which would look inward to the artistic deployment of the senses and of the common sense in perception, on the one hand, and, on the other, outward to art works in language and other media as exemplifications of that inward process. It would do so on the basis of assured communication with reality in perception and language.

The great question for such “immediate contact with the real” was, of course, how it was possible to be mistaken about something or to differ with others about it or to ‘change one’s mind’ in regard to it. “Immediate contact with the real” would seem to complicate, at the every least, such everyday occurrences. This was a question that had been debated at least since Plato’s Theaetetus and would now, through McLuhan and Ong (and Innis and Havelock) take on a new formulation. Namely, how can “im-mediate contact with the real” be compatible with internal and external exposure to transformative multiple media?

It remained to probe whether “understanding media” could somehow resolve this world-historical riddle.

  1. In this 1954 lecture McLuhan quotes Cesare Zavattini at length from ‘Some Ideas on the Cinema’, Sight and Sound, 23:2, Oct-Dec 1953, pp 64-69 — an interview translated from the Italian, originally in La Revista del Cinema Italiano, December 1952.
  2. Imitation and the Object of Art’, The Modern Schoolman, xvii:4, May 1940, 66-69, citing Thomas Gilby, Poetic Experience: an introduction to Thomist aesthetic, 1934.
  3.  Ramus and Talon Inventory: A Short-Title Inventory of the Published Works of Peter Ramus (1515–1572) and Omer Talon (1510–1562), 1958.
  4.  Review of McLuhan’s The Interior Landscape in Criticism: A Quarterly for Literature and the Arts, v12 , Summer 1970, 244-251; reprinted in An Ong Reader, 69-77.
  5. When McLuhan’s next children were born as twin girls in 1944, Muller-Thym became the Godfather of one of them, Mary, as well.
  6. ‘Bernhard’ here instead of ‘Bernard’ could certainly be a typo. Ong elsewhere always uses the latter designation. But ‘Bernhard’ was never changed in the multiple reissues of the book. It therefore could be a further sign (with the dedication itself) of a special friendship within which Ong knew of a genealogical or other connection between the two spellings. It could even be a joke of some sort. Mary Muller-Thym was Bernie Muller-Thym’s wife and a good friend of the McLuhans, especially Corinne. See McLuhan’s letter to the Muller-Thyms from June 11, 1974 (Letters 498).

Havelock and the question of ‘water’

And the dry stone no sound of water.1

When Eric Havelock moved from the University of Toronto to Harvard in 1947, he went through a difficult period.  He was leaving behind many intimate friends, longtime colleagues and a country where he had been intensely engaged, culturally and politically, for decades. He had even had run for parliament only a few years before.  At the same time, in common with thinking people everywhere, he was in shock from the revelations of German concentration camps during WW2 and the American use of atomic bombs in 1945.

His dark mood was reflected in his writing at the time. Here is he is from the abstract for his 1949 lecture, ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land

the poetic equation [of the Aeneid] is (…) complicated. (a) The smooth and dignified surface of the theme is continually violated by the upthrust of something emotionally uncontrolled and violent, an internal disturbance of the poetic consciousness which almost cancels the poem’s basic faith in heaven, history, and man. (b) The narrative epic of action is in part an illusion, devised to put on parade a series of states of the inner consciousness. The poem is to some degree a dream, or more correctly a nightmare.

And here are two passages from the beginning of his 19502 monograph, The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man (Chapter 1: ‘The Bitter Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge’):

We tap and scratch the surface of the rock on which we stand and find that it is indeed the rock of ages, printed with the map of a violent and illimitable history. Surveying it, our imagination abdicates and our comprehension of time breaks down. In place of the generations and centuries which mark our own frontiers, we substitute the trackless waste of geological aeons, and so drift back to the formless lava of a primeval furnace. In that day our human race was not, and was not thought of. In those temperatures it had no conceivable place. Such is the conclusion we draw, mechanically and meaninglessly. The reality is kept from us by our self-consciousness. Perhaps if we could put God there, he could make of geological time a furnished room for us once more, for us to inhabit, even though the only voice we heard was the voice of consuming fire.

Who dare say that justice is any more eternal in the heavens? It is a name, a sound of approval, voiced by an ephemeral species to indicate some crawling pattern of preference, on a speck of dust, in the vast halls of space and time. Who dare say that man any more keeps company with angels, in those trackless wastes beyond the sun and moon? Who dare say his intelligence, so long mastered by illusion, so long convinced that it stood at the point of judgment in a measurable and estimable environment, a cosmos organized by a permanent and stable providence — who dare say that intelligence has any health in it, any metaphysic, any revelation above the energy of the blind groping of a worm?

The trope of The Waste Land or “trackless waste” appears throughout. As does the note of “an internal disturbance (…) which almost cancels (…) basic faith in heaven, history, and man”. Almost?

By 1950 such “basic faith” seemed to be threatened by more than a “disturbance”: “If we could put God there”…”intelligence, so long mastered by [the] illusion [of] a permanent and stable providence”… “who dare say that intelligence has any health in it, (…) any revelation above the energy of the blind groping of a worm?” This from a man who had been an active Christian socialist and a firm believer in cosmic and earthly justice during all his years in Canada!

Only a few years before these 1949-1950 texts, in ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’ (1946-1947), Havelock had concluded with these lyrical lines:

And so, as primitive geography merged into the likeness of primaeval cosmology, there began to be heard from far the distant roar of Virgil’s rivers of the world, rising in their subterranean caverns, ranging over the earth from equatorial mountains to the ice-fields of the north. The navigators long ago had sighted landfall and found mighty rivers and explored cataracts at peril of their life. (…) And the geometer and the scientist had listened and told them where they had been. (…) And the philosophers had meditated and learnedly said of water that it surely is a powerful thing and permeates all and controls all and moves beneath us. Surely the earth itself must lie on water. And the poet listened to them all, and his enchanted ear caught the rumble of subterranean seas beneath his feet. Before his mind’s eye magic fountains issued from the depths and sprang into the air. Torrents cascaded between cliffs that had stood since the world began. He felt the icy breath of northern ranges, and was borne as in a dream on the bosom of irresistible currents. The road to Xanadu was open. (3: 18)

The difference in tone between the Xanadu essay and the slightly later passages is remarkable. What had been a delightful dream of “subterranean seas” and “magic fountains” that were “borne (…) on the bosom of irresistible currents” was now — a “nightmare”. Moreover, Havelock was hardly alone in this turn.  With different timing and with different degrees of insight and intensity, the whole world made it. Indeed, Nietzsche had seen it coming 60 and more years before:

Die Wüste wächst: weh dem, der Wüsten birgt!3

The wasteland waxes: vex [comes] to those begetting wastelands!4

Eliot, too, had sensed it 30 or 40 years before (with many others, like Ezra Pound) — leading to The Waste Land in 1922.

The great need was to understand what had happened here and especially to learn if it were definitive or in some way reversible. Or, at least, if not exactly reversible, at least subject to amelioration in some way.

Harold Innis understood the turn as a catastrophic collapse of the time sector in the spectrum of space-time possibilities. This had been caused, remarkably enough, by the hypertrophy of time — too much time had led to the foreshortening of time and even to the loss of time altogether:

The general argument [of my book] has been powerfully developed (…) by E. A. Havelock in The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man (Boston, 1951). Intellectual man of the nineteenth century was the first to estimate absolute nullity in time.  (Harold Innis, The Strategy of Culture, ‘Preface’, 1952)

Havelock had said as much himself. In the face of “the trackless waste of geological aeons”, he observed (as cited above), “our comprehension of time breaks down”.

Innis’ general theory was that cultures are “bound” by some space-time correlation from a spectrum of possibilities ranging from the purely “time-bound” at one end of the range to the purely “space-bound” at the other.  In the middle of the spectrum the two exist in relative balance and it was here alone that social stability was to be found: “a stable society is dependent on an appreciation of a proper balance between the concepts of space and time” (‘A Plea for Time’, 1947).

Associated with time-boundedness for Innis were oral cultures (vs literate ones), the ear (vs the eye), relatively permanent and immobile media like stone (vs disposable and easily transportable media like paper).  Space-boundedness had the reverse associations.

McLuhan took over all these determinations5, especially the derivative one of “acoustic space” (vs “visual space”) and, apparently less noticeably (given the remarkable lack of research attention), arrested time (vs chronological time). But whereas Innis tended to look at the relative weights of the poles of the configurations comprising the spectrum of their possibilities, McLuhan also looked at the implicated spectrum of the relations between such poles (which was, of course, isomorphic with the range of the ratios or relative weights of the poles):

The low visual definition of the environment favored a high degree of tactile and acoustic stress. At this end of the sensory spectrum individuality is created by the interval of tactile involvement. At the other end of the sensory spectrum we encounter the familiar mode of individuality based on visual stress and fragmentary separateness. The visual sense  lends itself to fragmentation and separateness for reasons quite antithetic to the monolithic and integral quality created by the tactile interval. (Through the Vanishing Point, 222)

Corresponding to two sorts of “interval” or “gap”, McLuhan contrasts two sorts of relationship here, one of “involvement” and one of ” separateness”.  At the base of experience is a “sensory spectrum” consisting of a range of relationships between “acoustic stress” and “visual stress”. The meaning of any experience depends first of all on which of these has been activated:

The meaning of meaning is relationship. (Take Today, 3)

But what was it that enabled something like relationship in the first place?

Here again, an indication could be found in Havelock with water standing in for relation:

the philosophers had meditated and learnedly said of water that it surely is a powerful thing and permeates all and controls all and moves beneath us. Surely the earth itself must lie on water. And the poet [Virgil] listened to them all, and his enchanted ear caught the rumble of subterranean seas beneath his feet. Before his mind’s eye magic fountains issued from the depths and sprang into the air. Torrents cascaded between cliffs that had stood since the world began. He felt the icy breath of northern ranges, and was borne as in a dream on the bosom of irresistible currents. The road to Xanadu was open. (3: 18)

The road to Xanadu in Havelock’s understanding was an “irresistible current”, or relationship, between above and below, north and south, consciousness and the unconscious, surface and depth, old and new, etc, and it was exactly such relationship as water that he found articulated in the concluding section of Virgil’s Georgics:

These [tales in the poem’s last section] are focused, if that is the best word, in certain master images, of fountains and rivers, of gorges and caverns, and of rivers in caverns. The first [musical] movement [the tale of Aristaeus] introduces the boy “weeping at the sacred river’s source”. The mother who responds is “in her chamber beneath the river’s depth”; her mermaids reside “in their glass-green abodes”. The boy descends “to the pools set deep in caverns and plangent glades”. This key-note once struck is sustained [in the second movement] in the resonant sea-cave of Proteus, [in the third in] the river bank on which Eurydice dies, [and then in further movements in] the solitary shore (…) on which Orpheus laments, the vasty halls of death through which glides the “awful stream”, the icy caverns of the north, and the gorge where Orpheus’ last cry still echoes down the tide. These [master] images [of water] are the real stuff of the poetry. They interpenetrate the panels of the composition and dissolve their [independent] integrity. (1: 5-6)

Havelock also cited further ancients making a similar depiction, like Plato:

For everywhere over the earth’s surface you have many hollow places, very various in shape and size, to which the water and mist and vapour drain (…) These places all have connections with each other underground, some narrower, some broader, with passages and openings. In this way much water flows from one to the other as though decanted from bowl to bowl. (…) One of the earth-chasms, besides being the largest, is pierced right through the whole earth (…) Into it flow all the rivers in confluence, and out of it they issue again, each afterwards taking on the individual character of the territories through which they happen to flow. The reason for the inflow and outflow of the streams is that the liquid, having no bottom or fundament, hangs suspended in space and moves in tidal waves up and down, and the air and wind about it does the same thing. (3:17, translating Plato, Phaedo 111e-112d)

And like the pre-Socratics generally and the Roman, Seneca, more than half a millennium after them:

Finally, lurking behind the roar of these romantic waters was that ancient pre-Socratic cosmology of the “waters under the earth”, the “vast sea…in the depths of the earth” (the phrases are Seneca’s). This subterranean sea was the source at once of all the world’s great rivers, and also of the circumambient Ocean, to which [source] they all return. (2: 6)

Havelock understood even the form of Plato’s work in this same light:

The dialogue format in which Plato cast his reflections indirectly allowed him to memorialise his master and friend [Socrates]. But there were other reasons for such a literary choice, which lay rooted in the character of his philosophy. Imaginary conversations, with their mimicry of the spoken as against the written word, could alone supply that fluid medium in which the sense of overlapping concepts and interpenetration of ideas might be continuously suggested.6

In sum, water supplies the, or at least a, “master image” of what “interpenetrates” and is therefore what first enables something like language (the interpenetration of sound with sound, sound with meaning, and speaker with auditor), society (the interpenetration of people with one another), history (the interpenetration of times), truth (the interpenetration of mind with reality), and religion (the interpenetration of humans with the divine).

McLuhan’s take on the turn reflected in Havelock’s 1950 Crucifixion book was recorded in a lecture he gave in 1954 before the Catholic Renascence Society:

Today many thoughtful people are torn between the claims of time and space, and speak even of The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man as he is mentally torn in these opposite directions.

This analysis went back to Innis and to Innis’ view of the fundamentality of the variable ratio between space and time. It agreed with Innis that social and intellectual instability results from a lack of balance between the two. What happens in such an unbalanced or “torn” situation is that the fundamental relation or interpenetration of space and time becomes attenuated and even lost altogether. But in the ancient view as presented by Havelock, this was to lose an appreciation for water. Hence McLuhan’s attempt to point out for us fish the water which (known or unknown) binds together and underlies our existing environment — without which we could not communicate or, indeed, be at all:

We don’t know who discovered water but we are pretty sure it wasn’t a fish! We are all in this position, being surrounded by some environment or element that blinds us totally; the message of the fish theme is a very important one, and just how to get through to people that way is quite a problem. (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 1966)

  1. Eliot, The Waste Land, I. The Burial of the Dead.
  2. Havelock’s Crucifixion of Intellectual Man was released in the UK in 1950, in the US in 1951.
  3.  Nietzsche wrote the Dionysos-Dithyramben in 1888, but had long sensed the coming of nihilism and the devastation it would bring.
  4. My translation: Nietzsche’s singular here (dem, der … birgt) has been rendered in the plural (those).  A different translation, and of all the Dionysos-Dithyramben, is available at the Nietzsche channel.
  5. Cf, ‘James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial’, 1953: “The press exists primarily as a means of spatial communication and control. Its time-binding powers are quite puny.”
  6. Havelock, ‘Introduction’ to Socrates and the Soul of Man, a translation of the Phaedo by Desmond Stewart, 1951.

“The formula of Virgil’s poetic chemistry”

the operation of a sort of tidal wave which swings to and fro through the bowels of the earth. (Virgil’s Road to Xanadu, 3: 17)1

Eric Havelock’s essay, ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’, was published in three parts in the first three issues of the new (in 1946) University of Toronto journal, Phoenix.2 He characterized his essay as a “search for the formula of Virgil’s poetic chemistry” ( 2: 7).3

The essay treats the last 251 lines of Virgil’s Georgics which weave together two mythological narratives: the tale of Aristaeus, god of agricultural cultivation — shepherding, cheesemaking, beekeeping — whose colony of bees dies off and who must find a way to engender it again; and the tragedy of Orpheus and Eurydice.

In Virgil’s telling, Aristaeus becomes desolate when his bees die and he appeals to his goddess mother, Cyrene, for help:

His mother was a princess who lived at the bottom of the sea with her mermaid attendants. She heard his cry, and at her command the waters parted asunder to allow her son to descend to the caverns where they dwelt. There he beheld the confluences whence issue with a mighty noise all the rivers of the world. (1: 4)

Parallels with Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom and with Plato’s Phaedo are evident. Like Poe’s mariner, Aristaeus must descend into the sea to obtain insight that is essential to him; and his finding there “the confluences whence issue with a mighty noise all the rivers of the world” matches Socrates’ description of the aquatic structure underlying the earth in Phaedo (112a):

all the rivers [meet] in confluence [there], and out of it they issue again, each afterwards taking on the individual character of the territories through which they happen to flow. (Cited by Havelock at 3: 17)

By way of anticipation (and as discussed further in Poe’s Maelstrom and Plato’s Phaedo), “all the rivers” with the “territories through which they happen to flow” may be taken to constitute the spectrum of the forms of experience — an elementary table of media.  A spectrum is, indeed, just what Poe’s mariner perceives at the bottom of the Maelstrom: “the rays of the moon seemed to search the very bottom of the profound gulf (…) over which there hung a magnificent rainbow”. A katabasis into this matrix of experience is necessarily chaotic and dangerous precisely because it exacts, willingly or unwillingly, the excision of all particular identity. Such a transformation is recorded by Poe in Descent into the Maelstrom:

Those who drew me on board were my old mates and dally companions — but they knew me no more than they would have known a traveller from the spirit-land. My hair, which had been raven-black the day before, was as white as you see it now. They say too that the whole expression of my countenance had changed.4

Poe terms such a katabasis a journey into “the spirit-land” or realm of the dead — as, indeed, both Plato and Virgil explicitly describe.5 For McLuhan it was to go “through the vanishing point”. 

From his matrix mother, Aristaeus learns that, like Homer’s Odysseus, he must wrestle with the shape-shifter, Proteus, to force him to divulge the knowledge he requires.  But Proteus, too, lives with his seals in a cavern beneath the sea. The journey to the bottom of the sea is in this way explicitly identified with the need to wrestle with multiple forms of being and experience and with the question of how to select the appropriate singular one out of this plural many. This question becomes overwhelmingly intensified once it is realized that it must be answered before the plurality is encountered — if that plurality itself is to be encountered appropriately. But how to select the proper form out of a spectrum of forms before that spectrum is encountered? And further, since identity results from this peculiar sort of ‘selection’, it is eminently questionable just who is to achieve this improbable action.6

It is exactly this sort of unsolvable riddle, akin to that posed to an infant learning to speak, that, McLuhan maintained, can be answered only by “magic“.  And it is just such “magic”, he then added, that is implicated in all human perception and in the birth of all the arts and sciences.

Aristaeus finds Proteus, successfully wrestles with his shapes and finally learns from him, as Havelock describes, that he, Aristaeus, with the loss of his bees and his grief over them,

pays the penalty for Orpheus’ grief. For Orpheus had loved Eurydice, but once upon a time the shepherd god [Aristaeus] had given chase to her upon the river bank, and in her fright she had run upon a snake which had killed her beside the stream. All the hills and valleys wept for her, and Orpheus made of his uncontrollable grief a song, and played it on his harp. Nay, he even went down after her into the vasty halls of the dead, playing all the time, so that he cast a spell over Tartarus, and the spirits were enchanted, and their grim guardians struck dumb. So he was able to draw her back after him towards the daylight of life once more. But at the last moment he looked back, and lo, the spell was broken, and with an anguished cry she vanished once more into the shadows, and all he could do was clutch at the darkness where now nothing was.
His grief and remorse were now beyond remedy. He made of them a song again, and in a cavern of the northern hills he played it continually, casting upon animals and trees the spell of his music. Thence he roamed over the ice-fields, wrapt in his music and his grief, indifferent to all womankind, till the Bacchant celebrants of the orgies of Dionysus turned upon him and tore him to pieces, and cast his limbs in the river. Even then the severed head continued to mourn with its last breath, and the river-bank caught the echo “Eurydice, Eurydice” as it floated down the tide. (1: 4)

Like the mariner in the Maelstrom, Orpheus learns that there is a primordial harmony — in this case, a melody — that encompasses even death.7 If he entrusts himself to this harmony he can penetrate even Hades and retrieve Eurydice. But what he cannot do in the realm of multiple forms is look back (cf, McLuhan’s rear-view-mirror), for this betrays a particularity that is too “desirous of the body” (as Socrates has it in the Phaedo).  It is just such a rear-view assessment that causes the mariner’s brother in Poe’s tale to cling to his familiar ship — the ship that takes him to his doom.

The required excision of particular identity and experience in the matrix of all media can hardly be more forcefully expressed than through the image of Orpheus’ severed head, still looking back for Eurydice and crying out for her, being carried away by the tide. As Plato comments: “the soul that is desirous of the body (…) after much resistance and many sufferings is led away with violence” (Phaedo 108b).

In the realm of multiple forms, humans can and must entrust themselves to the in-between as Poe’s mariner does.  McLuhan: “Managing The Ascent from the Maelstrom [an ano-kato play on Poe’s The Descent into the Maelstrom] today demands awareness that can be achieved only by going Through the Vanishing Point” (Take Today, 13). But as soon as particularity is invoked the in-between is lost. Havelock translates Virgil on Orpheus’ terrible moment of forgetfulness as follows:

Alas, he forgot; his heart’s longing overcame him and he looked round and at once
All his labour was thrown away and the bond granted by the pitiless monarch [Tartarus]
Was abrogated
. (1: 7)

In this terrible moment, the awful might of the in-between shows itself. It appears to be nothing, since it is outside8 all particular being and experience: “she vanished once more into the shadows, and all he could do was clutch at the darkness where now nothing was”. But it is actually the power of “the bond”: the power that separates and differentiates the particular forms of being and experience in their spectrum while yet uniting them in it. And that therefore gives access to that spectrum from any particular form of it. (Poe’s mariner takes this way between vehicles to save himself in the Maelstrom.)

On the mythological level, all that remains is for Aristaeus to atone for his sin of initiating the destruction of Eurydice and Orpheus and to recover his bees in the process of the required expiatory sacrifices. But for Havelock great questions had still to be considered. Especially, what is the relationship between these tales and Virgil’s poetry? Or even, between these tales and poetics in general? Or, as both these questions together may be put, since a science must consider the particular as expressing general law, what is “the formula of Virgil’s poetic chemistry”?

Addressing himself to the magic worked by Virgil in his poetry. Havelock asks:

What is the mechanism of this spell? The answer apparently lies in that level of the mind below the surface of conscious attention to fact, to situation, or to idea. The consciousness moves through a series of image-situations… (1: 5)

These “surface (…) image-situations” in which consciousness moves are sometimes called “panels” by Havelock:

These ingenuities of arrangement lie on the surface, and are the stock-in-trade of the Alexandrians. They exploit the device of juxtaposing items, which are functionally distinct, to form a symmetrical series of panels. Aesthetic pleasure derives from the antithesis between them, an antithesis cancelled by the [the Alexandrians through] purely formal connection. Such is the geometric genius of the Hellenistic epyllion. [But] to stop there is to miss the significant quality [and quality of significance] of Virgil’s specimen. It uses this kind of geometry and yet utterly transcends it (…) The poetry of the whole symphony develops a sustained power of quite another order. (1: 5)

The great question, then, concerns this “other order” lying “below the surface of conscious attention” to “panels” and (musical) “movements”:

These [“panels” and “movements”] are focused, if that is the best word, in certain master images, of fountains and rivers, of gorges and caverns, and of rivers in caverns. The first movement [the tale of Aristaeus] introduces the boy “weeping at the sacred river’s source”. The mother who responds is “in her chamber beneath the river’s depth”; her mermaids reside “in their glass-green abodes”. The boy descends “to the pools set deep in caverns and plangent glades”. This key-note once struck is sustained [in the second movement] in the resonant sea-cave of Proteus, [in the third in] the river bank on which Eurydice dies, [and then in further movements in] the solitary shore (…) on which Orpheus laments, the vasty halls of death through which glides the “awful stream”, the icy caverns of the north, and the gorge where Orpheus’ last cry still echoes down the tide. These [master] images are the real stuff of the poetry. They interpenetrate the panels of the composition and dissolve their [independent] integrity. (1: 5-6)

This dissolution of independent “integrity” through “master images” does not, however, cancel difference:

This kind of poetic composition is not dismayed by the incongruous. Rather, it exalts incongruity into a principle. (2: 4)

What is at stake, then, is a source that does not lose itself in the generation and maintenance of difference, but neither does it cancel difference in maintaining itself in its original-originating primacy. For the Greeks and Romans, this source was often conceived as ‘water’:

Finally, lurking behind the roar of these romantic waters [comprising the series of “master images”] was that ancient pre-Socratic cosmology of the “waters under the earth”, the “vast sea…in the depths of the earth” (the phrases are Seneca’s). This subterranean sea was the source at once of all the world’s great rivers (…) to which [source] they all return. (2: 6)

As Socrates explains in the Phaedo, water outflowing from the source takes on “the individual character of the territories through which they happen to flow”. However, since it is equally the power of their inflowing, it remains their “confluence”. Virgil’s poetry is seen by Havelock as operating through this power:

And so, as primitive geography merged into the likeness of primaeval cosmology, there began to be heard from far the distant roar of Virgil’s rivers of the world, rising in their subterranean caverns, ranging over the earth from equatorial mountains to the ice-fields of the north. The navigators long ago had sighted landfall and found mighty rivers and explored cataracts at peril of their life. (…) And the geometer and the scientist had listened and told them where they had been (…) And the philosophers had meditated and learnedly said of water that it surely is a powerful thing and permeates all and controls all and moves beneath us. Surely the earth itself must lie on water. And the poet listened to them all, and his enchanted ear caught the rumble of subterranean seas beneath his feet. Before his mind’s eye magic fountains issued from the depths and sprang into the air. Torrents cascaded between cliffs that had stood since the world began. He felt the icy breath of northern ranges, and was borne as in a dream on the bosom of irresistible currents. The road to Xanadu was open. (3: 18)

Havelock’s take on the road to Xanadu is that it is a foundational ano-kato dynamic or pathway which Virgil was able to express in, and through, his poetry. The idea may be imagined as a series of panels arranged, however, not horizontally in the Alexandrian manner, but vertically.

The top panel presents tales like those of Aristaeus and Orpheus, both of which involve a katabasis into the sea or into the underworld and a subsequent anabasis from them.

The next panel below consists of what Havelock called Virgil’s “master images” of descending waterfalls and ascending fountains with their own katabasis-anabasis movement that both illustrates and underlies the tales in the top panel.

The third panel shows what Havelock called “a change in levels of poetic description”. Here Virgil’s poetry is seen as itself taking on the synchronic ano-kato movement depicted in the scenes in the panels above it:

The smooth and dignified surface of the theme is continually violated by the upthrust of something emotionally uncontrolled and violent, an internal disturbance (…) which almost cancels the poem’s basic faith in heaven, history, and man.9

A calm surface previously prepared is suddenly and deliberately disrupted (…). The shift, that is to say, from bright light to the colors of gloom, is also a shift from the description of events occurring in the external world, the world of action (…). A change in levels of poetic description has occurred. The poet’s verse has taken a plunge downward below the surface…10

In this third panel, the focus is not on individual images, scenes or tales. Instead, its subject is Virgil’s artistry in juxtaposing different images or scenes belonging at once to “a calm surface” and to a “nightmare” below. Here plural scenes are at stake in simultaneous or synchronic ano-kato relation.  And this sort of incongruous juxtaposition is said to be what constitutes and reveals Virgil’s poetics: “The Aeneid is a work of divided genius”; “Not action, but reflection, and not sinuous sweep, but interruption and arrest, constitute the genius of the lines”.

In the fourth and final panel, Virgil’s artistry as portrayed in the third panel may itself be seen as a product of his own “plunge downward below the surface of the conscious life” where it has been energized and complicated in the “internal world”. Havelock calls this “the psychological dimension”: “the upthrust of something emotionally uncontrolled and violent” producing or reflecting “an internal disturbance”.

The narrative epic of action is (…) devised to put on parade a series of states of the inner consciousness. The poem is to some degree a dream, or more correctly a nightmare.[1.1949 abstract.]

Virgil, according to Havelock, was able to take the energy and complication available to him through this katabasisanabasis dynamic of the fourth panel to craft the poetry displayed in the panels above it.

his enchanted ear caught the rumble of subterranean seas beneath his feet. Before his mind’s eye magic fountains issued from the depths and sprang into the air. (…) He (…) was borne as in a dream on the bosom of irresistible currents. The road to Xanadu was open.11

  1. References to ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’ are given to the three sections in which it was published in Phoenix in 1946-1947 — issues 1:1, 1:2 and 1:supplement — followed by the page number in the corresponding issue. Some background to the essay is given in The Road to Xanadu and in The Maelstrom, Xanadu and Plato.
  2. Havelock was the founding president of the Ontario (later: Canadian) Classical Association and a co-founder of Phoenix, the association’s journal.
  3. Compare Havelock on Plato in his 1951 ‘Introduction’ to Socrates and the Soul of Man, a translation of the Phaedo by Desmond Stewart: “Platonism would seem to be not so much a system — for its quality still eludes the textbook writers — as a chemical solution which impregnates the syntax of the sentences and paragraphs in which thought is deployed.”
  4. Plato describes this moment of transformation of the soul with some frequency: “And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only (…) to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity” (Republic 618); “this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul” (Phaedrus 648a).
  5. For Plato, see McLuhan and Plato 1 – Phaedrus and Er and McLuhan and Plato 9 – on the plain of oblivion ; for Virgil, see The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land.
  6. See note 7 here.
  7. Further discussion in “Great change” in Descent into the Maelstrom.
  8. Not to say that it is not also inside!
  9. 1949 abstract for Havelock’s lecture, ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land’.
  10. The Aeneid and Its Translators‘, The Hudson Review, 27:3 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 338-370; as discussed in The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land, this 1974 essay was developed out of Havelock’s 1949 lecture.
  11. What Havelock here describes lyrically as Virgil’s “enchanted ear” and “eye magic” being “borne as in a dream on the bosom of irresistible currents”, he styled a couple years later as “more correctly a nightmare”. The great question is how this remarkable change in tone, which was by no means restricted to Havelock, took place.  For discussion see the forthcoming post on Havelock and the question of ‘water’.

McLuhan and Plato 15: Poe’s Maelstrom and the Phaedo

Finally, lurking behind the roar of these romantic waters was that ancient pre-Socratic cosmology of the “waters under the earth”, the “vast sea…in the depths of the earth” (the phrases are Seneca’s). This subterranean sea was the source at once of all the world’s great rivers, and also of the circumambient Ocean, to which [source] they all return. (Eric Havelock, ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’, 2: 6)1

In his 1946 essay ‘Footsteps in the Sands of Crime’, McLuhan began to use Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom as a master image2 for the process of the genesis of human experience throughout its register from sense perception to high theory. It was also the year that Eric Havelock began to publish his three-part essay on ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’ in the then new UT classics journal, Phoenix.3

Havelock’s essay concludes with a consideration of Plato’s description of the waters of the earth from Phaedo 111c-112e. This section of the Phaedo and Poe’s Maelstrom are mutually illuminating and together they supply an outline of what was even then beginning to unfold as McLuhan’s lifetime topic: the soul’s moment to moment katabasis into the fund of “human potentialities” (MB 3) and “potencies” (Innis letter).4  The fund-amental idea is that human beings are at every moment essentially exposed to different media, different basic forms of experience, and that this navigation among media in their plurality (the “worldpool”) is what constitutes the significance, or message, of humans as humans — the enactment of language (dual genitive). The medium is the massage is the message.

In Poe’s story, some authorities are said to hold that the Maelstrom is a kind of axis mundi about which all else turns:

Kircher and others imagine that in the centre of the channel of the Maelstrom is an abyss penetrating the globe

Something very similar from Plato (Phaedo 111e-112d) is cited in Havelock’s essay:

One of the earth-chasms, besides being the largest, is pierced right through the whole earth (…) Into it flow all the rivers in confluence, and out of it they issue again, each afterwards taking on the individual character of the territories through which they happen to flow. The reason for the inflow and outflow of the streams is that the liquid, having no bottom or fundament, hangs suspended in space and moves in tidal waves up and down, and the air and wind about it does the same thing (…) Some waters go right round the earth, coiling once or several times like serpents (…) and sink down as far as they can and come up again. (3:17)

The waters of the Maelstrom are, of course, also “coiling (…) like serpents” and it likewise “moves in tidal waves up and down” so that its “waters (…)  sink down as far as they can and [then] come up again“. Indeed, it is precisely this perpetual change in the horizontal and vertical motions of the Maelstrom (caused by the alteration of the ebb and flood tides driving it) that saves Poe’s mariner.5

At the extremes of the two tides, the Maelstrom is propelled violently into a circular motion (one direction with one of the tides, then its reverse with the other6), and it is this vorticular motion that drives the Maelstrom downward into the abyss like a screw:

As the old man spoke, I became aware of a loud and gradually increasing sound, like the moaning of a vast herd of buffaloes upon an American prairie; and at the same moment I perceived (…) the chopping character of the ocean beneath us, was rapidly changing into a current which set to the eastward. Even while I gazed, this current acquired a monstrous velocity. Each moment added to its speed — to its headlong impetuosity. In five minutes the whole sea (…) was lashed into ungovernable fury; (…) the vast bed of the waters, seamed and scarred into a thousand conflicting channels, burst suddenly into phrensied convulsion — heaving, boiling, hissing — gyrating in gigantic and innumerable vortices, and all whirling and plunging on to the eastward with a rapidity which water never elsewhere assumes except in precipitous descents.
In a few minutes more, there came over the scene another radical alteration. The general surface grew somewhat more smooth, and the whirlpools, one by one, disappeared, while prodigious streaks of foam became apparent where none had been seen before. These streaks, at length, spreading out to a great distance, and entering into combination, took unto themselves the gyratory motion of the subsided vortices, and seemed to form the germ of another more vast. Suddenly — very suddenly — this assumed a distinct and definite existence, in a circle of more than half a mile in diameter. The edge of the whirl was (…) the mouth of the terrific funnel, whose interior, as far as the eye could fathom it, was a smooth, shining, and jet-black wall of water, inclined to the horizon at an angle of some forty-five degrees, speeding dizzily round and round with a swaying and sweltering motion, and sending forth to the winds an appalling voice, half shriek, half roar, such as not even the mighty cataract of Niagara ever lifts up in its agony to Heaven.

When Poe ends his paragraphs here with “precipitous descents” and “the mighty cataract of Niagara”, his trope is directed to the kata-basis or going-down of the Maelstrom.

But after that tide (either ebb or flood, as the case may be) reaches its extreme and begins to subside — begins, that is, to reverse into the opposite tide — so does the violence of the Maelstrom subside with it. And the effect is to unscrew it out of the abyss and to initiate its ana-basis or going-up:

a great change took place in the character of the whirlpool. The slope of the sides of the vast funnel became momently less and less steep. The gyrations of the whirl grew gradually less and less violent. By degrees (…) the bottom of the gulf seemed slowly to uprise.

The general atmosphere is ameliorated as well:

The sky was clear, the winds had gone down…

Plato notes the same phenomenon:

the liquid (…) moves in tidal waves up and down, and the air and wind about it does the same thing…

Plato’s description of the physical state of the world in this section of the Phaedo is pointedly accompanied by a matching description of the state of the soul. And both immediately precede Socrates’ execution.  They constitute his final testament.  Regarding the soul Plato says:

if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger [we are in] now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise [in this life] as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its ability to learn and to change [ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς], and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius7 of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; (…) And the journey is not (…) a simple path [that] leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from [all] the [different] rites and ceremonies practiced here on earth. Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body (…) after much resistance and many sufferings is led away with violence. (Phaedo 107c-108b)

By bringing the state of the soul together with the state of the world and its waters, Plato is indicating that the demand made on the soul is to follow the tropical ano-kato movement of the cosmos.

Poe’s sailor in “The Maelstrom” saved himself by cooperating with the action of the “strom” itself. (Mechanical Bride, 75)

It is the primitive fact and everything depends on whether this is recognized or not. 

Here again the parallel with Poe’s story is striking.  When the mariner and his brother are carried on their ship into the Maelstrom, the mariner gradually “understands its circumstances”, like Plato’s “wise soul” in its sojourn in the land of the dead, and is able to use this understanding to save himself. But his brother remains overcome with fear (too “desirous of the body”) and therefore, as Socrates recounts about the soul that is not wise, “after much resistance and many sufferings, is led away with violence” into the abyss.

Thus it is that the key to salvation in both accounts is what Plato calls παιδεία τε καὶ τροφή: the ability to learn and to change. For “the soul (…) cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming [in its mortal life] as good and wise as possible”. Now becoming implicates change and the most important change required of the soul in this life, as Socrates shows in the tranquil manner of his death, is to value its immortal life more than its mortal one. And for this, as Poe’s mariner concretely demonstrates by daring to abandon ship in the midst of the Maelstrom, the necessity is to be able to learn and to change — radically.

In the utterly different circumstances of the other world, nothing from this life can aid the soul except such an ability to learn and to change because, as Socrates says, it must navigate a road there that has “many forks (…) and many windings” such that “one could miss the way” all too easily. This road “leads to the lower world” — from which ascension may be made to a place where the soul “finds gods for companions” (108c).  Missing the right way, however, leads the soul, like the mariner’s brother, only down — missing, that is, the naturally correlated up.

Implicated in the requisite radical change is a complicated notion of time. Plato puts it in the following way: “if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time (τοῦ χρόνου), which we call life, but in respect to all time (τοῦ [χρόνου] παντός)”. There is the time of this mortal life and the time of immortality, both of which, despite their fundamental difference, may be termed a sort of χρόνου; and ‘at the same time’ there is also a third time of critical decision (κρίση) between these, which the Greeks termed καιρός — the decisive moment for learning and for radical change (παιδεία τε καὶ τροφή) which is always at hand.

Poe presents these three times in serial or chronological fashion in terms of the tides. (The etymology of ‘tide’ is ‘tid‘ = ‘time’.)8 There is the flood tide and the ebb tide and the “slack” between them when, so to say, time (tid) stands still. Everything depends on the relation of the soul to the in-between time of “the hour of the slack”.

For McLuhan, the Descent into the Maelstrom is the story of what never ceases to take place, recognized or unrecognized, in every moment of every human life:

Every human being is incessantly engaged in creating an image of identity for himself (McLuhan to R.J. Leuver, July 30, 1969, Letters 386)

This is the moment of καιρός as a katabasis into the chaos of the multiple forms of potential experience — out of which in an anabasis we emerge with whatever form of experience we are ‘putting on’, that is, with whatever form of experience has first been ‘chosen’ there. Our experience is always a product or effect and McLuhan’s whole bent is to inquire backwards after what light it reflects of its prior formal cause.9

For McLuhan, then, what Plato describes as facing the soul between lives is always occurring between moments of experience:

And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only (…) to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. (Republic 618)

this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul (Phaedrus 648a)

It is because all human perception and experience is generated through such katabasis-anabasis navigation of a labyrinthine vortex, McLuhan can claim: 

One major discovery of the symbolists (…) was their notion of the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties… (Letter to Innis, 1951)

Just as the mariner and his brother go down into the labyrinth of the Maelstrom, and learn there, or fail to learn there, what decides life or death, so every human soul is momentarily exposed to all the forms of potential experience, to all the possible formations “of the senses and faculties”. This represents the soul’s opportunity to learn and to change and is exactly what is exercised when the arts are practiced and when the various sciences are born. Hence McLuhan’s continuation of his sentence in the Innis letter:

One major discovery of the symbolists which had the greatest importance for subsequent investigation was their notion of the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties whose retracing provided the key to all arts and sciences.

Arts and sciences are born, this is to say, when the same sort of double-clutch or Gestalt-switch demonstrated by Poe’s mariner in the Maelstrom is exercised in regard to some new domain of nature or society (a domain that is suddenly illuminated only with the Gestalt-switch). A different vehicle or medium of experience (like the mariner’s cask) is adopted through which a new sort of investigation becomes possible. What remained, McLuhan perceived, was to exercise such a Gestalt-switch in regard to this Gestalt-switch process itself. The medium is the message — and is therefore what must at last become the message of new sciences of inquiry.

McLuhan would dedicate the remaining 35 years of his life, often in terrible health, to the attempt to dis-cover and to probe this possibility and great need.

 

 

  1. The bracketed observation re Seneca is original to Havelock. References to ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’ are given to the three sections in which it was published in the University of Toronto journal Phoenix in 1946-1947 (issues 1:1, 1:2 and 1:supplement), followed by the page number in the corresponding issue. 1946 was McLuhan’s first year at UT and Havelock’s last.
  2. See McLuhan on Poe’s Maelstrom.
  3. Havelock was the founding president of the Ontario (later: Canadian) Classical Association and a co-founder of Phoenix, the association’s journal.
  4. Both the publication of MB and the Innis letter date from early 1951. But nearly all of MB was written in the 1940s and the Innis letter, which was a ‘rewrite’, may have been written in 1950.
  5. See “Great change” in Descent into the Maelstrom.
  6. Phaedo 112e: “Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but (…) the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron…”
  7. Because the experiencing subject is the result of this process, it cannot construct or otherwise manage it itself. Hence the idea that every human being has a known or unknown “guide”, as Socrates says, a guardian angel, or birth day saint, who helps with the navigation of life — if it is acknowledged and attended.
  8. Poe nearly always broaches the “slack” at the turning of the tides in connection with time: “the fifteen minutes’ slack”, “time for slackwater”, “a minute or so behind or before the slack”, “slack water, which we knew would be at eight”, “the time of the slack”, “the hour of the slack”.
  9. “I am not a ‘culture critic’ because I am not in any way interested in classifying cultural forms. I am a metaphysician, interested in the life of the forms and their surprising modalities.” (McLuhan letter to Joe Keogh, July 6, 1970, Letters 413)

Lodge on ‘Science and Literature’

The following column appeared in the Manitoba Free Press, October 10, 1931,  p 11.  It appears to have caught the interested attention of  W.O. Mitchell1 and Marshall McLuhan2 who were then both underclassmen at the University of Manitoba.

Science and Literature
Prof. Rupert C Lodge 

Dept of Philosophy and Psychology
University of Manitoba

I notice that a most interesting controversy is being carried on in your columns and, like the Irishman who asked whether this was a private fight or whether he might join in,3 I wonder whether a student of philosophy might express his opinion. The fundamental point at issue appears to be whether science and literature are, or are not, essentially parallel functions of the human mind. Both parties of the controversy regard science as a body of ascertained truth, such that each new generation starting where the last generation left off makes impersonal additions to this body of “fact”. [Reader] TBR, who believes in the parallelism of literature and science, argues that each generation of writers should similarly start where the previous generation left off and should make creative additions to “literature” and should not waste time on such “literary curiosities” as Chaucer and Shakespeare, who are apparently studied at some length at the University of Manitoba. On the other it is claimed that “literature” is not a “body of fact” to which simple additions can be made but is a unique creation of the human spirit distinct from science and that Chaucer and Shakespeare, unlike an Aristotle or Newton, have an especial kind of significance which makes the study them permanently valuable.

To a student of philosophy, the premises apparently accepted by both parties to the controversy seem unreliable. Science is essentially inquiry and discovery, continued and refined by successive generations of scientists. The content of a scientific textbook does not consist of a body of “facts” or “ascertained truths”, but represents, rather, a cross-section through a particular stage of scientific inquiry, with a history reaching back into the past and an outlook directed toward the future, and entirely dependent upon the efforts of particular human personalities. Science thus represents an adventure of the spirit quite as much as poetry and has quite as much power to thrill the imagination and liberate the mind from instinctive and local prejudices. This has, indeed, always been one of the chief reasons for studying science and it is in this respect similar to literature in its influences. The history of science in many universities constitutes a definite part of the curriculum and it is felt that if the student is to be more than a technician, he will study the history of science in order to acquire background and culture.

Literature seems to occupy a parallel position. A particular epic or drama is not something altogether out of time, but it is the product of its age and can be understood only in its historical relations, and as a cross-section through a particular stage of literary technique. Here, too, it is possible, by narrow insistence on creative writing, to turn out students who are technicians. It is also possible, by a judicious use of the great literature of the past, to broaden and deepen a student’s powers so that, with the background and culture thus acquired, he may be given the chance to create, not merely technical writing, but “literature”. In some universities there is a distinct department of “rhetoric” or “journalism”, which aims at developing technicians and may be entirely separate from the department of “English”, which devotes itself to emphasizing the cultural influences of literature. In most universities, as in the University of Manitoba, a certain compromise is effected in both scientific and literary departments.

As to the actual controversy, TBR is surely right in supposing that science and literature are parallel, and in deducing the possibility of training in the technique of writing without much reference to the great writers of ages which past. But both in science and in literature the study of history is of cultural value, and it is hardly fair to criticize departments either of science or of literature for not turning out large numbers of technicians in their particular fields, unless that is the avowed aim of the departments In question. The primary function of our university departments is, surely, to enlighten and liberate the minds of our students so that, whatever their professions or interests in after-life, they may be able to bring an educated and cultured outlook to bear upon their problems. 

  1. See W.O. Mitchell on Rupert Lodge.
  2. See the following note.
  3. Lodge’s quip about “the Irishman who asked whether this was a private fight or whether he might join in” appears, 40 (!) years later, in Take Today (212):  ‘Is this a private fight, or may anyone join in? – An Irishman’ . McLuhan is known to have used the quip as well in lectures around the same time in the early 1970s. Since he recalled Lodge in his Speaking of Winnipeg interview in 1970, this may have brought Lodge’s quip back to mind.

Innis and “the conditions of freedom of thought”

Science, technology and the mechanisation of knowledge are in grave danger of destroying the conditions of freedom of thought, and, in destroying the conditions of freedom of thought, bringing about the collapse of what we like to think of as western civilisation. (‘A Critical Review’, The Bias  of Communication, 190)

In 1948 Harold Innis gave a presentation at a conference of commonwealth universities in Oxford.1 In it he averred:

My bias is with the oral tradition, particularly as it has been reflected in Greek civilisation, [and] with the necessity of recapturing something of its spirit. For that purpose we should try to understand something of the importance of [the] life or of the living tradition which is peculiar to the oral as against the mechanised tradition… (Ibid)

Fundamental questions were implicated: What exactly characterizes an “oral tradition” vs a “mechanised” one?  Could classical Greece, for example, be said to be “mechanised” once it was no longer only “oral”?  If not, where and how to draw the line between the two?2 And just what is the “spirit” or the “life” of a civilisation or a tradition — how is this knot of questions to be approached?

Innis gestured in the direction of questions like these when he spoke of the need “to make some critical survey” and to render “a critical review” (the name he gave to his remarks when they were printed). But for a “systematic overhauling” of this sort, it was necessary to establish “a common point of view”.  And to achieve “a common point of view” it was necessary to recognize its absence in a time of “the pervasive influence of discontinuity”:

Knowledge has been divided in the modern world to the extent that it is apparently hopeless to expect a common point of view. (…) Western civilisation has reached the point that a conference largely composed of University administrators [like this one] should unconsciously assume division in points of view in the field of learning and (…) should have been so far concerned with political representation as to forget the [cultural] problem of unity in Western civilisation; or, to put it in a general way, (…) all of us here together seem [ourselves] to be [just] what is wrong with Western civilisation. (Ibid)

How had this come about?

The impact of science on cultural development has been evident in its contribution to technological advance, notably in communication and in the dissemination of knowledge. In turn it has been evident in the types of knowledge disseminated, that is to say, science lives its own life not only in the mechanism which is provided to distribute knowledge but also in the sort of knowledge which will be distributed.3 (…) We are compelled to recognise the significance of mechanised knowledge as a source of power and [the associated] subjection [of education] to the demands of force through the instrument of the State. The Universities are in danger of becoming a branch of the military arm. The [critical] problem of Universities in the British Commonwealth is to appreciate [the] implications [of this fact] and to attack in a determined fashion the problems created by a neglect of the position of culture in Western civilisation. Centralisation in education in the interests of political organisation has disastrous implications. (Critical Review, 393)

Innis had a great deal of practical experience dealing with this situation in the concrete, sometimes criticizing government interference in university affairs, sometimes criticizing academics for their myopia and for their failure to address the deep cultural problems of “Western civilisation”. But he did not have a solution in theory to the problem of establishing “a common point of view”.4 It is just here where McLuhan’s contribution must be assessed.5

 

  1. Report of Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Universities of the Commonwealth, 1948; also: ‘Appendix’ to Minerva’s Owl (1948); also: Bias  of Communication, 1951, 190-195; also: ‘The Mechanization of Knowledge’, in Staples, Markets and Cultural Change, 1995, 350-355.
  2. The Gutenberg Galaxy may be read as addressing this question.
  3. “The mechanism (…) to distribute knowledge” shapes “the sort of knowledge which will be distributed”: the medium is the message.
  4. Innis could not see his way to “a common point of view” on account of his twin convictions that “it is impossible for (the economic historian) to avoid the bias of the period in which he writes” and that the current period is characterized by “fundamental solipsism”. For references and discussion of these points, see Innis, McLuhan and “the power of metamorphosis”.
  5. McLuhan noted to Gerald Stearn that “(Sigfried) Giedion influenced me profoundly — (reading) Space, Time and Architecture was one of the great events of my lifetime.”  Now in Space, Time and Architecture one of the central points that caught McLuhan’s attention was the following chain of thought: “Historians quite generally distrust absorption into contemporary ways of thinking and feeling as a menace to their scientific detachment, dignity, and breadth of outlook. But one can be thoroughly the creature of one’s own period, embued with its methods, without sacrificing these qualities (of scientific detachment, dignity, and breadth of outlook). Indeed, the historian in every field must be united with his own time by as widespread a system of roots as possible. The world of history, like the world of nature, explains itself only to those who ask the right questions, raise the right problems. The historian must be intimately a part of his own period to know what questions concerning the past are significant  to it.” (6) With Giedion, McLuhan would deny both of Innis’ convictions that there is no escape from one’s period and that the present period implicates a “fundamental solipsism”. For discussion, see Innis, McLuhan and “the “power of metamorphosis”.

“Great change” in Descent into the Maelstrom

Poe’s story reverts over and over again to “the power of metamorphosis”:

about three years past, there happened to me an event such as never happened before to mortal man — or at least such as no man ever survived to tell of — and the six hours of deadly terror which I then endured have broken me up body and soul. You suppose me a very old man — but I am not. It took less than a single day to change these hairs from a jetty black to white, to weaken my limbs, and to unstring my nerves

*

As the old man spoke, I became aware of a loud and gradually increasing sound, like the moaning of a vast herd of buffaloes upon an American prairie; and at the same moment I perceived that what seamen term the chopping character of the ocean beneath us, was rapidly changing into a current which set to the eastward. Even while I gazed, this current acquired a monstrous velocity. Each moment added to its speed — to its headlong impetuosity. In five minutes the whole sea, as far as Vurrgh, was lashed into ungovernable fury; but it was between Moskoe and the coast that the main uproar held its sway. Here the vast bed of the waters, seamed and scarred into a thousand conflicting channels, burst suddenly into phrensied convulsion — heaving, boiling, hissing — gyrating in gigantic and innumerable vortices, and all whirling and plunging on to the eastward with a rapidity which water never elsewhere assumes except in precipitous descents.

*

In a few minutes more, there came over the scene another radical alteration. The general surface grew somewhat more smooth, and the whirlpools, one by one, disappeared, while prodigious streaks of foam became apparent where none had been seen before. These streaks, at length, spreading out to a great distance, and entering into combination, took unto themselves the gyratory motion of the subsided vortices, and seemed to form the germ of another more vast. Suddenly — very suddenly — this assumed a distinct and definite existence, in a circle of more than half a mile in diameter. The edge of the whirl was represented by a broad belt of gleaming spray; but no particle of this slipped into the mouth of the terrific funnel, whose interior, as far as the eye could fathom it, was a smooth, shining, and jet-black wall of water, inclined to the horizon at an angle of some forty-five degrees, speeding dizzily round and round with a swaying and sweltering motion, and sending forth to the winds an appalling voice, half shriek, half roar, such as not even the mighty cataract of Niagara ever lifts up in its agony to Heaven.

*

It was on the tenth of July, 18—, a day which the people of this part of the world will never forget — for it was one in which blew the most terrible hurricane that ever came out of the heavens. And yet all the morning, and indeed until late in the afternoon, there was a gentle and steady breeze from the south-west, while the sun shone brightly, so that the oldest seaman among us could not have foreseen what was to follow. (…) In the meantime the breeze that had headed us off fell away, and we were dead becalmed, drifting about in every direction. This state of things, however, did not last long enough to give us time to think about it. In less than a minute the storm was upon us

*

the seas, which at first had been kept down by the wind, and lay flat and frothing, now got up into absolute mountains. A singular change, too, had come over the heavens.

*

a great change took place in the character of the whirlpool. The slope of the sides of the vast funnel became momently less and less steep. The gyrations of the whirl grew, gradually, less and less violent. By degrees, the froth and the rainbow disappeared, and the bottom of the gulf seemed slowly to uprise. The sky was clear, the winds had gone down, and the full moon was setting radiantly in the west, when I found myself on the surface of the ocean, in full view of the shores of Lofoden, and above the spot where the pool of the Moskoe-strom had been.

*

A boat picked me up — exhausted from fatigue — and (now that the danger was removed) speechless from the memory of its horror. Those who drew me on board were my old mates and dally companions — but they knew me no more than they would have known a traveller from the spirit-land. My hair, which had been raven-black the day before, was as white as you see it now. They say too that the whole expression of my countenance had changed.

*

Changes to the weather, the sea, the heavens, the mariner and the whirlpool itself are radical and precipitous. But the greatest change lies in the reversal of the mariner’s fate in the maelstrom: he somehow finds life in “the inmost recesses of the abyss”. “The power of metamorphosis” envelops and constrains, it seems, even death.

The bubble of life in Tolstoy, Nietzsche, Havelock and Innis

In infinite time, in the infinity of matter, in infinite space, a bubble-organism separates itself, and that bubble holds out for a while and then bursts…
(Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 1873-1877)

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of the universe (…) there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history”, but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. One might invent such a fable, and yet it still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly — as though the world’s axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself.
(Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense‘, 1873)  

The researches carried out by modern man have forced him to look back along the corridor of time at prospects which lengthen on the sight, until they exceed the range of his possible imagination. Our civilization dates from Greece and Rome, but we have learned that it was not the first upon the earth. The record of urbanized man, as revealed by the spade, goes back to at least the sixth millennium before Christ. To the Greek and Roman, for whom human history began with the fall of Troy, a previous span of four thousand years would scarcely have been comprehensible, unless it were the epoch when the gods walked the earth, and there were no men. And our own pious ancestors, who dated all Creation by the Book of Genesis, would have been in no better case.
No sooner has the mind accustomed itself to the antiquity of civilized culture, than it must multiply the backward prospect by tens of thousands of years, to envisage the slow evolution of the human race from the ape. And yet that whole incredible story becomes only a day in the history of the earth. We tap and scratch the surface of the rock on which we stand and find that it is indeed the rock of ages, printed with the map of a violent and illimitable history. Surveying it, our imagination abdicates and our comprehension of time breaks down. In place of the generations and centuries which mark our own frontiers, we substitute the trackless waste of geological aeons, and so drift back to the formless lava of a primeval furnace. In that day our human race was not, and was not thought of. In those temperatures it had no conceivable place. Such is the conclusion we draw, mechanically and meaninglessly. The reality is kept from us by our self-consciousness. Perhaps if we could put God there, he could make of geological time a furnished room for us once more, for us to inhabit, even though the only voice we heard was the voice of consuming fire.
Yet even in geological time, could we imagine it, the mind finds no arrest nor any mansion that abides. The astronomer of our epoch, living beyond Copernicus and Newton, strives to fling our thought out into a universe of light-years, where it is wholly and totally alone and alien. Our own rocks that once boiled like the sun, and later saw the dinosaurs wallowing in the swamp, shrivel to a speck of dust, a passing incident. We strive to make this familiar and intelligible by the skill of multiplication, which accumulates numerals to the nth power, by the skill of words, which reduces the infinity of time to the terminology of years traveled by light. But our own species, in our own eyes, has now become so temporary that it can scarcely be said to exist; it has dwindled to so small a span that we can scarcely be said to be perceptible. We find ourselves utterly alone and naked like worms cast into a field. Then how shall we cover this nakedness, which science has at last, and so fully, exposed? In the eyes of the self-conscious man, the intelligent, the proud, the hopeful, the skillful, the masterful, and the moral man, the simplicity of the exposure becomes unbearable, and therefore almost unthinkable. For it seems to destroy those truisms which the nature of our consciousness demands shall stay true. ’Who dare say that justice is any more eternal in the heavens? It is a name, a sound of approval, voiced by an ephemeral species to indicate some crawling pattern of preference, on a speck of dust, in the vast halls of space and time. Who dare say that man any more keeps company with angels, in those trackless wastes beyond the sun and moon? Who dare say his intelligence, so long mastered by illusion, so long convinced that it stood at the point of judgment in a measurable and estimable environment, a cosmos organized by a permanent and stable providence — who dare say that intelligence has any health in it, any metaphysic, any revelation above the energy of the blind groping of a worm?
(Eric Havelock, The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, Chapter 1: ‘The Bitter Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge’, 1951)

The general argument [of The Strategy of Culture, 1952] has been powerfully developed (…) by E. A. Havelock in The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man (Boston, 1951). Intellectual man of the nineteenth century was the first to estimate absolute nullity in time. The present — real, insistent, complex, and treated as an independent system, the foreshortening of practical pre-vision in the field of human action — has penetrated the most vulnerable areas of public policy. War has become the result, and a cause, of the limitations placed on the forethinker [Pro-metheus]. Power and its assistant force, the natural enemies of intelligence, have become more serious since “the mental processes activated in the pursuit and and consolidating of power are essentially short range”.
(Harold Innis, The Strategy of Culture, ‘Preface’, 1952, citing Havelock, The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, 991)

  1. Havelock: “Those mental processes which are activated in the pursuit and the consolidation of power are essentially short range.” Innis’ Strategy of Culture was immediately republished in his Changing Concepts of Time (also 1952) and its ‘Preface’ incorporated in the ‘Preface’ of the new title.

A Descent into the Maelstrom – Edgar Poe

1841

The ways of God in Nature, as in Providence, are not as our ways; nor are the models that we frame any way commensurate to the vastness, profundity, and unsearchableness of His works, which have a depth in them greater than the well of Democritus. — Joseph Glanville.

*

We had now reached the summit of the loftiest crag. For some minutes the old man seemed too much exhausted to speak. “Not long ago,” said he at length, “and I could have guided you on this route as well as the youngest of my sons; but, about three years past, there happened to me an event such as never happened before to mortal man — or at least such as no man ever survived to tell of — and the six hours of deadly terror which I then endured have broken me up body and soul. You suppose me a very old man — but I am not. It took less than a single day to change these hairs from a jetty black to white, to weaken my limbs, and to unstring my nerves, so that I tremble at the least exertion, and am frightened at a shadow. Do you know I can scarcely look over this little cliff without getting giddy?”

The “little cliff,” upon whose edge he had so carelessly thrown himself down to rest that the weightier portion of his body hung over it, while he was only kept from falling by the tenure of his elbow on its extreme and slippery edge — this “little cliff” arose, a sheer unobstructed precipice of black shining rock, some fifteen or sixteen hundred feet from the world of crags beneath us. Nothing would have tempted me to within half a dozen yards of its brink. In truth so deeply was I excited by the perilous position of my companion, that I fell at full length upon the ground, clung to the shrubs around me, and dared not even glance upward at the sky —while I struggled in vain to divest myself of the idea that the very foundations of the mountain were in danger from the fury of the winds. It was long before I could reason myself into sufficient courage to sit up and look out into the distance.

“You must get over these fancies,” said the guide, “for I have brought you here that you might have the best possible view of the scene of that event I mentioned — and to tell you the whole story with the spot just under your eye.”

“We are now,” he continued, in that particularizing manner which distinguished him — “we are now close upon the Norwegian coast — in the sixty-eighth degree of latitude — in the great province of Nordland — and in the dreary district of Lofoden. The mountain upon whose top we sit is Helseggen, the Cloudy. Now raise yourself up a little higher — hold on to the grass if you feel giddy — so — and look out beyond the belt of vapor beneath us, into the sea.”

I looked dizzily, and beheld a wide expanse of ocean, whose waters wore so inky a hue as to bring at once to my mind the Nubian geographer’s account of the Mare Tenebrarum. A panorama more deplorably desolate no human imagination can conceive. To the right and left, as far as the eye could reach, there lay outstretched, like ramparts of the world, lines of horridly black and beetling cliff, whose character of gloom was but the more forcibly illustrated by the surf which reared high up against it its white and ghastly crest, howling and shrieking for ever. Just opposite the promontory upon whose apex we were placed, and at a distance of some five or six miles out at sea, there was visible a small, bleak-looking island; or, more properly, its position was discernible through the wilderness of surge in which it was enveloped. About two miles nearer the land, arose another of smaller size, hideously craggy and barren, and encompassed at various intervals by a cluster of dark rocks.

The appearance of the ocean, in the space between the more distant island and the shore, had something very unusual about it. Although, at the time, so strong a gale was blowing landward that a brig in the remote offing lay to under a double-reefed trysail, and constantly plunged her whole hull out of sight, still there was here nothing like a regular swell, but only a short, quick, angry cross dashing of water in every direction — as well in the teeth of the wind as otherwise. Of foam there was little except in the immediate vicinity of the rocks.

“The island in the distance,” resumed the old man, “is called by the Norwegians Vurrgh. The one midway is Moskoe. That a mile to the northward is Ambaaren. Yonder are Iflesen, Hoeyholm, Kieldholm, Suarven, and Buckholm. Farther off — between Moskoe and Vurrgh — are Otterholm, Flimen, Sandflesen, and Skarholm. These are the true names of the places — but why it has been thought necessary to name them at all, is more than either you or I can understand. Do you hear any thing? Do you see any change in the water?”

We had now been about ten minutes upon the top of Helseggen, which we had ascended from the interior of Lofoden, so that we had caught no glimpse of the sea until it had burst upon us from the summit. As the old man spoke, I became aware of a loud and gradually increasing sound, like the moaning of a vast herd of buffaloes upon an American prairie; and at the same moment I perceived that what seamen term the chopping character of the ocean beneath us, was rapidly changing into a current which set to the eastward. Even while I gazed, this current acquired a monstrous velocity. Each moment added to its speed — to its headlong impetuosity. In five minutes the whole sea, as far as Vurrgh, was lashed into ungovernable fury; but it was between Moskoe and the coast that the main uproar held its sway. Here the vast bed of the waters, seamed and scarred into a thousand conflicting channels, burst suddenly into phrensied convulsion — heaving, boiling, hissing — gyrating in gigantic and innumerable vortices, and all whirling and plunging on to the eastward with a rapidity which water never elsewhere assumes except in precipitous descents.

In a few minutes more, there came over the scene another radical alteration. The general surface grew somewhat more smooth, and the whirlpools, one by one, disappeared, while prodigious streaks of foam became apparent where none had been seen before. These streaks, at length, spreading out to a great distance, and entering into combination, took unto themselves the gyratory motion of the subsided vortices, and seemed to form the germ of another more vast. Suddenly — very suddenly — this assumed a distinct and definite existence, in a circle of more than half a mile in diameter. The edge of the whirl was represented by a broad belt of gleaming spray; but no particle of this slipped into the mouth of the terrific funnel, whose interior, as far as the eye could fathom it, was a smooth, shining, and jet-black wall of water, inclined to the horizon at an angle of some forty-five degrees, speeding dizzily round and round with a swaying and sweltering motion, and sending forth to the winds an appalling voice, half shriek, half roar, such as not even the mighty cataract of Niagara ever lifts up in its agony to Heaven.

The mountain trembled to its very base, and the rock rocked. I threw myself upon my face, and clung to the scant herbage in an excess of nervous agitation.

“This,” said I at length, to the old man — “this can be nothing else than the great whirlpool of the Maelstrom.”

“So it is sometimes termed,” said he. “We Norwegians call it the Moskoe-strom, from the island of Moskoe in the midway.”

The ordinary accounts of this vortex had by no means prepared me for what I saw. That of Jonas Ramus, which is perhaps the most circumstantial of any, cannot impart the faintest conception either of the magnificence, or of the horror of the scene — or of the wild bewildering sense of the novel which confounds the beholder. I am not sure from what point of view the writer in question surveyed it, nor at what time; but it could neither have been from the summit of Helseggen, nor during a storm. There are some passages of his description, nevertheless, which may be quoted for their details, although their effect is exceedingly feeble in conveying an impression of the spectacle.

“Between Lofoden and Moskoe,” he says, “the depth of the water is between thirty-six and forty fathoms; but on the other side, toward Ver (Vurrgh) this depth decreases so as not to afford a convenient passage for a vessel, without the risk of splitting on the rocks, which happens even in the calmest weather. When it is flood, the stream runs up the country between Lofoden and Moskoe with a boisterous rapidity; but the roar of its impetuous ebb to the sea is scarce equalled by the loudest and most dreadful cataracts; the noise being heard several leagues off, and the vortices or pits are of such an extent and depth, that if a ship comes within its attraction, it is inevitably absorbed and carried down to the bottom, and there beat to pieces against the rocks; and when the water relaxes, the fragments thereof are thrown up again. But these intervals of tranquillity are only at the turn of the ebb and flood, and in calm weather, and last but a quarter of an hour, its violence gradually returning. When the stream is most boisterous, and its fury heightened by a storm, it is dangerous to come within a Norway mile of it. Boats, yachts, and ships have been carried away by not guarding against it before they were within its reach. It likewise happens frequently, that whales come too near the stream, and are overpowered by its violence; and then it is impossible to describe their howlings and bellowings in their fruitless struggles to disengage themselves. A bear once, attempting to swim from Lofoden to Moskoe, was caught by the stream and borne down, while he roared terribly, so as to be heard on shore. Large stocks of firs and pine trees, after being absorbed by the current, rise again broken and torn to such a degree as if bristles grew upon them. This plainly shows the bottom to consist of craggy rocks, among which they are whirled to and fro. This stream is regulated by the flux and reflux of the sea — it being constantly high and low water every six hours. In the year 1645, early in the morning of Sexagesima Sunday, it raged with such noise and impetuosity that the very stones of the houses on the coast fell to the ground.”

In regard to the depth of the water, I could not see how this could have been ascertained at all in the immediate vicinity of the vortex. The “forty fathoms” must have reference only to portions of the channel close upon the shore either of Moskoe or Lofoden. The depth in the centre of the Moskoe-strom must be immeasurably greater; and no better proof of this fact is necessary than can be obtained from even the sidelong glance into the abyss of the whirl which may be had from the highest crag of Helseggen. Looking down from this pinnacle upon the howling Phlegethon below, I could not help smiling at the simplicity with which the honest Jonas Ramus records, as a matter difficult of belief, the anecdotes of the whales and the bears; for it appeared to me, in fact, a self-evident thing, that the largest ships of the line in existence, coming within the influence of that deadly attraction, could resist it as little as a feather the hurricane, and must disappear bodily and at once.

The attempts to account for the phenomenon — some of which, I remember, seemed to me sufficiently plausible in perusal — now wore a very different and unsatisfactory aspect. The idea generally received is that this, as well as three smaller vortices among the Feroe islands, “have no other cause than the collision of waves rising and falling, at flux and reflux, against a ridge of rocks and shelves, which confines the water so that it precipitates itself like a cataract; and thus the higher the flood rises, the deeper must the fall be, and the natural result of all is a whirlpool or vortex, the prodigious suction of which is sufficiently known by lesser experiments.” — These are the words of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Kircher and others imagine that in the centre of the channel of the Maelstrom is an abyss penetrating the globe, and issuing in some very remote part — the Gulf of Bothnia being somewhat decidedly named in one instance. This opinion, idle in itself, was the one to which, as I gazed, my imagination most readily assented; and, mentioning it to the guide, I was rather surprised to hear him say that, although it was the view almost universally entertained of the subject by the Norwegians, it nevertheless was not his own. As to the former notion he confessed his inability to comprehend it; and here I agreed with him — for, however conclusive on paper, it becomes altogether unintelligible, and even absurd, amid the thunder of the abyss.

“You have had a good look at the whirl now,” said the old man, “and if you will creep round this crag, so as to get in its lee, and deaden the roar of the water, I will tell you a story that will convince you I ought to know something of the Moskoe-strom.”

I placed myself as desired, and he proceeded.

“Myself and my two brothers once owned a schooner-rigged smack of about seventy tons burthen, with which we were in the habit of fishing among the islands beyond Moskoe, nearly to Vurrgh. In all violent eddies at sea there is good fishing, at proper opportunities, if one has only the courage to attempt it; but among the whole of the Lofoden coastmen, we three were the only ones who made a regular business of going out to the islands, as I tell you. The usual grounds are a great way lower down to the southward. There fish can be got at all hours, without much risk, and therefore these places are preferred. The choice spots over here among the rocks, however, not only yield the finest variety, but in far greater abundance; so that we often got in a single day, what the more timid of the craft could not scrape together in a week. In fact, we made it a matter of desperate speculation — the risk of life standing instead of labor, and courage answering for capital.

“We kept the smack in a cove about five miles higher up the coast than this; and it was our practice, in fine weather, to take advantage of the fifteen minutes’ slack to push across the main channel of the Moskoe-strom, far above the pool, and then drop down upon anchorage somewhere near Otterholm, or Sandflesen, where the eddies are not so violent as elsewhere. Here we used to remain until nearly time for slackwater again, when we weighed and made for home. We never set out upon this expedition without a steady side wind for going and coming — one that we felt sure would not fall us before our return — and we seldom made a miscalculation upon this point. Twice, during six years, we were forced to stay all night at anchor on account of a dead calm, which is a rare thing indeed just about here; and once we had to remain on the grounds nearly a week, starving to death, owing to a gale which blew up shortly after our arrival, and made the channel too boisterous to be thought of. Upon this occasion we should have been driven out to sea in spite of everything, (for the whirlpools threw us round and round so violently that, at length, we fouled our anchor and dragged it) if it had not been that we drifted into one of the innumerable cross currents — here to-day and gone tomorrow — which drove us under the lee of Flimen, where, by good luck, we brought up.

“I could not tell you the twentieth part of the difficulties we encountered ‘on the ground’ — it is a bad spot to be in, even in good weather — but we made shift always to run the gauntlet of the Moskoe-strom itself without accident; although at times my heart has been in my mouth when we happened to be a minute or so behind or before the slack. The wind sometimes was not as strong as we thought it at starting, and then we made rather less way than we could wish, while the current rendered the smack unmanageable. My eldest brother had a son eighteen years old, and I had two stout boys of my own. These would have been of great assistance at such times, in using the sweeps, as well as afterward in fishing — but, somehow, although we ran the risk ourselves, we had not the heart to let the young ones get into the danger — for, after all said and done, it was a horrible danger, and that is the truth.

“It is now within a few days of three years since what I am going to tell you occurred. It was on the tenth of July, 18—, a day which the people of this part of the world will never forget — for it was one in which blew the most terrible hurricane that ever came out of the heavens. And yet all the morning, and indeed until late in the afternoon, there was a gentle and steady breeze from the south-west, while the sun shone brightly, so that the oldest seaman among us could not have foreseen what was to follow.

“The three of us — my two brothers and myself — had crossed over to the islands about two o’clock P. M., and soon nearly loaded the smack with fine fish, which, we all remarked, were more plenty that day than we had ever known them. It was just seven, by my watch, when we weighed and started for home, so as to make the worst of the Strom at slack water, which we knew would be at eight.

“We set out with a fresh wind on our starboard quarter, and for some time spanked along at a great rate, never dreaming of danger, for indeed we saw not the slightest reason to apprehend it. All at once we were taken aback by a breeze from over Helseggen. This was most unusual —something that had never happened to us before — and I began to feel a little uneasy, without exactly knowing why. We put the boat on the wind, but could make no headway at all for the eddies, and I was upon the point of proposing to return to the anchorage, when, looking astern, we saw the whole horizon covered with a singular copper-colored cloud that rose with the most amazing velocity.

“In the meantime the breeze that had headed us off fell away, and we were dead becalmed, drifting about in every direction. This state of things, however, did not last long enough to give us time to think about it. In less than a minute the storm was upon us — in less than two the sky was entirely overcast — and what with this and the driving spray, it became suddenly so dark that we could not see each other in the smack.

“Such a hurricane as then blew it is folly to attempt describing. The oldest seaman in Norway never experienced any thing like it. We had let our sails go by the run before it cleverly took us; but, at the first puff, both our masts went by the board if they had been sawed off — the mainmast taking with it my youngest brother, who had lashed himself to it for safety.

“Our boat was the lightest feather of a thing that ever sat upon water. It had a complete flush deck, with only a small hatch near the bow, and this hatch it had always been our custom to batten down when about to cross the Strom, by way of precaution against the chopping seas. But for this circumstance we should have foundered at once — for we lay entirely buried for some moments. How my elder brother escaped destruction I cannot say, for I never had an opportunity of ascertaining. For my part, as soon as I had let the foresail run, I threw myself flat on deck, with my feet against the narrow gunwale of the bow, and with my hands grasping a ring-bolt near the foot of the foremast. It was mere instinct that prompted me to do this —which was undoubtedly the very best thing I could have done — for I was too much flurried to think.

“For some moments we were completely deluged, as I say, and all this time I held my breath, and clung to the bolt. When I could stand it no longer I raised myself upon my knees, still keeping hold with my hands, and thus got my head clear. Presently our little boat gave herself a shake, just as a dog does in coming out of the water, and thus rid herself, in some measure, of the seas. I was now trying to get the better of the stupor that had come over me, and to collect my senses so as to see what was to be done, when I felt somebody grasp my arm. It was my elder brother, and my heart leaped for joy, for I had made sure that he was overboard — but the next moment all this joy was turned into horror — for he put his mouth close to my ear, and screamed out the word ‘Moskoe-strom!’

“No one ever will know what my feelings were at that moment. I shook from head to foot as if I had had the most violent fit of the ague. I knew what he meant by that one word well enough —I knew what he wished to make me understand. With the wind that now drove us on, we were bound for the whirl of the Strom, and nothing could save us!

“You perceive that in crossing the Strom channel, we always went a long way up above the whirl, even in the calmest weather, and then had to wait and watch carefully for the slack — but now we were driving right upon the pool itself, and in such a hurricane as this! ‘To be sure’, I thought, ‘we shall get there just about the slack — is some little hope in that’ — but in the next moment I cursed myself for being so great a fool as to dream of hope at all. I knew very well that we were doomed, had we been ten times a ninety-gun ship.

“By this time the first fury of the tempest had spent itself, or perhaps we did not feel it so much, as we scudded before it, but at all events the seas, which at first had been kept down by the wind, and lay flat and frothing, now got up into absolute mountains. A singular change, too, had come over the heavens. Around in every direction it was still as black as pitch, but nearly overhead there burst out, all at once, a circular rift of clear sky — as clear as I ever saw — and of a deep bright blue — and through it there blazed forth the full moon with a lustre that I never before knew her to wear. She lit up every thing about us with the greatest distinctness — but, oh God, what a scene it was to light up!

“I now made one or two attempts to speak to my brother — but in some manner which I could not understand, the din had so increased that I could not make him hear a single word, although I screamed at the top of my voice in his ear. Presently he shook his head, looking as pale as death, and held up one of his fingers, as to say ‘listen!’

“At first I could not make out what he meant — but soon a hideous thought flashed upon me. I dragged my watch from its fob. It was not going. I glanced as its face by the moonlight, and then burst into tears as I flung it far away into the ocean. It had run down at seven o’clock! We were behind the time of the slack, and the whirl of the Strom was in full fury!

“When a boat is well built, properly trimmed, and not deep laden, the waves in a strong gale, when she is going large, seem always to slip from beneath her — which appears very strange to a landsman — and this is what is called riding, in sea phrase.

“Well, so far we had ridden the swells very cleverly; but presently a gigantic sea happened to take us right under the counter, and bore us with it as it rose — up — up — as if into the sky. I would not have believed that any wave could rise so high. And then down we came with a sweep, a slide, and a plunge, that made me feel sick and dizzy, as if I was falling from some lofty mountain-top in a dream. But while we were up I had thrown a quick glance around — and that one glance was all sufficient. I saw our exact position in an instant. The Moskoe-strom whirlpool was about a quarter of a mile dead ahead — but no more like the every-day Moskoe-strom, than the whirl as you now see it, is like a mill-race. If I had not known where we were, and what we had to expect, I should not have recognized the place at all. As it was, I involuntarily closed my eyes in horror. The lids clenched themselves together as if in a spasm.

“It could not have been more than two minutes afterwards until we suddenly felt the waves subside, and were enveloped in foam. The boat made a sharp half turn to larboard, and then shot off in its new direction like a thunderbolt. At the same moment the roaring noise of the water was completely drowned in a kind of shrill shriek — such a sound as you might imagine given out by the water-pipes of many thousand steam-vessels, letting off their steam all together. We were now in the belt of surf that always surrounds the whirl; and I thought, of course, that another moment would plunge us into the abyss — down which we could only see indistinctly on account of the amazing velocity with which we were borne along. The boat did not seem to sink into the water at all, but to skim like an air-bubble upon the surface of the surge. Her starboard side was next the whirl, and on the larboard arose the world of ocean we had left. It stood like a huge writhing wall between us and the horizon.

“It may appear strange, but now, when we were in the very jaws of the gulf, I felt more composed than when we were only approaching it. Having made up my mind to hope no more, I got rid of a great deal of that terror which unmanned me at first. I suppose it was despair that strung my nerves.

“It may look like boasting — but what I tell you is truth — I began to reflect how magnificent a thing it was to die in such a manner, and how foolish it was in me to think of so paltry a consideration as my own individual life, in view of so wonderful a manifestation of God’s power. I do believe that I blushed with shame when this idea crossed my mind. After a little while I became possessed with the keenest curiosity about the whirl itself. I positively felt a wish to explore its depths, even at the sacrifice I was going to make; and my principal grief was that I should never be able to tell my old companions on shore about the mysteries I should see. These, no doubt, were singular fancies to occupy a man’s mind in such extremity — and I have often thought since, that the revolutions of the boat around the pool might have rendered me a little light-headed.

“There was another circumstance which tended to restore my self-possession; and this was the cessation of the wind, which could not reach us in our present situation — for, as you saw yourself, the belt of surf is considerably lower than the general bed of the ocean, and this latter now towered above us, a high, black, mountainous ridge. If you have never been at sea in a heavy gale, you can form no idea of the confusion of mind occasioned by the wind and the spray together. They blind, deafen and strangle you, and take away all power of action or reflection. But we were now, in a great measure, rid of these annoyances — just as death-condemned felons in prison are allowed petty indulgences, forbidden them while their doom is yet uncertain.

“How often we made the circuit of the belt it is impossible to say. We careered round and round for perhaps an hour, flying rather than floating, getting gradually more and more into the middle of the surge, and then nearer and nearer to its horrible inner edge. All this time I had never let go of the ring-bolt. My brother was at the stern, holding on to a large empty water-cask which had been securely lashed under the coop of the counter, and was the only thing on deck that had not been swept overboard when the gale first took us. As we approached the brink of the pit he let go his hold upon this, and made for the ring, from which, in the agony of his terror, he endeavored to force my hands, as it was not large enough to afford us both a secure grasp. I never felt deeper grief than when I saw him attempt this act — although I knew he was a madman when he did it — a raving maniac through sheer fright. I did not care, however, to contest the point with him. I thought it could make no difference whether either of us held on at all; so I let him have the bolt, and went astern to the cask. This there was no great difficulty in doing; for the smack flew round steadily enough, and upon an even keel — only swaying to and fro, with the immense sweeps and swelters of the whirl. Scarcely had I secured myself in my new position, when we gave a wild lurch to starboard, and rushed headlong into the abyss. I muttered a hurried prayer to God, and thought all was over.

“As I felt the sickening sweep of the descent, I had instinctively tightened my hold upon the barrel, and closed my eyes. For some seconds I dared not open them — while I expected instant destruction, and wondered that I was not already in my death-struggles with the water. But moment after moment elapsed. I still lived. The sense of falling had ceased; and the motion of the vessel seemed much as it had been before while in the belt of foam, with the exception that she now lay more along. I took courage and looked once again upon the scene.

“Never shall I forget the sensations of awe, horror, and admiration with which I gazed about me. The boat appeared to be hanging, as if by magic, midway down, upon the interior surface of a funnel vast in circumference, prodigious in depth, and whose perfectly smooth sides might have been mistaken for ebony, but for the bewildering rapidity with which they spun around, and for the gleaming and ghastly radiance they shot forth, as the rays of the full moon, from that circular rift amid the clouds which I have already described, streamed in a flood of golden glory along the black walls, and far away down into the inmost recesses of the abyss.

“At first I was too much confused to observe anything accurately. The general burst of terrific grandeur was all that I beheld. When I recovered myself a little, however, my gaze fell instinctively downward. In this direction I was able to obtain an unobstructed view, from the manner in which the smack hung on the inclined surface of the pool. She was quite upon an even keel — that is to say, her deck lay in a plane parallel with that of the water — but this latter sloped at an angle of more than forty-five degrees, so that we seemed to be lying upon our beam-ends. I could not help observing, nevertheless, that I had scarcely more difficulty in maintaining my hold and footing in this situation, than if we had been upon a dead level; and this, I suppose, was owing to the speed at which we revolved.

“The rays of the moon seemed to search the very bottom of the profound gulf; but still I could make out nothing distinctly, on account of a thick mist in which everything there was enveloped, and over which there hung a magnificent rainbow, like that narrow and tottering bridge which Mussulmen say is the only pathway between Time and Eternity. This mist, or spray, was no doubt occasioned by the clashing of the great walls of the funnel, as they all met together at the bottom — but the yell that went up to the Heavens from out of mist, I dare not attempt to describe.

“Our first slide into the abyss itself, from the belt of foam above, had carried us to a great distance down the slope; but our farther descent was by no means proportionate. Round and round we swept — not with any uniform movement — but in dizzying swings and jerks, that sent us sometimes only a few hundred feet — sometimes nearly the complete circuit of the whirl. Our progress downward, at each revolution, was slow, but very perceptible.

“Looking about me upon the wide waste of liquid ebony on which we were thus borne, I perceived that our boat was not the only object in the embrace of the whirl. Both above and below us were visible fragments of vessels, large masses of building timber and trunks of trees, with many smaller articles, such as pieces of house furniture, broken boxes, barrels and staves. I have already described the unnatural curiosity which had taken the place of my original terrors. It appeared to grow upon me as I drew nearer and nearer to my dreadful doom. I now began to watch, with a strange interest, the numerous things that floated in our company. I must have been delirious — for I even sought amusement in speculating upon the relative velocities of their several descents toward the foam below. ‘This fir tree’, I found myself at one time saying, ‘will certainly be the next thing that takes the awful plunge and disappears’ — and then I was disappointed to find that the wreck of a Dutch merchant ship overtook it and went down before. At length, after making several guesses of this nature, and being deceived in all —this fact — the fact of my invariable miscalculation, set me upon a train of reflection that made my limbs again tremble, and my heart beat heavily once more.

“It was not a new terror that thus affected me, but the dawn of a more exciting hope. This hope arose partly from memory, and partly from present observation. I called to mind the great variety of buoyant matter that strewed the coast of Lofoden, having been absorbed and then thrown forth by the Moskoe-strom. By far the greater number of the articles were shattered in the most extraordinary way — so chafed and roughened as to have the appearance of being stuck full of splinters — but then I distinctly recollected that there were some of them which were not disfigured at all. Now I could not account for this difference except by supposing that the roughened fragments were the only ones which had been completely absorbed — that the others had entered the whirl at so late a period of the tide, or, from some reason, had descended so slowly after entering, that they did not reach the bottom before the turn of the flood came, or of the ebb, as the case might be. I conceived it possible, in either instance, that they might thus be whirled up again to the level of the ocean, without undergoing the fate of those which had been drawn in more early or absorbed more rapidly. I made, also, three important observations. The first was, that as a general rule, the larger the bodies were, the more rapid their descent; — the second, that, between two masses of equal extent, the one spherical, and the other of any other shape, the superiority in speed of descent was with the sphere; — the third, that, between two masses of equal size, the one cylindrical, and the other of any other shape, the cylinder was absorbed the more slowly.

“Since my escape, I have had several conversations on this subject with an old school-master of the district; and it was from him that I learned the use of the words ‘cylinder’ and ‘sphere.’ He explained to me — although I have forgotten the explanation — how what I observed was, in fact, the natural consequence of the forms of the floating fragments — and showed me how it happened that a cylinder, swimming in a vortex, offered more resistance to its suction, and was drawn in with greater difficulty than an equally bulky body, of any form whatever.1

“There was one startling circumstance which went a great way in enforcing these observations, and rendering me anxious to turn them to account, and this was that, at every revolution, we passed something like a barrel, or else the broken yard or the mast of a vessel, while many of these things, which had been on our level when I first opened my eyes upon the wonders of the whirlpool, were now high up above us, and seemed to have moved but little from their original station.

“I no longer hesitated what to do. I resolved to lash myself securely to the water cask upon which I now held, to cut it loose from the counter, and to throw myself with it into the water. I attracted my brother’s attention by signs, pointed to the floating barrels that came near us, and did everything in my power to make him understand what I was about to do. I thought at length that he comprehended my design — but, whether this was the case or not, he shook his head despairingly, and refused to move from his station by the ring-bolt. It was impossible to force him; the emergency admitted no delay; and so, with a bitter struggle, I resigned him to his fate, fastened myself to the cask by means of the lashings which secured it to the counter, and precipitated myself with it into the sea, without another moment’s hesitation.

“The result was precisely what I had hoped it might be. As it is myself who now tell you this tale — as you see that I did escape — and as you are already in possession of the mode in which this escape was effected, and must therefore anticipate all that I have farther to say — I will bring my story quickly to conclusion. It might have been an hour, or thereabout, after my quitting the smack, when, having descended to a vast distance beneath me, it made three or four wild gyrations in rapid succession, and, bearing my loved brother with it, plunged headlong, at once and forever, into the chaos of foam below. The barrel to which I was attached sunk very little farther than half the distance between the bottom of the gulf and the spot at which I leaped overboard, before a great change took place in the character of the whirlpool. The slope of the sides of the vast funnel became momently less and less steep. The gyrations of the whirl grew, gradually, less and less violent. By degrees, the froth and the rainbow disappeared, and the bottom of the gulf seemed slowly to uprise. The sky was clear, the winds had gone down, and the full moon was setting radiantly in the west, when I found myself on the surface of the ocean, in full view of the shores of Lofoden, and above the spot where the pool of the Moskoe-strom had been. It was the hour of the slack — but the sea still heaved in mountainous waves from the effects of the hurricane. I was borne violently into the channel of the Strom and in a few minutes, was hurried down the coast into the ‘grounds’ of the fishermen. A boat picked me up — exhausted from fatigue — and (now that the danger was removed) speechless from the memory of its horror. Those who drew me on board were my old mates and dally companions — but they knew me no more than they would have known a traveller from the spirit-land. My hair, which had been raven-black the day before, was as white as you see it now. They say too that the whole expression of my countenance had changed. I told them my story — they did not believe it. I now tell it to you — and I can scarcely expect you to put more faith in it than did the merry fishermen of Lofoden.

  1. Poe provides a footnote to “Archimedes, De Incidentibus in Fluido.  While Archimedes apparently did write on whirlpools in ‘De Incidentibus in Humido‘, Poe seems to have found his spurious authority in Sketch of the Progress of Physical Science by Thomas Thomson  (1843), in which De Incidentibus in Fluido appears — in time for the second edition of Descent in 1845.

Vortex atoms in 19th century physics

In 1914 Wyndham Lewis announced the vortex of art in Blast:

Long live the great art vortex sprung up in the centre of this town! (‘Long Live the Vortex!’, Blast 1, 1914)

With our Vortex the Present is the only active thing.
Life is the Past and the Future.
The Present is Art
Our Vortex insists on water-tight compartments.
There is no Present — there is Past and Future, and there is Art.

This is a great Vorticist age, a great still age of artists.

Our Vortex is proud of its polished sides.
Our Vortex will not hear of anything but its disastrous polished dance.
Our Vortex desires the immobile rhythm of its swiftness.
Our Vortex rushes out like an angry dog at your Impressionistic fuss.
Our Vortex is white and abstract with its red-hot swiftness.1 (‘Our Vortex’, Blast 2, 1915)

Long before this, starting in the 1860s and continuing in vogue until almost the end of the century, the vortex had been proposed in physics as nothing less than the elementary structure of the atom. Here is the great figure of William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), in a presentation to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1867:

After noticing Helmholtz’s admirable discovery of the law of vortex motion in a perfect liquid — that is, in a fluid perfectly destitute of viscosity (or fluid friction) — the author [Kelvin] said that this discovery inevitably suggests the idea that Helmholtz’s rings are the only true atoms. For the only pretext seeming to justify the monstrous assumption of infinitely strong and infinitely rigid pieces of matter, the existence of which is asserted as a probable hypothesis by some of the greatest modern chemists (…) [—] urged by Lucretius and adopted by Newton — [is] that it seems necessary to account for the unalterable distinguishing qualities of different kinds of matter. But Helmholtz has provided an absolutely unalterable quality in the motion of any portion of a perfect liquid in which the peculiar motion which he calls “Wirbelbewegung” has been once created. Thus any portion of a perfect liquid which has “Wirbelbewegung” has one recommendation of Lucretius’s atoms — infinitely perennial specific quality. To generate or to destroy “Wirbelbewegung” in a perfect fluid can only be an act of creative power. Lucretius’s atom does not explain any of the properties of matter without attributing them to the atom itself. Thus the “clash of atoms,” as it has been well called, has been invoked by his modern followers to account for the elasticity of gases. Every other property of matter has similarly required an assumption of specific forces pertaining to the atom. [But] it is [as] easy (…) to assume whatever specific forces may be required in any portion of matter which possesses the “Wirbelbewegung” as in a solid indivisible piece of matter; and hence the Lucretius atom has no prima facie advantage over the Helmholtz atom.

The vortex was, however, not only no less plausible than “a solid indivisible piece of matter” as “the true atom”. It also had the inestimable advantage, as Helmholtz had shown in regard to the vortex in a perfect liquid, that it had definable structure and was subject to mathematical specification. This meant that investigations could relate empirical findings to transformations of the hypothetical structure and to mathematical calculations in a way that could not be done taking atoms as solid lumps.

Furthermore, as Kelvin pointed out in his talk, the vortex atom theory seemed closely related to contemporary research into electricity and magnetism.  Indeed, Kelvin predicted in his presentation: “the velocities [of the vortex circles] at different points are to be in proportion to the intensities of the magnetic forces in the corresponding points of the magnetic field”.

Hence, although the vortex theory ultimately proved untenable, its focus on specifiable structure and mathematical modeling contributed mightily to the nobel prize winning discovery of the electron in 1897 by  J.J. Thomson and to the associated gradual understanding of the true structure of the atom.  In fact, J.J. Thomson’s earlier Treatise on the Motion of Vortex Rings (1884), had had no other goal than to describe the motions of Kelvin’s vortex atoms.

Now McLuhan took the vortex as the atomic structure of media and saw Poe’s Maelstrom as describing the peculiar difference between material and media atoms. Namely, media atoms have a kind of rider2 (like Poe’s mariner) who can detach from one medium in order to ride another — in Kelvin’s terms, “an act of creative power”? — but can also become so attached to a medium, like the mariner’s brother, that no alternative is available but to continue to ride it to certain doom.  (Such a rider apparently cannot dare to go “through the vanishing point” which is the only way between atomic media structures.) ‘Riding’ and ‘detaching’ and ‘reattaching’ in these ways are, McLuhan suggested, what it means to be a human being and are therefore central to its investigation.3 

Just before entering the maelstrom, Poe’s mariner experiences in anticipation what will take place there:

When a boat is well built, properly trimmed, and not deep laden, the waves in a strong gale, when she is going large, seem always to slip from beneath her — which appears very strange to a landsman — and this is what is called riding, in sea phrase. Well, so far we had ridden the swells very cleverly; but presently a gigantic sea happened to take us right under the [ship’s stern or] counter, and bore us with it as it rose — up — up — as if into the sky. I would not have believed that any wave could rise so high. And then down we came with a sweep, a slide, and a plunge, that made me feel sick and dizzy, as if I was falling from some lofty mountain-top in a dream.

The great questions are: what does it mean that humans are riders of forms?  and that these riders are somehow able to undertake (or undergo?) the radical change from one form to another?

The boat did not seem to sink into the water at all, but to skim like an air-bubble upon the surface of the surge.4

As he noted in his 1867 presentation to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Kelvin’s inspiration for his vortex atom theory came from Hermann von Helmholtz‘s 1858 paper: ‘Über Integrale der hydrodynamischen Gleichungen, welche den Wirbelbewegungen  entsprechen’. Kelvin’s friend and colleague, P.G. Tait, mentioned Helmholtz’s paper in a letter to Kelvin in 1862 and then in 1867 translated it as ‘On Integrals of the Hydrodynamical Equations, Which Express Vortex-motion’.  Between these two events, Kelvin and Tait developed ways of illustrating the workings of vortex motion using smoke rings and Helmholtz himself visited them in Glasgow from Germany in 1863.

Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom, which was originally published in 1841, and would become McLuhan’s continuing inspiration in 1946, became available in German translation starting in 1846.5 Strangely, it is therefore possible that Poe’s story played central roles, 100 years apart, in unexpected  developments of the physical sciences in the 19th century and of the human sciences in the 20th.6

In the first instance, it may have had some part in suggesting the study of ‘Wirbelbewegungen’ to Helmholtz, which led to Kelvin’s vortex atoms and eventually to J.J. Thomson’s electrons. And in the second, it certainly had a part in suggesting to McLuhan how a Gestalt-switch in media is central to all human experience and communication.

Meanwhile, halfway between these events, Lewis and Pound proclaimed vorticism in art.

  1. Lewis seems to have taken his description of the vortex here in part from Poe’s ‘A Descent into the Maelstrom: “Never shall I forget the sensations of awe, horror, and admiration with which I gazed about me. The boat appeared to be hanging, as if by magic, midway down, upon the interior surface of a funnel vast in circumference, prodigious in depth, and whose perfectly smooth sides might have been mistaken for ebony, but for the bewildering rapidity with which they spun around, and for the gleaming and ghastly radiance they shot forth, as the rays of the full moon (…) streamed in a flood of golden glory along the black walls, and far away down into the inmost recesses of the abyss.”
  2. See McLuhan’s ‘The Implications of Cultural Uniformity’ (in Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe1975): “William Empson has described the role of the semiconscious navigator between worlds, in his ‘Arachne’ (1928) which opens: “Twixt devil and deep sea, man hacks his caves; / Birth, death; one, many; what is true, and seems; /
    Earth’s vast hot iron, cold space’s empty waves.”
  3. Every human being comes to life in the medium of amniotic fluid (Cameron’s fluid) and is then born into the very different medium of the extra-uterine world.  The in-fant then learns to speak in another global Gestalt-switch whereby it leaves a world of instinctual communication and somehow comes to understand another sort of general communication based on sounds that can carry meaning to it and from it. Now understanding modern art, according to McLuhan, requires an analogous intro-duction or e-ducation into new learning: since late in the nineteenth century, artists, poets and musicians have been attempting to express insight into forms, or media, not content, or messages. As he wrote to Pound (July 16, 1952): “Your own tips are always exact. But they are of little help to the uninitiated. Once a man has got onto technique as the key in communication it’s different. But somehow the bugbear of content forbids that anybody be interested in technique as content” (Letters 231). McLuhan’s wider claim followed: the key to the investigation of human being, therefore to the survival of the species, depended on study of “the life and nature of forms” (‘Introduction’ to Innis’ The Bias of Communication, 1964).
  4. Empson’s ‘Arachne’: “His gleaming bubble between void and void, / Tribe-membrane, that by mutual tension stands, / Earth’s surface film”…
  5. As specified at The Edgar Allan Poe Society website, between 1846 and 1858, when Helmholtz’s ‘Wirbelbewegungen’ paper appeared, Poe’s Maelstrom was translated into German at least 3 separate times: ‘Auf dem Maelstrom: Reiseerinnerungen aus Norwegen’, Frankfurter Konversationsblatt, Oktober 1846; ‘Der Mahlstrom’, Bremischer Beobachter, April 1852; ‘Eine Hinabwirbelung in den Maalstrom’, Deutsche Monatshefte, Dezember 1855.
  6. “In the 20th” — as may perhaps be realized in the 21st!

Giedion on simultaneity

In the middle of a consideration of space in Space, Time and Architecture, Giedion suddenly broaches the topic of time:

Cubism breaks with Renaissance perspective. It views objects relatively: that is, from several points of view, no one of which has exclusive authority. And in so dissecting objects it sees them simultaneously from all sides — from above and below, from inside and outside. It goes around and into its objects. Thus, to the three dimensions of the Renaissance which have held good as constituent facts throughout so many centuries, there is added a fourth one — time. The poet Guillaume Apollinaire was the first to recognize and express this change, around 1911. The same year saw the first cubist exhibition in the Salon des Indépendants. Considering the history of the principles from which they broke, it can well be understood that the paintings should have been thought a menace to the public peace, and have become the subject of remarks in the Chamber of Deputies.
The presentation of objects from several points of view introduces a principle which is intimately bound up with modern life — simultaneity. It is a historical coincidence1 that Einstein should have begun his famous work, Elektrodynamik bewegter Korper, in 1905 with a careful definition of simultaneity.2 (First edition, 1941, 357; fifth edition, 1966, 436.)

As seen in this passage from STA, Giedion evidently considered Apollinaire a key figure. In fact, shortly after first meeting McLuhan in St Louis. Giedion recommended Apollinaire to him in a note from August 14, 1943:

Did you ever study the Alcools [1913] of Guillaume Apollinaire?

This, along with his on-going work on Eliot and on Poe (who was first translated into French by Baudelaire), suggested to McLuhan the need for a close study of French symbolist poetry (especially Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Mallarmé) that would occupy him for the next decade (not without a mass of other interests, of course). The result was an unpublished manuscript in the McLuhan papers in Ottawa discussing Eliot’s encounter with the symbolists that is full of citations in French from them: Prelude to Prufrock.

The central importance of this study for McLuhan’s literary essays and especially for his media work may be seen in a passage from his letter to Innis from March 14, 1951:

One major discovery of the symbolists which had the greatest importance for subsequent investigation was their notion of the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties whose retracing provided the key to all arts and sciences…

  1. ‘Historical coincidence’ has been substituted for ‘temporal coincidence’ here since ‘the temporal’ in this context is exactly not, or not only, ‘the historical’. While it is not impossible that Giedion intended the full significance of ‘the temporal’ here, that is, ‘the historical’ + simultaneity, the likelihood is that his expression here is an artifact of the translation of STA by Giedion and his aides from his German thinking to English-like writing. His late work would greatly benefit from Jackie Tyrwhitt’s emergence as his editor.
  2. English translation: ‘On the electrodynamics of moving bodies‘.

Giedion to Nef: “a young scholar of English literature”

On August 3, 1943, Sigfried Giedion wrote his friend John Nef at the University of Chicago (where Nef was the foremost of the founders of the Committee on Social Thought 1 and a close aide to UC President Robert Hutchins) about his meeting with a promising young scholar in St Louis: Mr H.M. McLuhan. Giedion in his somewhat stilted English wrote as follows:

One evening at St Louis I met a young scholar of English literature, Mr H M McLuhan.  I had an excellent impression of this young man who seems to live rather isolated at St Louis University. I heard that he made the PhD at Cambridge (England) and that he became there a catholic (as for instance also T.S. Eliot).  I did not read any of his articles, but I shall ask him to send me some fragments of his book on English literature, and when they are all right, I shall try and do my best that they will be published by a good publisher. Perhaps Chicago University may invite him once2 for a lecture. (…) I guess, Mr McLuhan would fit into the Chicago environment and I did not find many youngsters of his kind of approach.

The oral recollections of Giedion by Eduard Sekler are interesting in this context:

When I read Space, Time and Architecture at that time it was a revelation. I wrote a glowing review about it. I understand why, for a while, in every architecture school in this country, that was the book that was lying on the drafting board. Giedion was also a fascinating figure personally, and you could learn from him to have a scent for where the new was that was worth pursuing. He had this intuition that was admirable.3 

  1. The Committee is now named after him as the John U Nef Committee on Social Thought.
  2. ‘Once’: presumably Giedion was thinking of German ‘einmal’, which can mean ‘once’, but here should have been ‘sometime’. Eduard Sekler recalled: “I was among the few people who could follow his (Giedion’s) lectures because I could hear the German under his English”. See the next note for the reference.
  3. Spirit and project : Eduard F. Sekler, Getty Center Art History Oral Documentation Project, 1995.

Speaking of Winnipeg – “a vast sense of space and time”

In a 1970 interview of McLuhan and Tom Easterbrook by Danny Finkleman1, McLuhan recalled many different aspects of his life in Winnipeg (often with tongue in cheek):

We might as well have a few words about the superiority of the prairie meadowlark to all other songbirds (…) it has a much longer and almost melodic phrase. It isn’t a mere chirp; it has a melody. It talks to you. Besides it is extremely musical. It’s not just the solid glug-glug of the nightingale [championed by uninformed ornithologists like John Keats]. By comparison with the birds I’ve heard in Europe and England, it is enormously superior. (23)

I think of western skies as one of the most beautiful things about the West, and the western horizons. The westerner doesn’t have a point of view. He has a vast panorama; he has such tremendous space around him (…) a total field of vision,  and since he can take this total field at any time, he doesn’t have to worry about goals. He can take his time (…) You have a vast sense of space and time.  (23-24)

I lived on Gertrude Avenue [in the Fort Rouge section of Winnipeg] and there was the Assiniboine River at one end of the street, a few hundred yards away; at the other end, was the Red River.  I had a boat on each river, a rowboat on the Assiniboine (where I skied in winter) and a sailboat on the Red. (32)

Tom and I both started off [university] in Engineering [in the fall of 1928] and because of our long periods of study during the summer [when jobs were not available on account of the depression], we were able to upgrade ourselves into Arts. I read myself out of Engineering by my long summer [of 1929]. (27)

I walked to school many times in 50-below zero along Osborne Street [over the Assiniboine River via the Osborne Street bridge] across from the Parliament grounds to the old quondset huts that used to be called Manitoba University. (27-28)

We [Easterbrook and McLuhan] had an absolute agreement between ourselves to disagree about everything and this kept up (…) a very hot dialogue [between us] from morning to night for years in Winnipeg which carried us on foot across town at night, late at night till three or four in the morning, back and forth across the city. [McLuhan’s family lived south of downtown, Easterbrook’s north.] (34)

He’s been stubborn always. [Easterbrook on McLuhan] (34)

Tom and I went to Europe [in 1932] during the Depression on our own. (…) We used youth hostels. From portal to portal we spent one hundred dollars in three months and supported ourselves very happily all that period. It was the sort of trip you couldn’t have today.  You couldn’t ride bicycles on the roads we travelled on because of the congestion of traffic in England now. So it was a pastoral event and a fulfillment of a great ideal.  (26)

One peculiar thing happened when Tom and I were travelling in England. We had to decide as we came south on our bike route whether to go to Cambridge or bypass it for London. And we said, No, we’ll go to Cambridge later; we’ll study there. And both of us did. We ducked Cambridge on our tour and went back there to study. He went to Jesus College [as a professor in 1955-1956], I went to Trinity Hall [as a student in 1934-1936]. (36-37)

How fortunate we were [in Winnipeg] in receiving people from every part of United States. Manitoba University, in our time, had great figures from United States and Great Britain (…) like Rupert Clendon Lodge2… (30)

I applied to Wisconsin University for my first job in 1936 in the depth of the Depression and got it. I applied to Wisconsin University because of Lloyd Wheeler3, who was the only [professor] I knew [in the English department] at Manitoba who had been to an American university. I wrote to his alma mater using his name and got the job. (36)

  1. Speaking of Winnipeg, ed John Parr, 1974, 23-38
  2. See note 3 below.
  3. McLuhan to E.K Brown, new head of the UM English Department, December 12, 1935: “I wish merely to introduce myself as one of the products of some of the leanest years of the Manitoba English Department. The last year was somewhat relieved by the presence of Dr. Wheeler, but I had directed my energies to philosophy, and did my best work for Professor Lodge.” (Letters 79)

McLuhan and Beckett: Through the vanishing point by way of neither

Managing The Ascent from the Maelstrom [McLuhan’s ‘odos ano kato play on Poe’s The Descent into the Maelstrom] today demands awareness that can be achieved only by going Through the Vanishing Point. (McLuhan)1

I want to bring poetry into drama, a poetry which has been through the void (das Nichts durchschritten hat) and makes a new start in a new space. I think in new dimensions and basically [im Grunde] am not very concerned whether someone can follow me in this. (Beckett)2

McLuhan is reported to have detested Beckett.3 But this is almost certainly a misunderstanding due to McLuhan presenting his thought in different ways depending on his audience, his mood, the particular topic he was developing, and so on. This is no different from anybody else, of course, but with McLuhan the danger of such oversimplified misunderstanding was acute on account of the unique multiplicity of his thought, combined with his equally unique unconcern with precise formulation. It may be guessed that he knew how little ‘precise formulation’ had achieved in the past and wanted to see what ‘imprecise formulation’ could do. Hence his attachment to probes and to the mining of ignorance.

In fact, as the above citations illustrate, the central preoccupation of both McLuhan and Beckett was ‘the same’ — what might be termed ‘mapping the unmappable’, speaking the “unspeakable”. 

Formulated in McLuhan’s terms, as soon as the essential plurality of media is admitted4, the question emerges: what lies between media such that they may be differentiated? how is this between navigated? where and when does this take place? who is involved? above all, why does this take place? on what strange basis? and what does this “flip” through “the vanishing point” between media have to do with human being and with its history, society and culture?

Over and over again, for more than 30 years from 1946 to 1980, this drama of metamorphosis that takes place in the “interior landscape” was described by McLuhan in terms of the mariner in Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom. Many of these repeated descriptions have been collected here.  The key point for McLuhan, as he expressed it already in 1946, lay in the mariner’s escape from the whirlpool through detachment, study and reprogramming:

The sailor in his story The Maelstrom is at first paralyzed with horror. But in his very paralysis there is another fascination which emerges, a power of detached observation which becomes a “scientific” interest in the action of the strom. And this provides the means of escape. (Footprints in the Sands of Crime) 

Beckett, too, had been formulating the “quintessence” of his thought since ‘my way is in the sand’ from 1946, the same year as McLuhan’s ‘Footprints in the Sands of Crime’!  In that year Beckett published “Trois poèmes”, one of which, untitled, reads in his own translation:

my way is in the sand flowing
between the shingle and the dune
the summer rain rains on my life
on me my life harrying fleeing
to its beginning to its end

my peace is there in the receding mist
when I may cease from treading these long shifting thresholds
and live the space of a door
that opens and shuts5

Twenty years later, his 1966 ‘Pour Avigdor Arikha’ continued the effort of quintessential refinement (again in his own translation):

Siege laid again to the impregnable without. Eye and hand feverishly after the unself. By the hand it unceasingly changes the eye unceasingly changed. Back and forth the gaze beating against unseeable and unmakable. Truce for a space and the marks of what it is to be and be in face of. These deep marks to show.6

A decade later again, in 1976, when the composer Morton Feldman specifically asked him for “the quintessence” of his work7, Beckett gave him this:

TO AND FRO in shadow from inner to outer shadow
from impenetrable self to impenetrable nonself by way of neither
as between two lit refuges whose doors once neared gently close,
once turned away from gently part again
beckoned back and forth and turned away
heedless of the way, intent on the one gleam or the other
unheard footfalls only sound
till at last halt for good, absent for good from self and other
then no sound
then gently light unfading on that unheeded neither
unspeakable home 8

 This “way of neither” goes “through the vanishing point”. It is “the medium [that] is the message”.

 

  1. Take Today, 13.
  2. Samuel Beckett speaking to gymnasium students in Germany in February 1961.  Modified translation from Knowlson’s bio of Beckett, Damned to Fame, 427.  Original: “Ich will Poesie in das Drama bringen, eine Poesie, die das Nichts durchschritten hat und in einem neuen Raum einen neuen Anfang findet. Ich denke in neuen Dimensionen, und im Grunde kümmert es mich wenig, wer mir dabei folgen kann.” (Spectaculum 6, 1963, 319)
  3. See, eg, Marchand 106.
  4. McLuhan held that the essence of human being lies in language use. But every human begins as life as an in-fant, aka a non-speaker. A flip is required between the medium of in-fancy to that of speech. It therefore belongs to the very essence of human beings that media are plural.
  5. The French original: “je suis ce cours de sable qui glisse/entre le galet et la dune/la pluie d’eté pleut sur ma vie/sur moi ma vie qui me fuit me poursuit/et finira le jour de son commencement//cher instant je te vois/dans ce rideau de brume qui recule/où je n’aurai plus à fouler ces longs seuils mouvants/et vivrai le temps d’une porte qui s’ouvre et se referme”
  6. Disjecta, 152. The French original: “Siège remis devant le dehors imprenable. Fièvre oeilmain dans la soif du nonsoi. Oeil par la main sans cesse changé à l’instant même ou sans cesse il la change. Regard ne s’arrachant à l’invisible que pour s’asséner sur l’infaisable et retour éclair. Trêve à la navette et traces de ce que c’est que d’être et d’être devant. Traces profondes.”
  7. Knowlson, Damned to Fame: “I (Feldman) said that I was looking for the quintessence, something that just hovered.” (557). Beckett himself is recorded as observing to Martin Esslin, “I take away all the accidentals because I want to come down to the bedrock of the essentials, the archetypal.” (Beckett Remembering / Remembering Beckett, ed James and Elizabeth Knowlson, 2006, 47-48)
  8.  “Neither’, Samuel Beckett: The Complete Short Prose, 1929-1989, ed S E Gontarski, 1996. The original draft (which Beckett wrote for Feldman in the middle of their conversation and later slightly altered) began: “To and fro in shadow, from outer shadow to inner shadow. To and fro, between unattainable self and unattainable non-self.” (Knowlson, Damned to Fame, 557) Although written out in the form of a poem, and although having a clear relation to the poem ‘my way is in the sand’, Beckett insisted that ‘Neither’ was prose, not poetry. This may have been a pointer to ‘Pour Avigdor Arikha’.

Autobiography – beginning to teach in 1936

In 1960, McLuhan looked back a quarter century to his first years teaching at the University of Wisconsin (1936-1937) and St Louis University (1937-1944):

When I began to teach Freshman rhetoric in 1936 the “new criticism” had not yet begun to be current in colleges. Nor had there yet begun that full study of ancient rhetoric as a means of understanding Renaissance literature. Moreover, the application of anthropological method to the appreciation of the multi-levelled riches of popular culture had not yet come into vogue. From the first, I used all three of these approaches to freshman English, and further, found the Basic English of Ogden and Richards a wonderful aid. To these I would add to-day an introduction to the “languages” of the various media of writing,  typing, print, photography, film, radio, and television. For these tongues of the media, whether touched with mechanism or electronic fire, serve to reshape the patterns of discourse, and constitute a large portion of our “meaning.” What is shared by the “new criticism,” by traditional rhetoric, popular culture, and by study of the languages and grammars of the media, is the habit of reading and writing in depth. Depth analysis ended with printing and has returned in the past century, which may become known as the electric or electronic age. Multi-levelled exegesis of Ovid or Virgil or the Scriptures was not only a medieval mode of reading and writing. It preceded Christianity and was the norm among ancient “grammarians.” To-day it is again the norm in physics, in psychology, in poetry and the arts. (‘Grammars for the Newer Media’, Communication in General Education, ed Frances Shoemaker and Louis Forsdale, 17-27, 1960)

Preface to Eric Havelock and the Toronto School

Harold Innis and Eric Havelock taught at the University of Toronto together for almost twenty years. Innis came to Toronto in 1920 and remained until his death in 1952.  Havelock joined the faculty in 1929 and left for Harvard in 1947.

Marshall McLuhan taught at Toronto from 1946 until 1979.  Innis and he were colleagues for six years, bound together by Tom Easterbrook who was a longtime crony of McLuhan from Winnipeg (they toured England with one another as university students in 1932) and who was a close associate, almost an assistant, to Innis in the UT Political Economy department.

Innis and Havelock knew each other personally from 1930 at the latest and influenced each other profoundly over the following decades. McLuhan met Innis through Easterbrook in 1948 (if not already in 1947).  It is unclear when he first met Havelock, but presumably sometime in the 1950s. McLuhan, in turn, was profoundly influenced by both Innis and Havelock. The three together are rightly considered as forming a ‘Toronto school of communications’.

The chapters which follow are posts from the blog: McLuhan’s New Sciences (http://mcluhansnewsciences.com/).  Each considers some aspect or aspects of the relations between Innis, Havelock and McLuhan.  Often the instigation is taken from research claims which have all too often ignored the plain facts of the matter. In particular, researchers have unaccountably failed to look into Havelock’s early writings1 from Toronto and have therefore not seen when and how he contributed, mightily, to the ‘Toronto school’.

The research of all three turned on deep questions of epistemology and ontology. Now that all three are coming back into fashion as communication theorists, particularly Innis and McLuhan, perhaps to be joined soon by the early Havelock, it is time to consider just how they related to each other and what their objects were in doing so.  

Eric Havelock and the Toronto School is the first volume to be published by NorthWest Passage Press. The press will concentrate on Canadian intellectual history and will include volumes of original texts, some now out of print, some never published at all.  Its motivation, taken from Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan, is that the margin generates insights which the centre does not — but which, for its own stability, it needs to acknowledge. By according with such marginal insights and reorienting itself through them, the centre is able to regain its balance and prevent an uncontrollable destabilization that is otherwise inevitable.

 

Santa Ana, April 6, 2017

  1. Most of Havelock’s early writings from his time in Canada are now difficult to access or even to find at all. NorthWest Passage Press will issue a volume of them later in 2017.

Innis, McLuhan and “the “power of metamorphosis”

There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing with this subject. For it does not at all admit of theoretical expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion about it, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself. (Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c-d)1 

The words spoken by the muzhik had the effect of an electric spark in his soul, suddenly transforming and uniting into one the whole swarm of disjointed, impotent, separate thoughts which had never ceased to occupy him. (…) He felt something new in his soul and delightedly probed this new thing, not yet knowing what it was (…) “And suddenly (…) I understand him from a hint!” (Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky)

My aversion to publishing anything has not been due to want of interest in others but to the thought that after all a philosophy can only be passed from mouth to mouth, where there is opportunity to object & cross-question & that printing is not publishing unless the matter be pretty frivolous.” (C.S. Peirce to Lady Welby, letter of December 2, 1904)

The soul (…) has a slow and dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. (Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man)

The printing press and the radio address the world instead of the individual. Their dialectic is overwhelmingly significant to subjects whose subject matter is human action and feeling and is important in the discovery of new truth, but is of very little value in disseminating it. (Innis, A Critical Review)2

By the middle 1930’s, if not earlier, Harold Innis had become highly suspicious of information packaging in modern media like newspapers and radio, but just as much in academic research — including his own.3 He was clear that all information processing inevitably had an element of self-interest and/or of purchased interest and could sense that this inevitable “bias” would precipitate a crisis of civilization.

Starting sometime later, but by the early 1940s at the latest, he began to look into Eric Havelock’s research on “the use of epic poetry as a technique for inter-generational communication of the ‘cultural baggage’ of a non-literate people”.4 Communication as information packaging in modern society and in pre-classical Greece gave him two historical data points 2500 years apart. It must have occurred to him that further data points could be defined by correlating other communication media with their historical and cultural contexts. In fact, the chapters of Empire and Communications (1950) constitute just such a series of civilization/media data points:

Egypt [and “the shift from dependence on stone to dependence on papyrus”]
Babylonia [and questions of clay, scripts and languages]
The Oral Tradition And Greek Civilization
The Written Tradition And The Roman Empire
Parchment And Paper
Paper And The Printing Press

McLuhan was not alone in pointing out that Innis’ economics research into the pervasive and often surprising effects of staple products on the societies processing and transporting them, and on ‘The Penetrative Powers of the Price System’ (1938), provided models for the investigation of the complex relationships between communications media and their social-cultural-political correlates.

But the extension of his data points over a 5000-year history was intended by Innis to be more than a series of snapshots of communication revolutions. The first two sentences of Empire and Communications read: 

The twentieth century has been notable in the concern with studies of civilizations. Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, Sorokin, and others have produced works, designed to throw light on the causes of the rise and decline of civilizations, which have reflected an intense interest in the possible future of our own civilization.

Innis’ object, too, was to address “the possible future of our own civilization”. And his central concern was to investigate whether social science could surmount what he called “the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization”5 and thereby become a sort of gyroscope for use in navigating that future. In investigating the space-time implications of the communication capabilities of civilizations since the beginning of recorded history, the hope was to uncover an indirect way around the problem of “fundamental solipsism” through a kind of social science relativity theory. As Innis wrote as early as 1942! in ‘The Newspaper in Economic Development’:

The concepts of time and space must be made relative and elastic and the attention given by the social scientists to problems of space should be paralleled by attention to problems of time.6

This intention of Innis’ work was noted by McLuhan in his ‘Introduction’ to the 1964 reissue of The Bias of Communication:

Innis taught us how to use the bias of culture and communication as an instrument of research. By directing attention to the bias or distorting power of the dominant imagery and technology of any culture, he showed us how to understand cultures. Many scholars had made us aware of the “difficulty of assessing the quality of a culture of which we are a part — or of assessing the quality of a culture of which we are not a part.” (1327) Innis was perhaps the first to make of this vulnerable fact of all scholarly outlook the prime opportunity for research and discovery.

Also by  Graeme Patterson’ in History and Communications (1990):

Beginning with the late work, however, [Innis] began to write about the relativity , or “bias” of media both in relation to each other and to space and time. In this instance his pattern of thought resembles relativity theory, which he probably took as a model to escape the “mechanical” theory he so disliked and mistrusted. It offered him an escape from determinism. (79)

And by John Watson in his 2007 ‘Introduction’ to Empire and Communications:

What Innis was attempting to do in the social sciences was to develop a grand synthesis akin to the quest to develop a “unified field theory” in post-relativity science. He was attempting to develop and merge a theory of politics or imperialism (drawing largely on the work of classics scholars) with a theory of consciousness (drawing on scholars researching the concept of time and space) and a theory of technology (based on an understanding of the biases of media of communications). In so doing, he hoped to overcome the persistent problem of objectivity in the social sciences and provide a means of escape from the limitations of contemporary worldviews [like those of “Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, Sorokin and others”]. Although Innis did not successfully complete this grand synthesis, his work in my opinion does not represent a dead end but a rich scholarly vein that has been abandoned long before it is exhausted. Innis offers an immensely suggestive way forward in a world dominated by “spin”, punditry, and commercialism.

However, Watson was deeply mistaken in suggesting that the need for Innis, or for us after him, was to “successfully complete this grand synthesis” by going all the “way forward” to some supposed end of the lateral “vein” exposed by him.

Innis did not live long enough to come to grips with two suggestions made in this connection by McLuhan in the programmatic letter he wrote to Innis on March 14, 1951 (Letters 220-224).

The first of these was the strange notion that the only “way forward” was a labyrinthine way backward:

One major discovery of the symbolists which had the greatest importance for subsequent investigation was their notion of the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties whose retracing provided the key to all arts and sciences (…) Retracing becomes in modern historical scholarship the technique of reconstruction.8

Again:

But whereas Machiavelli was concerned with the use of society as raw material for the arts of power, [Wyndham] Lewis reverses the perspective and tries to discern the human shape once more in a vast technological landscape which has been ordered on Machiavellian lines.

In his letter to Innis, McLuhan described this retrograde movement of any medium, by which it establishes the prior social environment required by it in order to begin, as “magical”.9 In a later letter to Wyndham Lewis he characterized this strange action as the “power of metamorphosis” (McLuhan to Wyndham Lewis, December 18, 1954, Letters 245), where the phrase should be read in the first place as a subjective genitive: this is an irrepressible power belonging to metamorphosis.

The second suggestion was that this “magical” backwards step, or “flip”, has in fact already been activated whenever any communication medium is deployed, beginning with “language itself“. And since language defines human beings, differentiating them from all other sorts of beings, this knot in time is always already in operation wherever and whenever humans are at all. Indeed, so essential is it to humans that even their perception (“sensation itself”, “the first stage of apprehension”) cannot occur without it. McLuhan made this point in correspondence with Ezra Pound later in the same year as his letter to Innis:

From Joyce’s Stephen Hero, I gather that he had with the combined aid of Aristotle, Dante and Rimbaud decided that the poetic process was nothing else than the process of cognition. That sensation itself was imitation since the forms of things in our sensations are already in a new matter. Namely a human organ. So that the first stage of apprehension is already poetic. (July 24, 1951, Letters 228-229)

Similarly in another letter to Pound from February 28, 1953:

Art is imitation of the process of apprehension.10

And in his important 1954 lecture, Catholic Humanism and Modern LettersMcLuhan described this “scandal of human cognition” as follows:

As language itself is an infinitely greater work of art than the Iliad or the Aeneid, so is the creative act of ordinary human perception a greater thing and a more intricate process than any devised by philosophers or scientists. The poetic process is a reversal, a retracing of the stages of human cognition. It has and will always be so.11 

In sum, “the first stage of apprehension is already poetic” and “the poetic process is a reversal, a retracing of the stages of human cognition”. It followed that there is no human experience of any sort that does not already enact the backwards flip of media-tion. In the investigation of communication media, therefore, the need was first of all to follow, via “the technique of reconstruction”, what is always already happening on its own in all human experience.

In his letter to Innis McLuhan put this point in the middle of reflections on the cybernetics work at MIT which he saw as being “a dialectical approach born of technology” — that is, a linear method taking only the “way forward“: 

The fallacy in the Deutsch-Wiener approach is its failure to understand the techniques and functions of the traditional arts [ie, “the poetic process [a]s a reversal, a retracing of the stages of human cognition”] as the essential type of all human communication. It is instead a dialectical approach born of technology and quite unable of itself to see beyond or around technology. The Medieval schoolmen ultimately ended up on the same dialectical reef.

Between the lines, McLuhan was suggesting to Innis that his own studies of “the (…) type[s] of human communication”, like those of Karl Deutsch and Norbert Wiener at MIT, might have missed its essence. Innis’ approach, despite its great many virtues, had itself fallen prey at its core, perhaps, to the very “technology” he intended to critique. His research would therefore be subject to the same “dialectical” limitations as those of “the Medieval schoolmen” which culminated in “the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization”. (The irony here, of course, was that Innis had famously been critical of McLuhan’s Catholicism in one of their first encounters and now McLuhan was implying that ‘bad Catholicism’ was actually central to Innis’ own work.)

The point at stake, or knot, might be put in terms of Innis’s ‘Plea for Time’ which was correct, in McLuhan’s estimation, in associating time — or times — with “the human dialogue” and with the correlative need for space-time and eye-ear balance. But Innis missed the essential factor that one of the times implicated in “the human dialogue” was backwards (in the continual readjustments of interlocutors to each other in dialogue, a readjustment that was also operative in the “magic” of communications media) such that the fundamental plurality of time did not lie only in the undoubted complications of “forward” linearity.

But precisely since the plurality of time implicated questions of its “magical” reversal, it also forced the further question of that plurality’s synchronicity or “allatonceness”.12 For otherwise differences in time, regardless of their forward or backward direction, would be ‘one at a time’ and ‘one at a time’ is just what ‘time singular’ is!  If time were fundamentally plural, it followed that it must be plural at once — that is, all at the same time!  In this case, not only did time have different forward and backward horizontal directions, but also different vertical ones (‘odos ano katosuch that plural times could unfold simultaneously as well as progressively and retrogressively.  Time itself, like language for Saussure, was both diachronic AND synchronic. It was, as McLuhan put the point in Through the Vanishing Point  (1968), “multileveled“.13

Investigation of this space-time and media complex, while initiated by Innis, needed to be reoriented, in McLuhan’s judgement, if it were to specify the only way out of the problem that was plaguing that investigation, namely “the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization”. And the key to this reorientation was that it learn how to take up itself the “magical” resetting of space-time(s) which was already fundamental to the operation of media throughout the register of human sentience from perception to cognition. Understanding plural space-times could therefore be restated as “understanding media”, as Innis had shown, not only because each medium was inherently structured by some space-time configuration, but also, as McLuhan added, because media operate precisely and only on the basis of a “magical” resetting of these configurations.

The essence of communication according to McLuhan was the step back14 into its own possibility. So, when a child (or the human species for that matter) first begins to speak, the requirement is that it unexpectedly first find itself in a communicative environment. In his letter to Innis McLuhan called this “participation in a process”. Only so, only with some sudden feel for an already existing social medium (however unconscious this must be in the beginning), could a message ever be sent or received. Even, or especially, the initial message, ontogenetic or phylogenetic, requires the activation of a prior medium through which such a message could first be a message at all

A reworked ‘Plea for Time’ would therefore have to consider how an environment could already be in place before the first message and how it was possible to understand this — then and now. In McLuhan’s 1964 ‘Introduction’ to The Bias of Communication he observed:

One can say of Innis what Bertrand Russell said of Einstein on the first page of his ABC of Relativity (1925): “Many of the new ideas can be expressed in non-mathematical language, but they are none the less difficult on that account. What is demanded is a change in our imaginative picture of the world.”15

The great question is when and where this “change in our imaginative picture of the world” takes place. After the ‘I’ is in place in its accustomed environment?  Or before?  Produced by and through the experiencing subject?  Or productive of the experiencing subject?16

If a child (or the species) in linear fashion simply continued its existing inability to understand language, no message would, of course, ever be sent or received. But this was just the cul-de-sac in which Innis was trapped.  As he baldly put the point in ‘A Plea for Time’: “It is impossible for [the economic historian] to avoid the bias of the period in which he writes”. That is, temporal conditions are both determinative and unbreakable — unbreakable on account of time’s (singular) arrow forward. “The fundamental solipsism of Western civilization” necessarily followed from the suppositions that time is singular and that singular time takes only the “way forward” and that there is no remove from this moving staircase.

Instead, according to McLuhan, a “magical” resetting of identity is always occurring to humans through a flip back in time and space into a new sensed environment — a flip he called “the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties” — and that he saw as already characterizing perception itself. So where Innis was prescient that “a stable society is dependent on an appreciation of a proper balance between the concepts of space and time” (‘A Plea for Time’), between the eye and the ear, he did not consider that this balance as a dynamic sensus communis might be more fundamental than linear time and the familiar environment in space — and than the identity correlate with these. He therefore did not see that it is entirely possible “to avoid the bias17 of the period in which [one] writes” and thereby to avoid “the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization”. 

In his letter to Innis, McLuhan indicated that this “learning process”, particularly in the case of language but in fact with any medium at all, “provided the key to all arts and sciences” and even to contemporary commerce and politics in what he called “the age of advertising”: 

Working concepts of “collective consciousness” in advertising agencies have in turn given salience and practical effectiveness to these “magical” notions of language.

But the modern world was caught in the strange fate that although it everywhere put this “magic” to use, it remained unconscious of it (like fish of water) and therefore remained trapped in it —  trapped in what could and should be its way out. As McLuhan put it to Innis:   

The whole tendency of modern communication whether in the press, in advertising, or in the high arts is toward participation in [such] a [magical] process (…) And this major revolution, intimately linked to technology, is one whose consequences have not begun to be studied although they have begun to be felt.

Technology itself had gone from Gutenbergian linearity to electric “allatonceness”. And now McLuhan was proposing to Innis that study of “this major revolution” be initiated on “Bloor St”, meaning in the old McMaster Building where Innis had been a student 40 years before and that now (following the McMaster move to Hamilton) housed the UT department of political economy that Innis headed.

McLuhan’s letter ends with a description of how this study might operate: 

A simultaneous focus of current and historic forms. Relevance to be given to selection of areas of study by dominant artistic and scientific modes of the particular period. Arts here used as providing criteria, techniques of observation, and bodies of recorded, achieved, experience. Points of departure but also return.

His estimation here of the potential of the “arts” echoed claims made earlier the letter:

But it was most of all the esthetic discoveries of the symbolists since Rimbaud and Mallarmé (developed in English by Joyce, Eliot, Pound, Lewis and Yeats) which have served to recreate in contemporary consciousness an awareness of the potencies of language such as the Western world has not experienced in 1800 years.

an experiment in communication which is to follow the lines of this letter in suggesting [a] means of linking a variety of specialized fields by what may be called a method of esthetic analysis of their common features.

What was at stake in these “esthetic discoveries” and in an “esthetic analysis” derived from them was the “method” of a flip back into changed presuppositions (or media)18

From the point of view of the artist however the business of art is no longer the communication of thoughts or feelings which are to be conceptually ordered, but a direct participation in an experience.

Experience conceived on the model of language learning — “awareness of the potencies of language” — was the continually renovating exercise of perception based on the flip back into a changed medium. Study of this “process” as implemented on the basis of different dominants would allow “a simultaneous focus of current and historic forms” AND the testing of each of these forms through “direct participation in an experience” for the intelligibility it was able to give (or not) to the great questions implicated in communication (especially that of its unavoidable “bias”).  Once “achieved”, such intelligibility would itself already represent an overcoming of “the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization” and so be a new “departure but also [a] return”.19

Communications study on this model would be a search for its own beginning and itself be knotted in time. For it would actually begin only after the sort of testing for intelligibility it was already doing came into sudden focus for a community of speakers of what would constitute a new language. It would genuinely begin only when the pieces suddenly fell into place as described by Plato in his Seventh Letter as cited above — but now, not for isolated individuals who have “found [it] and [and then have it be] lost again and again”, but for an ongoing community of researchers.

Plato’s descriptions of the necessarily dialectical process of communication in philosophy have been reported with some frequency. Here is Tolstoy:   

It was something like that which might happen to a man who, after vainly attempting, by a false plan, to build up a statue out of a confused heap of small pieces of marble, suddenly guesses at the figure they are intended to form by the shape of the largest piece; and then, on beginning to set up the statue, finds his guess confirmed by the harmonious joining in of the various pieces. (What I Believe, 1884)

And Thomas Kuhn:

Suddenly the fragments in my head sorted themselves out in a new way, and fell into place together. My jaw dropped, for all at once Aristotle seemed a very good physicist indeed, but of a sort I’d never dreamed possible. Now I could understand why he had said what he’d said, and what his authority had been. Statements that had previously seemed egregious mistakes now seemed at worst near misses within a powerful and generally successful tradition. That sort of experience — the pieces suddenly sorting themselves out and coming together in a new way — is the first general characteristic of revolutionary change that I shall be singling out after further consideration of examples. Though scientific revolutions leave much piecemeal mopping up to do, the central change cannot be experienced piecemeal, one step at a time. Instead, it involves some relatively sudden and unstructured transformation in which some part of the flux of experience sorts itself out differently and displays patterns that were not visible before. (The Road Since Structure, 2000, 16-17)

And here is McLuhan on Innis in his ‘Introduction’ to the 1964 reissue of The Bias of Communication discussing “the basic difference between classified knowledge and pattern recognition”:

It is a helpful distinction to keep in mind when reading Innis since he is above all a recognizer of patterns. Dr. Kenneth Sayre explains the matter as follows (…): Classification is a process, something which takes up one’s time, which one might do reluctantly, unwillingly, or enthusiastically, which can be done with more or less success, done very well or very poorly. Recognition, in sharp contrast, is not time-consuming. A person may spend a long while looking before recognition occurs, but when it occurs it is “instantaneous”. When recognition occurs, it is not an act which would be said to be performed either reluctantly or enthusiastically, compliantly or under protest. Moreover, the notion of recognition being unsuccessful, or having been done very poorly, seems to make no sense at all.20

Along the way of trying out “participation” in the different ‘space-time resetting’ processes of multiple media21, communications study might at some happy and necessarily sudden moment join physics, chemistry, genetics and other sciences which have been born from the same experimental procedure and which have the same basis in the social resetting “magic” of new language learning. As McLuhan suggested in his letter to Innis:

One major discovery of the symbolists which had the greatest importance for subsequent investigation was their notion of the learning process as a labyrinth of the senses and faculties whose retracing provided the key to all arts and sciences…

  1. Heidegger used this text in his 1929 laudatio for Husserl to describe Husserl’s ability to spark die Sache des Denkens in his students.
  2. Instead of “their dialectic” in this passage Innis has “the oral dialectic”. He meant something like: ‘Having significance which ultimately derives from oral dialectic, their subject matter is human action and feeling and is important in the discovery of new truth…’.
  3. See Innis and McLuhan in 1936. Innis’ experience in WW1 and his graduate work in Chicago just after the war with the then 34 year old Frank Knight had inclined him in this direction. Then, in 1935, articles in the maiden issue of The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science by Knight and by Innis’s mentor at UT, E.J. Urwick, prompted Innis to specify his suspicions.
  4. See Sirluck on Innis, Owen and Havelock and Innis and Havelock – 1930 and Beyond. Much ink has been spilled on the question of how Innis came to have an interest in communications.  The suggestion here is that he had it at least since his graduate studies in Chicago in the inchoate field of “political economy”. Havelock’s work (which was abroad at UT and particularly, of course, in the classics department where Innis had close friends) then suggested the need for a similar — but interestingly different — concern in relation to the development of Greek society leading up to Plato. As McLuhan noted, the suggestion was then close of “a shift in attention from the trade-routes of the external world to the trade routes of the mind” (‘The Later Innis’, 1953).
  5. Empire and Communications, 1950 edition, 67; 1972 edition, 56.
  6. Originally in the Journal of Economic History, December 1942, reprinted in Political Economy in the Modern State, 1946, p 34.
  7. McLuhan is citing Innis here from an essay included in The Bias of Communication, ‘Industrialism and Cultural Values’.
  8. In his first published paper in 1936 on Chesterton, McLuhan, age 25, had already noted that “history is a road that must often be reconsidered and even retraced”.
  9. See ‘the “magical” essence of communication‘ for further discussion.
  10. Letters 235.  With “imitation” here, McLuhan has Greek ‘mimesis‘ in mind.  Such “imitation” is anything but a “matching”.
  11. The Medium and the Light, 157
  12. See Through the Vanishing Point, p 103: “The Shakespearean moment (“that time of year”) includes several times at once…”.
  13. Through the Vanishing Point, 55: “If the three-dimensional illusion of depth (in Western European art) has proved to be a cul-de-sac of one time and one space, the two-dimensional (in Eastern art) features many spaces in multileveled time.” Cf, The Gutenberg Galaxy citing Georges Poulet: “For the man of the Middle Ages, then, there was not one duration only. There were durations, ranked one above another, and not only in the universality of the exterior world but within himself, in his own nature, in his own human existence” (14; also Through the Vanishing Point, 9). And Understanding Media: “plurality-of-times succeeds uniformity-of-time” (152).
  14. The ‘horizontal’ step back is just as much, according to McLuhan, a ‘vertical’ step down. Hence the importance to him of Poe’s Maelstrom and the underworlds of Odysseus, Orpheus. Aeneas and Alice. The notion of such a ‘step back’ appears as ‘der Schritt zurück’ at least as early as Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1794).
  15. Similarly in his later (1972) ‘Foreword’ to Empire and Communications citing Schrödinger instead of Russell: “What Erwin Schrödinger tells us about the change of outlook from Newtonian to quantum physics concerns the student of Harold Innis: This intrusion (of quantum physics) has, in a way, overthrown what had been built on the foundations laid in the seventeenth century, mainly by Galileo, Huygens and Newton. The very foundations were shaken.
  16. It is hard to see how any sorts of discoveries (especially “scientific revolutions”) can be made without a resetting of perception and identity. But how to delineate the ‘resetting of perception and identity’ is a fateful question which has been posed without answer for at least 2500 years and probably for many millennia more than that. A great part of the problem, of course, lies in the questions of where and when this ‘takes place’, if a resetting of time and space is of its essence, and who ‘does’ it, if the experiencing subject is its result.
  17. There is no such thing for McLuhan as “the bias”. For not only are psychological and sociological contexts as complicated as chemical and genetic ones, implicating an array of different biases, but any bias is itself always situated in an ontological context which supplies a kind of counter-current to it. This underlying counter-current to bias is “the main question“.
  18. Media for McLuhan are not ‘mechanical things’. They are psychological and sociological and even ontological dominants. In his ‘Introduction’ to The Bias of Communication (1964) he wrote of the bias or distorting power of the dominant imagery and technology entailing new perception and new experience“.
  19. The great mystery to communications research is that such intelligibility has long been “achieved”, but its achievement resists communication:
    And what there is to conquer
    By strength and submission, has already been discovered
    Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope
    To emulate — but there is no competition —
    There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
    And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
    That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
    For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.  (‘East Coker’, v)
  20. McLuhan cites Sayre from The Modeling of Mind (1963), 17-18.
  21. In his ‘Introduction’ to The Bias of Communication McLuhan described Innis’ method as the “use of history as a scientific laboratory, as a set of controlled conditions within which to study the life and nature of forms”.

The “magical” essence of communication

As theme (…) I have taken (…) the new media of communication and their power of metamorphosis. (McLuhan to Wyndham Lewis, December 18, 1954, Letters 245)

We paced along the lonely plain, as one who returning to his lost road, and, till he reached it, seems to go in vain. (Dante, Purgatorio, Canto 1, cited by McLuhan in ‘Space, Time, and Poetry’, 1955)1

The world of electric circuitry feeds us back into ourselves. The whole point about feedback is that it feeds back into you, and involves you in the process. That is what is called communication. (Education in the Electronic Age, 1959)

In his letter to Harold Innis from early in 1951 (if not at the end of 19502), McLuhan observed that modern art, social science and commerce all echoed an ancient complex (recalling his 1946 essay ‘An Ancient Quarrel in Modern America’3):

Many of the ancient language theories of the Logos type which you cite [in Empire and Communicationsfor their bearings on government and society have recurred and amalgamated themselves today under the auspices of anthropology and social psychology. Working concepts of “collective consciousness” in advertising agencies have in turn given salience and practical effectiveness to these “magical” notions of language. (…) Mallarmé (…) saw at once that the modern press was not a rational form but a magical one so far as communication was concerned. Its very technological form was bound to be efficacious far beyond any informative purpose.

By “informative purpose” here McLuhan meant what he would later call “the message” and “its very technological form” was “the medium”.  So he was clear already in late 1950 or early 1951 that “the medium is the message”.4 That is, something else and something more is going on in communication than information exchange. This something else and something more is, in the first place, the trans-formative effect of communication on its users to produce by a kind of backwards flip the social understanding that is required to be already in place in order to begin to issue or to receive a message as a message. Required, that is, for communication to be initiated at all.

It is this trans-formative power of a medium to effect integration into the social environment required by it that McLuhan called “magical”. A sort of backwards somersault is effected so that the capacity that must already be in place in order to have the capability to send or receive a message has somehow suddenly been activated beforehand

Following Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, McLuhan saw that a sudden knot in time was the key structural feature of such “magic”:

We have to repeat what we were about to say (‘The Be-Spoke Tailor’, Explorations 8, 1957, #4)

The basis of all paradox, Christian and secular, is to be found in the sixth book of the Physics of Aristotle [235b-241b], to which Aquinas refers in his Summa Theologica I.II.q 113.a.7, ad quintum. The question for Aquinas is whether justification by faith occurs instantly or gradually. Aquinas says it occurs instantly because — ­here he appeals to Aristotle’s Physics — “the whole preceding time during which anything moves towards its form, it is under the opposite form.” (From Cliché to Archetype, 1970, 160)5

In a postscript to his May 6, 1969 letter to Jacques Maritain (Letters, 371), McLuhan cited all of this same text, in Latin, and included its continuation:

et in ultimo instanti illius temporis, quod est primum instans… (and in the last instant of that [preceding] time, which is the [succeeding time’s] first instant …)

The initial (initiating) understanding of language, whether in an individual child or in the whole species, cannot be the result of gradual steps. For this would presuppose something like ‘pre-linguistic thinking’ and would decisively submit the supposed process to Zeno’s paradox (that a gradual course cannot be brought to an end because always reaching only some fraction of the way to that end).6 In fact, language learning implicates Zeno’s paradox in a particularly heightened way since the process at stake is not only one of crossing a certain distance in time or space, but of crossing from ignorance to insight. As with McLuhan’s example from Aquinas of “justification by faith”, understanding language can hardly be thought to depend on a process “under the opposite form” — ie, based on the ignorance and absence of what is to be achieved. 

When a child first hears the sounds of language it can have no idea yet of their “informative purpose”. At some point, however, it will suddenly grasp the meaning of one or two of these sounds as its first steps toward full language capability. From this “magical” moment on, it will understand both the meaning of a growing number of sounds and be more and more integrated (or in-formed) into its social environment exactly through this understanding. These steps will be possible only because the child has “magically” been introduced into the “very technological form” of these sounds — that is, into the medium of language as the technique of using sounds to communicate. The time sequence here is all important. The child cannot understand a message like ‘mama’ without first understanding (however unconsciously) the medium of language: it must already have come to understand in some sense that sounds can mean in order then to grasp the meaning and use of some particular sound. Strangely, however, the medium (that sounds can mean) is somehow learned (ie, found to be in effect) through the sounds repeatedly made to the child. The that medium, which must come first, is somehow effected via the what messages, which can come only second.7 In the event, the medium is imparted unconsciously and by “magic”. It is a matter, as McLuhan says, of a “collective consciousness” that is somehow able suddenly to bootstrap itself in the child as the peculiar sort of creative receptivity needed to understand the meaning of sounds. This can occur only after it has first of all mysteriously found itself in a communicative environment.

Something of the sort occurred when language first began to be used by humans (regardless of whether this happened once or multiple times). Before this sudden event, or events, there was, of course no acclimatization to language because there was no language. Nor did one or more proto-humans think up language in some sort of non-verbal thinking leading to a light-bulb moment.  For whatever ‘non-verbal thinking’ might be, it would of course be non-verbal and the great phylogenetic (species related) question, as much as the ontogenetic (individual related) one, is exactly how a non-verbal being suddenly becomes a verbal being. How is this gap crossed? How is this gap crossed into a new sort of environment that is suddenly accomplished in a moment’s time and not by one individual alone but by at least two together and at once — for communication (“the human dialogue itself”) is inherently social.

McLuhan emphasized the importance of this point for an understanding of the present and future of the electric age in a letter to John Snyder, Aug 4 1963:

we are already moving in depth into a situation in which learning becomes a total process (…) from infancy to old-age. The pattern by which one learns one’s mother tongue is now being extended to all learning whatsoever. The human dialogue itself becomes not only the economic, but the political and social, fact.  (Letters 291)

Media, and especially language as the archetypal medium, somehow effect a resetting of time and space — and of the individual and social identity that is correlate with these. This is “magical” exactly because of this unaccountable translation of space, time and identity. Always and everywhere humans are submitted to this “magic” with incalculable effect. But they do not perceive this submission, nor its trans-formative effect, nor their calling to an understanding of these. Nor, of course, do they intuit their utmost need to do so.

His [Midas’] power of translating all he touched into gold,8 is in some degree the character of any medium, including language. This myth draws attention to a magic aspect of all extensions of human sense and body; that is, to all technology whatever. All technology has the Midas touch.9 (UM, 139)

This “Midas touch” possessed by “any medium, including language”, is the vast but invisible “power of translating” into a new space-time dimension and its correlate identity: the fundamental power of meta-phor.10

  1. See McLuhan and Plato 9 – on the plain of oblivion and the passage given above from McLuhan and Watson, From Cliché to Archetype, 1970, 160.
  2. McLuhan’s letter to Innis of March 14, 1951 (Letters, 220-223) is described as a “rewrite”. Innis’ answer to the original was written in February and apologizes for the belated reply.
  3. ‘An Ancient Quarrel in Modern America’ was originally a talk delivered in 1944. The talk, in turn, was based on his 1943 PhD thesis, The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of His Time, a thesis which might well have been titled ‘An Ancient Quarrel in Elizabethan England’.
  4. In a letter to Pound (July 16, 1952, Letters 231): “Once a man has got onto technique as the key in communication it’s different. But somehow the bugbear of content forbids that anybody be interested in technique as content.”
  5. The passage from Aristotle discussed by Thomas here is cited again by McLuhan, but in Latin, in ‘The Medieval Environment’ from 1974.
  6. Aristotle specifically discusses Zeno in this same book of the Physics.
  7. The sounds conveying the what message vary greatly, of course, from culture to culture.  But the that medium is universal.
  8. McLuhan was well aware that Midas touched his own daughter, Zoe (‘life’) into gold (death). The unanswered question hanging over modernity is whether the magical world-transformative powers gigantically developed in it lead to life or death.
  9. The centrality of the “magical” essence of communication to McLuhan’s whole enterprise may be seen from the ‘declaration’ he made on the sacred island of Delos in 1972 on his second ‘ekistics’ tour of the Aegean with C.A. Doxiadis: The mystery of creativity is the paradox of how beauty is created from ruin. After a long career of stylistic invention and triumph, W.B. Yeats deliberately scrapped his entire enterprise in order to begin again: “Now (that) my ladder’s gone, I must lie down (where all the ladders start) in the (foul) rag and bone shop of the heart.” (The Circus Animals’ Desertion) It is the mystery of how life succeeds in that it seems to fail, the paradox of how beauty is born out of despair, art out of the garbage and sweepings of the street. The merely mechanical world of the computer has coined the phrase: “Garbage in, garbage out”. It is the glory of the human spirit (…) that “garbage in” is wonderfully transformed into “treasure out”. (‘Epilogue to the Declaration of Delos Ten’, Ekistics v203, 291, October 1972.) Because no human medium can ever do more than enable the making of meaning (“garbage in”), never the matching of it, the success of communication (“treasure out”) depends entirely upon its prior situation in an ontological environment that prompts and sustains this multiple transformation.
  10. Compare Samuel Beckett speaking in his excellent German to gymnasium students in Germany in February 1961: “Für mich ist das Theater keine moralische Anstalt im Schillerschen Sinne. Ich will weder belehren noch verbessern noch den Leuten die Langeweile vertreiben. Ich will Poesie in das Drama bringen, eine Poesie, die das Nichts durchschritten hat und in einem neuen Raum einen neuen Anfang findet. Ich denke in neuen Dimensionen, und im Grunde kümmert es mich wenig, wer mir dabei folgen kann. Ich konnte nicht die Antworten geben, die man erhofft hatte. Es gibt keine Patentlösungen.” (Spectaculum 6, 1963, 319, emphasis added.) The translation given in Knowlson’s biography of Beckett (427) is frequently cited in English language Beckett criticism, but stupidly gives “space-room” for Beckett’s “Raum”: “For me, the theatre is not a moral institution in Schiller’s sense. I want neither to instruct nor to improve nor to keep people from getting bored. I want to bring poetry into drama, a poetry which has been through the void (das Nichts durchschritten hat) and makes a new start in a new room-space (SB: ‘in a new space’). I think in new dimensions and basically am not very worried about whether I can be followed. I couldn’t give the answers,which were hoped for. There are no easy solutions.”

The Toronto school and 3 Plato books

Decades ahead of Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato in 1963, three other Plato books were published by scholars with close Toronto ties.  On the one hand, this gives evidence of a long-standing concern with Plato in the area. On the other, it is one more instance of Whitehead’s observation that the “European philosophical tradition” — and not only its philosophical tradition — “consists of a series of footnotes to Plato”.

E.J. Urwick (1867-1945) came to Toronto in 1924, where he would head the Department of Political Economy and mentor his successor in that position, Harold Innis. In 1920, still in England, he had published The Message of Plato, a Re-Interpretation of the Republic. There was, of course, close study of Plato in Toronto’s great classics department, as touched upon below. But Urwick’s attention to him in specific reference to classical Sanskrit thought, and in the context of Urwick’s academic areas of political economy and social work, introduced a cross-disciplinary concern with Plato that would find later expression in the work both of Innis and of Havelock. In a letter to Innis, a year before his death, Urwick described his concern as follows:

The whole trend today is to exalt the rationalist scientific approach and to discard the philosophical. I am not thinking only of the worship of the physical and mechanical sciences, but rather of the attempt to make ethics, philosophy, sociology,  etc., conform in method and language to the physical sciences — with disastrous results. Specialization runs mad, and when it does so, never leads to understanding. Its natural result is strife and violent dogmatism. (Urwick letter to Innis, April 24, 1944, cited in innis, Political Economy in the Modern State, 1946, 144)

George Grube (1899–1982) was a year ahead of Eric Havelock studying classics at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. He came to Toronto in 1928, another year ahead of Havelock, and remained there for the remainder of his career, retiring in 1970. His frequently republished study, Plato’s Thought, was first issued in 1935.  Through his work on Plato, on Aristotle, on Greek drama, and particularly through his many translations of Plato, Grube was one of the outstanding educators in his time of the classics and particularly of Plato. Grube and Havelock were particularly close, not only as old friends from Emmanuel Cambridge, but also as fellow outspoken socialist activists. In the Festschrift celebrating Grube’s 70th birthday, Havelock contributed ‘Dikaiosune: An Essay in Greek Intellectual History (In Tribute to George Grube, the Distinguished Author of Plato’s Thought)’.

Alban Winspear (1899-1973) grew up near Calgary and became a Rhodes Scholar in classics from Queens University in Kingston, Ontario (160 miles east of Toronto). After a short stint back at Queens, he taught at the University of Wisconsin (one of his grad students was Norman O. Brown) from 1930 until the second world war. Although his tenure included the year McLuhan was a teaching assistant at UW (1936-1937), there is no indication that the two met. Since they would certainly have done so as fellow western Canadians trained in England, Winspear may have been on sabbatical that year. His The Genesis of Plato’s Thought was published in 1940 and reviewed by Havelock in The Canadian Forum in 1941.1 Like Havelock’s later Plato study, Winspear’s book focused on the changes in Greek society leading up to Plato and to the classical era.  As Havelock reported:

A classical professor of Wisconsin, an ex-Rhodes scholar of Queen’s University, has now written a book on “The Genesis of Plato’s Thought”, which marks a new departure in Platonic scholarship, and perhaps the beginning of a new tradition in Platonic interpretation. (…) Conforming to the demands of a historical interpretation, the author very properly devotes well over half his work to establishing Plato’s context in the unfolding process of Greek society, a process conditioned by economic forces and determined by deep underlying class conflicts. In the prehistoric stage, according to his account, Greece enjoyed the loose yet homogeneous structure of the tribe, a roughly communal society. The literature, art and philosophy of Greece as we know them are the products of those epochs in which this tribal order decayed and gave way to new forms. Social change was accomplished in two main stages: first, by the establishment of private property in land, accompanied by the rise of a land-owning oligarchy oppressing the majority as serfs, and already committed to the use of slave labor (…) But secondly, the agrarian economy was in turn invaded by the commercial exchange economy, governed by production for the market, and crystallizing in Athens in that combination of imperialism and democracy under the great Pericles which we think of as the golden age of Greece. These stages of economic change and class conflict were mirrored in Greek thought and philosophy.

Havelock’s review looks forward to Preface to Plato both positively and negatively. On the positive side Winspear’s book had virtues which Havelock would attempt to match:

This account of Plato and his times has one great merit: it is synoptic, and at the same time dynamic. Greek history is presented not as a series of events but as an organic process in which Plato’s philosophy appears not as an isolated creation, but as part of a pattern of Greek behavior. 

Preface to Plato would attempt to specify that pattern.

Negatively, the work had defects which Havelock would work to avoid:

Yet precisely because the circulation of this book is likely to reach beyond the horizons of classical departments, the lay reader needs to be warned of certain flaws and cracks in Winspear’s structure which are not superficial, but affect the foundations. I am not thinking of particular inaccuracies of fact or of evidence, of which there are enough to whet the appetite of the professional scholar long schooled in the art of not seeing the wood for the trees. Nor am I thinking of objections to this work which will be based on a refusal to accept its premises, the economic interpretation of history and the materialist dialectic. If the book fails to command major respect as an interpretation of Plato, it is because the author has not lived up to his own premises with sufficient ardor and patience.

Havelock paid particular attention to Winspear’s explication of Platonic metaphysics:  

[Plato’s] so-called ‘Theory of Forms’ is justly expounded as a necessary contribution to the methodology of the sciences, both physical and social, without which they could not advance beyond the stage of barren empiricism. These concluding pages, which the hostile reviewer is least likely to read, are the best in the book.

He recognized in Winspear a laudable but failed attempt, following Plato’s own potentially more promising one, to bring together strict empiricism with theory. Havelock concludes his review with the remarkable claim that Plato “was, after all, a materialist; he wanted order at all costs“.2

In Empire and Communications (originally 1950), Innis referenced Winspear’s book (p 56, n4 in the 1972 version edited by Mary Quayle Innis) as the sort of “Marxian interpretation” that “has received its expected reward”.  It is probable that he was alerted to it by Havelock’s review in Canadian Forum.

What is distinctive of the Toronto school in the persons of Innis, Havelock and McLuhan is the attempt to turn decidedly against “specialization”, but without losing specification and particular relevance. So far, it must be said, this attempt on the part of the Toronto school has not been seen to have succeeded (any more than Havelock saw Winspear as succeeding).

Specialization has certainly not proved a bulwark against nihilism and may be seen as one of the progenitors of it.  The great question is whether specialization may be exceeded rigorously. And the central matter implicated in this open question is whether a general theory of the humanities and social sciences is possible which not only is not contradicted by the “materialist” facts but is able to further specify them.

 

  1. The Riddle of Plato’s Politics’, Canadian Forum, April 1941, 15-19
  2. Havelock’s characterization of Plato as “a materialist” who ” wanted order at all costs” relates to his own position in 1941.  At a time when his friends on the left like George Grube were pacifists and against Canadian participation in the war, Havelock, whose brother had died in WW1, was an interventionist. He was, then, a materialist determined to achieve proper order “at all costs” — just like Plato.

Reuel Denney

Gary Genosko has pointed up the relevance of Reuel Denney for McLuhan research and for communication studies in general. Denney was a co-author with David Riesman and Nathan Glazer of The Lonely Crowd (1950) and was a colleague of Riesman at the University of Chicago in the 1950’s.1 In 1957 he published The Astonished Muse which followed The Mechanical Bride in offering a close reading of American popular culture, especially its spectacles (football games) and hobbies (hot rods). Riesman supplied an introduction to the 1982 reprinting.

With Riesman, a McLuhan correspondent and frequent contributor to Explorations, and Denney, Chicago was one of the institutions, along with Toronto (Innis, McLuhan, Carpenter and Tyrwhitt), Harvard (Richards, Parry, Havelock; also Tyrwhitt after she left Toronto for Harvard in 1955) and Yale (Cleanth Brooks; also Havelock after he left Harvard for Yale in 1963) where investigation of oral and written media was thought to have the potential of throwing important new light on the working of mind.

In 1955 Denney authored ‘The Cultural Context of Print in the Communications Revolution‘ (Library Quarterly, 25:4, Oct 1955, 376-383).  Like Innis and McLuhan before him, Denney led off his article with the tale told by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus concerning the invention of writing by the Egyptian god, Theuth:

At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. (‘The Cultural Context of Print in the Communications Revolution‘, 376-377, citing Phaedrus, 274-5 in the Jowett translation)

 

 

  1. Riesman left for Harvard in 1958; Denney for Hawaii in 1962.

What nobody knows

ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνώνυμον ὂν τυγχάνει τὸ τῶν αὐτεπιτακτῶν γένος (Plato, Statesman, 260e, ‘since the class of those who issue orders on their own is virtually nameless’)

Movies and TV complete the cycle of mechanization of the human sensorium. With the omnipresent ear and the moving eye, we have abolished writing, the specialized acoustic => visual metaphor1 that established the dynamics2 of Western civilization.
By surpassing writing, we have regained our WHOLENESS, not on a national or cultural, but cosmic, plane.3 We have evoked a super-civilized sub-primitive man.4 
NOBODY yet knows the language inherent in the new technological culture; we are all deaf-blind mutes5 in terms of the new situation. Our most impressive words and thoughts betray us by referring to the previously existent, not to the present.6
We are back in acoustic space. We begin again to structure the primordial7 feelings and emotions from which 3000 years of literacy divorced us. (‘Five Sovereign Fingers Taxed The Breath’, Counterblast, 1954) 

the full analogical sense of exact orchestration (…) implies the complete self-effacement of the writer (…) Existence must speak for itself. It is already richly and radiantly signed. The artist has merely to reveal, not to forge the signatures of existence. (Joyce, Mallarmé, and the Press, 1954)

Have you encountered the work of Ed T Hall? He says he got the idea of our technologies as outerings of sense and function from Buckminster Fuller. I got it from nobody.8 (McLuhan to Walter Ong, February 27, 1962, Letters 287) 

Nothing has its meaning alone. (Take Today, 3)

  1. McLuhan has “the specialized acoustic-visual metaphor” here which might be taken to indicate that his thinking about the question of how to express the sensory foundations, plural, of media was still in development at this point.  The essential difference between “the omnipresent ear and the moving eye” together in “movies and TV” and “the specialized acoustic-visual metaphor” of writing is captured only in the word “specialized”.  The essential time difference between the either/or emphasis of the chronological ‘acoustic => visual’ transformation eventuating in writing, and the both/and synchronic emphases of ‘ear <=> eye’ in “movies and TV” remains silent in his formulation — as does writing’s marginalization of the acoustic and correlative centrification of the visual.
  2. “Dynamics” here points to “cosmic” in the next sentence. Going back to Plato and Aristotle, and continued to this day in the liturgy of the eastern church, δύναμις names the power that is the basis of order throughout the κόσμος. Cf, in Plato: “wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order (κόσμος), not of disorder (ἀκοσμία) or dissoluteness (ἀκολασία). Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power (μέγα δύναται) of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry.” (Gorgias 207e-208a)
  3. Here is the nub of McLuhan’s difference from, say, Richards and Havelock. He starts from an ontological or “cosmic plane”.  Only from it can there be “WHOLENESS, (…) on a national or cultural (…) plane” or, indeed, on an individual one.
  4. ‘Super-sub’ invokes Heraclitus B60: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή (the way up and the way down are one and the same) — one of the epigrams to Eliot’s Four Quartets.  This image implicates in turn his central themes of figure/ground and the synchronic “interior trip into the darkness of our own being”, aka into the “interior landscape”.
  5. McLuhan invokes “the language inherent” here in contrast to “mutes” and to “words and thoughts (that) betray us”.  The Logos as “the language inherent” in all things is a “cosmic” third against the “specialized acoustic” (“deaf”) and “specialized (…) visual” (“blind”) — or (as it may just as well be put) against the “specialized acoustic” (“blind”) and “specialized (…) visual” (“deaf”).
  6. Here the question of time emerges that would preoccupy McLuhan for the rest of his life. How to express “the new situation” in terms of the “all” that “is always now” (Eliot)?
  7. Primordial aka “cosmic”.
  8. “I got it from nobody” may be considered in many different ways,  Heard as an historical claim, this is of course nonsense: McLuhan plainly had the idea from Henry Wright.

I.A. Richards on Eric Havelock

Eric Havelock officially moved from the University of Toronto to Harvard in 1947, but was a guest lecturer there already in 1946. He and I.A. Richards appear to have immediately developed a close relationship. But even prior to their becoming Harvard colleagues, they may have been acquainted: both were at Cambridge (UK) twenty years before, Richards as a popular lecturer, Havelock as a brilliant student. And while Havelock was still in Toronto, Richards may have been in touch with him as part of the recruitment process for Harvard.

Richards had begun an intense engagement with Plato soon after he arrived at Harvard from Cambridge in 1939.  By 1942 he had already produced a translation of the Republic into Basic English. But after Havelock’s arrival he took up Homer and published a translation of the Iliad in 1950.  As seen from the citations below, it is probable that he began to investigate “the shift from Homer to Plato” through the influence of Havelock’s published and unpublished work (particularly his never published volumes on Socrates funded by the Guggenheim foundation) and through personal dialogue between the two.

Richards’ references to Havelock are surprisingly frequent:

‘The Spoken and Written Word’. The Listener, October 16, 1947 (pp 669-670), reprinted as ‘Literature, Oral-Aural and Optical’, in Complementarities, (1976, ed John Paul Russo), 201-208:

Eric Havelock has suggested that we may see in Plato’s rejections of Homer the revolt of the writing mind’s mode of apprehension against the pre-literate mind’s other, less abstract and intellectual, ways of ordering itself.

‘Toward a More Synoptic View’ (1951) in Speculative Instruments, (1955):

It is a perilous transition [from oral apprenticeship to literary instruction], no doubt, but hardly new or, on our ordinary time-scale, sudden. If Mr Eric Havelock is right, Socrates was put to death for trying to replace apprenticeship — association with and imitation of the knowledgeable — by instruction, and it looks as though the founding of [Plato’s] Academy itself was an early and decisive step in an interminable and necessary process. (Speculative Instruments, 126)

‘Opening Address’, P.E.N. Conference 1964, Arena, v24 (1965), 4-14, 20-22, reprinted in Design for Escape: World Education Through Modern Media (1968), chapter 2:

As Eric Havelock has been insisting, Homeric and Platonic utterances are trying to do radically different things. Plato’s rejection of Homer was in fact a revolution, a redesigning of what a man should be endeavouring to be. “The greatest invention of the Greeks was man”, remarked Werner Jaeger. The Greeks he was speaking of have Plato, not Homer, as their type specimen! This contrast between Homer and Plato has a special importance just now when in so many parts of the world an oral, story-borne culture is being destroyed and and replaced by a literate conceptual world-picture. (Design for Escape, 37)

‘Prologue: From Criticism to Creation’, Times Literary Supplement, 27 May, 1965, 438-439, reprinted in So Much Nearer (1968) with additional notes:

the shift from Homer to Plato: Eric Havelock in Preface to Plato (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963) very fully discusses this transition showing the depth and extent of the changes that can occur in a culture as an oral tradition is replaced by a  literature. In the Greek case the outcome was singularly happy. But with the cultures, say, of Africa, there are grave reasons to fear that values now carried in speech will be swept away without compensating gains for any but an unhappily separated few.  On how this world-wide transition is managed (or mishandled) the mental and moral quality of living of the majority of human beings, for many generations, will depend. But how many competent people are thinking about this — compared with those competent people who are devoting themselves to ‘winning’ some local and ephemeral war? (So Much Nearer, 20)

‘Instructional Engineering’ in The Written Word (1971):

further reflection on how writtens and spokens differ and yet aid one another is timely. And here a sustained explanatory account of a chief difference by Eric Havelock, in his Preface to Plato, proves useful. He gives it as a reply to a striking, indeed, for our occidental tradition, a momentous question: whether, given the immemorial grip of the oral method of preserving group tradition “a self-consciousness could ever have been created. If the educational system which transmitted the Hellenic mores had indeed relied on the perpetual stimulation of the young in a kind of hypnotic trance, to use Plato’s language, how did the Greeks ever wake up? The fundamental answer must lie in the changing technology of communication. Refreshment of memory through written signs enabled a reader to dispense with most of that emotional identification by which alone the acoustic record was sure of recall. This could release psychic energy, for a review and rearrangement of what had now been written down, and of what could be seen as an object and not just heard and felt. You could as it were take a second look at it . . . In Greek, the words for explain, say, and mean could coincide . . . Now, the statement in question, if it concerned important matters of cultural tradition and morals, would be a poetised one, using the imagery and often the rhythms of poetry. It was one which invited you to identify with some emotively effective example, and to repeat it over again. But to say, ‘What do you mean? Say that again’, abruptly disturbed the pleasurable complacency felt in the poetic formula or the image. It meant using different words and these equivalent words would fail to be poetic; they would be prosaic.” This account presents an opposition between the identification invited by epic and the questioning attitudes which release from the memory load and development of thinking can induce.1 (70)

  1. The same passage from Havelock cited by Richards here from Preface to Plato (208-209) is used earlier by McLuhan in ‘The Future of Morality: The Inner versus the Outer Quest’ (1967). That Richards was reading McLuhan at just this time is evidenced by his mentioning him in 1968 in So Much Nearer.

Body percept 2

McLuhan seems to have first broached the notion of body percept in a letter to Peter Drucker in October 1966:

Whenever we make a new technology, that creates a new environment which we automatically assume as our cultural mask. We do this via our senses, not our concepts. Each new environment creates a new body percept, new outlook and new inlook (…) The orientalizing of our world by inner involvement in depth occurs via circuit or feedback along with speed-up of data. An all-at-once world is structurally like the subconscious. It tends to be mythical and archetypal. Consciousness becomes incidental rather than structural. It is the old environment, not the new one. The individual yields to the tribal man. Electronic man is the first since neolithic times to live in a man-made environment. Preliterate man naturally regarded his world as man-made. An information environment like ours is man-made. Media are, as it were, cultural or corporate masks. (McLuhan to Peter Drucker, October 24, 1966, Letters 338) 

Over the next two years he recurred to the notion with some frequency:

Each of us forms a body percept, from moment to moment, based upon his intake of sensations, perceptions, but we are completely unaware of this body percept which we form of ourselves from moment to moment. It takes considerable dexterity and skill to observe one’s own body percept, the image we form of ourselves. (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, Session — Technology: Its Influence on the Character
Of World Trade and Investment, November 16, 1966)

Everybody responds to a new environment without benefit of concepts. The immediate sensory adjustments which we make to each and every change in our surroundings also (…) alter our body-percept or our sense of ourselves. (The Future of Morality: inner vs outer quest, 1967)

a feeling of themselves — an image of themselves — body percept (McLuhan in conversation with Norman Mailer and Malcolm Muggeridge in 1968)

the vanishing point in the viewer (…) proprioceptive tension and body percept (Through the Vanishing Point, 59)

On the frontier everybody is a nobody

ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνώνυμον ὂν τυγχάνει τὸ τῶν αὐτεπιτακτῶν γένος (Plato, Statesman, 260e, ‘since the class of those who issue orders on their own is virtually nameless’)

O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall.
Frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed.
(Hopkins, No Worst, There Is None, 1885, cited in ‘The Analogical Mirrors’, 1944, and in Take Today, 1972, 256)

What is more moving than to think that this soldier [featured in an ad] fought and died for the fantasies he had woven around the image of Betty Grable? It would be hard to know where to begin to peel back the layers of insentience and calculated oblivion implied in such an ad. And what would be found as one stripped away these layers, each marked with the pattern of sex, technology, and death? Exactly nothing. One is left staring into a vacuum… (The Mechanical Bride, 1951, 13)

the artist (…) lives perpetually on this borderland between (…) worlds, between technology and experience, between mechanical and organic form (…) [exercising] the spirit of play which is necessary to maintain the poise between worlds of sensibility (McLuhan to Wilfrid Watson, Oct 8, 1959, Letters 257)

When we put our central nervous system outside us we returned to the primal nomad state. (…) Television man is nomadic man again; he has only one possible environment again: the globe. (‘Prospect’, 1962)

the interior trip into the darkness of our own being (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 1966, 28)

the computer, by speeding up the total available human experience, has in effect put outside — as the new environment — the human subconscious or unconscious. For years I’ve been noticing the extension of consciousness by various technological means. The human unconscious is the total experience of mankind, stored without any story line, just jumbled and assembled in the human unconscious. Now, with instant dispersal and instant retrieval systems, we have the all at once. We have put outside us, as a new environment, the unconscious… (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 1966, 13)

the vanishing point in the viewer (Through the Vanishing Point, 1968, 59)

the unperson: the man that never was (Take Today, 1972, 26)

the new frontier is as invisible as a radio wave. There are no tracks (…) The new frontier is pure opacity (Take Today, 90)

The We Nobody Knows (Take Today, 259)

Quest for Privacy And Identity Turns Everybody into Nobody (Take Today, 269)

When things come at you very fast, naturally you lose touch with yourself. Anybody moving into a new world loses identity. If you go to China, and you’ve never been there before, you’re a nobody.  You can’t relate to anything there. So loss of identity is something that happens in rapid change. But everybody at the speed of light tends to become a nobody. This is what’s called the masked man. The masked man has no identity. (Forward Through The Rearview Mirror, 100)

On the frontier everybody is a nobody (‘All The Stage Is A World In Which There Is No Audience’, 1978; ‘Last Look at the Tube’, 1978; ‘Living at the Speed of Light’, 1980)

McLuhan’s nomad/no-man is Plato’s Er in the realm of the dead, Poe’s mariner in the Maelstrom, Conrad’s Kurz in the Heart of Darkness, Alice in Wonderland, Eliot’s Tiresias in The Waste Land (see below). All undertake the “interior trip into the darkness of our own being” (Technology and World Trade, 28, 1966). And what is encountered there, in the dark, are the primordial forms of time and space out of which human identity is forged: “the total experience of mankind, stored without any story line, just jumbled and assembled in the human unconscious”.  (“Assembled” in this passage means “situated”, not “put together” — for there is ‘no one’ there “on the frontier” before identity who might assemble anything.  Here there is only “the unperson: the man that never was”, “the masked man”, the “nobody”.)

This phantom “unperson” is robbed of all identity in this “interior trip into the darkness” where it ‘finds itself’ in the “pure opacity” of “the human unconscious”. Most strangely, however, what effects the “opacity” here is not an absence but a fullness1 — for what is to be encountered here are the seeds of “everybody”, “the we nobody knows”, “the total experience of mankind“, “worlds plural, the entire “globe” of all possible human perception.

When the globe becomes a single electronic web with all its languages and culture recorded on a single tribal drum, the fixed point of view of print culture becomes irrelevant, however precious. (McLuhan to David Riesman, February 18, 1960, Letters 261)

What robs the “unperson” of identity is not (or not only) the disappearance of its usual markers, but the “jumbled” revelation of all possible markers. As Aristotle puts it in his usual pithy manner:

the fact that we cannot simultaneously grasp a whole and its parts shows the difficulty involved. However, since the difficulty is twofold [involving both what we see and our seeing], perhaps its cause is not in things but in us; for just as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, so is our soul’s intellective power to those things which are by nature the most evident of all. (Metaphysics, 993)

Hence, in The Waste Land, Tiresias, as man and woman, living and dead, has “foresuffered all“:

And I Tiresias have foresuffered all
Enacted on this same divan or bed;
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall
And walked among the lowest of the dead.

2500 years before, Plato set out the scene as follows:

every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them. (Phaedrus 249e-250a)

McLuhan’s claim was that with the advent of electric technology the planet would be forced to regain “an adequate remembrance” of “true being”.  As a professor of English, he put forward the hypothesis that this might be accomplished by the interrogation of language:

I have not wandered as far from literature as might appear. In so far as literature is the study and training of perception, the electric age has complicated the literary lot a good deal. However the new extensions of our senses have greatly enhanced the role of language as training for coping with the total environment. As the total environment becomes a technologically prepared environment, language assumes new roles over and beyond the confrontation with the printed page. Yet the literary man is potentially in control of the strategies needed in the new sensory environment. Language alone includes all the senses and interplay at all times. (McLuhan to Michael Wolff, July 4, 1964, Letters 304)

It is distinctive of human beings to have language and to have language to deploy some constellation of sense. Every constellation of sense, in turn, may be thought to derive from a mysterious exposure to all the possibilities of such constellations in “the darkness of our own being” — and to have made a selection there resulting in some “body percept“. Insofar as language expresses such selections as their effect and exposes them under itself, like a palimpsest, it may be said to reveal, in “the totality of language itself” (GG 248-9) across the historical and spatial range of its users, “all the senses and [all the possibilities of their] interplay”.2 Hence it is that “the literary man is potentially in control of the strategies needed in the new sensory environment” — where the word ‘potentially‘ indicates not only a future eventuality, but also the strange space and time of the investigations (from ‘vestige’ and ‘vestigium’ = “a footprint, a track”) of the potencies3 of sensory modalities through which, alone, this eventuality might be realized.4 

  1. Therefore the utterly strange finding that this “opacity” is at once a “landscape”.
  2. Cf, McLuhan to Robert J Leuver, July 30, 1969: “The reason that Joyce considered Vico’s new science so important for his own linguistic probes, was that Vico was the first to point out that a total history of human culture and sensibility is embedded in the changing structural forms of language.” (Letters 385). Also: “Eliot and Joyce accepted language as the great corporate medium that encodes and environs the countless dramas and transactions of man.” (Media Ad-vice: An Introduction, 1973)
  3. Cf, McLuhan’s letter to Innis of March 14, 1951: “But it was most of all the esthetic discoveries of the symbolists since Rimbaud and Mallarmé (developed in English by Joyce, Eliot, Pound, Lewis and Yeats) which have served to recreate in contemporary consciousness an awareness of the potencies (McLuhan’s emphasis) of language such as the Western world has not experienced in 1800 years. (Letters 220)
  4. The ‘situation’ of the nomad/nobody between the potencies of sense-formation is that of the child (or of the entire human species) at the moment of first language learning (when learning and use occur at the same moment). In a 1962 addendum to ‘Joyce, Aquinas, and the Poetic Process’ (1951) McLuhan cited Adolf Hildebrand from The Problem of Form: “The height of positivism would be attained if we could perceive things with the inexperience of a new-born child” (Joyce’s Portrait: Criticisms and Critiques, ed Thomas E Connolly, 265). Then, the next year in a letter to John Snyder (August 4, 1963, Letters 291): “The pattern by which one learns one’s mother tongue is now being extended to all learning whatsoever.” McLuhan’s claim, following the great minds from Heraclitus to Eliot, was that the forms of human experience differ in a fundamental way from the forms of physical materials in that they require activation from moment to moment. Known or unknown, the horizontal span of human experience is broken at every moment by a vertical descent into “the darkness of our own being” where selection must be made made between the potential formations ‘there’. The potential for our waking from the nightmare of history is therefore omnipresent. Cf, Heraclitus DK B53: αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεττεύων· παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη (Eternity is a child moving counters in a game, the kingly power is a child’s); and DK B70  Ἡ. παίδων ἀθύρματα νενόμικεν εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα (Heraclitus considered human opinions to be children’s toys).

Tradition and the Individual Talent

Eliot’s 1919 essay, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent‘, originally published in The Egoist, runs like a red thread through McLuhan’s work from beginning to end. Here he is at St Louis University in 1938, in his first year of full-time teaching (where the passage in bold announces his lifetime research goal):

Donne, and the later Shakespeare, on the one hand, and the Romantics on the other, have been read at Cambridge as though they were contemporaries of Mr. Eliot — which of course they are. For the continuing life of the language itself is such as to constitute a medium in which they are all contemporary. It is thus, as Mr. Eliot points out in his celebrated essay on ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, that the present is able to alter the “past” as much as the “past” nourishes the present. The “past” must be constantly reconsidered in order that it may be available in the present. And just as insensitivity to poetry marks a person as oblivious to the most exact and significant effects of language, so a lack of concern for the situation of contemporary taste and literary expression, is the mark of a radical defect in approaching letters. (‘The Cambridge English School’, Fleur de Lis, 38:1, 24, emphasis added)

And here he is 40 years later in the last substantial essay published before his death:

As cited (…) in Eliot’s (1919) review [of Pound’s Quia Pauper Amavi (which contains three Cantos) entitled “The Method of Mr. Pound”], “Mr. Pound proceeds by acquiring the entire past,” at which point “the constituents fall into place and the present is revealed”. This is the Pound “vortex”, and also the key to Mr. Eliot’s idea of Tradition: “a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional”. (‘Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land’, 1979, citing ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, Selected Essays, 1932, 14.)

A set of isomorphic problems is posed: what is the nature of time such that there can be “the timeless as well as (…) the temporal and (…) the timeless and of the temporal together”? What is the nature of language such that it is always constituted as “contemporary taste and (…) expression” while yet it “has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order”? What is the nature of human individuality such that a person can be a particular self, even while constantly changing — and such that that self is at once  differentiated from all others while ‘at the same time’ belonging with others to family, society and tradition? 1

Aside from frequent direct and indirect allusions to Eliot’s essay, McLuhan’s discussions of it include the following:

The New England ethos naturally finds its highest level of expression in the scholastic man, and the result is that the New England professor is autocratic. There is no social life co-extensive with him, nor one able to embody (…) his thought and actions. Brought up amidst this social nudity (…) T. S. Eliot confronted the situation directly in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’. Here it was that he exploded the heresy of “self-expression,” of “message”, and of artistic isolation and futility, which had found such congenial soil in New England. (Edgar Poe’s Tradition, 1944)2

The whole problem for the critic to determine in poetic judgment has been precisely indicated by Mr. Eliot in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’: “For it is not the ‘greatness’, the intensity of the emotions, the components, but the intensity of the artistic process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place, that counts.” (Poetic and Rhetorical Exegesis, 1944)

To the merely rationalist and revolutionary mind of the social “planner” or engineer there is never any way of grasping the nature of politics or of art. Rilke makes the same point as Eliot in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’: (…) only the traditionalist can be radical. He isn’t content merely to cut the shrubbery into new shapes. The essential impatience and rebellion of the New England mind disqualifies it for political and artistic functions, so that the defection of Henry James and T. S. Eliot was a trauma necessary to the preservation of their talents. (The Southern Quality, 1947)

We welcome the non-Euclidean spaces of modern physics which are not visualizable. And in these fields of relations we find it easy to recognize that any new factor of information or of codification, any new medium or channel, will somewhat modify the entire field of relations.
This admission from the world of mathematics and physics was introduced into literary discussion by T. S. Eliot in 1917 in his ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ when he indicated that for the twentieth century it was natural to consider “that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order”. This type of perception, so natural to a world in which all kinds of information flow with electronic velocity, involves the obvious corollary which Mr. Eliot at once pointed out: “The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new.”
To the literary mind, accustomed to the lineal arrangement of language on the page, the notions of simultaneity and of transformation by mutual interaction are very difficult concepts. They are alien and repugnant ideas. But even the literary person has no trouble recognizing the way in which a musical theme or harmony simultaneously modifies all the portions of a musical work. In a musical structure it is easy to observe the total relevance of every phrase to the entire work. The gradual admission of this organic criterion of ‘total relevance’ has come about in all fields of discussion in this century. It is equally the basis of anthropological study of cultures and of critical method in literature. The so-called ‘new criticism’ is, in the main, a recognition of the validity of the ‘total relevance’ attitude to all forms of speech and composition. (Knowledge, Ideas, Information and Communication, 1958)

In an auditory order the speaker becomes a voice in a liturgy, not an orator seeking to alter a point of view. An all-at-once auditory structure makes “self-expression” meaningless. The catalytic concept of T. S. Eliot in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ merely helped us to face the change which had already occurred in our culture in the later nineteenth century. In fact this may well be a principal junction of art: to anticipate change and to invent new models of experience that will enable us to come to terms with change before its full impact can erase earlier achievement. (Romanticism Reviewed, 1960) 

an all-at-once and simultaneous presence of all facets of the past (…) is what T. S. Eliot calls “tradition” in his celebrated essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’. Eliot’s concept seemed quite revolutionary in 1917, but it was in fact a report of an immediate and present reality. Awareness of all-at-once history or tradition goes with a correlative awareness of the present as modifying the entire past. It is this vision that is characteristic of the artistic perception which is necessarily concerned with making and change rather than with any point of view or any static position. (The Emperor’s New Clothes, 1968) 

The mosaic arrangement of multiple items of daily news creates not a picture of the world but an X ray in depth. A picture has a vanishing point related to a fixed position from which the picture is taken, but a mosaic, like a total field of energy or relationships, does not present the means for a point of view or a fixed position. It is an all-at-once or mythical structure in which beginning and middle and end are simultaneously present.
T. S. Eliot explained in his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ that all literature and art from Homer to the present constitutes a simultaneous order that is totally modified by the advent of any new work. A new work creates new space for itself and for all the pre-existing space, yet this is quite different from shifting one’s point of view. A point of view depends upon a pictorial space that is uniform and continuous and connected. (Environment As Programmed Happening, 1968)

Bertrand Russell noted of complementarity that the greatest discovery of the twentieth century was the technique of “the suspended judgement” — not single but multiple models of experimental exploration. The need to suspend points of view and private value judgments is indispensable to the programming of total environments.
T. S. Eliot, in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, gave classic statement to the theme of strategy of “the suspended judgment”. Citing the role of platinum as catalyst in effecting new chemical combination, Eliot observed: “The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material.” (Take Today, 97, 1972, citing ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, Selected Essays, 1932, 7-8.)

T.S. Eliot has two statements that directly concern our new simultaneous world of “auditory” or “acoustic” space in which electric man now dwells on the “wired planet.” The first passage is from his discussion of ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, explaining that “the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.” It is the character of auditory space, which we make in the act of hearing, to be a sphere whose center is everywhere and whose margin is nowhere, for we hear from all directions at once.
In the magnetic city of the new electric environment we receive data from all directions simultaneously, and thus we exist in a world sphere of resonant information that is structured and which acts upon us in the auditory pattern. Eliot had regard to the role of the individual talent faced by this new kind of richness of tradition and experience. So it is not strange that our time should witness a revival of many forms of oral culture and group performance, any more than it is strange that we should see on all hands the awakening and cultivation of occult traditions, and new concern with inner life and visionary experience.
For these are resonant things hidden from the eye. The wide interest in every kind of structuralism in language and art and science is direct testimony to the new dominance of the nonvisual values of audile-tactile involvement and group participation. In fact, it could be said that there is very little in the new electric technology to sustain the visual values of civilized detachment and rational analysis.
Mr. Eliot’s second statement on the world of the simultaneous concerns the “auditory imagination”: “What I call “auditory imagination” is the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word: sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end. It works through meanings, certainly, or not without meanings in the ordinary sense, and fuses the old and obliterated, and the trite, the current, and the new and the surprising, the most ancient and the most civilized mentality.”

Eliot here speaks of the mind’s ear, the subliminal depths and reach of the corporate tongue bridging countless generations and cultures in an eternal present. Eliot and Joyce accepted language as the great corporate medium that encodes and environs the countless dramas and transactions of man. Their raids on this vast inarticulate resource have made literary history on a massive scale. (Media Ad-vice: An Introduction, 1973)

My theme for the medievalist of today is that the electronic world has restored the habit of simultaneous awareness which is a primary character of acoustic or synchronic culture. T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets provides a complete guide to structural or synchronic perception of the world.  He had anticipated this awareness in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’: “the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of literature of Europe from Homer and within the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional.  And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity.” (The Medieval Environment, 1974) 

Yeats and Lady Gregory sought to regain the modes of corporate awareness of the oral folk as indispensable for the practice of contemporary literature. Eliot had stated his idea of tradition as an acoustic, resonating simultaneity without beginning, middle, or end, when he indicated [in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’] the relation of the individual to the corporate life as involving the historical sense, which “compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order”. The same simultaneous or acoustic approach to language occurs in his famous definition of “The Auditory Imagination”: “What l call the ‘auditory imagination ‘ is the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word: sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end, It works through meanings, certainly, or not without meanings in the ordinary sense, and fuses the old and obliterated, and the trite, the current,and the new and the surprising, the most ancient and the most civilized mentality. Arnold’s notion of ‘life’, in his account of poetry, does not perhaps go deep enough.” (English Literature as Control Tower in Communication Study, 1974)

It is quite fitting (…) that Alice and Humpty Dumpty should discuss words, since, as the very informing principle of cosmic action, it is language itself that embodies and performs the dance of being. Humpty Dumpty, the cosmic egg, says: “I can explain all the poems that ever were invented — and a good many that haven’t been invented just yet.” This remark by Humpty Dumpty invites a look at the work of T. S. Eliot, whose essay on ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ explains that a traditional writer will have the historical sense … “and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own Country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.” (Empedocles and T. S. Eliot, 1976)

 

 

  1. McLuhan’s conversion in 1937 announced that he found the answers to these questions in the ontological and economic trinities — in the nature of the Godhead and in the nature of the relation of the Godhead to creation. Following Thomas, he thereby accepted that the nature in both cases is love.
  2. Much ink has been spilled over the question of when McLuhan began asserting that “the medium is the message”. The passages in bold from 1938 and 1944 above, taken together, show that the point was already present in his mind at the very beginning of his career (although it would take decades to find a way to focus it). One the one hand: “the continuing life of the language itself is such as to constitute a medium” (1938); on the other, “the heresy of “self-expression,” of “message”, and of artistic isolation and futility” (1944). Because the message exists only in relation to the medium, it may be said that “the medium is the message”. That is, the medium is what makes a message possible as a message — what makes possible its intelligibility and therefore its very existence (since a message cannot be a message absent intelligibility). In this way, a message is always secondary to a primary medium (although our encounter with these is always reversed, first the message and second, if ever, the medium). When the medium goes into eclipse, so also any particular message and even the general possibility of messages. McLuhan’s whole career may usefully be seen as an attempt to answer the riddle of how to address these questions — how to compose a message about them — in a time (the night of the world) when media have fundamentally gone into eclipse. How to find a way of “contemporary (…) expression”?

“Body percept” – identity, space and time

In the mid-60s McLuhan broached the topic of what he called the “body percept”:1

Each of us forms a body percept, from moment to moment, based upon his intake of sensations, perceptions, but we are completely unaware of this body percept which we form of ourselves from moment to moment. It takes considerable dexterity and skill to observe one’s own body percept, the image we form of ourselves. The immediate surrounding — the new environment, whatever it is — is always invisible… (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, Session — Technology: Its Influence on the Character Of World Trade and Investment, November 16. 1966, p 12.)

 the image we have of ourselves….our body percept, as the psychologists say….our body percept, is something of which we are always unconscious…your body percept changes directly with any alteration in temperature, any alteration in sound….any alteration in input through any of the senses affects your body image….of this you’re completely unaware…(‘This is Marshall McLuhan’, NBC Television, March 19, 1967)

The thing that is most intimate and most totally surrounding us at all times is our own body percept. We create a body percept from minute to minute, or second to second by simple sounds and inputs that we experience, and if this body percept were totally unconscious, it would take the toil of a psychiatrist to reveal it. We do not know what our body percept is without special efforts at getting into a new environment from which to examine it. (‘Education in the Electric Age’, 1967)2

Everybody responds to a new environment without benefit of concepts. The immediate sensory adjustments which we make to each and every change in our surroundings also affect the patterns of human association in society as much as they alter our body-percept or our sense of ourselves. (The Future of Morality: inner vs outer quest, 1967)

This “body percept” is said to be “the image we form of ourselves”, “our sense of ourselves”. But this is clearly a very strange matter. For, in the first place, who does this work of identity formation? Since the “body percept” is something “we form of ourselves” — “our sense of ourselves” being the object and result of the activity — it would seem that there is something, or somebody, prior to our selves, that in some way enables the “image” and “sense” we have of who we are.  An “I” (“each of us”) somehow before and aside from our “I”?  An “I” that somehow originates and crafts our “I”? (As discussed here, McLuhan treats this shadow figure involved in identity formation as the “masked man” on the “frontier”.  In his 1972 interview with L’Express he said: “the key is that they [the young] return to a primitive existence, in which life is reduced to nothing, and they no longer have any kind of identity. They reject their own identity, and become no-one. (…) It is liberation, but when it is total liberation, it is like death. We all know the reincarnation thesis: we are freed from our own body; we can disappear right now and come back totally different next time. This is what we have reached.”)

Further, when does this activity occur?  McLuhan says that it transpires “from moment to moment” and is “immediate” and is “without benefit of concepts”.  Such a process can hardly occur in ordinary chronological time for it would then, of course, ‘take time’: it would be mediate, not “immediate”, subject to conceptualization, not “without benefit of concepts”, and would not be finalized “from moment to moment”. In fact, if identity formation occurred in clock time, we would always be waiting for our “body percept” to resolve itself in order then to go about the business of the “intake of sensations” and of “sensory adjustments (…) to (…) our surroundings”. But there is no such delay and no such chronological process. Instead, our sense of ourselves and our response to our surroundings is, as McLuhan says, always “immediate”.

If the “body percept” yet changes “from moment to moment”, this is no trans-formation which happens in chronological time.  Instead, it is a change which has always already occurred such that the “body percept” is immediately in possession of a sense of itself and able to respond to the surrounding world — no matter how different it may be from the “body percept” from the moment before. 

In Saussure’s terms, this process is synchronic, not diachronic. In this understanding, human beings are subject to a remarkable process in which their very identity is formed, including the manner of their “intake of sensations”, in a way similar to the saussurean view of the ‘production’ of language. Here the genesis of language is conceived to operate through a series of decisions made in synchronic time concerning which sounds and which modifications of those sounds (like their order and emphasis) are to be taken as significant. Or as insignificant. So English operates via a defined range of accepted meaningful sounds and of the manipulation of those sounds, while other languages operate with different ranges of these same variables.  

In the remaining decade and a half of his life after broaching the notion of the “body percept”, McLuhan would increasingly focus on the plurality of time as times as the key to this formation and on the role of Saussure in specifying this strange chronology.  In one of his last published essays before his death (‘Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land’, 1979) he would write:

Contemporary linguistics has recovered the multi-leveled study of language in our time. (…) the four divisions of the Four Quartets in respect to the four seasons, the four elements, and the four analogical levels of exegesis (…) are musical and simultaneous rather than sequential. (…) Mythic “narrative” is not sequential but simultaneous, requiring prolonged meditation.  (…) The importance of this simultaneity concerns the classical claim to embody the Logos in the resonant interplay of divisions. (…) The simultaneity of the four levels, as used by the grammarian, constitutes the resonance of the Logos, just as the five divisions, when used by the orator, constitute the presence of the word. This is what the linguists now call la langue (…) Eliot made a wedding of the diverse patterns of the four levels of exegesis on the one hand, and of the five divisions of classical rhetoric on the other. As already remarked, both patterns are synchronic and simultaneous rather than diachronic or sequential. 

In this same essay McLuhan cites Eliot on tradition as “a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer (…) has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense (…) is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together…” (‘Tradition and the Individual Talent‘ [1919], Selected Essays, p. 14).

And so as well with the “body percept”.  In the process of identity formation — aka, of “our sense of ourselves” and our response to the world — humans somehow engage with a chaotic array of possibilities for self identity which McLuhan terms “allatonceness” and “the unconscious”. These possibilities are necessarily chaotic and unconscious because they are situated3 before any particular instance of consciousness derived from them. It is the same difference as that between all the sounds available for language use and the set of sounds used in any particular language. As cited below from Technology and World Trade“the human unconscious is the total experience of mankind, stored without any story line, just jumbled…”. 

This is a process of engagement with all the possibilities for our “sense[s] of ourselves” — one which every human being is continually undergoing “from moment to moment”. It is out of this confrontation that a selection has always already been made resulting “immediately” in “the image we form of ourselves” and the “sensory adjustments [we make] to (…) our surroundings”. As McLuhan put the matter in his letter to Serge Chermayeff of Dec 19, 1960:

The massive overlay of antecedent and existent technologies takes on a peculiar character of simultaneity in the electronic age. All technologies become simultaneous, and the new problem becomes one of relevance in stress and selection, rather than of commitment to any one.

McLuhan seems to have been wrestling with this complex at least by the early 1940’s when he was teaching in St Louis and Windsor:

Increasingly, I feel that Catholics must master C.G. Jung. The little self-conscious (unearned) area in which we live to-day has nothing to do with the problems of our faith. Modern anthropology and psychology are more important for the Church than St. Thomas to-day. (McLuhan to Walter Ong and Clement McNaspy, December 23, 1944, Letters 166)4

McLuhan’s interest in Freud, Adler and Jung requires detailed research.  Suffice it to note here that Jung’s notion of a “collective unconscious” must have appealed to McLuhan on account of its complications of identity5 (the “I” as produced rather than as producing6), time (identity formation occurring not in chronological diachronic time but in a simultaneous synchronic time) and space (the “interior landscape” situated not inside a capsule “I”, but ‘outside’ and ‘before’ it, spatially as well as temporally).

Already in 1916 (and included in a volume of his essays in English translation in 1917), Jung hypothesized that

besides [repressed and  subliminal materials] the unconscious contains all the material that has not yet reached the threshold of consciousness. These are the seeds of future contents. Equally we have every reason to suppose that the unconscious is never quiescent in the sense of being inactive, but presumably is ceaselessly engaged in the grouping and regrouping of so-called unconscious fantasies. (CG Jung, ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’, CW7, 270-271)

In McLuhan’s terms 50 years later, “the material that has not yet reached the threshold of consciousness”, but could do so, is “the total experience of mankind” (full citation given below). And Jung’s “ceaselessly engaged in the grouping and regrouping” is McLuhan’s “body percept which we form of ourselves from moment to moment”. 

When McLuhan called our self-consciousness “unearned”, he apparently meant a self-consciousness  which was unaware of its own genetic investments — unaware, that is, of the process through which it was what it was.

It was around this same time in the mid 1940s that he began to work on Poe (‘Edgar Poe’s Tradition’, 1944, which was selected for inclusion in The Interior Landscape 25 years later) and discovered in his Maelstrom (apparently through his close friend Cleanth Brooks) a prescient description of the process through which identity formation occurs “from moment to moment”.7  

As well, he was already engaged with Eliot’s Four Quartets (published in four steps between 1936 and 1942) — a contemporary consideration of this same complex. This was an engagement which began when he was still in Cambridge and was pursued, as seen above in the citation from his last essay, until the end of his life. Referring to the later 1940’s, Hugh Kenner has described how

Marshall, at that time pretty much a New Critic, believed with F. R. Leavis that the one major poet of our time was Eliot. (…) The passion (…) with which we two (…) studied Eliot! We penciled notes on the yellow postwar paper of a Faber Four Quartets8

When he arrived in Toronto in 1946, McLuhan found that Eric Havelock was considering another voyage to the bottom of the sea, this time in Virgil (but not without its own connection with Poe9combined with his (Havelock’s) ongoing investigation of sensory configurations, media and culture in pre-classical and classical Greece. McLuhan would then begin a 10 year engagement with Virgil’s labyrinths (recorded above all in his correspondence with Ezra Pound) and a 35 year engagement with media and sensory modalities.

This latter investigation, too, is prefigured in his 1944 letter to Walter Ong and Clement McNaspy in his criticism there of F.R. Leavis:

his failure to grasp current society in its intellectual modes (say in the style of Time and Western Man or Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture) cuts him off from the relevant pabulum. (December 23, 1944, Letters 166)10

These “intellectual modes” would turn into ‘media’ and ‘sensory modalities’ in his later work. But it would take 15 more years for these notions to crystallize — for thinking, too, transpires in a time of its own. Suffice it to note here only that the attempt to specify the synchronic process of identity formation must rely on “pattern recognition” just as the comparative study of different languages does and just as Poe’s mariner found in the Maelstrom when he began to identify recurring patterns in its gyrations. At bottom, McLuhan’s ‘media’ are these ‘patterns’ which exist before identity formation in comparable11 fashion to the way in which chemical elements are prior to the formation of any and all physical material. They comprise, so to say, the available shapes.

Finally, the question arises of where this identity formation takes place? McLuhan is clear that the answer to this question is not ‘inside us’:

the computer, by speeding up the total available human experience, has in effect put outside — as the new environment — the human subconscious or unconscious. For years I’ve been noticing the extension of consciousness by various technological means. The human unconscious is the total experience of mankind, stored without any story line, just jumbled and assembled in the human unconscious. Now, with instant dispersal and instant retrieval systems, we have the all at once. We have put outside us, as a new environment, the unconscious… (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 13, 1966)

“The total experience of mankind”, McLuhan says, is now “outside us”. Or, rather, since the nature of “us” has thereby become questionable, the inside and the outside are now “jumbled” such that neither can be isolated from the other. Hence it is not possible, as McLuhan research usually attempts, to take technological environments (or, worse, technological objects) as somehow given for analysis.  Instead, the need is to identify those media which are the recurrent configurations of the “body percept” in order to understand the variable “adjustments which we make to each and every change in our surroundings”.  Only then is it possible, both as regards our own subjective approach and as regards our objective “surroundings”, to begin the required study.

The great problem, of course, is that the ground of every particular “body percept”, the entire range of the “body percept” forming “the new environment”, is “invisible”, “unconscious” and unknown (“whatever it is”):

the computer, by speeding up the total available human experience, has in effect put outside — as the new environment — the human subconscious or unconscious. (…) We have put outside us, as a new environment, the unconscious… (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 13, 1966)

we are completely unaware of this body percept which we form of ourselves from moment to moment. It takes considerable dexterity and skill to observe one’s own body percept, the image we form of ourselves. The immediate surrounding — the new environment, whatever it is — is always invisible (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 12, 1966)

No language can privilege all sounds. For language is a system of differences between sounds and this requires a selection between significant and insignificant ones. So with the “body percept”. Its synchronic formation consists in a selection from “the total available human experience”. And this process is “always invisible”, not only in the vulgar sense that most are utterly unaware of its operation, but also in the more profound sense that the “body percept”, too, exists only as a system of differences and cannot simply be ‘all’.  The implied selection, which ‘takes place’ on the way to consciousness must, as McLuhan says, be “assembled in the human unconscious”. The synchronic process of constitutional selection (“which we form of ourselves from moment to moment”) occurs on the other side of an essential darkness which is prior to and fundamentally distanced from consciousness exactly because it is on the way to it. In his contribution to Technology and World Trade, McLuhan called this the “interior trip into the darkness of our own being” (28). 

Hence it is that McLuhan’s entire work might be understood as an ongoing meditation on the Four Quartets as a twentieth century specification of The Descent into the Maelstrom (1841) and Heart of Darkness (1899) — the “Africa within”12

At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity,
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards,
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where.
And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in time.
(…)
Descend lower, descend only
Into the world of perpetual solitude,
World not world, but that which is not world,
Internal darkness, deprivation
And destitution of all property,
Dessication of the world of sense,
Evacuation of the world of fancy,
Inoperancy of the world of spirit;
This is the one way, and the other
Is the same, not in movement
But abstention from movement; while the world moves
In appetency, on its metalled ways
Of time past and time future. (‘Burnt Norton’, 1936)

In this case — if McLuhan’s entire work can be understood as an ongoing meditation on the Four Quartets — it would have been McLuhan’s genius not to invent insight we already have in spades from Plato (see Plato on the plain of oblivion) to Eliot (with priceless pearls on the string between13), but to retrieve it in new ways permitting its application in both theory and practice. The former would unfold in new sciences, plural.  The latter, essentially including the former new sciences, would begin to address the individual and social problems precipitated by a world engulfed, as never before, in nihilism.

  1. In 1965 Seymour Wapner and Heinz Werner published a small book called The Body Percept. Given the date just before McLuhan began talking about the matter, it seems highly probable that McLuhan read, or at least saw, their book.  But it is not in his library preserved at the UT Fisher Library and he seems not to have referenced it in any of his writings.
  2. Presented as ‘Education in the Electric Age’ on January 19, 1967 to the Provincial Committee on the Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario. Printed as ‘Education in the Electronic Age’ in Interchange, 1:4, 1-12, 1970; also in The Best of Times/The Worst of Times: Contemporary Issues in Canadian Education, eds, Hugh A. Stevenson, Robert M. Stamp, and J. Donald Wilson, 1970. Earlier in his presentation, McLuhan mentioned the body percept: “You cannot put a satellite environment around a planet without altering the planet and the occupants of the planet. Their whole vision of themselves, their body percepts, their corporate social percepts, are entirely altered by a satellite environment.”
  3. As treated below, the sense of ‘space’ at stake here is equally strange as those of identity and time.
  4. Cf McLuhan to Walter Ong in December 1947: “ it is plain enough to me that the abiding achievement of the past century has been in analytical psychology and as such the Catholic mind has yet to ingest let alone digest that achievement. But your essay shows one main road back from the central point of contemporary awareness through medieval culture to St Augustine. Notice that your own discussion on “tension” as the mode of Xian being is specifically psychological — the basic approach of present-day esthetic analysis.” (Letters 191)
  5. Cf, Jung’s contrasts of ego and self, personal unconscious and collective unconscious, etc.
  6. Consciousness becomes incidental rather than structural.” (McLuhan to Peter Drucker, October 24, 1966, Letters 338)
  7. Significantly, Brooks’ Maelstrom poem begins: “Then when the terror is at its height, you hurl / The useless watch away, fling time away, / Having no more to do with time…”. And in its concluding section: “Who knows the whirlpool’s season or the hour / That ripens it to peace? Who thinks to catch / Time’s phoenix on her nest?”
  8. 1985 Preface to the reprinting of Kenner’s The Poetry of Ezra Pound from 1951.
  9. In 1946 Havelock began to publish his three-part essay ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’ in the new UTP journal Phoenix. In 1943, situated between his 1939 Catullus monograph and the Xanadu essay, he issued ‘Homer, Catullus and Poe’ in The Classical Weekly, 36:21.
  10. McLuhan’s criticism of Leavis here in 1944 throws into question Kenner’s assessment of his remaining identification with Leavis five years later (cited above per note 8).
  11. Comparable — while remaining fundamentally different. As discussed here, the essential difference between physical elements and experiential media is that the formations of the latter require synchronic activation.  While both are subject to fundamental trans-formation in fission and fusion, as well as compounding and intermixing in phenomena as complicated as weather fronts, with media this is, so to say, natural and incessant.
  12. McLuhan referred to the “Africa within” frequently and attributed the phrase, perhaps in error, to Conrad. His use of the phrase seems to appear first in his 1961 review of Louis Dudek’s Literature and the Press in UTQ, 30:4, 421.
  13. And further pearls are arrayed on the string stretching back as far before Plato as we are after him — back to the beginning of recorded history in the fourth millenium BC. And before that, in the deep reaches of pre-history…?

Theuth in Plato’s Philebus

Both Innis and McLuhan recurred repeatedly to Plato’s description in the Phaedrus of the invention of letters by the Egyptian god Theuth.  Plato discusses Theuth’s invention also in the Philebus

Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels; these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters. 
(….) 
And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many, and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity.
(….)

if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry. (Philebus 18, Jowett trans) 

Plato’s discussion here relates back to Heraclitus: you cannot step into the same river twice. That is, the same river — “this common bond which in a manner united them” — is by its nature both “one and also many” such that when we encounter it we do so only (only!) in a particular and limited manner (cf, “a certain number”, “a definite number”, some discrete “one of them”).  But this encounter with some particular “one” has the further implication that “none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all”. For when a child first understands a word as a word and not merely as a meaningless sound, it has thereby learned not just this particular instance of language but what language is per se.

Although the same river is always different, stepping into it is to experience — the river.

Now language and grammar are a kind of water in which humans qua humans swim: “this common bond which in a manner united them”.  “United them”: both in their particular conversation and in their common humanity.

McLuhan famously observed  (apparently following John Culkin, who, in turn, may have been following Einstein?) that

We don’t know who discovered water but we are pretty sure it wasn’t a fish! We are all in this position, being surrounded by some environment or element that blinds us totally; the message of the fish theme is a very important one, and just how to get through to people that way is quite a problem. (Contribution to Technology and World Trade, 29, 1966)

You know there is an old saying (not so very old) : “We don’t know who discovered water, but we are sure it wasn’t a fish.” That is literally true. It is inconceivable that a fish could discover water or that anybody could discover anything that was totally surrounding his senses. That is the one thing you will never know. (‘Education in the Electric Age’, 1967)1

we don’t know who discovered water, but we’re pretty sure it wasn’t a fish. The one thing you can never see is the element in which you move. (‘Canada, The Borderland Case’, 1967, in Understanding Me, 106).

we live invested with an electric information environment that is quite as imperceptible to us as water is to a fish. (…)  The fish knows nothing of water” (Counterblast, 1969, 5 and 75).

McLuhan may be read as raising, once again, the question that is at least as old as Heraclitus and Plato: How to communicate about the medium of communication in which humans exist as fish do in water?  

After 2500 years of failure, in a global village with nuclear weapons, he was of course quite correct that “just how to get through to people that way is quite a problem”. 

 
  1.  Presented as ‘Education in the Electric Age’ on January 19, 1967 to the Provincial Committee on the Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario. Printed as ‘Education in the Electronic Age’ in Interchange, 1:4, 1-12, 1970; also in The Best of Times/The Worst of Times: Contemporary Issues in Canadian Education, eds, Hugh A. Stevenson, Robert M. Stamp, and J. Donald Wilson, 1970.

Parry and Lord in McLuhan

There are many reasons to think that Eric Havelock had crucial influence on McLuhan long before the publication of Havelock’s Preface to Plato in 1963:

  • Havelock’s orality research was well known at Toronto when McLuhan arrived in 1946.1
  • By 1947 at the latest the same was true at Harvard (after Havelock’s guest lectureship there in the 1946-1947 academic year and his joining the faculty in 1947). In the fall of that year I.A. Richards, McLuhan’s old professor from Cambridge and at Harvard since 1939, described Havelock’s orality research in a BBC talk. A transcript appeared in the BBC Listener and McLuhan may well have seen it since news of it must have been abroad at UT among Havelock’s many friends and former colleagues there.2
  • In 1946-1947 Havelock published Virgil’s Road to Xanadu in three parts in the new UT journal Phoenix.  This essay details a view of poetic composition that McLuhan would explore in depth over the next decade and that led him to his central findings (a relativity theory of human experience and the roll of co-variable senses in demarcating different types of experience within that theory).3
  • Havelock and McLuhan appeared in the same issue of UTQ in 1948 where Havelock’s review specifically raised the question of oral vs literate composition.4
  • McLuhan’s 1954 lecture, ‘Eliot and The Manichean Myth As Poetry’, mentions Havelock’s 1951 Crucifixion book: “Today many thoughtful people are torn between the claims of time and space, and speak even of The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man as he is mentally torn in these opposite directions.”5

Aside from these markers in which Havelock is explicitly involved, it may be that McLuhan’s references to the work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord point in the same direction.6 For aside from a  footnote to an obscure paper from Parry7 in Innis’ Empire and Communications (itself doubtless owing to Havelock), Havelock would seem to have been the source of the immense importance attributed by McLuhan to the work of Parry and Lord on oral composition and performance.

In fact, McLuhan begins The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962) by situating it in relation to Parry (who died in 1935, age only 33) and Lord (who was a colleague of Havelock at Harvard during Havelock’s time there from 1946 to 1961).  His ‘Prologue’ begins:

The present volume is in many respects complementary to The Singer of Tales [1960] by Albert B. Lord. Professor Lord has continued the work of Milman Parry, whose Homeric studies had led him to consider how oral and written poetry naturally followed diverse patterns and functions. Convinced that the poems of Homer were oral compositions, Parry “set himself the task of proving incontrovertibly if it were possible, the oral character of the poems, and to that end he turned to the study of the Yugoslav epics.” His study of these modern epics was, he explained, “to fix with exactness the form of oral story poetry … Its method was to observe singers working in a thriving tradition of unlettered song and see how the form of their songs hangs upon their having to learn and practice their art without reading and writing.” [The Singer of Tales, p. 3] Professor Lord’s book, like the studies of Milman Parry, is quite natural and appropriate to our electric age, as The Gutenberg Galaxy may help to explain. (…) The enterprise which Milman Parry undertook with reference to the contrasted forms of oral and written poetry is here extended to the forms of thought and the organization of experience in society and politics. That such a study of the divergent nature of oral and written social organization has not been carried out by historians long ago is rather hard to explain. Perhaps the reason for the omission is simply that the job could only be done when the two conflicting forms of written and oral experience were once again co-existent as they are today. Professor Harry Levin8 indicates as much in his preface to Professor Lord’s The Singer of Tales (p. xiii): “The term ‘literature’, presupposing the use of letters, assumes that verbal works of imagination are transmitted by means of writing and reading. The expression ‘oral literature’ is obviously a contradiction in terms. Yet we live at a time when literacy itself has become so diluted that it can scarcely be invoked as an esthetic criterion. The Word as spoken or sung, together with a visual image of the speaker or singer, has meanwhile been regaining its hold through electrical engineering. A culture based upon the printed book, which has prevailed from the Renaissance until lately, has bequeathed to us — along with its immeasurable riches — snobberies which ought to be cast aside. We ought to take a fresh look at tradition, considered not as the inert acceptance of a fossilized corpus of themes and conventions, but as an organic habit of re-creating what has been received and is handed on.” (…) Such a reverse perspective of the literate Western world is the one afforded to the reader of Albert Lord’s Singer of Tales. But we also live in an electric or post-literate time when the jazz musician uses all the techniques of oral poetry. Empathic identification with all the oral modes is not difficult in our century. (…) The work of Milman Parry and Professor Albert Lord was directed to observing the entire poetic process under oral conditions, and in contrasting that result with the poetic process which we under written conditions, assume as “normal.” Parry and Lord, that is, studied the poetic organism  [before]9 the auditory function was suppressed by literacy. They might also have considered the [contrasting] effect on the organism when the visual function of language was given extraordinary extension and power by literacy. (The Gutenberg Galaxy, 1-2, 3)

After the 1963 appearance of Preface to Plato, McLuhan continued to cite the work of Parry and Lord, usually along with Havelock, as follows:

The invention of script provided a technology that created extensive new environments. The content of script was at first the oral tradition of poetry and wisdom. Just how the content of script was affected by the new medium of writing is a story that has been told by Albert Lord in his Singer of Tales and by Eric Havelock in his Preface to Plato. The new technology, in creating new environment for the old technology, maximizes change. Yet the environmental is also the unnoticeable. We seem to be least conscious of the most archetypal technologies. (New Media and the Arts, 1964)

Eric Havelock in Preface to Plato (…) explains the relation of Homer to the “tribal encyclopedia”. In presenting the bard as the traditional educator of Greeks, Havelock indicates that poetic performance was a kind of group ritual that involved the public like any jazz or rock festival. As Parry and Lord have indicated in The Singer of Tales, in an oral culture performance is also composition. Havelock devotes much of his book to explaining the effect of the phonetic alphabet on the Greek sensibilities and culture, pointing to the rise of self awareness and identity as an immediate result of this unique form of codifying experience. What especially needs to be noted about the phonetic alphabet in our time is its power to impose its assumptions on wide fields of operation and experience. (Reading and the Future of Private Identity, 1973)

The source of inspiration and the group who are to be helped or enlightened are one and the same in an oral culture. We are all familiar with the work called The Singer of Tales, about the conditions of oral composition in the Yugoslav epic. Parry and Lord, the authors of this book, studied the conditions of oral composition, those of Homer but also those of the modern jazz musician. Even in the popular art of jazz, the public is the immediate participant in the composition. There is no written score; there is a vast store of formulas which are used according to the needs of the moment and the particular occasion. Improvision is the mode of composition. It is only by improvising that the public can participate in Art, in the creative activity of Art. This event, as big an upheaval in human affairs as ever occurred, puts the Third World directly in the centre of the picture as the kind of world we are now beginning to share everywhere, the kind of world we need to understand in order to understand ourselves. I think we should concentrate on that theme: Third World as centre of the picture, because it is now also the First World, since we are systematically transforming the First World into another Third World by our own electronic technologies. If we keep that in mind we can then turn to the Third World for enlightenment, just as Parry and Lord turn to Yugoslavia for enlightenment on the Homeric Epic. They discovered that they performed exactly the same way our jazz musicians perform. (UNESCO statement, 1976)

 

  1. See here for further discussion.
  2. See here for further discussion.
  3. See here for further discussion.
  4. See here for further discussion.
  5. See here for further discussion.
  6. McLuhan could not have seen Lord’s 1960 book until he was in the last year of his construction of The Gutenberg Galaxy, which had been underway since 1952 and was finally completed in 1961. The importance attributed to The Singer of Tales, to the extent of beginning GG with a discussion of it, must have derived from some other source. That other source was Havelock.
  7. Empire and Communications, 72 n89: “Milman Parry, ‘The Homeric Gloss: a Study in Word Sense’ (Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, lix, 1928, pp. 233 ff”).
  8. Levin was a colleague of Richards, Lord and Havelock at Harvard.  His work on Joyce (especially his 1941 James Joyce: A Critical Introduction) was frequently cited by McLuhan.
  9. McLuhan has ‘when’ here which confuses his point.

The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land

In 1949 Eric Havelock gave a lecture at the annual meeting of the Classical Association of New England, ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land’.1 He repeated it at Vassar in that same year as recorded in an announcement for a later (1952) lecture there:

His lecture here in 1949 on Aeneas’ Journey through the Waste Land, one of the most memorable ever presented at Vassar, traced the parallelism between T. S. Eliot’s poem and the quest of Virgil’s Aeneas. (Vassar Chronicle, Volume IX, Number 25, 10 May 1952, p 1)2

That the 1949 lecture on ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land’ was indeed “memorial” is amply demonstrated by this announcement for another lecture three years later. But Havelock never published it and ongoing attempts to locate it in the Eric Havelock papers at Yale have proved unsuccessful. However, Havelock did publish ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators‘ in The Hudson Review in 1974 and there are convincing reasons to suppose that Havelock used his earlier ‘Journey through the Waste Land’ lecture in composing it.

Havelock’s abstract of the 1949 lecture has been preserved in the Annual Bulletin of the Classical Association of New England (#44, 1949, p 17-18):

The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land
The Aeneid has been estimated as the work of a semi-official poet-laureate celebrating Rome’s history and destiny, as these are prefigured in the career of its hero, To counterbalance its official optimism, critics have thought they discerned a mysterious sadness lingering in the poem, and bordering on the sentimental. The tenor of the first book in particular, with its confident prophecies and lacrimae rerum, lends superficial support to this estimate. But in fact the poetic equation is more complicated. (a) The smooth and dignified surface of the theme is continually violated by the upthrust of something emotionally uncontrolled and violent, an internal disturbance of the poetic consciousness which almost cancels the poem’s basic faith in heaven, history, and man. (b) The narrative epic of action is in part an illusion, devised to put on parade a series of states of the inner consciousness. The poem is to some degree a dream, or more correctly a nightmare. These contradictions are conspicuous in the second, fourth, and sixth books, though not peculiar to them. The Aeneid is a work of divided genius. 

This abstract and the 1974 essay correspond closely. For one thing, Eliot’s 1922 Waste Land which appears in the title of the 1949 lecture has a significant role, or roles, in ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators’. It is specifically cited in a passage which may be taken as suggesting that ‘the rise and fall of cities’ is a central topic of Virgil’s epic:

The city that at once confronts us in the twelfth line of the poem is Carthage — urbs antiqua fuit (I, 12) — which, as [Aeneas] abandons it in the conclusion of the Dido episode, is prefigured as a city overwhelmed and set on fire by its enemies (IV, 669-671; V, 3-5). The second is Troy which collapses in ashes  — urbs antiqua ruit, multos dominata per annos; the formula varies, the theme is constant, and when he adds “for many years mistress of the world,” he could be talking of Rome herself. He carries both these cities of destruction with him into Italy. As the last battle of the epic rises to its climax, he summons his forces to destroy utterly the capital of the Latins. The city is set on fire (XII, 572-611) and its ultimate fate is, in the poem, left unresolved. Yet these are the people with whom he is supposed to unite his Trojans in a peaceful union in order to achieve a common destiny.
What is the city over the mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the violet air
Falling towers
Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria
Vienna, London
Unreal3

In short, as Havelock continues this passage in the 1974 essay, “The Waste Land can furnish better comment on the Aeneid than is found in Mr. Eliot’s essays on the same subject.”

The sort of “better comment” furnished by The Waste Land is captured in this paragraph of Havelock’s essay:

The world which [Virgil] reports is already old and its inhabitants are living in a time of trouble. His Latin deserves to be read with an attention close enough to recapture for this generation a view of reality imprisoned in his verse which is more complex and also more contemporary than at first appears. If, in the contradictions of his tale, success is so often flawed by doubt and security so often undercut by hate, terror or despair, this need not surprise us. We encounter an experience closer, I dare say, to our own ambiguous image of ourselves in this the second half of the twentieth century than we are likely to discover in the clearer light and simpler affirmations of the Homeric saga. When Homer lived and sang, the world was younger and the gods still walked the earth with men.

Compare the 1949 abstract:

the poetic equation is (…) complicated. (a) The smooth and dignified surface of the theme is continually violated by the upthrust of something emotionally uncontrolled and violent, an internal disturbance of the poetic consciousness which almost cancels the poem’s basic faith in heaven, history, and man. (b) The narrative epic of action is in part an illusion, devised to put on parade a series of states of the inner consciousness. The poem is to some degree a dream, or more correctly a nightmare.

It is not so much in content, however, but in poetic technique where Havelock (himself a published poet) finds “better comment” on Virgil in The Waste Land:

the particular critical error to which this essay has tried to call attention lies in the field of poetics. It has consisted in an initial misjudgment of the style of the Virgilian verse and therefore of the canons to which its translation should respond. These have been set by the notion that the theme of the poem is historical and that its content is a narrative of epic action. (…) A preconception of epic continuity has prevailed to smooth over an arresting heaviness of rhythm, employed by Virgil to mark an abrupt descent of the mind to a level below previously expressed experience. (…) My present purpose is addressed to the way in which the psychological dimension is so often inserted into the poem discontinuously by way of that kind of interruption which has the effect of reversing or cancelling with poetic rudeness a mood of security and relaxation, or of confidence and hope, into which the reader has been seduced, as it were, by previous description.  (…) A calm surface previously prepared is suddenly and deliberately disrupted by the upthrust of an experience which is psychological. The shift, that is to say, from bright light to the colors of gloom, is also a shift from the description of events occurring in the external world, the world of action and movement and consciously articulated speech, to the internal world of the human consciousness. A change in levels of poetic description has occurred. The poet’s verse has taken a plunge downward below the surface of the conscious life. (…) Not action, but reflection, and not sinuous sweep, but interruption and arrest, constitute the genius of the lines.4

It may be significant that in 1973, the year before ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators’ appeared, Havelock published ‘The Sophistication of Homer’ in a Festschrift for I.A. Richards. This 1973 essay was originally a lecture given at UT in 1946. ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators’ seems to have had a similar history.  For one reason or another, Havelock, then in his seventies, may have been putting his affairs in order at this time. Publication of these two lectures from the 1940s may have been on his bucket list.

It is not (yet) known exactly to what extent Havelock used ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land’ in composing ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators’. Nor is it known if McLuhan had access to Havelock’s 1949 lecture (and his 1946 one?) in some way. But what is clear, despite these admitted unknowns, are the many striking parallels between Havelock’s 1973 and 1974 essays and McLuhan’s publications 25 years earlier around 1950. Now either these originated independently or one was dependent on the other. In turn, if there were dependence, it must have been McLuhan on Havelock, and not vice versa, since the points at stake appear suddenly in McLuhan’s work at this time, but have roots in Havelock’s work going back at least to his 1939 Lyric Genius of Catullus. Finally, if McLuhan’s essays around 1950 grew out of Havelock’s poetics, they of course did not do so out of work that was to be published only far in the future. The hypothetical conclusion follows that McLuhan came to know one or both of Havelock’s 1946 and 1949 lectures, ‘The Sophistication of Homer’ and ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land’, soon after they were  delivered.  And that they then had truly decisive influence on his thought.

Future posts will need to consider in detail how Havelock’s poetics were put to use in McLuhan’s developing project.  Only an overview can be offered here:

  • In 1949 McLuhan and Hugh Kenner were working together on a projected Eliot book. McLuhan published an article (‘Mr Eliot’s Historical Decorum’, 1949) and a review of eleven books on Eliot (1950) in this period.
  • In his correspondence, particularly with Ezra Pound, McLuhan would record his on-going research into Virgil and especially the figure of the labyrinth, or labyrinths, in the Aeneid. Concerns with Eliot and the labyrinthine were not new to McLuhan at this time, of course, but this existing interest would surely have attracted him to Havelock’s 1949 Aeneas essay and supplied the seedbed for its fertility within his work.
  • Even at the level of vocabulary, Havelock’s influence seems clear. In ‘The Aeneid and Its Translators’ he writes of Virgil’s poetics in terms of  ‘arrest’, ‘reversal’, ‘interruption’, ‘discontinuity’ and ‘disruption’ — all terms McLuhan would start to employ around 1950 in describing what he called ‘the aesthetic moment’ (leading, later, to ‘the gap where the action is’). 
  • Havelock introduces his main concern as follows: “My present purpose is addressed to the way in which the psychological dimension is so often inserted into the poem discontinuously by way of that kind of interruption which has the effect of reversing or cancelling with poetic rudeness a mood of security and relaxation, or of confidence and hope, into which the reader has been seduced, as it were, by previous description.”  This “psychological dimension” is called “an exposure of his own consciousness, his animus” and represents “a shift from the description of events occurring in the external world, the world of action and movement and consciously articulated speech, to the internal world of the human consciousness.” McLuhan would appeal to such an “interior landscape” for the rest of his life (to the extent of giving the collection of his literary essays this title in 1969) and would find in its elaboration the distinctive movement of modern art and, indeed, science.
  • “Description of events occurring in the external world, the world of action and movement and consciously articulated speech” may be called ‘epic’ and epic in this sense contrasted with “the internal world of the human consciousness”. So: “A preconception of epic continuity has prevailed to smooth over an arresting heaviness of rhythm, employed by Virgil to mark an abrupt descent of the mind to a level below previously expressed experience,” Again: “These words emerge from his inner consciousness, not from the external requirements of the epic narrative.” By denying the “preconception of epic continuity” Havelock was denying its unbroken singularity and affirming its divided plurality. Instead of epic singular, then, epics plural.  But epics plural are necessarily smaller than epic singular and may therefore be called ‘little epic’ or ‘epyllion’ or ‘epiclet’ (Joyce5). As Marchand and others have described, McLuhan became fascinated by this topic of the epyllion around this time and remained so for decades.
  • Havelock writes that “not action, but reflection, and not sinuous sweep, but interruption and arrest, constitute the genius of [Virgil’s] lines.” They thereby represent “a shift from the description of events occurring in the external world, the world of action and movement and consciously articulated speech, to the internal world of the human consciousness.” A plurality of worlds is at stake here, then, as well as a plurality of times within and between these worlds. Hence, as McLuhan has it in The Gutenberg Galaxy (citing Georges Poulet): “For the man of the Middle Ages, then, there was not one duration only. There were durations, ranked one above another, and not only in the universality of the exterior world but within himself, in his own nature, in his own human existence” (14; also Through the Vanishing Point, 9). And now today in the “electric era”, superseding the Gutenberg galaxy, once again “plurality-of-times succeeds uniformity-of-time.” (Understanding Media, 152)  McLuhan was still trying to think through the implications of this plurality when he died in 1980.  It is broached repeatedly in the notes used for the posthumous Global Village.

In his 1951 essay ‘Dos Passos: Technique vs. Sensibility’, McLuhan noted the demand placed on the artist:  

to explore the interior landscape which is the wasteland of the human heart6 

And in another 1951 essay he described this demand in relation to Eliot at some length:

The principal innovation was that of le paysage interieur or the psychological landscape. This landscape, by means of discontinuity, which was first developed in picturesque painting, effected the apposition of widely diverse objects as a means of establishing what Mr. Eliot has called ‘an objective correlative’ for a state of mind. The openings of ‘Prufrock’, ‘Gerontion’ and The Waste Land illustrate Mr. Eliot’s growth in the adaptation of this technique, as he passed from the influence of Laforgue to that of Rimbaud, from personal to impersonal manipulation of experience. Whereas in external landscape diverse things lie side by side, so in psychological landscape the juxtaposition of various things and experiences becomes a precise musical means of orchestrating that which could never be rendered by systematic discourse. Landscape is the means of presenting, without the copula of logical enunciation, experiences which are united in existence but not in conceptual thought. (Tennyson and Picturesque Poetry)

  1. See here under ‘3/18-19/1949’.
  2. The full announcement reads: “Harvard Faculty’s Prof Havelock Will Discuss The Trial of SocratesWhy Was Socrates Tried?  Professor E. A. Havelock of Harvard University will examine one of the fundamental problems in the development of Western humanism in his lecture next Tuesday evening (May 13, 1952) at 8:30 in Taylor. Professor Havelock, who is speaking under the auspices of the Department of Classics, will use part of the material from his courses on “The Estate of Man” as conceived by the poets and thinkers of classical antiquity. After his lecture, which is open to the public, the Classical Society will entertain in his honor. Before joining the Harvard Faculty, Professor Havelock. who was educated at Cambridge University, taught at the University of Toronto, where Dean Tait (Marion Tate, born in Saskatoon) studied with him. His lecture here in 1949 on Aeneas’ Journey through the Waste Land, one of the most memorable ever presented at Vassar, traced the parallelism between T. S. Eliot’s poem and the quest of Virgil’s Aeneas. Professor Havelock has published two interpretations of classical literature: The Lyric Genius of Catullus and The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, a study of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound. Both books incorporate Professor Havelock’s verse translations of the originals. His forthcoming book is Socrates and the Soul of Man. an examination of a subject in which he has long been interested.” Havelock’s 1952 Vassar lecture Why Was Socrates Tried? was published that same year in the Festschrift for his friend and former colleague at UT, Gilbert Norwood (Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood, ed Mary E. White, 1952).
  3. The Waste Land, v. What the Thunder Said
  4. The Aeneid and Its Translators‘, The Hudson Review, 27:3 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 338-370; the text blocks given here are verbatum, but they have been reordered.
  5. In a letter to Constantine Curran from July 1904: “I am writing a series of epiclets — ten — for a paper. I have written one. I call the series Dubliners to betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis which many consider a city.” This term has been a matter of some controversy in Joyce research owing to the fact that it was mistranscribed as ‘epicleti‘ in his Letters and has been taken as an allusion to Gk epiklesis — which, among other meanings, is the evocation of the Holy Spirit in the liturgy of sacrifice in the mass. But surely there is no need to see an either/or at work here — Joyce’s genius worked exactly through such multi-lingual puns.
  6. The  Interior Landscape, 53, emphasis added.

Abcedmindedness

Just as he does with the “vacuum”, McLuhan takes “abcedmindedness” in two different ways, one seemingly only negative, reflecting literal (ABC…) thought, the other a difficult positive, enabling complex insight into “the gestures of being itself”.  But where he treats the “vacuum” first in negative (empty) fashion, then in positive (replete), here the order is reversed to treat “abcedmindedness” first in its positive aspect (“to be abced-minded is to be part of the dream of history that is Finnegans Wake“), then in its negative one (“just alphabetically controlled”). As with the “vacuum”, the great question is, of course, the relation between these two senses of the term.

Whereas the ethical world of Ulysses is presented in terms of well-defined human types the more metaphysical world of the Wake speaks and moves before us with the gestures of being itself. It is a nightworld and, literally, as Joyce reiterates, is “abcedminded.” Letters (“every letter is a godsend”), the frozen, formalized gestures of remote ages of collective experience, move before us in solemn morrice1 [dance]. They are the representatives of age-old adequation of mind and things, enacting the drama of the endless adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world. The drama of cognition itself. (James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial, 1953)2

Throughout Finnegans Wake Joyce plays some of his major variations on his theme of “abcedmindedness” in “those pagan ironed times of the first city . . . when a frond was a friend.” His “verbivocovisual” presentation of an “all nights newsery reel” is the first dramatization of the very media of communication as both form and vehicle of the flux of human cultures. (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press, 1954)

Throughout Finnegans Wake Joyce sends telegraph messages to the “abced-minded.” That is, to the sleepers locked up in what he calls the nightmare of history, he tries to get through by a sort of telegraphic seance method. But, paradoxically, the abced-minded are the literate. Just as speech is a sort of staccato stutter or static in the flow of thought, letters are a form of static of oral speech. And letters, requiring as they do translation into inner speech, set up a complex group of mechanical operations between eye and ear which cause physical withdrawal. So to be abced-minded is to be part of the dream of history that is Finnegans Wake. (‘Radio and Television vs. The ABCED-Minded’, Explorations 5, 1955)

In From Script to Print, H.J. Chaytor suggests that with writing comes inner speech or the dialogue with oneself. This would seem to be the result of the action of translating the verbal into the visual (writing) and of translating the visual into the verbal (reading). This is an extremely complex process for which we pay a heavy psychic and social price — the price, as James Joyce put it, of ABCED-mindedness. Literate man experiences an inner psychic withdrawal from his external senses which gives him a heavy psychic and social limp. But the rewards are very rich. (Historical Approach to the Media, 1955; also in Counterblast, 1969, 117)

The phonetic alphabet and all its derivatives stress a one-thing-at-a-time analytic awareness in perception. This intensity of analysis is achieved at the price of forcing all else in the field of perception into the subliminal. For 2500 years we have lived in what Joyce called “ABCED-mindedness.” We win, as a result of this fragmenting of the field of perception and the breaking of movement into static bits, a power of applied knowledge and technology unrivaled in human history. The price we pay is existing personally and socially in a state of almost total subliminal awareness. In the present age of all-at-onceness, we have discovered that it is impossible — personally, collectively, technologically — to live with the subliminal. Paradoxically, at this moment in our culture, we meet once more preliterate man. For him there was no subliminal factor in experience; his mythic forms of explanation explicated all levels of any situation at the same time. (‘Introduction’ to Explorations in Communication, 1960)

everywhere in Finnegans Wake Joyce reiterates the theme of the effects of the alphabet on “abced-minded man,” ever “whispering his ho (here keen again and begin again to make sound sense and sense sound kin again)” and urges all to “harmonize your abecedeed responses”. (Gutenberg Galaxy, 1962, 152)

It would be difficult to exaggerate the bond between print and movie in terms of their power to generate fantasy in the viewer or reader. Cervantes devoted his Don Quixote entirely to this aspect of the printed word and its power to create what James Joyce throughout Finnegans Wake designates as “the ABCED-minded,” which can be taken as “ab-said” or “ab-sent,” or just alphabetically controlled. (Understanding Media, 1964, 285)

“(Stoop) if you are abcedminded … in this allaphbed!” (FW 18) (War and Peace in the Global Village, 1968, 92).

In the sixteenth century religion went inward and private with Gutenberg hardware. Liturgy collapsed. Bureaucracy boomed. Today liturgy returns. Bureaucracy fades. The present electric ESP age of multiple interfaces finds no problem in metamorphosis or transubstantiation such as baffled abced–minded culture of the sixteenth century and after. (Culture is our Business, 1970, 82)

 

 

  1. For “move before us in solemn morrice” compare Ulysses 2.155: “the symbols moved in grave morrice”.
  2. McLuhan was Don Theall’s adviser for his 1954 PhD thesis, ‘Communication Theories In Modern Poetry: Yeats, Pound, Eliot, And Joyce’. The remove necessary to investigate the nightworld is treated by Theall as follows: “The reader is continually reminded that he must be ‘abced-minded’ in reading the Wake, for it is through the individual word that the ‘communionistic’ technique occurs at the intellectual level. It is from HCE, HeCitEncy, that the intellectual act begins, for it is the stammer of HCE that breaks the flow of ALP. The ‘He’, ‘Cit’ and ‘Ency’ suggest the pattern of realization of the self, realization of the social nature of man, and realization of the arts of knowledge. Hesitency suggests the patience of thought and the stuttering of HCE himself.”

The “Vacuum of the Self”, the “Abced-minded”

Just as with “Abced-mindedness“, McLuhan deploys the “Vacuum of the Self” in two fundamentally different ways.  But these two ways are not opposed as two poles at odds with one another.  Instead, one considers everything in terms of such mutually exclusive poles and the other does not.

The “vacuum” considered in The Book of Tea has the characteristic action of ‘giving way’: the water pitcher gives way to water and to its management in being stored and carried and poured:

The usefulness of a water pitcher dwelt in the emptiness where water might be put, not in the form of the pitcher or the material of which it was made. Vacuum is all potent because all containing.” (Okakura KakuzōThe Book of Tea, as cited in ‘The Brain and the Media’, 1978, and the posthumous Laws of Media, 78)

 Such a “vacuum” essentially gives way to what is not vacuous and so expresses itself in and as what the other sense of “vacuum” would consider to be complete opposites (the vacuum vs material stuff).

This difference is so fundamental that it even applies to the two senses or poles of the “vacuum” itself. The sense of “vacuum” as empty and annihilating considers the other sense of “vacuum” as replete and enabling to be its utter opposite — an utter opposite that in its view is nonsensical. But the sense of “vacuum” as replete and enabling considers the other sense of “vacuum” as empty and annihilating to be what most expresses its fundamental creativity and communicability, what most demonstrates how strangely essential it is to it — to give way.

The replete is so replete that it gives way even, or especially, to the empty.

 

Encountering Maritain in 1934

According to McLuhan in a late (May 6, 1969) letter to Jacques Maritain: 

My first encounter with your work was at Cambridge University in 1934. Your Art and Scholasticism was on the reading list of the English School. It was a revelation to me. I became a Catholic in 1937. (Letters 371)

As discussed here, in 1934 McLuhan may already have been in touch with Maritain’s colleague and friend, Father Gerald Phelan, and may well have started to read Maritain on Phelan’s recommendation. Since McLuhan arrived in Cambridge in the fall of 1934, his reading Maritain in his first term there at the time of his initial exposure to Eliot, Joyce and Pound, may hint in that direction. Absent such stimulus, it is hard to imagine that he would have had the motivation and time to do so. Similarly with his citation of Maritain in his Chesterton paper (written in 1935) since Phelan almost certainly arranged the publication of that paper in The Dalhousie Review. Similarly again in his note to Maritain that “I became a Catholic in 1937”, an event guided by Phelan. 

As shown by a letter to his family in February 1935, McLuhan also read another book of Maritain in the first months he was in Cambridge, one that would not have been “on the reading list of the English School”:

As a handbook on Philosophy with especial regard to its historical development, I strongly commend Maritain’s Introduction to Philosophy to you, Red. He is the greatest living French thinker and is one of the foremost students and interpreters of Aquinas. Like most French texts it is a marvel of lucidity and order. I have read or dipped into numerous histories (all of which supposed Augustine and Aquinas were spoofers) and which therefore misunderstood everything that happened in society and philosophy after them. It is for his sympathy in this matter as well as his general account that I recommend him to you as certain to prove most coherent and stimulating. (Letters 53) 

A quarter century later McLuhan reviewed a new translation of Art and Scholasticism in his only other appearance in The Dalhousie Review. Here he identified what must have been so important to him in Cambridge:

Maritain’s familiarity with the work of the symbolist poets and the painting of his time provided him with a sensibility that gave him access to scholasticism, not as an historical, but as a contemporary, mode of awareness. (Dalhousie Review, 42:4, 1963, 532,)

 

 

McLuhan and Father Gerald Phelan 1934-1936

The biographers all agree.  McLuhan’s article on Chesterton just happened to appear in The Dalhousie Review in Halifax, then just happened to catch the eye of Fr Gerald Phelan in Toronto, who, “oddly enough”, just happened to be a friend of McLuhan’s mother1.

Here is Philip Marchand in Marshall McLuhan: The Medium and the Messenger:

In 1936 [McLuhan] wrote an article on Chesterton for a quarterly published by Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia. Father Gerald Phelan, the president of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael’s College at the University of Toronto and a friend, oddly enough, of Elsie McLuhan, admired the article and wrote to its author. There followed a correspondence between Phelan and McLuhan that finally nudged McLuhan into becoming a Catholic. On his Christmas visit to his mother in Toronto in 1936, McLuhan met Phelan, and the priest examined McLuhan about the state of his beliefs. It was a satisfactory examination for both parties. On Holy Thursday, March 25, 1937,  McLuhan was received into the Church. Thereafter he never failed to note the anniversary of this epochal event. (50-51)

Similarly from Terrence Gordon in Escape Into Understanding:

In Toronto Elsie approached Father Gerald Phelan, at St Michael’s College, about the prospects for a position for her son after learning from him that he had received a letter from Phelan expressing his appreciation of the Chesterton article in The Dalhousie Review. (…) McLuhan made contact, once again, with Father Phelan at St Michael’s College [by letter in November 1936], and told him to wished to become a Catholic. Visiting Elsie in Toronto over the Christmas holidays [in December 1936], he had several meetings with Phelan, who put questions to him about his faith and satisfied himself that McLuhan could be a candidate for reception into the Church (…) It was Elsie who had been apprehensive about her son’s career if he converted to Catholicism (…) and yet it was Elsie who had made the first contact with Father Phelan that led both to McLuhan’s conversion and support for his Saint Louis [University] appointment. (61, 71, 76)

Similarly again from Judith Fitzgerald (but with her chronology very mixed up) in Marshall McLuhan Wise Guy:

McLuhan settles into a routine of sorts at Wisconsin [beginning in September 1936!] (…) [and] resolves to make the best of what turns out to be a disappointing situation. He turns his hand to honing his writing skills and penning articles for various academic and literary journals. In these, he eloquently discourses on subjects such as the importance of the thought of recent Roman-Catholic convert G.K. Chesterton, the respected English author of the sleuth/priest Father Brown series of novels (…) When McLuhan’s Chesterton piece appears [in January 1936!] in a quarterly published by Nova Scotia’s Dalhousie University, Father Gerald Phelan, the University of Toronto’s president of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael’s College (and, incidentally, a friend of McLuhan’s mother), impressed by its contents, writes the first of several letters he sends to the young Turk. It is the correspondence between them — bolstered by a very satisfactory [December] 1936 meeting the pair enjoyed during McLuhan’s Christmas holidays spent in Toronto with Elsie and Red — that convinces McLuhan he must do what he must do… (45)

And finally from Douglas Coupland in Marshall McLuhan: You Know Nothing of My Work!, whose chronology is also confused, apparently following Fitzgerald:

And so there was a lonely young Marshall in a foreign city [Madison], teaching students he considered space aliens. He knew that seven hundred miles away, his family was in the final stages of disintegration; whether by choice or by fate, he was still single and had nobody with whom to share his life. It was at this point that a letter arrived from Father Gerald Phelan, president of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael’s College at the University of Toronto. Phelan had read an article by Marshall on Chesterton that had appeared in a university quarterly. The two began a correspondence, and, during Christmas 1936, while visiting Elsie in Toronto, Marshall met with Phelan, who was, coincidentally, an acquaintance of Elsie’s. Her motherly Geiger counter must surely have been bleeping off the dial to see her religion-hunting son Marshall falling into the clutches of the Catholics. In any event, his meeting with Phelan must have gone well. The lonely young man returned to America and, on Tuesday, March 30, 1937, was received into the Church. (60-61)

All these reports go back to an editorial note to a letter from McLuhan to Elsie April 12, 1936 (Letters 82) in which he comments on her speaking to Phelan, perhaps concerning whether he might help McLuhan find a job:

Father Gerald B. Phelan (1892-1965), whom Elsie McLuhan knew, was at this time Professor of Philosophy at St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto, and in the School of Graduate Studies. He was President of the Pontifical Institute of Studies from 1937 to 1946, the year he moved to the University of Notre Dame. On 29 January 1936 (diary) McLuhan had been “immensely gratified by a note of appreciation (of my GK article)” from Phelan. Elsie McLuhan had perhaps offered to speak to Father Phelan about the possibilities of a teaching position for Marshall after he graduated from Cambridge. Later in the year Phelan would have a preliminary role in McLuhan’s conversion to Roman Catholicism — a goal towards which McLuhan was moving when he wrote this letter. To his brother Maurice he had written on 11 April [1936]: “Had I come into contact with the Catholic Thing, the Faith, 5 years ago, I would have become a priest, I believe.”

These accounts don’t entirely accord with each other or with the facts of the matter. It is certainly not the case, for example, that “In 1936 [McLuhan] wrote an article on Chesterton”, as Marchand says, since by January 29 of that year McLuhan, in Cambridge, had already received “a note of appreciation” from Phelan in Canada about its appearance in DR (as recorded in the Letters editorial note above). It was, in fact, written in 1935, in Cambridge, certainly not in Madison as Fitzgerald unaccountably suggests. Nor is it the case that Phelan was then “the president of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael’s College” (as Marchand, Fitzgerald and Coupland all have it) since the Institute did not become Pontifical until 1939.2

Furthermore, and more importantly, none of the accounts considers how it was that McLuhan’s article came to appear in The Dalhousie Review in the first place. Clarification of this question works to throw light on McLuhan’s conversion, which all of the accounts situate in this context of the Chesterton paper and Phelan, but do little to illuminate.

As set out in ‘Autobiography – encountering Chesterton‘, McLuhan and Elsie were already corresponding about a Chesterton paper for Canada during McLuhan’s first term in Cambridge in 1934: 

My head is teeming with ideas for the GK article which will be written on a sudden shortly. I have kept jotting down separate notions as they came from all sorts of reading I have been at lately, so the longer it waits the better it will be. I intend to send it to the mgr of GK’s Weekly before sending it to Canada, to have any criticism or suggestion he can offer. (December 17, 1934, Letters, 48)

So McLuhan’s paper was written in 19353 for a destination in Canada and that destination must have already been The Dalhousie Review in Halifax, where it appeared only a year after this letter (lightening speed to go from “ideas” to published copy, especially for a first-time author).4 McLuhan must have been given to understand that publication was assured — if he put together a decent essay. So, unlike most first-time authors, McLuhan did not write his paper on spec in the hope of publication somewhere after the usual review process (first of the idea, then of the paper itself). Instead — as seen by the timing McLuhan’s paper in fact experienced (finished in the late spring of 1935 and in print a little over a half year later, in an era when submissions, queries and corrections could be communicated between England and Canada only by ship post) — the interest of The Dalhousie Review must already have been secured, along with the mechanics required for its immediate publication.

The question is: how was it that McLuhan’s article came to appear in The Dalhousie Review in this rather exceptional fashion?

The answer seems to be that it came to DR through Father Phelan.  Since McLuhan’s paper did not undergo the usual submission process and was published almost instantaneously upon receipt at DR, it must be that this was arranged by someone with excellent connections to the Review.5 Phelan had such connections6 and is cited by all the bios as having a relation with McLuhan only through this DR paper (however unlikely it may be that it was first through the paper that contact was established). Further, Phelan helped to arrange McLuhan’s jobs at SLU in 1937, Windsor in 1944 and Toronto in 1946. And he may have helped to place McLuhan’s 1943 UTQ paper on Hopkins as part of the stepped move from SLU to Toronto. In any case, it seems that it can only have been Phelan who organized McLuhan’s appearance in 1936 in DR. He was from Halifax, was an old friend of the DR editor, Herbert Leslie Stewart 7 and was himself a contributor to the Review.8

Admittedly, all that is known with certainty is that by December 1934 McLuhan and his mother could already discuss an offer to arrange publication in Canada of an article on Chesterton. But such an arrangement could not have been put in place, absent anything on paper from McLuhan, except by someone with enough knowledge of Chesterton to judge that McLuhan’s take on “GK” was accurate enough and interesting enough to warrant publication. Further still, such an arrangement could be put in place at DR only by someone whose judgement of McLuhan’s views on Chesterton was accepted there without question. Only Phelan fits this complex description.

Supposing McLuhan’s appearance came though Phelan, then, it remains to wonder how this process got started.  Since Phelan had no cause to contact McLuhan prior to the appearance of his Chesterton paper in 1936, any contact with him in 1933 or 1934 must have originated with Elsie (who was living in Toronto after September 1933) or McLuhan himself (who came through Toronto on his way to Cambridge in the summer of 1934).

It is possible that one or both of them heard (or heard of) a Phelan lecture on Chesterton:

He [Phelan] had an interest in the careers of men who put intellect at the service of the Church: Kenelm Henry Digby, Virgil Michel, Hippolyte Delehaye, Cardinal Newman, St. John Eudes, Jacques Maritain, Alexander Joseph Denomy, and G.K. Chesterton on the last of whom he produced an often-delivered, but never published, paper with the subtitle: “Confessor non-Pontiff.” (Arthur G. Kirn, ‘Introduction’ to G. B. Phelan: Selected Papers, 1967, 10)

The Phelan papers at St Michael’s have notes and incomplete drafts for this lecture. The fragmentary draft for the version delivered in New York on November 24, 1936, begins: “Twelve months ago a young Canadian author, writing in The Dalhousie Review, said this about G. K. Chesterton: ‘He has become a legend while he yet lives. Nobody could wish him otherwise than he is’.” This “young Canadian author” was, of course, McLuhan.

Another indication of Phelan’s interest in Chesterton is the fact that he quoted him three times in Phelan’s short 1937 book Jacques Maritain (which had originated in another lecture of his). So McLuhan was discovering Maritain in Cambridge just when Phelan was lecturing on Maritain and putting together a book on him. If McLuhan and Phelan were indeed already in contact, as seems highly likely, it may be guessed that it was Phelan who prompted this attention to Maritain (a close personal friend of Phelan and a sometime colleague of his at St Michael’s).9

The usual story of McLuhan’s conversion is that he was thinking about it more or less on his own until he came into contact with Phelan, in 1936, through his Chesterton paper. All the biographers (with the exception of Gordon) attribute some importance to McLuhan’s conversion a year later to the continuing correspondence with Phelan that resulted from this contact initiated by Phelan.  The suggestion here is that their dialogue probably began much earlier and was initiated by McLuhan and/or his mother. In this view, McLuhan and Phelan were already in contact by 1934,10 at the latest, such that Phelan became a, or the, great influence on the process of McLuhan’s thinking leading up to his decision to convert two years later. This influence would have been due both to Phelan’s broad knowledge of Catholic thought, medieval (especially Thomas, whom he translated) and modern (especially Maritain, whom he also translated), and to his decided but wide-ranging and open personality.11  Indeed, surely it was Phelan whom McLuhan had in mind as a model when he wrote to his brother Maurice from Cambridge on April 11, 1936: “Had I come into contact with the Catholic Thing, the Faith, 5 years ago, I would have become a priest, I believe.” (Letters, 82n)

  1. Elsie McLuhan moved to Toronto from Winnipeg in 1933. See ‘Elsie McLuhan Leaving To Take Toronto Post‘, Winnipeg Tribune, September 9, 1933, p4, with discussion here.  A year or two later Maurice McLuhan joined her there to attend UT. That both knew and were friendly with Fr Phelan is attested in a 1946 letter from McLuhan to Elsie where he describes a visit with Phelan at St Mike’s just prior to his move there from Windsor: “Phelan delighted me.  Asked much about you and Red.” (Letters 181)
  2. Phelan did become head of the not-yet-Pontifical institute in 1935 (as acting president) and in 1936 was confirmed in that position. The Letters note claims that Phelan became president of the institute in 1937, but this is an error.
  3. Other letters cited in Autobiography – encountering Chesterton‘ record its progress.
  4. It is remotely possible that “Canada” refers to Father Phelan in Toronto with the expectation of publication in some journal through him. As the ex-president (1931) of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, a central figure at St Michael’s and its Mediaeval Institute and the author over 20 academic papers by 1935, Phelan had the connections necessary to place McLuhan’s paper in a variety of publications.
  5. As  described in further posts, McLuhan had other Winnipeg connections — Rupert Lodge, Watson Kirkconnell and John Defoe — who published in DR in the 1934-1936 period.  His first introduction to the Review may have come from any one of them, of course. But the Chesterton topic of McLuhan’s paper suggests that Phelan must have played the major role in the publication of his paper.
  6. See the following note.
  7. Phelan and Stewart were among the small handful of teachers of philosophy in Halifax after WWI (Stewart at Dalhousie, Phelan at St Mary’s, but Phelan was also working at Dalhousie with Stewart where he founded its Newman Club and regularly lectured on ethics) and had a mutual interest, originating with Stewart, in the relation of philosophy to psychology. (Stewart’s book Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology was published in 1912, immediately before he began his long career at Dalhousie.) Phelan would go on from Halifax to do advanced graduate work in Stewart’s area, philosophical psychology, in Europe (he was based in Louvain from 1922 to 1925, where he obtained his PhD) and became a recognized expert in the field.
  8. The first item in the January 1936 issue of DR, immediately before a paper by Harold Innis, was ‘Fifteen Years Of The Review‘ by the editor, H.L. Stewart. In it he observes that the review’s “catholicity of interest is illustrated by the appearance, within a short space, of critical papers on Bertrand Russell and Cardinal Mercier”. The Mercier article (DR 6:1, 1926, 9-17) was one of Phelan’s contributions. A more recent Phelan article was ‘The Lateran Treaty‘ in DR 9:4, 1930, 427-438. Since Phelan was regularly publishing in Journals like New Scholasticism and Philosophical Review, it appears that he regarded DR as a publication for writing that was not strictly theological or philosophical — like his piece on Cardinal Mercier or McLuhan’s on Chesterton.
  9. Phelan was the translator of a series of books by Maritain and even one by his wife.
  10. Phelan became the acting president of the Mediaeval Institute in 1935 and was confirmed in that role in 1936. That he found the time to guide and assist McLuhan at a time when he must have been very busy must have impressed McLuhan.
  11. “Gerald Phelan’s interest in art and the philosophy of art reflected, not only his own abilities (he was an accomplished musicologist), but also a number of close personal friendships with artists (notably Arnold Walter and Eric Gill), and is attested by several articles. (…) As a man, he impressed me as one of those rare people to whom Providence has granted the power to look the emptiness of his own success in the face.” (Arthur G. Kirn, ‘Introduction’ to G. B. Phelan: Selected Papers, 1967, 11)

Innis and McLuhan in 1936

Scholars have stipulated that “only in 1951 did he [McLuhan] begin reading anything by that great political economist [Harold Innis]”. So Babe. Theall concurs: “McLuhan first read Innis in 1951”. For many reasons this claim cannot be correct.1 The proper date must be 1949 at the latest and could have been, at least as regards McLuhan’s time at UT, as early as 1947 (when his long-time Winnipeg friend, Tom Easterbrook, came back to UT to work closely with Innis).

In fact, it is highly likely that McLuhan first read Innis fifteen years before 1951 — in 1936! While he was still in Cambridge!

Here is the cover of the Dalhousie Review from January 1936 with its table of contents: the ninth contribution is McLuhan’s ‘G.K. Chesterton: A Practical Mystic’; the second is Innis’ ‘Discussion in the Social Sciences’.2 

McLuhan’s very first scholarly paper appeared in the same issue of the Dalhousie Review as an important essay of Innis — one in which (as detailed below) his turn to communication is already visible.

There are good reasons to think that McLuhan read Innis’ essay as soon as he received a copy of the review.3 In the first place, of course, McLuhan must have taken great interest, and pride, in this issue of the Dalhousie Review with his first paper (outside of University of Manitoba undergraduate publications). It is hardly imaginable that he failed to look into all its articles and to read the ones of interest to him.

In the second place, it is very likely that Innis’ essay, like McLuhan’s, came to The Dalhousie Review via Fr Gerald Phelan at UT.  Phelan was from Halifax, was an old friend of the Dalhousie Review editor, Herbert Leslie Stewart4 and was himself a contributor to the Review5. Correspondence between McLuhan and his mother (April 12, 1936, Letters 82) shows that both knew Phelan and it was to him that McLuhan communicated his decision to convert (on November 26, 1936, Letters 93). A decade later Phelan, having been Hugh Kenner’s faculty adviser for his M.A. thesis on Chesterton, would secure publication for it (with an introduction by McLuhan). Although no correspondence has yet come to light regarding the publication of McLuhan’s Chesterton paper in Dalhousie Review, it is highly likely that Phelan did the same thing for him as he came to do a decade later for Kenner. Both were started on their academic careers by Phelan through publications on Chesterton and through jobs at Catholic schools (McLuhan at St Louis, Kenner at Assumption in Windsor). And both McLuhan and Kenner went on from Phelan’s assistance with their careers to become Catholic converts.

By 1936 Phelan and Innis had been colleagues in Toronto for more than a decade.6 Since Innis — unlike McLuhan at this time — had no need of help to publish a paper, his Dalhousie Review piece must have appeared there through some kind of special request from the side of the Review. And this must have been mediated, if not originated, through Phelan.7 Whatever the details of the case may have been, it may be supposed that Phelan talked of Innis’ paper in the course of what must have been a great many exchanges with McLuhan about his Chesterton piece for Dalhousie Review and about his conversion (where Phelan played a, probably the, central role).

Thirdly, McLuhan’s close friend from Winnipeg and the University of Manitoba, Tom Easterbrook, was studying for his PhD with Innis at just this time in Toronto. It is probable that Innis’ essay was discussed in exchanges between the two Winnipeg friends — particularly in regard to Chesterton in whom also Easterbrook had a long-standing interest. Indeed, Easterbrook is said to have been the person who first suggested Chesterton to McLuhan’s attention. Further, this connection with Innis via Easterbrook may have been reinforced through the fact that McLuhan’s mother was now living in Toronto with his brother, Maurice, and both knew Easterbrook well from Winnipeg.  

In the fourth place, Innis’ paper (which was originally a lecture at UBC) would have interested McLuhan both in its content and in its style, especially its biting depreciation of the academy. As regards the latter, Innis at the very start of his remarks observes:

I am addressing a university audience interested in the pursuit of truth and in certain standards of intellectual integrity and honesty. This may be a bold assumption. (‘Discussion in the Social Sciences’ (= DSS below), Dalhousie Review, January 1936, 401-413, here, 401)

He goes on to describe academic conferences as follows:

Conferences subsidized (….) for the discussion of problems of the social sciences would become intolerable without the entertainment provided by a trained group of intellectuals designed to stimulate those anxious to think they are making important contributions to a solution of the world’s problems — and to amuse those who know better. The social sciences provide both the opiates and the stimulants to what passes for modem thought. The travelling comedians who masquerade as economists and prophets… (Ibid, 406)8

Innis scholars often criticize McLuhan’s sometimes disparaging style as if it were opposed to the supposedly more scholarly or responsible style of Innis. But this is mistaken. Innis could be just as direct, and just as politically incorrect, as McLuhan: 

Finally, we turn to the real source of intelligent discussion, that carried on by the “intellectual” — the most tragi-comic group in the history of discussion. (…) Academic freedom has become the great shelter of incompetence. The intellectual writes informatively for people who still believe they discuss the complex problems of society intelligently… (ibid, 405)

As regards content, Innis’ January 1936 Dalhousie Review paper was “intended as complementary to ‘The Role of Intelligence’ [in] The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, May 1935″ (ibid, 401n). The proximity of views held by McLuhan at this time to those of Innis (and perhaps influenced by Innis) may best be seen from this “complementary” article:

Innis: the social scientist is apt to develop strong vested interests in the prospects of an enterprise or of a group or of a society. He becomes concerned in many cases with the increasing profits and the increasing sale of products irrespective of the wants of the community, and acts largely in a predatory capacity. (…) A politician succeeds by detecting and using to his advantage the weakness of others. (‘The Role of Intelligence’, CJEPS, 1:2, 1935, 281; hereafter ‘The Role of Intelligence’ = ‘RoI’.)

McLuhan: What sort of motive, what complexion of intelligence is likely to be concerned with the output and control of Little Men? For almost a century now, the intelligence of the ablest men has been systematically bought and set to work to exploit the weakness and stupidity of the rest of mankind. This is the exact reverse of the traditional procedure of all civilizations. Hitherto the ablest men have been selected to govern, to educate, rather than to exploit, the others. (‘Peter or Peter Pan’, Fleur de Lis, 37:4, 1938)

Further, Innis’s RSS paper indicates the direction in which McLuhan (along with Eric Havelock and, indeed, Innis himself) would head in the following decades:

…the possibilities of discussion have increased immeasurably. The character of discussion (…) has been tremendously influenced by recent industrialism and inventions (…) the development of the printing press, economic expansion and the growth of literacy (…) improvements in facilities for discussion, particularly the radio (…) the intellectual has failed to realize the significance of the change which has so profoundly influenced discussion. He remains as a vestige of an era of discussion which has passed.  (DSS 403, 404, 405)

All this is encapsulated in Innis’ bald formulation:

The pulp and paper industry is a fundamental development.9 (DSS 403)

That is: continuing “development of the printing press, economic expansion and the growth of literacy”, along with new inventions (“particularly the radio”), have “increased immeasurably” the amount and speed of information exchange (“possibilities of discussion”) and have thereby closed one “era of discussion” and opened another.  With this closure and opening has come a revolution in “the character” and “the significance” of “discussion” — aka of communication.10

Innis could see with his friend and mentor, E.J. Urwick, his predecessor as the chair of the Department of Political Economy, that these developments implied, or at least served fully to expose, “fundamental limitations” (RoI 284) in the findings of the social sciences.  These had to do, on the one hand, with what Innis took to be “the contradiction in terms” of “introspection” investigating “introspection”:

the impossibility  of building a science on a basis on which the observer becomes the observed (…) the social scientist cannot be “scientific” or “objective” because of the contradiction in terms (…) “Introspection” is a contradiction, but what is meant by the word is the foremost limit of scientific investigation in a range extending back to geological time (…) [“scientific” or “objective”] organized discussion [in the social sciences] is a contradiction in terms…(RoI 281, 283, 284)

This “contradiction” was the old worry that any introspection of introspection initiated an unstoppable infinite regress. For also such investigative introspection as a subjective act could become the object of a further subjective act of introspection in its turn. And so on “in a range extending back to geological time”.

On the other hand, Innis could also sense (with implications he could at this time only vaguely fear, but that Havelock would unfold step by step in the introduction to his 1950 Prometheus book)11 that this “contradiction” left humans enclosed in themselves with no purchase on “reality”:

The never-ending shell of life suggested in the persistent character of bias… (RoI 283)

As Nietzsche had detailed a half century before, human thought encased in a “never-ending shell” cannot come into genuine contact (genuine contact!) with objective reality — not even, or especially not, with the ‘ objective reality’ of “human thought” in its “never-ending shell”.  As Nietzsche put it: “With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!”.  The result was exactly that nihilism which has since manifestly engulfed the planet.  And both Innis and McLuhan would go to their graves wrestling with this spectre.

But meantime a series of deep questions were precipitated from Innis’ 1935-1936 essays which Havelock and McLuhan and Innis himself would all take up in their different ways (thereby defining the ‘Toronto school of communications’):

  • what exactly is “the character” of “an era of discussion”?  How is “an era” to be recognized as such and differentiated from another?
  • if “the nineteenth century, with the development of the printing press, economic expansion and the growth of literacy”, together with later “improvements in facilities for discussion, particularly the radio”, precipitated a new “era of discussion” in the twentieth century, when and where have such eras arisen in the past and what could their study tell us about the course of history and about our present situation?
  • If all human experience is ineluctably limited or biased by the “era of discussion” in which it occurs, might the social sciences be reoriented and revivified through focus on this figure-ground relationship (experience/era of discussion) as on some kind of elementary structure?

In his RoI essay Innis repeatedly broaches this latter possibility:

The innumerable difficulties of the social scientist are paradoxically his only salvation. (…) The ‘sediment of  experience’ provides the basis for scientific investigation. The never-ending shell of life suggested in the persistent character of bias provides possibilities of intensive study of the limitations of life and its probable direction. (RoI 283)

the habits or biases of individuals which permit prediction are reinforced in the cumulative bias of institutions and constitute the chief interest of the social scientist. (RoI 283)

The fundamental limitations outlined by Professor Urwick involve the salvation and the despair of the social sciences. Habits and institutions, even stupidity, are the assets of the social scientist. (RoI 284)

But it may be that Innis himself never resolved the question of whether ineluctable bias is “the salvation [or] the despair of the social sciences”, whether “the persistent character of bias provides possibilities of intensive study” or wrecks itself on the unavoidable reef of “the limitations of life”. The great issue may be put in terms of Innis’ use of the word ‘fundamental’:

The pulp and paper industry is a fundamental development. (DSS 403)

The fundamental limitations outlined by Professor Urwick… (RoI 284)

Was the “fundamental development” of “the pulp and paper industry” (standing in for all those innovations which have served to define “discussion” aka “communication” in terms of mass consumption) “fundamental” in the sense of providing a “basis for scientific investigation” (RoI 283)? Or did it entail “fundamental limitations” that disabled any such “basis” exactly because those “limitations” were “fundamental” and so insuperable?

In 1936, at least, Innis leaned toward the view that “the social scientist cannot be ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ because of the contradiction in terms” (RoI 283) implied by the attempt to make a study of bias that would itself inevitably be biased:

There are fewer and fewer people who will admit that they do not know, or who have the courage to say that they have not solved the problem. And yet that is what the social scientist must continually keep saying if he hopes to maintain any hold on intellectual life. (DSS 408)

If not a science, then, perhaps the social sciences could function as some kind of art? But no! Even this proves illusory. ‘Discussion in the Social Sciences’ ends abruptly with the resigned assessment:

Discussion runs riot and ceases even to be artistic. (DSS 413)

In this vein, Innis would come to speak a decade later of:

the fundamental solipsism of Western civilization (Empire and Communications, 1950, p67).

 

  1. As set out in McLuhan on first meeting Innis, it is certainly not the case that “McLuhan first read Innis in 1951”. He commented on Empire and Communications in his March 1951 “rewrite” of his letter to Innis which was first composed either at the end of 1950 or very early in 1951. So McLuhan must have read Empire and Communications in 1950, the year of its publication. But McLuhan recorded that the first thing he read from Innis was ‘Minerva’s Owl’  (first published in 1947 and republished by UTP in 1948) which would accord with his participation with Innis in the Values Discussion Group of 1949.
  2. Innis’ paper is available online at the Dalhousie website. But a markup error has consolidated it with the Editor’s (H.L. Stewart) ‘Fifteen Years in Review‘: Innis’ contribution begins on p3 of the pdf, p401 of the journal. The paper was reissued as ‘The Intellectual in History’ in the collection of Innis papers, Staples Markets and Cultural Change, ed Drache, 446-458, which appeared in 1995, more than 40 years after Innis’ death.
  3. McLuhan may also have looked up a related Innis essay that had appeared the year before. A footnote to the title of Innis’ 1936 Dalhousie Review piece reads: “A paper read before a meeting of the summer session of the University of British Columbia; 1935, and intended as complementary to ‘The Role of Intelligence’, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, May 1935, 280-7.”
  4. Phelan and Stewart were among the small handful of teachers of philosophy in Halifax after WWI (Stewart at Dalhousie, Phelan at St Mary’s — but Phelan was active also at Dalhousie where he founded its Newman Club and lectured on ethics) and had a mutual interest, originating with Stewart, in the relation of philosophy to psychology. (Stewart’s book Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology was published in 1912, immediately before he began his long career at Dalhousie.) Phelan would go on from Halifax to do advanced graduate work in philosophical psychology in Europe (he was based in Louvain from 1922 to 1925) and became a recognized expert in the field.
  5. The first item in the January 1936 issue of Dalhousie Review, immediately before Innis’ paper, was ‘Fifteen Years Of The Review‘ by the editor, H.L. Stewart. In it he observes that the review’s “catholicity of interest is illustrated by the appearance, within a short space, of critical papers on Bertrand Russell and Cardinal Mercier”. The Mercier article (Dalhousie Review 6:1, 1926, 9-17) was one of Phelan’s contributions. A more recent Phelan article was ‘The Lateran Treaty‘ in Dalhousie Review 9:4, 1930, 427-438.
  6. Innis started at UT in 1920, Phelan in 1925.
  7. It is not impossible that Innis sought out a ‘remote’ publication for his rather acerbic essay. But if so, and if he thought Dalhousie Review appropriately remote, approach to Stewart would have taken place through Phelan. It is more likely, however, that the impetus came from the Review side and that Stewart and/or Phelan wanted a piece from UT’s rising star. But here again, Phelan was the natural person to approach Innis.
  8. Innis’ punctuation has been slightly altered here in the service of clarity. Compare Innis’ “travelling comedians who masquerade as economists and prophets” to Rabelais in Gargantua and Pantagruel: when a company from the University of Paris in their academic robes comes to Gargantua wishing to retrieve the bells of Notre Dame he has made off with — “seeing them so disguised, (he) thought they had been some masquers out of their wits, which moved him to inquire of one of the said artless masters what this mummery meant.” Rabelais’ “said artless masters” were, of course “artless masters” — of arts.
  9. See here for discussion of Irene (Biss) Spry’s view that Innis’s “work on the pulp and paper industry (…) was leading him into his later work on communications.”
  10. Importantly, where the subject of Innis’ 1936 Dalhousie Review essay is called ‘discussion’ (even in its title), his 1937 Encyclopedia of Canada article on the ‘Pulp-and-Paper Industry’ replaces that term with ‘communication’: “Expansion of press services and of advertising agencies has accompanied the marked improvements in communication and in the distribution of newspapers”.
  11. First published as The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man. See The bubble of life in Tolstoy, Nietzsche, Havelock and Innis.

The vacuum tube, “the ballet of electrons”

McLuhan was interested in the parallels between the vacuum tube as employed (before the advent of transistors) in electric devices like radios, televisions, computers, etc, and analogy as deployed in literature. Here he is in a letter to Norbert Wiener from March 1951:

it may interest you to know that the electron valve (…) represents a principle discovered in 1870 by Arthur Rimbaud and applied to poetry and painting since that time. Your account of the uses of the vacuum tube in heavy industry is an exact description of the poetic techniques of Joyce and Eliot in constructing their works.  Their use of allusion as situational analogy effects an enormous amplification of power from small units, at the same time that it permits an unrivalled precision. Their stripping of rhetoric and statement corresponds to your observation that “it is no longer necessary to control a process at high-energy-levels by a mechanism in which the important details of control are carried out at these levels”.1 Stephane Mallarmé made this observation about his own poetic technique in 1885. In short, appearances and pedagogical limitations aside, there never is or can be a dichotomy between the top-level perceptions and procedures in the arts and sciences of an age.2 (McLuhan to Wiener, March 28, 1951)

He specified this interest further in a letter to Ezra Pound a few months later:

I’m interested in such analogies with modern poetry as that provided by the vacuum tube. The latter can tap a huge reservoir of electrical energy, picking it up as a very weak impulse. Then it can shape it and simplify it to major intensity. Technique of allusion as you use it (situational analogies) seems comparable to this type of circuit. Allusion not as ornament but as precise means of making available total energy of any previous situation or culture. Shaping and amplifying it for current use. (McLuhan to Pound, June 12, 1951, Letters 224)

Another 1951 instance is found in McLuhan’s ‘Dos Passos: Technique vs. Sensibility’:

Ulysses shows a very different conception of history in providing a continuous parallel between ancient and modern. The tensions set up in this way permit Joyce to control the huge accretions of historic power and suggestion in the human past by means of the low-current of immediate incident. The technological analog of this process occurs in the present use of the electronic valve in heavy-power circuits. So that Joyce does not have to step up the intensity of the episode or scene so long as he maintains its function in the  total circuit.

His on-going consideration of the matter is reflected in a series of texts McLuhan published in the mid 1950s:

As a vacuum tube is used to shape and control vast reservoirs of electric power, the artist can manipulate the low current of casual words, rhythms, and resonances to evoke the primal harmonies of existence or to recall the dead. But the price he must pay is total self-abnegation. (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press, 1954)

The technique of an Eliot poem is a direct application of the method of the popular radio-tube grid circuit to the shaping and control of the charge of meaning.3 An Eliot poem is one instance of a direct means of experiencing, under conditions of artistic control, the ordinary awareness and culture of contemporary man. (Media Log, 1954)

The cathode tube carries ‘the charge of the light brigade’. The tube carries both the charge and the answering barrage. The result is the painting of images by the ballet of electrons. (Notes on the Media as Art Forms, Explorations 2, 1954)

… radio and TV were not just the electrification of speech and gesture but the electronification of the entire range of human personal expressiveness. With electronification the flow is taken out of the wire and into the vacuum tube circuit, which confers freedom and flexibility such as are in metaphor and in words themselves. (Historical Approach to the Media, 1955, emphasis added)

The electronic or vacuum tube first manifested its powers in the acoustic sphere [radio] but did not achieve full expression until TV. (…) Television takes a large step toward reassembling all the elements of interpersonal discourse which were split apart by writing and by all the intervening artificial media. For language itself is a (…) medium which incorporates gesture and all the various combinations of sensuous experience in a single medium… (Educational Effects of Mass Media of Communication, 1956)

His most protracted consideration is to be found at this same time in the 1955 ‘Radio and Television vs. The ABCED-Minded’:4

The simplest way to get at Joyce’s technique in language, as well as to see its relation to TV, is to consider the principle of the electronic tube. The paradox of the electronic tube is that it is the [continuation by] means of breaking the conductor in an electric circuit. The tube permits the electrons to escape from the wire that ordinarily conveys them. But the tube controls the conditions of escape. It liberates electrons from the wire but it provides a new context in which they can be repatterned. The cathode inside the tube is one end of the broken conductor and the anode is the other. The anode attracts and receives the billions of electrons that are “boiled” off the surface of the cathode. When a tube is connected into an alternating-current circuit, the anode is positive during half of each cycle. During the half cycle when the anode is negative, electrons cannot reach the anode.5 (…) This led to a more effective way than any known before of controlling a large current by a small voltage.  (…)
The grid is the (…) “valve” (…) of the tube. It is located between the cathode and the anode in the path of the electrons. By voltage control the grid acts as [a variable] trigger for the electronic flow. Grid bias6 blocking electronic flow is recentralized [or coordinated with the main circuit] by signal voltage. Signal voltage is a trigger that releases full flow of current through the tube. But this flow stops when anode voltage becomes negative. Cycle then repeats. (…)
Thus a tiny amount of energy can be exactly controlled or stepped up instantly to very high potentials.7
Now metaphor has always had the character of the cathode-anode circuit, and the human ear has always been a grid, mesh, or, as Joyce calls it in Finnegans Wake, Earwicker8. But Joyce was the first artist to make these aspects of language and communication explicit. In so doing, he applied the principles of electronics to the whole history of culture. The entire cyclic body of Finnegans Wake is suspended between a predicate and a subject.9 The cathode-anode aspect of metaphor and language Joyce first extended to syntax. He took the charge of meaning out of the wire of direct statement into the vacuum-tube of the self-contained poetic drama of his “all nights newsery reel” (FW 489).

Later in this same essay:

Metaphor means a carrying across. (…) There is necessarily discontinuity in metaphor. There has to be a leap from one situation to another. (…)  Joyce carried these (…) proportions into every gesture and situation in the WAKE. That is why it is always radiant with intelligibility when seen or apprehended. Here Comes Everybody is his cathode, Anna Livia Plurabelle his anode, and Earwicker or Persse O’Reilly his grid or triggerman. We are the main circuit into which this electronic tube is connected. We can thus see that the functions of a work of art, or electronic tube in the social circuit, are manifold. Principally, however, the tube provides a means of control which can step up the feeble signal voltage to greater intensities of manifestation. The tube permits multiple re-shaping of the ordinary current of small talk and gossip for many kinds of work. It is no exaggeration to say that all things in this “funanimal” (FW244 – Ed.) world were current for the tube of the WAKE. All the social currents that ever were, Joyce can easily adopt in the vacuum tube, or head, or glass house of the sleeping giant Finnegan.

  1. The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 1950, 146. For the wider passage see here.
  2. The idea that “there never is or can be a dichotomy between the top-level perceptions and procedures in the arts and sciences of an age” was central to the work of Sigfried Giedion whom McLuhan met in 1943, initiating a decades-long correspondence between the two. His own background as an engineering student in 1928 at the University of Manitoba who transferred to English and Philosophy might be thought to prefigure this notion. His letter to Innis in March 1951 ends with a statement of the notion and then concludes with reference to AM and FM radios in which the vacuum tube was an essential component: “the actual techniques of (political-)economic study today (Innis was chair of the political economocs department) seem to me to be of genuine relevance to anybody who wishes to grasp the best in current poetry and music. And vice versa. There is a real, living unity in our time, as in any other, but it lies submerged under a superficial hubbub of sensation. Using Frequency Modulation techniques one can slice accurately through such interference, whereas Amplitude Modulation leaves you bouncing on all the currents” (Letters, 223).
  3. See the conclusion to McLuhan’s March 14, 1951 letter to Harold Innis in note 2 above.
  4. Radio and Television vs. The ABCED-Minded’, Explorations 5, 1955, 15-16.
  5. Cf, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 1950, 145: “the vacuum tube, or electron valve (…) originated in Edison’s greatest scientific discovery (…). He observed that when an electrode was placed inside an electric lamp, and was taken as electrically positive with respect to the filament, then a current would flow, if the filament were heated, but not otherwise.” In his March 1951 letter to Wiener (given above), McLuhan cited a sentence from this same paragraph of Wiener’s book.
  6. “Grid bias” is a tip of the hat to Harold Innis. McLuhan’s idea is that all communication not only has bias, as Innis said, but also that all communication works through bias and only through bias. To understand communication therefore demands an understanding of how bias operates and this is just what McLuhan was attempting to do in his considerations of the vacuum tube.
  7. The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 1950, 146: “It is quite possible to form a certain pattern of behavior response at levels much lower even than those found in usual radio sets, and then to employ a series of amplifying tubes to control by this apparatus a machine as heavy as a steel-rolling mill.”
  8. ‘Wicker’ in the sense of a wicker basket and of a wicket; ‘ear’ in the sense of ‘communication capability’, eg, “she had an ear for languages”; but ‘ear’ also as “Eire”. So the individual and collective “grid” or “mesh” ‘enablishing’ (400 hits in Google!) the continuation of the communication circuit by breaking it in patterned ways. Hence McLuhan’s frequent description of language, following Joyce, as a “stutter“.
  9. Bias works through a gate or grid in the communication circuit, just as a basket works through wicker. The etymology of wicker in ‘weak’ might be taken to be indicated by Irish pronunciation of ‘wicker’ as ‘weaker’. This etymology, in turn, would point to the enabling of language through a weakness without whose pliability and paradoxical strength language could not be. Communication works through fuzziness, not through exactitude. Finnegans Wake weaves this weakness and strength, or weakness as strength, into its entire construction down to individual letters.

The “Vacuum of the Self”

McLuhan specifies a “vacuum” in the human self and society. But goes on to understand it, and valorize it, as ontological ground:

What is more moving than to think that this soldier fought and died for the fantasies he had woven around the image of Betty Grable? It would be hard to know where to begin to peel back the layers of insentience and calculated oblivion implied in such an ad. And what would be found as one stripped away these layers, each marked with the pattern of sex, technology, and death? Exactly nothing. One is left staring into a vacuum … (Mechanical Bride, 1951, 13)

The nihilist (…) must destroy because of the vacuum and self-hatred within him. He is born  (…) of the violent meeting and woundings which occur when different cultures converge. In short, he is born of the social conditions of rapid turnover, planned obsolescence, and systematic change for its own sake.  (Mechanical Bride, 13)

Mailer’s General [in The Naked and the Deadis literally a big nobody. He is big because he is geared to a war-machine of which he is the central nervous system. He is successful to the degree to which he can reduce his personal nervous equipment to the level of that machine. Success in this renders him a robot, a nobody, a vacuum. That is inevitable in modern circumstances.  (Mechanical Bride, 37)

That huge frozen vacuum which constitutes our northern frontier territory exerts a polarizing force, in every sense, on Canadian psychology. (Defrosting Canadian Culture, 1952)

the clash of the old segmented visual culture and the new integral electronic culture creates a crisis of identity, a vacuum of the self (Playboy Interview, 1969)

Living in the transitional identity vacuum between two great antithetical cultures… (Playboy Interview, 1969)

The art and science of this century reveal and exploit the resonating bond in all things. All boundaries are areas of maximal abrasion and change. The interval or gap constitutes the resonant or musical bond in the material universe. This is where the action is. To naïve classifiers a gap is merely empty. (…) With medieval dread they abhor vacuums. But by directing perception on the interfaces of the processes in ECO-land, all gaps become prime sources of discovery. (Take Today, 1972, 3)

“We must know the whole play in order to properly act our parts; the conception of totality must never be lost in that of the individual. This Laotse illustrates by his favourite metaphor of the vacuum. He claimed that only in vacuum lay the truly essential. The reality of a room, for instance, was to be found in vacant space enclosed by the roof and walls, not in the roof and walls themselves. The usefulness of a water pitcher dwelt in the emptiness where water might be put, not in the form of the pitcher or the material of which it was made. Vacuum is all potent because all containing.” (Okakura Kakuzō, The Book of Tea, as cited in ‘The Brain and the Media’, 1978, and the posthumous Laws of Media, 78)

Over these citations, the representation of the “vacuum of the self” moves from an objective genitive, where the self as object is expunged by the vacuum, to a subjective genitive, where the self as subject is endowed1 by the vacuum. The vacuum gives way to the self, gives space for it.

The transformation in the representation of the vacuum is from the empty to the replete and from the disabling to the enabling. At the same time, the representation of the vacuum moves from being an overpowering pole opposed to another pole, that of the overpowered self, to being the transitive middle or gap that enables relations (such as those of self and world or word and thing) as meta-phor.

 

 

  1. The etymology of endow works back through dowry, date, donatation.

Wiener on the Vacuum Tube

From The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 1950, 145-146 (emphasis added):

The most flexible universal apparatus for amplifying small energy-levels into high energy-levels is the vacuum tube, or electron valve (…) that  (…) originated in Edison’s greatest scientific discovery (…).
He observed that when an electrode was placed inside an electric lamp, and was taken as electrically positive with respect to the filament, then a current would flow, if the filament were heated, but not otherwise. Through a series of inventions by other people, this led to a more effective way than any known before of controlling a large current by a small voltage. This is the basis of the modern radio industry, but it is also an industrial tool which is spreading widely into new fields. It is thus no longer necessary to control a process at high energy-levels by a mechanism in which the important details of control are carried out at these levels.1
 It is quite possible to form a certain pattern of behavior response at levels much lower even than those found in usual radio sets, and then to employ a series of amplifying tubes to control by this apparatus a machine as heavy as a steel-rolling mill. The work of discriminating and of forming the pattern of behavior for this is done under conditions in which the power losses are insignificant, and yet the final employment of this discriminatory process is at arbitrarily high levels of power.
It will be seen that this is an invention which alters the fundamental conditions of industry (…) The study of the pattern of behavior is transferred to a special part of the instrument in which power-economy is of very little importance. We have thus deprived of much of their importance the dodges and devices previously used to insure that a mechanical linkage should consist of the fewest possible elements, as well as the devices used to minimize friction and lost motion. The design of machines involving such parts has been transferred from the domain of the skilled shopworker to that of the research-laboratory man; and in this he has all the available tools of circuit theory to replace a mechanical ingenuity of the old sort. Invention in the old sense has been supplanted by the intelligent employment of certain laws of nature. The step from the laws of nature to their employment has been reduced by a hundred times.

 

  1. This sentence was cited by McLuhan in his letter to Wiener from March 28, 1951. For discussion see here.

Menippean satire 4

Since all the arts (dance, opera, sculpture, painting, music, poetry, etc) began radical experimentation around the turn of the twentieth century, ‘the absurd’ (the absurd!), ‘satire’ and ‘shock’ have been used to explicate what artists were up to — without the need to engage the particular ways in which they presented their work. In this way, any artist could be run together with any other, or any number of others, since each of them had the same objective condition (the absurd) and the same lack of subjective foundation and conviction (on account of the absurd) and nothing substantial to say (ditto) and therefore no occasion for their work (ditto).

In the event, all that could be expressed was this lack of occasion: “The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express”, as Beckett put it in nuce.

The resulting act of production, together with what is produced, could be called ‘satire’. This was the obligatory hiccup indicating that the artist was aware of the utterly unhinged “obligation” of the creative act. (Any artist not so conscious was not an ‘artist’ at all.  He, or she, was a moron.)

In this situation, the one thing that could differentiate artworks, and so be used to rank them, was the question of how much notice they received. The achievement of such ‘notice’ could be called ‘communication’ and, as had been found in advertising generally, required ‘shock’. For what does not shock, aka reset perception in some way, however momentarily, cannot be said to have been noticed.

In this way, the resetting of perception, or at least what was taken to be the resetting of perception, became something normal and one-dimensional (as Herbert Marcuse had it from Heidegger). In modern life, nothing became more everyday than shock since everything, in the universal quest for attention, was shocking. (But genuine shock, as the fundamental resetting of perception, became obscured and, in general acceptance, impossible.)1

In sum, all real art was thought to express a fundamental absence of occasion and great art was what somehow motivated its audience, even and exactly in the event of that absence, to take out their wallets. Or at least something of their passing attention.

it was remarketable (FW 533)

Art and advertising had become the same.  But if someone like McLuhan pointed this out in so many words (cf ‘The Age of Advertising’, Commonweal Magazine, September 11, 1953), he was an ignorant jerk.

  1. The death of God —  as an objective genitive! — was simply the determination that all human experience, including all possible resets of experience, was locked into a small range that excluded the experience of God or, indeed, even the experience known by one’s own grandparents. This was, of course, stupendously ignorant, and lazy, but was what had become of modern humans.

Stamps on Havelock and McLuhan

Unthinking Modernity: Innis, McLuhan, and the Frankfurt School by Judith Stamps (1995):

McLuhan had not read Havelock at the time of writing The Gutenberg Galaxy… (129)

Since McLuhan referred to Havelock’s 1951 Crucifixion of Intellectual Man a decade before The Gutenberg Galaxy, this is clearly false. And there is much indirect evidence indicating that he read Havelock’s 1946-1947 essay in Phoenix, as well as his 1948 review in UTQ, as they appeared.

But Stamps seems to have used ‘McLuhan had not read Havelock’ here as a stand-in for ‘McLuhan had not read Havelock’s 1963 Preface to Plato‘ which, in reference to the 1962 publication of The Gutenberg Galaxy, is vacuously true.

Goody on Havelock, Innis and McLuhan

Literacy in Traditional Societies by Jack Goody (1975):

the somewhat extravagant work by Marshall McLuhan (…) elaborates on themes developed also at Toronto by Innis (…) and later by E. A. Havelock (whose Preface to Plato appeared in 1963)… (footnote on p 1)

This is an early example of the “later by E. A. Havelock” persuasion. Goody had, of course, no interest at all in the chronology he mentions in passing here and had done no research into it. But the notion gained traction and would be repeated in many quarters. 

Later, after 1990 when Patterson published Innis correspondence from 1951 showing his appreciation of Havelock’s orality research at that time, the “later by E. A. Havelock” thesis was back-dated from 1963 to 1951. But the publication date of that research was retained. Here is Jeffrey in 1997:

[In a letter to Frank Knight from 21 May, 1951 published by Patterson] Innis writes about Havelock’s work on “the question of the shift from the oral to the written tradition in Greek culture” which [work] was not published until 1963. (Jeffrey, 208) 

 

The gigantomachia in Dostoevsky

Notes from a Dead House:

Orlov (…) was not at all an ordinary man. I became more closely acquainted with him out of curiosity and studied him for a whole week. I can say positively that I have never in my life met a man of stronger, more iron character than he. Once, in Tobolsk, I saw a celebrity of this kind, the former chief of a band of brigands. He was a wild beast in the fullest sense, and standing next to him and not yet knowing his name, you sensed instinctively that you had a frightful creature beside you. But for me the horrible thing in him was his spiritual torpor. The flesh had  won out over all his inner qualities so much that from the  first glance you could see by his face that the only thing left in him was one savage craving for physical gratification, sensuality, fleshly indulgence.  I am sure that Korenev — the name of this brigand [in Tobolsk] — would even have lost heart and trembled with fear in the face of [physical] punishment, though he was capable of killing without even batting an eye. Orlov was the complete opposite of him. This was manifestly a total victory over the flesh. You could see that the man had limitless control of himself, despised all tortures and punishments, and had no fear of anything in the world. You saw in him only an infinite energy, a thirst for activity, a thirst for revenge, a thirst for attaining a set  goal. Among other things, I was struck by his strange haughtiness. He looked upon everything from some incredible height, though without any effort to stand on stilts, but just so, somehow naturally. I think there was no being in the world who could have had an effect on him by authority alone. He looked at everything with a sort of unexpected calm, as if there was nothing in the world that could surprise him.[1.Pevear and Volokhonsky translation.)

Typical characteristics of the gigantomachia to be noted here:

  • a struggle (Gk machia) is envisaged between enormous (gigantic) powers: “not at all (…) ordinary”; “frightful”; “horrible”; “total”; “limitless”; “infinite”…
  • the struggle is between one “complete opposite” and another: both are “a celebrity of this kind”, but champions of the opposite pole 
  • on the one side, materiality, earth, below: “wild beast in the fullest sense”; “a frightful creature”; “flesh had  won out over all his inner qualities”; “the only thing left in him was one savage craving for physical gratification, sensuality, fleshly indulgence”…
  • on the other side, ideality, sky, above: “total victory over the flesh”; “limitless control of himself”; “no fear of anything in the world”; “strange haughtiness”; “looked upon everything from some incredible height”; “no being in the world (…) had an effect on him”…

According to Plato, this is a struggle which is “always going on” between the giants of the earth and the gods in the heights…

Theall on Innis, Havelock and McLuhan

Virtual Marshall McLuhan by Don Theall, 2001:

McLuhan first read Innis in 1951, some three years after the initial publication of Empire and Communication (…) One can speak loosely of the existence in the late 1940s (…) of a “Toronto School of Communication” — since Eric Havelock (who was beginning his studies of orality and literacy), as well as Innis and McLuhan were all at Toronto. However, there was little actual contact between Havelock, Innis, and McLuhan, even though they were aware of one another’s work. (…) From my personal contact with McLuhan, which began three years prior to the seminar [on Culture and Communication, 1953-1955], I learned that (…) he was not personally close to Innis — which was clearly confirmed on two or three occasions at which I was present when Marshall conversed with Innis. (49)

In the space of a few sentences here, Theall makes a whole series of factual errors. Since these must have resulted from his “personal” recollection, they throw in some doubt those matters where his recollection is the only basis of their veracity.

It is not the case that “McLuhan first read Innis in 1951”.1 He commented on Empire and Communications in his letter to Innis which was first written either at the end of 1950 or very early in 1951.2 So McLuhan must have read Empire and Communications in 1950, the year of its publication (and not, as Theall, says, 1948, ie, “1951, some three years after the initial publication of Empire and Communication“). In fact, McLuhan recorded that the first thing he read from Innis was ‘Minerva’s Owl’  (which was published by UTP in 1948) which would accord with his participation with Innis in the Values Discussion Group of 1949.

Further, the title of Innis’ book was Empire and Communications, plural, not Theall’s Empire and Communication, singular. Further still, it is not the case that Havelock, Innis, and McLuhan “were all at Toronto” together “in the late 1940s” — or ever.  Havelock left Toronto for good in 1947 and in 1946, McLuhan’s first year at UT, Havelock was a guest lecturer at Harvard. Finally, Innis’ letter to McLuhan from January 12, 1952 — which begins, “I was immensely pleased to get your warm letter” — might serve to qualify, at least, Theall’s recollected impression that McLuhan “was not personally close to Innis”.3  

In a more concentrated look at ‘The Toronto School of Communications‘ Theall offers this synopsis:

The foundation of the Toronto School begins with Havelock and the way he interpreted Aeschylus’s play, Prometheus Bound, [= The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, 1951] as a commentary on the dilemma of the rise of technology and its creation of a new sense of space, time and memory in a post-technological world dominated by a shift from orality to writing –- an argument he was later to develop at great length in a book McLuhan praised highly, The Preface to Plato. Innis openly admitted Havelock’s influence on his own work with his interest in communication technologies and the shift in biases toward time and space which resulted, [as manifested] in [works in] various media. McLuhan’s early work in his Cambridge doctoral thesis, Thomas Nashe and the Learning of his Time, and his first book, The Mechanical Bride, provided him with a unique access to Havelock’s work, presenting possibilities of reinterpreting, expanding and critiquing many of Havelock’s, and later Innis’s, insights. McLuhan was able to use the history of grammar, dialectic and rhetoric and their impact on shaping (…) and directing learning from Greece to Elizabethan England to extend Havelock’s history of Greek culture to that of the history of culture from the Roman Empire to the Reformation.

Theall certainly errs here in observing that “the foundation of the Toronto School begins with Havelock” in 1951. By that time, Havelock was already deeply engaged in his orality research and was long gone from Toronto, Innis had published his major contributions in communications (Empire and Communications and many of the essays included in The Bias of Communication), and McLuhan had published The Mechanical Bride. Despite this, however, the synopsis offered here is illuminating and demands close consideration. Particularly Theall’s well-founded specification of “a new sense of space [and] time” in Havelock and Innis is important in light of McLuhan’s investigations of spaces and times throughout the 1950s, culminating in his relativity theory of human experience sometime around 1960.

  1. As discussed below, this avowal is made by Babe and other historians of the Toronto school. Its effect has been to excuse researchers from looking into the facts of the matter before this time.
  2.  The copy in Letters (220-222) is dated March 14, 1951, but is identified as a “rewrite”.  In Innis’ February response to the original letter, Innis apologies for his late reply.
  3. Theall arrived in Toronto in the fall of 1950. This letter from Innis to McLuhan, written a little more than one year later, could not have fallen too far out of the time frame of the “two or three occasions at which I (Theall) was present when Marshall conversed with Innis”. Theall’s recollection here, going back 50 years, might have been colored by, eg, Robert Babe, who also maintained that the relationship of Innis and McLuhan was “not (…) particularly warm on a personal basis” (see here). Babe’s influence on Theall’s recollections may be suspected as well from Babe’s faulty contention, again to be found in Theall, that “only in 1951 did he (McLuhan) begin reading anything by that great political economist” (ibid).

The question of unity

And just as our individual experiences of our individual senses get processed by some sort of inner common sense which gives unity to the diversity of our sensations, so with the media as extensions of our senses. These cooperative technological extensions of ourselves undergo a social or communal processing which gives them unity… (Explorations 8, 1957, 1-18)

A sensus communis for external senses is what I’m trying to build. (McLuhan to Walter Ong on November 18, 1961, Letters 281)

Between these two dates (in the first of which ‘unity’ is a social fact, but in the second remains outstanding), presumably in the course of composing his Project in Understanding New Media, McLuhan seems to have realized that it was not enough to attest to unity as he and Giedion did:

Giedion: “in spite of seeming confusion, there is nevertheless a true, if hidden, unity, a secret synthesis, in our present civilization.” (Space, Time and Architecture, Foreword to the first edition, 1941.)

McLuhan: “There is a real, living unity in our time, as in any other, but it lies submerged under a superficial hubbub of sensation. (McLuhan to Harold Innis, March 14 1951, Letters 223)

Instead, he now understood (at a time when his mother’s health was fatally broken1 and his own was starting to break with “occasional blackouts and dizziness” (Letters, 175) and his children were falling away from the church) that the perception of unity was problematic (whatever its metaphysical status might be).  Further, that this failure of perception had potentially devastating effect when human destructive power was greater than ever and the world was smaller than ever. 

It may be guessed that his wrestling with “acoustic space” — which he would continue from 1955 until his death 25 years later — was above all motivated by the question of how to articulate a discontinuous and non-linear ‘unity’ in order to promote its renovated perception. And this at a time when, beyond the perennial problems posed to such perception by human mortality and evil and blindness, in the new situation of the electric era all traditional perspectives, with their associated particular conceptions of unity, were doomed.

  1. Elsie McLuhan suffered a debilitating stroke in 1956 and died in 1961.

Pre-Christian Logos

As the four levels of understanding and exegesis are found in both the secular and patristic traditions, they would seem to bridge the worlds of Paul and Apollo. (Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land, 1979)

McLuhan did not perceive Christianity as being entirely original, as being entirely new wine appearing in the world without long preparation. Instead he thought of Christianity as the carrier of Logos, of an age-old truth, or truths, which it presented and celebrated (or presented especially via celebration) in revolutionary and superlative ways.

1948
When the Church Fathers adapted the neo-Platonic and Stoic concept of the Logos to Christian Revelation, they committed the church to many centuries of symbolism and allegory. The result was that for a very long time the outer world was seen as a net-work of analogies which richly exemplified and sustained the psychological and moral structure of man’s inner world. Both inner and outer worlds were mirrors in which to contemplate the Divine Wisdom. (Where Chesterton Comes In, 1948)

Here are further texts, in chronological order, in which McLuhan puts forward aspects of this view: 

1943
A brief consideration of Stoic philosophy will serve to indicate how the study of language and poetry could become completely wedded to the study of physics and ethics. Vernon Arnold’s fine study of Roman Stoicism points out (…) the Stoics (…)
 “adopted and developed a conception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other systems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of deity to the divine Word, which from one point of view is the deity, himself, and from another is something which emanates from him and is in some way distinct.Confronted with the great doctrine of the Logos, it is, perhaps easier to understand how grammar and etymology should have been esteemed as means of investigating both the nature of deity and the natures of phenomena. Inseparable from the doctrine of the Logos is the cosmological view of the rerum natura, the whole, as a continuum, at once a network of natural causes and an ordo naturae whose least pattern expresses analogically a divine message. This notion, already  implicit in the Chaldean cosmology, is the very basis of Plato’s Timaeus, the work of his which had the greatest influence of any of his works, both in antiquity and in the medieval times. If its full influence is to be explained, this dialogue should be seen as a statement of a cosmology already many centuries old, and one which had, long after Plato’s own day, exponents as different as the Pythagoreans and the Stoics. (The Classical Trivium: The Place Of Thomas Nashe In The Learning Of His Time, 1943, 20-21)

1943
The doctrine of the Logos, so important for understanding the interfusion of language and physics in the mind of antiquity, seems to have been adopted by the Stoics from Heraclitus of Ephesus, who propounded it in the early part of the fifth century. (…) The Logos or universal reason is at once the life and order which are in all things, and in the mind of man. When the Romans found it impossible to translate Logos by any single word “they therefore adopted the phrase ratio et oratio (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to include also the broad notion of ‘Universal Law’ or the ‘Laws of Nature’.” It has often been pointed out how profoundly this doctrine of the Logos was received by Christianity; but it has not been seen that the intermediate stages by which the transference of influence occurred was the grammatical art or discipline, which was common both to Stoic physics and to the earliest Christian theology. Seen in the light of the doctrine of the Logos, the Stoic interest in etymology as a source of scientific and philosophic knowledge, is perfectly natural.  (The Classical Trivium: The Place Of Thomas Nashe In The Learning Of His Time, 22; the quotation is from Edward Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 1911)

1943
The use and continuance of the allegorical and etymological methods by the Stoics and Plato, as well as by Philo, St. Augustine, and St. Bonaventure, is not a carry-over from a primitive world-view. (…) The Stoic interpreters of poetry and mythology knew very well what they were doing, and did not derive their doctrines from, but applied them to, these matters. The Logos, far from being a piece of naïve animism, is metaphysical in character. (The Classical Trivium: The Place Of Thomas Nashe In The Learning Of His Time, 24)

1943
The central clue to the whole matter is once more provided by the doctrine of the Logos. Arnold, reporting [in Roman Stoicism] the ancient interpretation of the Logos as expounded by Heraclitus, says, “All things both in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the ‘Logos‘; it is a cosmic principle, ‘common’ or ‘universal’; and (…) it is the duty of man to obey this ‘Logos‘, and so to place himself in harmony with the rest of nature.” (The Classical Trivium: The Place Of Thomas Nashe In The Learning Of His Time, 62-63)

1943
From the earliest Greek times until the time of Descartes the upholders of civilized life never tired of expressing the fact that man as man is distinguished from the brutes by the power of speech. Inseparable from his rational soul and indispensable to his social and political life is the need to utter himself. Eloquence was therefore cherished as the finest expression of man’s excellence. This doctrine supported by the great doctrine of the Logos (ratio et oratio) inspired the ancient world to achieve and sustain those legal institutions which defined the civis and from which we have civilization. (Education of Free Men, 1943)

1946
The origin of this important claim for the inseparable character of eloquence and wisdom would seem to lie in the familiar doctrine of the Logos, which may be supposed to have arisen with Heraclitus. Society is a mirror or speculum of the Logos, as, indeed, are the external world, the mind of man and, above all, human speech. Society, ideally the cosmopolis or perfect world state, claimed the devotion of every virtuous man. And just as Zeno considered wisdom or prudence “not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all,” so political prudence is the noblest sphere in which to exercise this virtue. The Stoics deduced from this doctrine the corollary that “The bond of the state is the Logos (ratio atque oratio)”. Viewed from the standpoint of the doctrine of the Logos, man is distinguished from the brutes by speech, and as he becomes more eloquent he becomes less brutish. As he becomes less brutish he becomes more wise. There is thus no conflict between eloquence and wisdom; and since eloquence is the means to political power, the great orator, the great statesman, and the great philosopher are one and the same. (An Ancient Quarrel in Modern America, 1946)1

1950
In Mallarmé the Word has no theological overtones. It is rather a return to the pre-Christian doctrine of the Logos which included ratio et oratio and was the element in which all men were thought to move and have their being. (T.S. Eliot [Review of eleven Eliot books], 1950) 

1951
Many of the ancient language theories of the Logos type (…) have recurred and amalgamated themselves today under the auspices of anthropology and social psychology. Working concepts of “collective consciousness” in advertising agencies have in turn given salience and practical effectiveness to these “magical” notions of language. (McLuhan to Harold Innis, March 14 1951, Letters 220)

1955
But even for Aristotle the obvious fact about speech is that it is a technique of arresting the hearer’s mind and fixing his attention. For a culture of readers it seems strange to define speech as a series of acoustical gestures for arresting the mind. We had long ceased to speculate on this 
mystery until the mechanization of speech, image, and gesture brought the wheel full circle. Today, with all our technology, and because of it, we stand once more in the magical acoustical sphere of pre-literate man. (Space, Time, and Poetry, 1955, emphasis added)

1960
Multi-levelled exegesis of Ovid or Virgil or the Scriptures was not only a medieval mode of reading and writing. It preceded Christianity and was the norm among ancient “grammarians.” To-day it is again the norm in physics, in psychology, in poetry and the arts. (‘Grammars for the Newer Media’, 1960)

1969 
I am a Thomist for whom the sensory order resonates with the divine
Logos. I don’t think concepts have any relevance in religion. Analogy
is not concept. It is community. It is resonance. It is inclusive. It is the
cognitive process itself. That is the analogy of the divine Logos. (McLuhan to Mole, April 18, 1969, Letters 368-369)

1978
I was not concerned with theology in my observations, but merely rhetoric and psychology. The speaker or performer has inevitably to “put on” his public as a corporate mask, and this involves simultaneously the three roles of the logos: the logos prophorikos (the uttered or spoken word), the logos spermatikos (the embedding of the seed in things), and finally, the logos hendiathetos (the mode of inner resonance): “You that have ears to hear, let them hear!” [Luke 8:8] (McLuhan letter to the editor of Commonweal, March 17, 1978)

1978
…”every sentence” involves the whole man and the whole art, as in the Logos of the Herakleitos epigraph at the opening of the poem [Four Quartets]. The theme is of liberation through involvement in the “timeless moments”, between the way up and the way down [=  ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή, “the Herakleitos epigraph”]. “Between two waves of the sea” is the resonant interval, the stilling of the unheard music that assures that “all shall be well”.  (R
hetorical Spirals in Four Quartets, 1978)2

1979
This “classic” poem [Hugh Selwyn Mauberly] has the claim to be truly classic in respect to its structural use of the five divisions of classical rhetoric. Seven years before the appearance of The Waste Land, Pound had developed the style of classical eloquence in contemporary poetry. He divided “Mauberly” into five numbered sections which are simultaneous, rather than sequential, resonant rather than logical, as are the five divisions of classical oratory as understood by Cicero and Quintilian. The importance of this simultaneity concerns the classical claim to embody the Logos in the resonant interplay of these divisions. (Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land, 1979) 

Posthumous
The space of early Greek cosmology was structured by logos — resonant utterance or word. (Laws of Media, 35)3 

Posthumous
the spoken word, logos, functioned in oral society as the principal technology both of communication and of fashioning and transmitting the culture. Logos was also related to formal cause, to the existential essence of things. In this sense, Pedro Laín Entralgo observes, all things are, as it were, words, expressions: “The logos of the philosophers, from Thales to Democritus, was used to declare what things ‘are’. (…) The logos (…) belongs therefore to the very structure of being” [Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity]. The logos in its double sense of word and reason (the Romans had to translate it ‘ratio et oratio‘) was considered by the preliterate Greeks as the ‘highest and most specific’ of the gifts of nature. By means of active utterance, logos (speech), men could express what things are as well as exercise rhetorical power over other men. Fair words and lofty deeds are the titles of social excellence in Homer. Before writing, logos was active and metamorphic rather than neutral — words and deeds were related as were words and things. The logos of creation is of the same order: ‘Let there be light’ is the uttering or outering of light. (Laws of Media, 36) 

Posthumous
kosmos
and the logos that informs it are encyclopedic (as they concern the universe, ‘the world of nature taken in its widest sense’) and both are concerned with metamorphosis. These properties of the logos are of particular importance to the later development of Stoic and Roman grammar and rhetoric. (…) While common-sense acoustic space held sway, the cosmos was perceived as a resonant and metamorphic structure informed by logos: “The structure of man’s speech was an embodiment of the structure of the world.” (Laws of Media, 37, citing Harold Innis, Empire and Communication, 76) 

Posthumous
The Stoics developed a ‘threefold logos’ that served as the pattern for the trivium, although the trivium itself was not formally recognized as the basis of education and science for some time. The pre-alphabetic logos was retrieved in two ways; it informed the Patristic ‘doctrine of the logos,’ and it was recapitulated in the overlapping structures of the threefold Stoic logos. (Laws of Media, 124) 

Posthumous
Following the Greek rhetorician Isocrates, Cicero, and after him Quintilian, established the basic pattern for Western civilized education, reaffirmed by St Augustine four centuries later, as the alignment of encyclopedic wisdom and eloquence. That is, with the trivium as a retrieval of the oral logos on the new ground of writing, the conjunction of grammar and rhetoric on the one hand, and dialectic on the other, provided a balance of the hemispheres. (Laws of Media, 124-125)

 

  1. Originally a 1944 lecture in St Louis.
  2. The Four Quartets quotations are from ‘Little Gidding’, lines 227; 238; 254; 258.
  3. Laws of Media was published posthumously. Most of the notes incorporated into the volume by Eric McLuhan came from late in his father’s career.

Ted Carpenter on discovering ‘auditory space’

Ted Carpenter’s ‘That Not So Silent Sea’ is included as an appendix to Donald Theall’s The Virtual Marshall McLuhan (2001). Somewhat differently from McLuhan and Williams (see ‘Autobiography 1954: McLuhan & Williams on discovering ‘auditory space’)1, he recalls the discovery of ‘auditory space’ in their Culture and Communication seminar as follows:

Carl Williams (…) sought to refine psychology to an objective science. It was for this reason he was invited to join the group. We felt we needed his bias to balance ours (…) to get Ford funding. [Yet it was] Carl [who] provided the first breakthrough [of the seminar sessions]. He used the phrase “auditory space” in describing an experiment by EA. Bott. (…) The phrase was electrifying. Marshall changed it to “acoustic space” and quoted Symbolist poetry. Jackie [Tyrwhitt] mentioned the Indian city of Fatehpur Sikri. Tom saw parallels in medieval Europe. I talked about Eskimos. (…)  Carl [then] sent a paper on “auditory space” to Explorations, minus all [the] seminar dialog [as just noted from McLuhan, Tyrwhitt, Easterbrook and Carpenter]. So Marshall & I put it [back] in. A mistake. Two articles, one on the mechanics of auditory space [by Williams], the other on acoustic “patterning” [by Carpenter and McLuhan] might have been more diplomatic. But we needed some input from Carl, and clearly it wouldn’t come without [our] help. (241)2

Carpenter and Williams plainly did not get along. This had some of its ground in the fact that Williams (a friend of McLuhan since high school) was close to Claude Bissell, who became Principal of Carleton College (UT) in 1956 and President of UT itself in 1958.  Williams followed Bissell as Principal at Carleton and became President of the University of Western Ontario in 1967 after serving in a series of further administrative positions at UT under Bissell.  

Now Bissell and McLuhan had come to the UT English Department together in the same year, 1946, and had established a friendship that lasted until McLuhan’s death. Williams came back to UT a few years later at which time he and McLuhan had been friends for two decades. This somewhat strange relationship with administration power in the persons of Bissell and Williams served McLuhan well over the years, but apparently irked Carpenter. In ‘That Not So Silent Sea’ he mentions a spat over allocation of some of the Culture and Communication Ford Foundation grant: “The head of Anthropology, as always, supported the administration. So did Carl.” (242)

Carpenter’s explanation of why Williams “was invited to join the [seminar] group”, namely that “we needed his bias to balance ours”, is only partly true, at best, since the number of people at UT who could have been approached to counter-balance McLuhan and Carpenter was very large. There must have been something to single Williams out from this multitude. In fact, he was a very old friend3 of McLuhan from Winnipeg and UM (along with Easterbrook).4 This personal background may have been another ground for the animosity between Carpenter and Williams — the two belonged to different, and perhaps competing, groups of McLuhan associates.

Carpenter also gives the impression that Williams was somewhat dim-witted, in need of the “help” of Carpenter and McLuhan to author a short paper. In fact, although Williams (born July 1912) was a year younger than McLuhan, he graduated from UM in Arts (English, Philosophy, Sociology, French) in 1932, a year ahead of McLuhan. He then went to Toronto for his M.A. and PhD in psychology and, before returning to UT in 1949, was head of the UM Psychology Department back in Winnipeg5. And in 1954 he was the President of the Canadian Psychology Association.

Williams was plainly a talented person, but in ways other than those prized by Carpenter. Noteworthy for McLuhan is the fact that he and Williams remained friends for half a century despite the fact that McLuhan shared Carpenter’s depreciative view of administration and management — without, however, considering it the only facet of Williams’ personality and without considering even that facet in Manichean black/white terms. 

  1. For further light on the ‘discovery of ‘acoustic space’ (as McLuhan always called it), see Eisenstein 3 (Balázs). McLuhan and Don Theall had read Balázs’ Theory of the Film which has a section on ‘The Acoustic World’. The exchanges in the seminar concerning ‘auditory space’ must have been mediated, at least for McLuhan and Theall, by Balázs’ discussion.
  2. Carpenter also discussed the same event in his interview on YouTube: “I remember there was one idea that came in. It  was introduced by a psychologist named Williams and he based it on (E.A.) Bott’s research. It was called (auditory) space and Marshall immediately renamed it acoustic space and that somehow liberated the thing and it became an amazing idea. The application in anthropology became to me of primary importance. We suddenly realized that every culture defines a sensory profile and in native cultures for example to maximize sound you will minimize sight, so the dancer is often blinded, deliberately. Or you may find that they will deliberately turn sound into a (tactile) thing so they will plug their ears when they sing. If you begin to examine cultures I think you’ll find that all peoples do this. We go into an art gallery and the sign says, do not touch; a concert goer closes his eyes (to favor hearing); in the library it says, silence; and you’ll find that this will differ markedly from culture to culture. With Jacqueline Tyrwhitt this immediately brought to mind to her a fabled city in India which was in a sense acoustic space, like a Frank Gehry building. And Tom Easterbrook got so interested in this he shifted his research to Africa and the marketplace and so forth. And for Marshall suddenly all kinds of things began to appear in terms of literature.” (‘Edmund Ted Carpenter 2011 —  On Marshall McLuhan and Explorations’, Interview on YouTube, 31:25ff).
  3. In Who was Marshall McLuhan?, Barrington Nevitt and Maurice McLuhan note that: “Carlton Williams (…) was one of Marshall’s close friends” (143). And Williams himself records: “Marshall and Tom Easterbrook were already close friends when we were all undergraduates at the University of Manitoba in the early 1930s.  I came to know both at that time and to value their friendship” (286). In fact, McLuhan and Williams  knew each other already before university since they attended Kelvin High School together (Who’s Who in Canada, Volume 77, 1985, p 962). For images of the Kelvin yearbook showing McLuhan and Williams in their respective rooms, see Richard Altman’s short film ‘Jacqueline Tyrwhitt‘ (0.29ff).
  4. Perhaps this Manitoba mafia regarded the Ford Foundation application as something of a lark? Or even the seminar itself?  See McLuhan to Lewis, March 7, 1955: ” We are spending some Ford Foundation funds by way of studying the new media of communication.” (Letters, 247)
  5. Williams’ wife was from Toronto and may have wanted to return there, perhaps to look after her widowed mother.

McLuhan & Williams on discovering ‘auditory space’

In ‘The End of the Work Ethic’, an address to The Empire Club of Canada, November 16, 1972, McLuhan described a moment, apparently in 19541, which he styled as “my own first discovery of acoustic space”.2 The same event was described by Carlton Williams for Who Was Marshall McLuhan (1994, p 144).

McLuhan: A group of us which included Carl Williams (now President of the University of Western Ontario), Tom Easterbrook (Political Economy, University of Toronto), and Jacqueline Tyrwhitt (Architecture and Town Planning) were discussing the newest book of Sigfried Giedion, The Beginnings of Architecture.

Williams: At one of our earlier [Culture and Communication seminar] sessions3 we were wrestling with Space, Time and Architecture, a major work by (…) Sigfried Giedion.

Williams must be correct about the Giedion book which was being discussed. The Beginnings of Architecture was not published until almost a decade later and Giedion’s underlying Mellon lectures to Beginnings were not given until 1957.4

McLuhan: Jacqueline Tyrwhitt (she had worked with Giedion on this study for years) was explaining how Giedion presented the fact that the Romans were the first people to enclose space. The Egyptian pyramids enclosed no space since their interior was dark, as were their temples.

Williams: I made the point that one could, and indeed had to, consider space in various ways: it was not a simple “given.” There was, he [Giedion] said, “hollowed out” space, as in a cave; “enclosed” space, as in a stadium; “infinite” space, as in the heavens.

McLuhan: At this point, Carl Williams, the psychologist, objected that, after all, the spaces inside a pyramid, even though dark, could be considered as acoustic spaces, and he then mentioned the characteristic modes of acoustic space as a sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose margins are nowhere…

Williams: This put me in mind of a comment of Hermann von Helmholtz, a major figure in German psychology and physics at the turn of the century. Helmholtz used the phrase, “auditory space” to describe the notion of space experienced by a blind person, or a seeing person wearing a blindfold. Such persons are at the centre of an n-dimensional sphere, in that they may detect a sound from any angle.

McLuhan: I have never ceased to meditate on the relevance of this acoustic5 space to an understanding of the simultaneous electric world.6

Williams: The notion of auditory space struck Marshall with great force and I was thereafter bombarded with telephone calls, (usually after midnight), as he presented his latest insights sparked by this idea. This was characteristic of Marshall: that he appropriated ideas from others, developing and expanding them beyond anything contemplated by the original proposal.7

For Carpenter on the same event, see Ted Carpenter on discovering ‘auditory space’.

  1. McLuhan to Wyndham Lewis, December 18, 1954 (Letters 245): “A group of us here have been studying the new media and have been looking into the character of Acoustic Space as reconstituted by the mechanization of sound. Acoustic Space is spherical. It is without bounds or vanishing points. It is structured by pitch separation and kinesthesia. It is not a container. It is not hollowed out. It is the space in which men live before the invention of writing — that translation of the acoustic into the visual. With writing men began to trust their eyes and to structure space visually. Pre-literate man does not trust his eyes very much. The magic is in sound for him, with its power to evoke the absent.” On the same day to Ezra Pound: “A group of us here are working on the character of acoustic space — the space of pre-literate man. Non-euclidian, non-container.” (Letters, 246)
  2. An earlier description of the same event was recounted by McLuhan in ‘Environment As Programmed Happening’ (1968): I vividly recall an occasion when I made my first encounter with acoustic space as a concept. Professor Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, now at the Harvard School of Design, was a member of our Toronto seminar on Culture and Communications. She had been explaining some of Sigfried Giedion’s recent findings in which he discriminated between enclosed and unenclosed spaces. Since that time his study of The Beginnings of Architecture has brought these matters into a luminous focus. As Professor Tyrwhitt followed his exploration of Egyptian as contrasted with Roman space, she stressed the point that a pyramid did not enclose any space since darkness is to space what silence is to sound. In the same way, an Egyptian temple does not enclose space since it, too, is dark. Even the Greeks never achieved true closure of space. This remained for the Romans. At this point psychologist Carl Williams (now President of the University of Western Ontario) intervened, He observed that unenclosed space could best be considered as acoustic or auditory space. Williams had long been associated with E.A. Bott, who has spent his life studying auditory space. Bott’s formula for auditory space is simply that it has no centre and no margins, since we hear from all directions simultaneously. Structurally, it tends to be the space of all preliterate societies since the auditory sense has much primacy over the visual sense in preliterate cultures.”
  3. The seminar began in 1953 and ended in 1955.
  4. McLuhan was doubtless thinking of Giedion’s ‘Space Conceptions in Prehistoric Art’ which appeared in Explorations 6 (1956) and may well have been discussed along with Space, Time and Architecture in this same seminar session in a preview version courtesy of Tyrwhitt (Giedion’s longtime editor and translator). It was not unusual for the seminar to have access in this way to research which would be published in Explorations at a later date.  The ‘Auditory Space’ paper attributed to Carlton Williams in Explorations 4, for example, cites an Eskimo bard declaring “Let me be known only as the man who wrote the songs of my people”.  This would appear years later in Explorations 9 in Ted Carpenter’s Eskimo.
  5. Williams: “He (McLuhan) always — and wrongly — called it ‘acoustic’ space. I say ‘wrongly’, because acoustics pertain to the physical properties of the room, auditorium or whatnot, in which human auditory capacity is called into play.”
  6. Cf, McLuhan to Tyrwhitt, Dec 23, 1960 (Letters 278): “Today with electronics we have discovered that we live in a global village and the job is to create a global city, as center for the village margins. The parameters of this task are by no means positional (= those of visual space). With electronics, any marginal area can become centre, and marginal experiences can be had at any center. (…) In a word, that which is normal and desirable in a print culture with regard to the titillation of the senses may become quite nonviable under electronic conditions, even for the welfare of the private individual. Whatever we may wish in the matter, we can no longer live in Euclidean space under electronic conditions, and this means that the divisions between inner and outer, private and communal, whatever they may have been for a literate culture, are simply not there for an electric one.”
  7. Cf, Ted Carpenter, ‘That Not So Silent Sea’: “Writers commonly speak of Marshall’s original ideas. He had none. (…) His genius lay in perceiving, not creating. He accepted the world as he found it and simply described what he saw, free of the haze he believed obstructed all others.” (Virtual Marshall McLuhan, Donald Theall, 2001, 245) Also Buckminster Fuller: “McLuhan has never made any bones about his indebtedness to me as the original source of most of his ideas. The ‘Global Village’ indeed was my concept. I don’t think he has an original idea. Not one. McLuhan says so himself. He’s really a very great enthusiast, a marvelous populariser and teacher. He has an irrepressible sense of the histrionic, like no one I’ve known other than Frank Lloyd Wright. . . . My concept of the ‘mechanical extensions of man’ is the basis for his talk of the ‘Electrical Extensions’ of man. . . . McLuhan has always been the first to say ‘Bucky is my master. I am only his disciple.’” Letter from Fuller to E. J. Applewhite, July 10, 1973, in Synergetics Dictionary: The Mind of Buckminster Fuller, ed. E. J. Applewhite (1986), 592. Also Wilfred Watson: “invention was not his metier”, ‘Marshall McLuhan and Multi-Consciousness: The Place Marie Dialogues’, boundary 2, 3:1, 1974, 197.

Relativity in Space, Time & Architecture

This is not an invitation to prophecy but a demand for a universal outlook upon the world. (Space, Time and Architecture, 7)

In what was originally his introductory lecture, ‘The Role of History Today’, in his Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard on “Art and Architecture”, 1938, and later became the first chapter of Space, Time and Architecture (STA), Sigfried Giedion sets out the case for a relativity theory of the domain of human experience — aka the domain of “the world of history”.

There are no “absolute points of reference”:

Absolute points of reference are no more open to the historian than they are to the physicist; both produce descriptions relative to a particular situation. Likewise there are no absolute standards in the arts: the nineteenth-century painters and architects who thought certain forms were valid for every age were mistaken. (5)

The historian cannot in actual fact detach himself from the life about him; he, too, stands in the stream. The ideal historian — out of the press of affairs, au-dessus de la melée, surveying all time and all existence from a lofty pedestal — is a fiction. The historian, like every other man, is the creature of his time and draws from it both his powers and his weaknesses. (6)

Unfortunately the historian has often used his office to proclaim the eternal right of a static past. Ever since man recognized the impossibility of making objective judgments, such an attitude has been discredited. (6-7)

History is not simply the repository of unchanging facts, but a process, a pattern of living and changing attitudes and interpretations. As such, it is deeply a part of our own natures. To turn backward to a past age is not just to inspect it, to find a pattern which will be the same for all comers. The backward look transforms its object; every spectator at every period — at every moment , indeed — inevitably transforms the past according to his own nature. (5)

History cannot be touched without changing it. The painters of our period  have formulated a different attitude: lo spettatore nel centra del quadro. The observer must be placed in the middle of the painting, not at some isolated observation point outside. Modern art, like modern science, recognizes the fact that observation and what is observed form one complex situation — to observe something is to act upon and alter it. (5-6)

But intelligibility is not the same thing as building upon “absolute points of reference”:

Historians quite generally distrust absorption into contemporary ways of thinking and feeling as a menace to their scientific detachment, dignity, and breadth of outlook. But one can be thoroughly the creature of one’s own period, embued with its methods, without sacrificing these qualities [of scientific detachment, dignity, and breadth of outlook]. Indeed, the historian in every field must be united with his own time by as widespread a system of roots as possible. The world of history, like the world of nature, explains itself only to those who ask the right questions, raise the right problems. The historian must be intimately a part of his own period to know what questions concerning the past are significant  to it. (6) 

So it is that “scientific detachment, dignity, and breadth of outlook” are possible, and are possible only, on the basis of the relativity of human experience:

We must take our departure from a large number of specialized disciplines and go on from there toward a coherent general outlook on our world. (17)1

The key is to discover some co-variance which functions across all the varieties of “specialized (…) outlook” (thereby establishing a continuum in which also our own outlook is situated)2:

Today we consciously examine the past from the point of view of the present to place the present in a wider dimension of time, so that it can be enriched by those aspects of the past that are still vital. This is a matter concerning continuity… (7)

In 1908 the great mathematician Hermann Minkowski first conceived a world in four dimensions, with space and time coming together to form an indivisible continuum. His Space and Time of that year begins with the celebrated statement, “Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality”.  It was just at this time that in France and in Italy cubist and futurist painters developed the artistic equivalent of space-time in their search for means of expressing purely contemporaneous feelings. (14)

Each period lives in a realm of feeling as well as in a realm of thought, and changes in each realm affect the changes in the other. Each period finds outlets for its emotions [the realm of feeling] through different means of [artistic] expression. Emotions and expressive means vary concomitantly with the concepts [in the realm of thought] that dominate the epoch. Thus in the Renaissance, the dominant space conceptions [in the realm of thought] found their proper frame in [artistic] perspective [in the realm of feeling], while in our period the conception of space-time  [thought] leads the artist to adopt very different means [feeling]. (16) 

The degree to which its methods of thinking and of feeling coincide [aka, establish some kind of balance] determines the [particular sort of] equilibrium of an epoch. (17)

Present-day happenings are simply the most conspicuous sections of a continuum; they are like that small series of wave lengths between ultraviolet and infra-red which translate themselves into colors visible to the human eye. (7)

Such a general theory of experiential relativity enables us to overcome relativity in the vulgar sense:

A transition period may affect two observers in very different ways. One may see only the chaos of contradictory traits and mutually destructive principles; the other may see beneath all this confusion those elements which are working together to open the way for new solutions. It is not a simple thing to decide between two such judgments, to determine which has emphasized the essential marks of the time. We need some objective guide to what is going on in the depths of the period, some sign by which we can determine whether or not its dispersed energies are being brought into united action.  A comparison of the methods which govern its [correlated] major activities, its thinking and feeling, may afford us such an objective criterion.3(12)

But sensing such a possibility and communicating it are two different things: 

In both contemporary science and contemporary art it is possible to detect elements of the general pattern which our culture will embody. The situation is a curious one : our culture is like an orchestra where the instruments lie ready tuned but where every musician is cut off from his fellows by a soundproof wall. It is impossible to foretell the events that will have to come before these barriers are broken down. The only service the historian can perform is to point out this situation, to bring it into consciousness. (17)

Still, historians have a responsibility to such “interrelationship”, both in establishing focus for their subject matter and in their dedication to communication with their contemporaries:

The historian detached from the life of his own time writes irrelevant history, deals in frozen facts. But it is his unique and non transferable task to uncover for his own age its vital interrelationships with the past. (6)

A period may be dominated by transitory or by constituent [aka, interrelational or orchestral] facts; both alternatives are open. There is, however, no doubt which of these two classes of trends is the more likely to produce a solution of the real problems of the age. (19)

 

  1. McLuhan 30 years later writing about Harold Innis: “lnstead of despairing over the proliferation of innumerable specialisms in twentieth-century studies, he simply encompassed them.” (‘Introduction’ to Empire and Communications, 1972, vii)
  2. See the editors’ statement for Explorations: “We envisage a series that will cut across the humanities and social sciences by treating them as a continuum.”
  3. The words ‘methods’ and ‘activities’ here are not well chosen, since such correlation of thinking and feeling occurs prior to any action and hence prior to any methodical activity. It might have been better to formulate the point as follows: “A comparison across periods, or across disciplines in any one period, of the correlated emphases holding between the elementary components of thinking and feeling, may afford us such an objective criterion.” Of course, it would then become imperative to show how such thinking-feeling correlations can objectively be identified and studied. Much of McLuhan’s incessant work may be thought to have been directed to this end: how to define the co-variables (such as thinking/feeling, science/art, eye/ear, print/speech, left hemisphere/right hemisphere, diachronic/synchronic, linear/circular, literal/mythic, west/east, message/medium, figure/ground, etc etc) through which the field, or continuum, of human experience might be delimited, exoterically, and thereby investigated?

Space, Time & Architecture and McLuhan

Giedion influenced me profoundly. Space, Time and Architecture (1941) was one of the great events of my lifetime. (Stearn interview)

In Space, Time and Architecture (1941), Giedion makes a series of points which McLuhan would find decisive for his life’s work:

Giedion: “in spite of seeming confusion, there is nevertheless a true, if hidden, unity, a secret synthesis, in our present civilization.” (Space, Time and Architecture, Foreword to the first edition.)

McLuhan: “There is a real, living unity in our time, as in any other, but it lies submerged under a superficial hubbub of sensation. (McLuhan to Harold Innis, March 14 1951, Letters 223)1

Giedion: “To point out why this synthesis has not become a conscious and active reality has been one of my chief aims.” (Space, Time and Architecture, Foreword to the first edition.)

McLuhan:  “it has been the effort of this book to explain how the illusion of segregation of knowledge had become possible by the isolation of the visual sense by means of alphabet and typography.” (The Gutenberg Galaxy)

In the latter passages, both Giedion and McLuhan describe the “aim” or “effort” of their most important books. Giedion investigates a missing “synthesis”; McLuhan investigates the flip side of the same coin, “the illusion of segregation”, “the isolation”.

Giedion: History is not a compilation of facts, but an insight into a moving process of life. (Space, Time and Architecture

McLuhan: “History is not a compilation of facts, but an insight into a moving process of life.” S. Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture (Take Today, 76)

There is an original complexity (“a moving process of life“) in which all human events unfold. This complexity accounts for both finitude (as an original going out) and finitude’s relation beyond itself (as an original going in). In McLuhan’s terms: “Un Coup de Des [“Throw of the Dice”] illustrates the road he [Mallarmé] took in the exploitation of all things as gestures of the mind, magically adjusted to the secret powers of being.”  (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press, 1954)

Giedion: In Civilization of the Renaissance Burckhardt emphasized sources and records rather than his own opinions. He treated only fragments of the life of the period but treated them so skillfully that a picture of the whole forms in his readers’ minds. (…) Modern artists have shown that mere fragments lifted from the life of a period  can reveal its habits and feelings; that one must have the courage to take small things and raise them to large dimensions(STA, 3-4)

McLuhan: Now was the time for the artist to intervene in a new way and to manipulate the new media of communication by a precise and delicate adjustment of the relations of words, things, and events. His task had become not self-expression but the release of the life in things. (…) As a vacuum tube is used to shape and control vast reservoirs of electric power, the artist can manipulate the low current of casual words, rhythms, and resonances to evoke the primal harmonies of existence… (Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press)

Two further STA texts show Giedion’s general influence on McLuhan which would only be diminished by giving specific McLuhan texts in proof:

Giedion: These artists have shown in their pictures that the furniture of daily life, the unnoticed articles that result from mass production — spoons, bottles,  glasses, all the things we look at hourly without seeing — have become parts of our natures. They have welded themselves into our lives without our knowing it. (4)

Giedion: Moreover, such insight is obtained not by the exclusive use of the panoramic survey, the bird’s-eye view, but by isolating and examining certain specific events intensively, penetrating and exploring them in the manner of the close-up. This procedure makes it possible to evaluate a culture from within as well as from without. (vi)2

While individual quotations might certainly be found to parallel these STA passages, in fact McLuhan’s whole work might be considered as arising from them (although not only from them, of course) and as framed by them.   

  1. Compare McLuhan to Giovanelli, May 10, 1946, Letters 184, “The view is horrible. but the garden is there too”; also: “The present stage is (…) full not only of destructiveness but also of promises of rich new developments (MB, v).
  2. McLuhan cites this passage in his 1972 introduction to Innis’ Empire and Communications.

The dateline 1

While McLuhan himself may have been entirely unconscious of the remarkable parallel, the “date line” (or “dateline”), which he treated repeatedly in his work, is precisely what distinguishes experiential events from physical events in their “world line” (or “worldline”).

The idea of world lines originates in physics and was pioneered by Hermann Minkowski. The term is now most often used in relativity theories (i.e., special relativity and general relativity).
The world line (or worldline) of an object is the path of that object in 4-dimensional spacetime, tracing the history of its location in space at each instant in time. It is an important concept in modern physics, and particularly theoretical physics. The concept of a “world line” is distinguished from concepts such as an “orbit” or a “trajectory” (e.g., a planet’s orbit in space or the trajectory of a car on a road) by the time dimension, and typically encompasses a large area of spacetime wherein perceptually straight paths are recalculated to show their (relatively) more absolute position states — to reveal the nature of special relativity or gravitational interactions. (Wiki)

The dateline (and perhaps especially in its difference from the worldline) is critical in delineating the domain McLuhan was attempting to dis-cover for investigation: the universe of experiential events — “the infinite, interior spaces of our psyche” (Space, Time, and Poetry, 1955) comprising the total field of information” (Great Change-overs for You, 1966).

Future posts will examine the relation of dateline and worldline in some detail. Here McLuhan’s continuing reflections on the meaning and function of the dateline will be documented in a series of passages from a 20 year period from 1951 to 1972:

The Aesthetic Moment in Landscape Poetry, 1951
Mallarmé had been led to [his] technique by an aesthetic analysis of the modern newspaper, with its static inclusiveness of the entire community of men. But the newspaper (…) as a vivisection of human interests, stands (…) behind Ulysses, with its date-line Thursday, June 16, 1904. (…) What Mallarmé and Joyce exploit in [interior] landscape technique is its power of rendering an inclusive consciousness in a single instant of perception.

Technology and Political Change, 1952
Perhaps the most significant single fact about the newspaper is its date-line. Aesthetically speaking, a week-old newspaper is of no interest at all, even though intellectually speaking it has exactly the same components as today’s paper. Aesthetically the newspaper creates an impact of immediacy and of super-realism. Metaphysically its mode is existential. Its impact is that of the very process of actualization. The entire world becomes, in this way, a laboratory in which everybody can watch the stages of an experiment. Everybody becomes a spectator of the biggest show on earth — namely the entire human family in its most gossipy intimacy. One curious aspect of the press is its willingness to be as surrealist as possible in its handling of geography and space, while sticking rigidly to the convention of a date-line. As soon as the same treatment is accorded time as space, we are in the world of Joyce’s Ulysses where it is 800 B.C. and 1904 A.D. at the same time. (…) On looking closely at the newspaper once more, it becomes evident that as a popular art form it embraces the world spatially but under the sign of a single day. The newspaper as a late stage in the mechanization of writing is handicapped in taking the next step, which occurs easily in radio and television, namely to cover not only many spaces but many times, or history, simultaneously. But even the newspaper has long felt the pressure to take this step. In juxtaposing items from Russia, India, Iran and England, it is plain that there is also a diversity of historical times that are being artificially and arbitrarily elucidated under a single date line.

Comics and Culture1, 1953
In the one-day world of the newspapers, the comics are time-binders, making possible a continuity of experience which is not to be found in the day-by-day news itself. The news is assembled each day from the world of space. In respect to time, continuity, and memory, the newspaper hasn’t the capacities of a low-grade idiot, but in its breadth of geographic perception the press has the apprehension of a god. Local items jostle others from Iran, California, Korea, Tibet, and Italy. Yet all that holds these diverse items in focus is the date line which in effect proclaims: “This is the world in cross-section for today”. The newspaper is a highly specialized and collective art-form brought into existence by instantaneous telegraphic and radio abridgement of space.

James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial, 1953
The net of analogies or symbolic juxtapositions of Ulysses can (…) be seen with reference to the date line June 16, 1904. The frankly newspaperish aspect of this epic derives from the speculations and practice of Mallarmé who regarded the press as a new kind of popular poetry, collective in origin and appeal. If the trivium and quadrivium represent seven crossroads for the meeting of the various degrees and levels of reality, a page of the press is an even more complex set of crossroads, juxtaposing events representative of many times and multiple spaces under a single date line. In the press an Eskimo item will repose beside a Parisian event, the neolithic and the atomic man meet in the same flat paper landscape of the press. In the same way Ulysses is 1904 A.D. but also 800 B.C. And the continuous parallel between ancient and modern provides a “cubist” rather than a linear perspective. It is a world of a “timeless present” such as we meet in the order of objections in a Thomistic article, but also typical of the nonperspective discontinuities of medieval art in general. History is abolished not by being disowned but by becoming present. “History is now,” as Eliot sees it in Four Quartets. This “cubist” sense of the past as a dimension of the present is natural in four-Ievel scriptural exegesis and ancient grammatica. It is necessary to enjoyment of Ulysses or the Wake with its theme that “pastimes are past times,” that the popular press, popular games and ordinary speech are charged with the full historic weight of the collective human past.

Giedion-Welcker’s Klee2, 1953
What became cubism [in art] was implicit in the technological conditions of reportage and news presentation more than a hundred years earlier. Implicit in the juxtaposition of many different spaces (news items) is multiplicity of times, since different areas of the world represent widely varied stages of historic acculturation. In a word the press landscape as art form is intimately linked to the technology of spatial communication and control, but is also a revolutionary medium artistically and politically. The simultaneous presentation of numerous geographic entities and historic cultures under the daily date-line creates a melting pot of the mind on a global scale.

Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press, 1954
It was Mallarmé who formulated the lessons of the press as a guide for the new impersonal poetry of suggestion and implication. He saw that the scale of modern reportage and of the mechanical multiplication of messages made personal rhetoric impossible. Now was the time for the artist to intervene in a new way and to manipulate the new media of communication by a precise and delicate adjustment of the relations of words, things, and events. His task had become not self-expression but the release of the life in things. Un Coup de Des illustrates the road he took in the exploitation of all things as gestures of the mind, magically adjusted to the secret powers of being. As a vacuum tube is used to shape and control vast reservoirs of electric power, the artist can manipulate the low current of casual words, rhythms, and resonances to evoke the primal harmonies of existence or to recall the dead. But the price he must pay is total self-abnegation. (…) By extending the technique of reporting the coexistence of events in China and Peru from global space to the dimension of time, Joyce achieved the actualized realism of a continuous present for events past, present, and future. In reverse, it is only necessary to remove the [particular] date-line from any newspaper [by adding all possible datelines] to obtain a (…) model of the universe [of experience].

Space, Time, and Poetry, 1955
[Pound’s] Cantos (…) are a flat landscape compounded of innumerable inner and acoustical spaces. (…) Even more than the Cantos, Finnegans Wake is the ultimate whispering gallery of the human psyche, its vast nocturnal caverns reverberating with every sigh and gesture of the human mind and tongue since the beginning of time. Joyce had only to remove the [particular] date-line from an ordinary newspaper in order to turn its contents into such a timeless [every dateline] whispering gallery-cum-shooting alley. But it is probably the exceptional auditory powers of Joyce and Pound that led them to acoustical manipulation of the great flat landscapes of Romantic art and the new media. To order visual images in the airy dimensions of the inner ear has been their achievement.

The Electronic Revolution in North America, 1958
More than a century ago Edgar Poe, a newspaper man, foresaw the news pattern which was to be confirmed by the telegraph. As the flow of news increased in speed and quantity, editorial or literary processing (…) became impossible. It became necessary to present a vast number of items under a single date line as a do-it-yourself kit. More and more the reader had to process the news himself. And this consequence of the electronic or instantaneous is exactly opposite to the supposed passivity which had long been the tendency of a mechanical and industrial culture in creating a consumer-oriented world. The electronic age has to become a producer-oriented world. Poe was the first to Invent art forms which met the electronic challenge by anticipation. Baudelaire and Valéry were not misguided in regarding him as a sort of Leonardo da Vinci. For he created the symbolist poem and the detective story at the same time. And both of these forms invite the reader to become co-creator. For a century the misunderstanding (…) has risen between those who look at art as a completely processed and packaged experience and those who are prepared to become co-creators in developing the experience it presents.

Myth and Mass Media, 1959
It is this instantaneous character of the information field today, inseparable from electronic media, that confers the formal auditory character on the new culture. That is to say, for example, that the newspaper page, since the introduction of the telegraph, has had a formally auditory character and only incidentally a lineal, literary form. Each item makes its own world, unrelated to any other item save by date line. And the assembly of items constitutes a kind of global image in which there is much overlay and montage but little pictorial space or perspective.

Report on Project in Understanding New Media, 1960
In the case of the newspaper, the image which is given to the reader is of the community itself. The public press presents a kind of group picture or verbal telephoto of the global human community, hour by hour. This image is made by means of a collage or assembly of dozens and even hundreds of small items much as a wire photo is achieved by means of numerous dots forming a stippled pattern. The make-up of each page must tend toward a selection in order to include a very large range of human interests. The mosaic of human interests thus achieved creates a strong impression of depth and range so that the ordinary reader is quite satisfied that he has made a real contact with the collective life of the community under the dateline indicated at the top of the page. Of course, if a reader suddenly discovers that he is reading yesterday’s newspaper, the sort of disillusionment and letdown is acute indeed. (…) By definition, no two items in a newspaper can have any connection one with the other. The only connection between any two items in a newspaper is indicated by the dateline. The fact that it happened on our planet on a given day affords the only logic or rationale…

The Medium is the Message, 1960
The items of news and advertising that exist under a dateline are interrelated only by that dateline. They have no interconnection of logic or statement. Yet they form a mosaic whose parts are interpenetrating. Such is also the kind of order that tends to exist in a city or a culture. It is a kind of orchestral, resonating unity, not a logical unity of discourse. It is not necessary to be satisfied with such a state of affairs once it is understood. Personally, I feel none of the fervor in favor of such order, as an ideal to be sought for, that is not uncommon among anthropologists. My notion is that this kind of order is inseparable from electronic technology and that auditory order quickly wipes out or brainwashes visual kinds of order by subliminal action.

The Agenbite of Outwit, 1963
The items of news and advertising that exist under a newspaper dateline are interrelated only by that dateline. They have no interconnection of logic or statement. Yet they form a mosaic of corporate image whose parts are interpenetrating. Such is also the kind of order that tends to exist in a city or a culture. It is a kind of orchestral, resonating unity, not the unity of logical discourse.

Understanding Media, 1964
Long before big business and corporations became aware of the image of their operation as a fiction to be carefully tattooed upon the public sensorium, the press had created the image of the community as a series of on-going actions unified by datelines. Apart from the vernacular used, the dateline is the only organizing principle of the newspaper image of the community. Take off the dateline, and one day’s paper is the same as the next.

Address at Vision 65, 1965
One of the mysterious things about newspapers is that the items in them have no connection except the dateline. The only connecting factor in any newspaper is the dateline, and it is this dateline that enables us to enter the world of the news, as it were, by going through the looking glass. Just as Alice in Wonderland went through the looking glass, when you enter the world of the telegraph or of the circuit, you really become involved in the information process. When you enter through the dateline, when you enter your newspaper, you begin to put together the news and you are producer. And this is a most important fact to understand about the electric time, for it is an age of decentralism. It is hard to face this. We still like to look in the rearview mirror. We still tend to think of the Electric Age as a mechanical age. It is in effect organic and totally decentralist. But the reader of the news, when he goes through his dateline apertures, enters the news world as a maker. There is no “meaning” in the news except what we make and there is no connection between any of the items except the instant dimension of electric circuitry. News items are like the parts of the symbolist structure. The reader is the co-creator, in a newspaper as in a detective story, in which the reader has to make the plot as he goes.

Great Change-overs for You3, 1966
The story line has disappeared from the recent forms of movie, whether it is the work of Fellini, or Vanderbeek, or Warhol, or Bergman. Oddly enough, the disappearance of the story line creates a much higher degree of involvement for the viewer or reader. The discovery of this means of involving the audience had been made more than a century ago by symbolist poets. Edgar Allan Poe had used the same technique in his invention of the detective story. By the use of scrambled time sequences, the detective story requires the reader to be co-author. When the telegraph entered journalism, it was quickly discovered that no story line could accommodate the total field of information produced at instant speeds. The newspaper has only one unifying factor: a dateline. There are no connections between any of the items in a newspaper, save on the editorial page which retains the story line and point of view of the book. In an electric world it is not only the story line that disappears, but also the clothes line, and the stag line, and the party line. The alternative to a story line, and to the art of connecting events, is the art of the interval. Oriental art doesn’t use  connections, but intervals, whether in the art of flower arrangement or in the poetry of Zen Buddhism. The Western world first intuited the onset of the electric age and the change-over to the art of the interval in symbolism, on one hand, and the primacy of musical structures, on the other hand. Walter Pater had observed the tendency for all the  arts to approach the condition of music, that is to say, the art of timing and of interval. James Joyce in Finnegans Wake took over the art of the interval as a means of retrieving the fantastic wealth of perception and experience that is stored in ordinary human language. As used by Joyce, the dispensing with the story line became the means of instant grasp of complex wholes

Relation of Environment to Anti-Environment, 1966
The items in the daily press are totally discontinuous and totally unconnected. The only unifying feature of the press is the date line. Through that date line the reader must go, as Alice went, “through the looking glass”. If it is not today’s date line, we cannot get in. Once he goes through the date line, he is involved in a world of items for which he, the reader, must write a story line. He makes the news, as the reader of a detective story makes the plot.

Is The Book Dead? 1967
When everything happens at once, you have mass. It doesn’t matter how many, as long as they are all the same moment. The newspaper, the telegraph services of a newspaper, creates a mass audience in a sense that everything happens at once. When everything happens at once, you don’t have a story line. You have a dateline. In newspaper, there is no story line. The events are totally unrelated to one another except by a dateline. That is a happening. The newspaper was a happening in the fullest sense of the word, artistically, decades before the happenings began to break out in New York.

Include Me Out: The Reversal Of The Overheated Image, 1968
The world of the ear offers none of the continuity and connectedness known only to the eye. The discontinuities of the electric “space-time” had received much advance billing in the arts before Einstein. Lewis Carroll’s Alice flipped out of the hardware world of visual space, of visual uniformity and connectedness, when she went Through the Looking-GlassBut the telegraph press itself had, even earlier, reversed the pattern of the old book and editorial image. At electric speeds, a point of view is meaningless, even in a newspaper. News items are necessarily unconnected except by a date line. The newspaper mosaic has no story line. Like syncopated jazz or poetic symbolism, it is discontinuous.

From Cliché to Archetype, 1970
The newspaper has claim to be considered the first verbal form to be subjected to the shaping power of electric circuitry. The wire services had a direct impact on the nature of reporting and relating as well as upon observing events. Telegraphic speed in relaying reports had a peculiar result upon editorial practice of laying out the copy on the page. It seems to have been discovered at once that no connection was needed between any of the events recorded. The dateline was a sufficient force to create a unified field for all events whatever.

Take Today, 1972
The new information environment tends to supplant Nature, whereas the old mythic wisdom tried to explain nature. Thus modern man has to live mythically, in contrast to his ancient forebears, who sought to think mythically. Myth is the record of a simultaneous perception of effects with causes in a complementary process. It is possible to see a history of world art today in thirty seconds. A newspaper under a single date line gives you “Your World Today”.

Take Today, 1972
The poet Ezra Pound saw that the telegraph press, with its mosaic coverage of world events under a single date line, had solved the problem of creating the new poetic vision for our time.

  1. Saturday Night, 68:1, 19-20 Feb 28, 1953. Reprinted in Our Sense of Identity: A Book of Canadian Essays, ed, Malcolm Ross, 240-246 1954.
  2. Review of Carola Giedion-Welcker, Paul Klee (1952), Shenandoah, 3:1, 77-82,1953.
  3. Vogue, 148:1, 60-63, 114-115, 117, August 1, 1966, Reprinted: Problems and Controversies in Television and Radio, ed H. T. Skornia and J. Kitson, 26-36 1968.

Relativity in Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters

What we symbolize in black the Chinaman may symbolize in yellow; each has his own tradition. Greek beauty laughs at Coptic beauty and the American Indian derides them both. It is almost impossible to reconcile all tradition whereas it is by no means impossible to find the justification of every form of beauty which has been adored on the earth by an examination into the mechanism of esthetic apprehension whether it be dressed in red, white, yellow or black. We have no reason for thinking that the Chinaman has a different system of digestion from that which we have though our diets are quite dissimilar. The apprehensive faculty must be scrutinized in action. (James Joyce, Stephen Hero, as cited in CHML1)

It was the Thomistic awareness of analogy derived from sense perception that gave Joyce the means of digesting all the ideas of all his contemporaries without relying on any of them as a (…) frame of reference. (CHML)

What [Etienne Gilson] does is to elicit the image of truth from past errors [“All those pseudo-rationalisms, forged links and fraudulent intelligibilities which official literature has imposed on existence”]2 and to confirm the unity of man’s quest from the jarring discords of unremitting debate. But what I wish to point out is that Gilson’s method is that of contemporary art and science (for contemporary poetry has healed the old breach between art and science). Gilson does not set out to produce a theory or view that will unify the philosophical disputes of the past. (…) We don’t arrive at a simple unifying concept but are put on the road to achieving a wisdom. And the road to this wisdom is by way of sympathetic reconstruction, involving the abeyance of personal prejudice and preconception. (CHML)

By 1954, almost all of the pieces of McLuhan’s mature position were in place. He could sense that a theory of theories was possible which would cover “the entire world of language and consciousness”3: “all the ideas of all“.  It would function not as one more perspective in “the jarring discords of unremitting debate” among perspectives, but exactly through “the abeyance of personal (…) preconception” — ie, “without relying on any [one perspective] as a prop or frame of reference“.  This it would accomplish, in turn, through focus on “the mechanism of esthetic apprehension“, of “the apprehensive faculty (…) in action“, across every possible perspective, “by way of sympathetic reconstruction“.

In another 1954 article, ‘Sight, Sound and Fury’ (Commonweal, April 9, 1954) McLuhan put these points as follows:

What we have to defend today are not the values developed in any particular culture or by any one mode of communication. Modem technology presumes to attempt a total transformation of man and his environment. This calls in turn for an inspection and defense of all human values. And so far as merely human aid goes, the citadel of this defense must be located in analytical awareness of the nature of the creative process involved in human cognition.

Sympathetic reconstruction” of “all the ideas of all“, aka of “human cognition” in general, would function, furthermore, just as “contemporary art and sciencealready function — “for contemporary poetry has healed the old breach between art and science“. It would analyze any sample of experience in terms of the process through which it had come to be synchronically. So chemistry analyzes materials not in terms of how they happened to evolve in historical or diachronic time (iron rusting in water), but in terms of their necessary development according to synchronic law (Fe + O => Fe2O3). Similarly, modern art or poetry is not interested in how certain images came to be associated historically, but in their synchronic relationship in “the universal fabric” (The Mechanical Bride, 3).

Hence McLuhan’s observation in CHML that “the poetic process is a reversal, a retracing of the stages of human cognition”. This is no “retracing of (…) stages” in backwards linear time, but exposure by such images of their underlying synchronic prerequisites exactly as images of “cognition” or “apprehension” — something like Fe + O => Fe2O3, but where chemical law concerning chemical elements is replaced by “human cognition” law concerning the elements of “esthetic apprehension“. 

Now in 1954 McLuhan had a rough idea of such cognitive elements.  From a variety of sources (Wright, Lodge, Gilson, Muller-Thym, Richards, Giedion, Havelock, Innis) he understood human experience as pre-shaped by underlying types (realist, idealist, pragmatist) or disciplines (rhetoric, logic, grammar) or media (speech, print, electronics) or sense (ear, eye, touch) or different flavors of spaces and times. And he had a rough idea of the inter-convertibility of these classifications.4

But what he did not yet have was exactly what had provided Einstein with his key to the formulation of relativity: co-variance.  This McLuhan would come to see at some point between 1955 and 1960 through his exposure to, and subsequent reflection on, “acoustic space“. The essence of the matter is that law can depend either on a fixed frame of reference or on some dynamic co-variability that functions across all frames of reference.  For both Einstein and McLuhan a fixed frame of reference (Newtonian physics for the one, the Gutenberg galaxy for the other) was exactly the problem that had to be overcome. Their solution therefore depended on finding a formulation of co-variance that could be used in place of any fixed framework.

For McLuhan this meant that he had to find a way to specify the elements of “the mechanism of esthetic apprehension” in terms of a co-variability,  But which elements according to what co–variability would have to fall in place together, since only the co–variability would expose the elements and only the elements the co–variability. 

  1. Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, a lecture delivered by McLuhan in March 1954 at St Joseph Seminary in Hartford.
  2. ‘Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press’, also from 1954.
  3. “Siegfried Giedion has given exact procedures for how the modern painter or poet should conduct himself in the company of scientists: Adopt and adapt their discoveries to the uses of art. Why leave this solely to the distortions of the industrialist? (Just as) Newton revolutionized the techniques of poetry and painting (through his optics, so) Joyce encompasses Einstein but extends his (…) formula to the entire world of language and consciousness” (‘New Media as Political Forms’, Explorations 3, 1954). For Newton’s optics and poetry, cf  ‘Space, Time, and Poetry’, 1955: “English poetry and painting of the 18th century were decades ahead of the European equivalents. That is, Thomson, Blake, Sterne, Wordsworth and Shelley were using techniques of landscape for the precise delineation and control of mental states long before the Europeans. And it was Newton’s Optics which gave these techniques in poetry and painting such early impetus. The discovery of the exact correspondence between the structure of the inner eye and the outer world established the study and vogue of symbolic correspondence between landscape and mental states.” (McLuhan writes of “delineation and control of mental stages” here which seems misleading on account of its diachronic implications. ‘Mental stages’ has therefore been changed to ‘mental states’ — which is the happier formulation McLuhan uses at the end of the cited passage.)
  4. Innis, for example, correlated speech, ear and time as also writing, eye and space.

Autobiography 1956: “Huge shift in the geography of perception and feeling”

Personally. I feel quite helpless and panicky as I contemplate the range of new assumptions and frames and parameters which our new technology has imposed upon us.  (NAEB Project, ”MATERIALS DEVELOPED BY PROJECT”)

McLuhan seems to have arrived at his relativity theory of human experience between 1955 and 1960. His coming to understand “acoustic space” as “a means of exploring and defining mental states was central to this process.

Here he is in ‘New Media in Arts Education’, an address given at the March 1956 convention of The Eastern Arts Association.

By the time of Baudelaire and Rimbaud the use of painting as a means of fixing a mental state had been pushed very far. Suddenly the visual boundaries yielded to music, and the symbolist poets discovered the acoustic space of the auditory imagination. Let me say at once that this break through from the visual world into the acoustic world seems to be the most revolutionary thing that has occurred in Western culture since the invention of phonetic writing. To understand the human, social, and artistic bearings of this event is indispensable today whether for the teacher or the citizen. Most of the cultural confusion of our world results from this huge shift in the geography of perception and feeling. Let me repeat that the artistic developments which we associate with the Romantics in painting and poetry, had consisted in the impressionistic use of external landscape as a means of exploring and defining mental states. When these artists came to the frontiers of visual landscape they passed over into its opposite, as it were, namely acoustic or auditory space. This unexpected reversal or translation of the visual into the acoustic happened again when the silent movies became sound pictures and again when radio was suddenly metamorphosed into TV. And the consequences of these shifts between sight and sound need to be understood by the teacher today since they turn the language of the arts into a jabberwocky that has to be unscrambled to be understood. When the arts shifted from sight to sound, from visual to acoustic organization of experience, the tempo and rhythm of our culture shifted as though an LP disc were suddenly shifted to 78 speed.

McLuhan is also describing his own experience here in the crucial 1955-1956 time period. To paraphrase: 

Suddenly the visual boundaries [which had constrained me until at least 1954yielded to music, and [I] discovered the acoustic space of the auditory imagination. This break through from the visual world into the acoustic world [was] the most revolutionary thing [that had ever occurred to me and, now that I had experienced it in myself, I came to believe that it was equally] the most revolutionary thing that had occurred in Western culture since the invention of phonetic writingTo understand the human, social, and artistic bearings of this event [seemed] indispensable [to me since I could now attribute] most of the cultural confusion of our world [to] this huge shift in the geography of perception and feeling.

By 1959 his thinking had advanced to the notion of an “instantaneous (…) information field” in which all possible space-time configurations were arrayed: “Each item makes its own world, unrelated to any other (…) and the assembly of items constitutes a kind of global image in which there is much overlay and montage but little pictorial space or perspective“. Here he is in ‘Myth and Mass Media‘ of that year:1

Electronic culture accepts the simultaneous as a reconquest of auditory space. Since the ear picks up sound from all directions at once, thus creating a spherical field of experience, it is natural that electronically moved information should also assume this sphere-like pattern. Since the telegraph, then, the forms of Western culture have been strongly shaped by the sphere-like pattern that belongs to a field of awareness in which all the elements are practically simultaneous. It is this instantaneous character of the information field today, inseparable from electronic media, that confers the formal auditory character on the new culture. That is to say, for example, that the newspaper page, since the introduction of the telegraph, has had a formally auditory character and only incidentally a lineal, literary form. Each item makes its own world, unrelated to any other item save by date line. And the assembly of items constitutes a kind of global image in which there is much overlay and montage but little pictorial space or perspective. For electronically moved information, in being simultaneous, assumes the total-field pattern, as in auditory space. And preliterate societies likewise live largely in the auditory or simultaneous mode with an inclusiveness of awareness that increasingly characterizes our electronic age. The traumatic shock of moving from the segmental, lineal space of literacy into the auditory, unified field of electronic information is quite unlike the reverse process. But today, while we are resuming so many of the preliterate modes of awareness, we can at the same time watch many preliterate cultures beginning their tour through the cultural phases of literacy.

How to investigate and communicate this “field of experience” would become the task for the remaining two decades of his life. Here he is attempting both of these in the ‘The Agenbite of Outwit’, 1963:

The all-at-once-ness of auditory space is the exact opposite of lineality, of taking one thing at a time. It is very confusing to learn that the mosaic of a newspaper page is “auditory” in basic structure. This, however, is only to say that any pattern in which the components co-exist without direct, lineal hook-up or connection, creating a field of simultaneous relations, is auditory, even though some of its aspects can be seen. The items of news and advertising that exist under a newspaper dateline are interrelated only by that dateline. They have no interconnection of logic or statement. Yet they form a mosaic or corporate image whose parts are interpenetrating. Such is also the kind of order that tends to exist in a city or a culture. It is a kind of orchestral, resonating unity, not the unity of logical discourse.

 

 

  1. Myth and Mass Media‘ was originally given as a lecture at Harvard in the spring of 1958.

Ontology and epistemology

…for Being, which is analogous, and in which beings are proportionately and not generically one, in so far as it always expresses a proportion to its Act-to-Be, which to-Be is diverse, [such Being] holds everything known in a concept under the formality of essence within the intelligibility of the ultimate Act-to-Be; and thus Being is an absolute principle of human cognition. (Muller-Thym, ‘The To Be which Signifies the Truth of Propositions’, 1940)1

As Aquinas indicates everywhere, there is a proportion between the modes of Being and the modes of our human knowing. (Joyce, Aquinas, and the Poetic Process)

In his preface to Where Is Science Going?, Albert Einstein insists: “There is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance.” (Take Today, 128)

The last citation illustrates the implication of epistemology in ontology for Einstein and, indeed, McLuhan. Since “there is no logical [step by step, linear] way to the discovery of these elemental laws” — just as “there is no logical [step by step, linear] way” to the learning of language by a child — the possibility of making these leaps at all and of their succeeding to communication and even to “the discovery of (…) elemental laws”, rests upon a prior translative or metaphorical “resonance of (…) existence itself” (TT 7): the gap is where the action is!2

Only because there is an “order lying behind (…) appearance” (but one that expresses itself in and as appearance), and only because this order is that of “the resonating interval” (whose transitivity equally grounds (or is) the relation of ontology and “appearance”), is it possible for humans to learn to communicate with each other and to come to recognize “elemental laws”.3 For while understanding is never perfect, neither of words nor of the various things we study, so that both of these may be further investigated forever, it remains true that we do learn to communicate and do learn to know.

 

  1. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol XVI, 230-254, 1940, 231-232). ‘Being’ has been capitalized as have ‘to-Be’ and ‘Act-to-Be’, which have been hyphenated as well.
  2. See here: Absent such fundamental ’relation beyond ourselves’, humans could never have begun to use language in the deep past and could not learn language as children even now. The mystery is that a capacity (for relation beyond itself) can be awakened in a child in a process that could not take place unless this capacity were already operative. Here is McLuhan to John Snyder, Aug 4 1963: “…we are already moving in depth into a situation in which learning becomes a total process (…) from infancy to old-age. The pattern by which one learns one’s mother tongue is now being extended to all learning whatsoever. The human dialogue itself becomes not only the economic, but the political and social, fact.”  (Letters 291)
  3. “Elemental laws” operating in the physical — and in the experiential! — domains.

Analogy of proper proportionality

Now to-be is diverse; and while diverse, it is yet that ultimate act in proportion to which each being is being; so that all beings are one in being, not with the unity of a genus, but with the community of analogy: and we are speaking of the analogy of proper proportionality. (Bernard Muller-Thym, ‘The To Be which Signifies The Truth of Propositions’, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol XVI, 230-254, 1940)1

Perhaps the most precious possession of man is his abiding awareness  of the Analogy of Proper Proportionality, the key to all metaphysical insight, and perhaps the very condition of consciousness itself. (‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’, Through the Vanishing Point, 1968, 240)

The following passage from the 1968 Through the Vanishing Point (TVP) has been considered at length in a previous post (here). The present post will look at its specification of “the Analogy of Proper Proportionality” in human experience.

The late nineteenth century saw a remarkable advance on Newtonian ideas, with particular emphasis on the afterimage and simultaneous contrast. While this theory is generally known to practicing painters, its wider sociological implications have never been explored. To explain simply, in the field of color the afterimage consists of a physiological balancing on integral white. A brief formula might be sensory impact plus sensory completion equals white (SI + SC = W)2 (…) It is postulated that just as white is a result of the assembling of the primary colors in ratio, so touch is an assembly of all the [psychological] senses in ratio. Black is, therefore, the after-image of touch [SI + SC = B]. Naturally as the visual gradient [or SI or white] of the culture ascends, the modalities of touch [or SC or black] are minimized. This appears very vividly in the sensory evolution of the arts. From cave painting to the Romantics, there is steady visual progress. Thereafter, with the coming of synesthesia in the arts and non-visual electronic phenomena in the sciences, we may well be moving into a kind of zero-gradient culture, with all modes of experience receiving simultaneous attention [SI + SC = BW]. The need for physiological and psychological balance means that any (…) sensory impact needs to find (…) sensory completion… (‘Sensory Modes’, TVP 15, 1968)

Another TVP passage supplies commentary and amplification:

Perhaps the most precious possession of man is his abiding awareness of the Analogy of Proper Proportionality, the key to all metaphysical insight, and perhaps the very condition of consciousness itself. This analogical awareness is constituted of a perpetual play of ratios among ratios. A is to B, what C is to D, which is to say the ratio between A and B, is proportionable to the ratio between C and D, there being a [third] ratio between these [first two] ratios, as well. This lively awareness of the most exquisite delicacy depends upon there being no connection whatsoever between the components [of these various ratios]. If A were linked to B, or C to D, mere logic would take the place of analogical perception, thus one of the penalties paid for literacy and a high visual culture is a strong tendency to encounter all things through a rigorous storyline, as it were. (‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’, TVP 240)3

McLuhan posits the dynamic interaction — or co-variance — or proportionality — of several ratios here at once. First, within sensory input (SI) and sensory completion (SC), each considered on its own, there is a dynamic interaction between figure and ground, or between numerator and denominator, or between individual SI color or SC sense (on the one hand) and their respective foundational “after-images” (on the other). As the ground or denominator or “after-image” asserts itself, the figure or numerator or particular color or sense recedes. And vice versa. So, as the grounding “after-image” of a particular color is emphasized, namely in favor of the full spectrum of color that is clear light, that color fades towards ‘white’; while emphasis of a particular color, contrariwise, has the opposite effect of fading out its ground in favor of its increasingly vivid individual ‘shade’. In parallel fashion, when we have only a general sense4 of, say, expectation, all the individual senses fade into the background of a global ‘feeling’; while emphasis on any particular sense has, contrariwise, the effect of depressing our awareness of our general feeing in favor of the particular sort of evidence of that single sense.5 Each of these ratios or fractions co-varies such that the more of the one component (be it figure or ground, numerator or denominator, foreground or afterimage), the less of the other. At the same time, there is also a further dynamic ratio or proportionality between these two ratios, SI and SC, together. The more SI, the less SC — and vice versa.

The rather startling implication is that these various ratios — color:spectrum, sense:synaesthesia, SI:SC — are inter-convertible.  More, since each of these ratios can be expressed in terms of one of their terms (since their terms are co-variable), it would seem that any such one, properly specified, would entail6 all the rest.

With his reference to “a rigorous storyline” McLuhan adds a further inter-convertible ratio — that of time(s).  As is observed in The Gutenberg Galaxy:

The auditory field is simultaneous, the visual mode is successive. (111)

And in the posthumous Global Village:

time considered as sequential (left hemisphere) is figure and time considered as simultaneous (right hemisphere) is ground. (10)

The ratio of the brain hemispheres is thrown in for good measure.

So it was that McLuhan could write to Hugh Kenner:

We [analogists] are in position of being able to use any insights whatever. Any kind of knowledge is grist to an analogist. But to a Kantian every new fact is a potential threat to his entire world. E.g. Newton’s system now obsolete because of subsequent observations. Progress = obsolescence, destruction. Ritual slaughter of old by young. Unilateral causal connections.7

For “that ultimate act” of “to be”, the “progress” of its creative action, while it is indeed “to be (…) diverse”, does not result in “obsolescence” or “destruction” but in the very “Establishment of the University of Being“.  It is exactly this original “uni-versity” of the di-versity of “to be” that constitutes the “unity of nature” which, according to Einstein (see here), is both the basis and the goal of scientific research.

At the same time, in our everyday lives, it is only on the foundation of this “unity of nature” aka “university of Being” that we are able to learn language and generally communicate with our surrounding world despite all the various distances we have from it.

 

  1. Muller-Thym’s manner of expression was exacting in a way that won Etienne Gilson’s great admiration. Like Gilson, Muller-Thym held that everything depends on an under-standing of Being as verbal (“to be”), not as substantive: “to be is (…) that ultimate act” of original di-versity as “uni-versity”.  Because it is originally creative as its way “to be” and because it does not lose or dissipate itself in its creative action, so can we, and all beings, securely be: “while diverse, it is yet that ultimate act in proportion to which each being is being”. This hold through difference is what Muller-Thym calls the “Uni-versity of Being” in explicating Meister Eckhart. (In the citation, “to be” has been emphasized and hyphenated.)
  2. This formula in round brackets stems from McLuhan.  The following ones in square brackets have been added.
  3. Twenty years before McLuhan noted in a letter to Ezra Pound (December 21, 1948): “the principle of metaphor and analogy — the basic fact that as A is to B so is C to D. AB:CD” (Letters 207).
  4. Supposedly following Thomas, McLuhan often calls this general ‘common sense’ ‘touch’ or ‘tactility’ — just as ‘feeling’ can refer to a particular action of touching or to a general mood. The particular one-of-five sense of touch is exactly not meant (although it is, of course, included in tactility considered as the ‘common sense’).
  5. So the “Gutenberg galaxy” is first of all an emphasis on the single sense of sight and a corresponding and simultaneous depression of the common sense.  Then, exactly because the common sense is depressed, so also awareness of the other senses and especially of the acoustic.  In this way, awareness would seem always to be mediated by some or other modality of the common sense.
  6. The entailment here would of course not be direct. As McLuhan sometimes expressed the matter, a “formula” would be involved.
  7. In a letter from March 16, 1949, cited by Andrew Chrystall in his thesis, 90.

Giedion – an “Author’s Note”

Sigfried Giedion published ‘A Complicated Craft Is Mechanized’ in 1943 in the MIT Technology Review. This essay on the development of the cylinder lock by Linus Yale, Jr (1821–1868) would become a part of Mechanization Takes Command in 1948.

The following note was added at the head of the essay.

Author’s Note. — This essay in industrial history is based on research preparatory to a volume dealing with the creative as well as destructive influence of mechanization on the coming about of modern life. Here is neither the place nor the opportunity to explain the methodological background of that research. But some hints about it may be given.

Complicated craft: The difference between European and American industry is marked from the very beginning, the late Eighteenth Century. Europe mechanized, above all, the simple craft; the characteristic American development was the mechanization of the complicated craft. In Europe, the mechanization of simple crafts — mining, spinning, weaving — became nearly synonymous with industry. In America, the story is different. Here, the fundamental trend is to be seen in the mechanization of the complicated craft which demands men of special skill as well as a large amount of time and labor. America began in the Eighteenth Century with mechanizing the trade of the miller and ended in the Twentieth Century with mechanizing the job of the housekeeper. In between, all the trades concerned to a certain extent with our intimate life had undergone the same process of mechanization: the tailor, the shoemaker, the farmer, the locksmith, the baker, the butcher. In Europe, most of these complicated crafts still form important strata of society. That they have nearly disappeared from American life has had enormous influence on habits and thoughts.

Mass production: When the question arises: “What is the greatest contribution of America to mankind, what has America done that influences the whole Western world?” there is no doubt of the answer. It is the tremendous instrument of mass production, which has been developed more intensively in this country than in any other. Mass production, replacing skilled labor, replacing the complicated craft, penetrates into our most intimate life. It is a very dangerous instrument; everything depends on how it is handled. When it is misused, or when it assumes dictatorial power over the human mind, the whole hierarchy of human values begins to crumble. Man loses his perspective and becomes uncertain in faith and judgment. On the other hand, when the instrument of mass production is used in the right manner and restricted to the place it deserves, then, for the first time in human history, a differentiated culture can emerge without any kind of open or concealed slavery.

Historical consciousness: There are excellent studies on the social and economic background of our period, and on the lives of the great entrepreneurs. But when one tries to get an insight into the phenomena themselves — into the anonymous history of inventions and ideas, which are the tools that build the instrument of mass productions — one finds nothing but gaps. In general opinion inventions must pay dividends; if they do not, they are obsolete and without significance. But, on the whole, inventions and the trends they reveal govern our present-day life. Nothing shows the complete lack of historical consciousness more strongly than the fact that because no funds could be found to prevent [it],the most precious witnesses of American history — the original models of the United States Patent Office — have been wandering about from barn to barn since 1926, when, with the consent of Congress, they were sold for some thousands of dollars to an English industrialist. Historically speaking, this disrespect is as though the bones of our ancestors should be strewn to the winds.

Emphasis has been added throughout to highlight those points in Giedion’s note which especially set McLuhan to thought:

  • if “mass production (…) penetrates into our most intimate life”, into ourhabits and thoughts” and so comes togovern our present-day life” with dictatorial power over the human mind”, how does it do so? Just how does this all take place?
  • if the effect of mechanization is that “the whole hierarchy of human values begins to crumble” and “man loses his perspective and becomes uncertain in faith and judgment”, how is this to be exposed and combatted (especially given its dictatorial power over the human mind”)?
  • if a new sort of “anonymous history” may be initiated beyond that of assumed standpoints and privileged perspectives, how can this contribute to an investigation of the previous questions?

 

 

Minkowski in Giedion

For McLuhan, reading Sigfried Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture in 1943 was a “one of the great events of my lifetime” (as he noted in the Stearn interview).

A central aspect of that importance for McLuhan was Giedion’s appeal to human integrity, to the union of thought and feeling, which could be re-established, he claimed, through focus on the common root of science and art.

Throughout the nineteenth century the natural sciences went splendidly ahead, impelled by the great tradition which the previous two hundred years had established, and sustained by problems which had a direction and momentum of their own. The real spirit of the age came out in these researches in the realm of thinking, that is. But these achievements and results were regarded as emotionally neutral, as having no relation to the realm of feeling. Feeling could not keep up with the swift advances made in science and the techniques. The century’s genuine strength and special accomplishments remained largely irrelevant to man’s inner life.
This orientation of the vital energies of the period is reflected in the make-up of the man of today. Scarcely anyone can escape the unbalanced development which it encourages. The split personality, the unevenly adjusted man, is symptomatic of our period.
But behind these disintegrating forces in our period tendencies leading toward unity can be observed. From the first decade of this century on, we encounter curious parallelisms of method in the separate realms of thought and feeling, science and art. Problems whose roots lie entirely in our time are being treated in similar ways, even when their subject matter is very different and their solutions are arrived at independently.
In 1908 the great mathematician Hermann Minkowski first conceived a world in four dimensions, with space and time coming together to form an indivisible continuum. His Space and Time1 of that year begins with the celebrated statement, “Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality”2 It was just at this time that in France and in Italy cubist and futurist painters developed the artistic equivalent of space-time in their search for means of expressing purely contemporaneous feelings.3

  1. Raum und Zeit, German text here; translation here.
  2. “Von Stund′ an sollen Raum für sich und Zeit für sich völlig zu Schatten herabsinken und nur noch eine Art Union der beiden soll Selbständigkeit bewahren.”
  3. Space, Time and Architecture, 13-14. Giedion’s marginal guidelines for these paragraphs include: “The split personality”, “The split civilization”, and “Unconscious parallelisms of method in science and art”.

“New Media Changing Spatial Orientation Of Self”

The 4-page cover (front cover, inside front, inside back, and back cover) of Explorations 2 (April 1954) features pages from the Feenicht’s Playhouse ‘newspaper’. The newspaper headline reads:

New Media Changing Spatial-Temporal Orientation Of Self

There are 24 ‘reports’ on the 4 newspaper pages, with a total of 3 pictures and, inside the back cover, a single ‘ad’ — for the movie “Bwana Devil”, in “3-D natural vision”, a new viewer experience providing “A Lover in your arms” and “A Lion in your lap!”!  Now!

The best of these reports, “Time-Space Duality Goes”, narrowly edges out “Historic Time Comes To End”, “Modern Art All The Bunk”, and “Ploof Book Sells Millions” (“Sabrina Horne’s bosom, a prominent part of this novel, was agitated”).

Time-Space Duality Goes

Today scientists announced that western notions of time and space once believed to be intuitive and universal, are, in fact, neither.  Recognition of this fact stems from two sources: (1) a growing awareness that other cultures do not share these particular metaphysical concepts, and (2) realization that these concepts are rapidly changing in our own society.
Since the Renaissance the metaphysics underlying our language and thinking has imposed upon the universe two grand cosmic forms said to be utterly separate and unconnected aspects of reality. These are: (1) static three-dimensional  infinite space, and (2) kinetic one-dimensional, uniformly and perpetually flowing time, which is, in turn, the subject of a three-fold division: past, present and future.
But for modern man, lineal thought, chronological order, historical sequence, causal relationships, and all that these imply, are no longer of vital importance. Time standing alone has ceased to be a primary value; only as an ingredient of a larger whole is it now important. The novel, the autobiography, the essay are no longer structured by historical time, while emphasis upon causality and succeeding impressions, is being replaced by emphasis upon the single gestalt standing alone. The “past” and the “future” have become part of the “now”, and time and space are one.
Scholars are divided in their enthusiasm over these changes. Some argue that the end of the time-space duality, inseparably connected with science since the Renaissance, means the end of science. They view with alarm the new role of space, and fear for the printed page and the analytical argument. One large foundation has thrown its full weight behind traditional time studies. Other scientists are not so sure, and wonder if perhaps science will not only survive but flourish in this new climate.
Attempts to explain this revolutionary trend must be sought not in changes in the techniques of production of commodities, but in changes in the techniques of packaging and distributing ideas and feelings, which for man at least is as important as the food-quest itself. The power for change is not in the content of the messages, but in the form of the media themselves. Just as in the industrial revolutions, human relations and personality patterns were changed more by the means of production than by the commodities produced, so will these new media…1

  1. Explorations 2, April 1954, front cover, emphasis added

Explorations and Epilogue

The covers (front, back, inside front and inside back) of Explorations 2 (April 1954) give 4 pages of a ‘Feenicht’s Playhouse’ newspaper. There are 23 single-spaced reports and one 3-line double spaced insert (on the inside back cover).  It reads:

Now time has reached the flurrying curtain-fall

That wakens thought from historied reverie

And gives the word to uninfected discourse

This is a silent citation from the short-lived1 Laura RidingRobert Graves journal, Epilogue (1935–1938). Riding described the name and the journal (referring to the 3 verse lines) as follows:

…the thing is called Epilogue, meaning that it’s all about what comes after the drama of history, that although it’s after history it represents happenings, though of another kind. And the three verse lines say this too. I don’t want to print Epilogue on the cover just as a magazine name, but as a meaning to remind that Epilogue means a dramatic performance coming after the strict dramatic performance. (…) the play proper is over…2

The citation from Epilogue serves to situate Explorations as a successor au revoir to modernism. Robert Graves was co-editor of Epilogue and a contributor to Explorations.

  1. Explorations was originally intended to be even shorter lived.  A note at the start of the early issues specifies: “Published three times a year for two years.”
  2. Letter from Laura Riding to John Aldridge from March? 1935, cited in The Oxford Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines, vol 1, 2009, 806.

Different kinds of “acoustic space”

Today, with all our technology, and because of it, we stand once more in the magical acoustical sphere of pre-literate man (Space, Time, and Poetry, 1955)

Not any art doctrine, then, but such complex changes as occur in the emergence of the press as art form, lead to the union of the visual and acoustical space in a new space-time poetry. (Space, Time, and Poetry, 1955)

McLuhan observed that he “never ceased to meditate on the relevance of (…) acoustic space to an understanding of the simultaneous electric world.” (‘The End of the Work Ethic’: The Empire Club Address, 1973).  But what may never have been defined explicitly by him are the deep differences between disparate sorts of “acoustic space”: (1) pre-literate experience, (2) electric experience and (3) topological meta-experience about all experience — with (3) including both (1) and (2), as well as the intervening Gutenberg galaxy: “the union of the visual and acoustical space in a new space-time”.1

All three of these were considered by him as variously implicating “acoustic space”.

The third — topological meta-experience about all experience — must include all possible experience whatsoever, but without identification with any one sort of it. Or, conversely, with identification with precisely every sort of it.

As far as my media studies are concerned, the Mechanization Takes Command by Sigfried Giedion is indispensable background for the languages of media. As soon as one approaches [such] a field, one has to abandon subjects. Or rather, [all] subjects are automatically included within the field. (McLuhan to Harry Skornia, January 20, 1960.)2

In this context the differentiation of “acoustic space” from “mosaic  space” could be highly important. For, while the Gutenberg galaxy (say) was exactly not “acoustic”, it was a “mosaic”: “the galaxy or constellation of events upon which the present study concentrates is itself a mosaic”. Perhaps “mosaic” might be thought of as the ontological shape of everything that comes to be, as Bernard Muller-Thym might put it, with “acoustic” being those modes of human experience which are fitting to “mosaic” as lacking fixed perspective (although inevitably not fitting in other respects):

Auditory space has no point of favored focus. It’s a sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the thing. It is not pictorial space, boxed in, but dynamic, always in flux, creating its own dimensions moment by moment. (‘Auditory Space’, 1960)

With the end of lineal specialisms and fixed points of view, compartmentalized knowledge became (…) unacceptable… (Gutenberg Galaxy, 253)

It is exactly this lack of a “point of favoured focus” — a lack that it shares with pre-literate and electric experience — that enables topological meta-experience about all experience to extend its “formula to the entire world of language and consciousness” (‘New Media as Political Forms’, Explorations 3, 1954).3

  1. As exemplified by this citation from ‘Space, Time, and Poetry’, McLuhan was clear (although often not explicit) that pre-literate experience and modern experience were not the same. See also: “modern man has to live mythically, in contrast to his ancient forebears, who sought to think mythically” (Take Today, 8) — perhaps contrasting conscious (“modern”) with unconscious (“ancient”) modes.
  2. Cited by Michael Darroch in Media Transatlantic: Developments in Media and Communication Studies between North America And German-Speaking Europe, ed Friesen, 2016, 63. It is unclear whether McLuhan was referring here to academic subjects like English and Engineering and Anthropology, or to subjects as ‘perspectives’ and ‘points view’. Perhaps both.
  3. As suggested by McLuhan’s letter to Harry Skornia from January 20, 1960 (cited above), Giedion’s suggestion of an “anonymous history”, aka a history beyond or aside from subjects, seems to have played a key role in the development of McLuhan’s ideas here. Cf, ‘The Later Innis’ (1953): “No individual can ever be adequate to grappling with the vision of what Siegfried Giedion calls ‘anonymous history’. That is to say, the vision of the significance of the multitude of personal acts and artefacts which constitute the total social process which is human communication or participation.”

Einstein

McLuhan, along with everybody else in his time, regularly invoked Einstein.  The suggestion here is that, uniquely, McLuhan may have found a way to apply relativity and topology to the universe of human experience.  This was his answer to the question of how to maintain values which had taken root in a literary environment — like private identity and individual rights and democracy and religious belief — when that environment was dissolving in the electric era. For such a theory would allow the translation of values across experiential divides: “seeing our old literary culture in the new plastic [or electric] terms” would “enable it to become a constitutive part of the new culture created by the orchestral voices and gestures of new media.”1 

 McLuhan himself attributed the initial dis-covery of the idea to Joyce:

Siegfried Giedeon has given exact procedures for how the modern painter or poet should conduct himself in the company of scientists: Adopt and adapt their discoveries to the uses of art. Why leave this solely to the distortions of the industrialist? [Just as] Newton revolutionized the techniques of poetry and painting [through his optics, so] Joyce encompasses Einstein but extends his (…) formula to the entire world of language and consciousness. (‘New Media as Political Forms’, Explorations 3, 1954)

Dis-covering a “formula” that would cover “the entire world of language and consciousness” was possible for McLuhan, however, only when he learned how to translate himself across that “entire world”.  In fact he had long applied this demand to others.  Already in 1944 he had complained in a letter to Walter Ong and Clement McNaspy that F.R. Leavis, his erstwhile intellectual model, was unable “to grasp current society in its intellectual modes”:

the trouble with Leavis is that his passion for important work forbids him to look for the sun in the egg-tarnished spoons of the daily table. In other words, his failure to grasp current society in its intellectual modes (say in the style of Time and Western Man or Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture) cuts him off from the relevant pabulum.2

This demand for potential identification with any and all human experience was central both to McLuhan’s intellectual trajectory and to his religious persuasion. Over the next decade (1944-1954) he would come to see that the rejection of any aspect of human experience amounted to gnosticism — to the claim that God’s power was limited, and/or that God’s goodness was limited, in such a way that aspects of reality were not as they ought to be. Such a value judgement, he would realize, necessarily privileged some perspective and this, in turn, both implemented a central procedure of the dissolving Gutenberg galaxy and cut off access to the possibility of a general relativity theory of “the entire world of language and consciousness”. 

It is no accident that his struggles with gnosticism came at just the time that he was also struggling intellectually to understand non-Gutenberg experience, aka “acoustic space”, from within. 

McLuhan had to come to valorize acoustic space as much as visual space in order then (and only then) to focus experience as the range of the ratio of the ‘visual’ and the ‘acoustic’ as modulated by ‘touch’. Thanks to Ted Carpenter‘s work with the Inuit, and Carlton Williams‘ work on “auditory space” with E.A. Bott,  and to his own on-going absorption with Finnegans Wake (all of which require much future consideration), McLuhan came in the second half of the 1950s to perceive, through a new appreciation of “acoustic space”, how decidedly he himself had been visually biased even as late as 1954.3

This new appreciation of acoustic experience and of its fundamental differences from visual experience emerges in reference to Einstein in the 1960 version of ‘Acoustic Space’ (in the anthology, Explorations in Communication), a reworking by McLuhan and Carpenter of Williams’ earlier essay of the same name in Explorations 4.

Most people feel an obscure gratitude to Einstein because he is said to have demonstrated that “infinite” space has a boundary of some kind. The gratitude flows, not because anyone understands how this can be, but because it restores to visual space one of its essential elements. The essential feature of sound, however, is not its location, but that it be, that it fill space. We say “the night shall be filled with music,” just as the air is filled with fragrance; locality is irrelevant. The concert-goer closes his eyes. Auditory space has no point of favored focus. It’s a sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the thing. It is not pictorial space, boxed in, but dynamic, always in flux, creating its own dimensions moment by moment. It has no fixed boundaries; it is indifferent to background.

Two years later in The Gutenberg Galaxy McLuhan described the coming and the going of the visual world in further reference to Einstein:

But the absurdity of speaking of space as a neutral container will never trouble a culture which has separated its visual awareness from the other senses. Yet, says Whittaker (p. 100 [Space and Spirit, 1948]) “in Einstein’s conception, space is no longer the stage on which the drama of physics is performed: it is itself one of the performers; for gravitation, which is a physical property, is entirely controlled by curvature, which is a geometrical property of space.” With this recognition of curved space in 1905 the Gutenberg galaxy was officially dissolved. With the end of lineal specialisms and fixed points of view, compartmentalized knowledge became (…) unacceptable (…). And it has been the effort of this book to explain how the illusion of segregation of knowledge had become possible by the isolation of the visual sense by means of alphabet and typography.4  Perhaps it cannot be said too often. This illusion may have been a good or a bad thing. But there can only be disaster arising from unawareness of the causalities and effects inherent in our own technologies. (253)

 In Understanding Media he again recurs to Einstein in two important contexts:

Lewis Carroll took the nineteenth century into a dream world that was as startling as that of Bosch, but built on reverse principles. Alice in Wonderland offers as [its contasting] norm that continuous time and space that had created consternation in [Bosch and] the Renaissance. Pervading this uniform Euclidean world of familiar space-and-time, Carroll drove a fantasia of discontinuous space-and-time that anticipated Kafka, Joyce, and Eliot. Carroll, the mathematical contemporary of Clerk Maxwell, was quite avant-garde enough to know about the non-Euclidean geometries coming into vogue in his time. He gave the confident Victorians a playful foretaste of Einsteinian time-and-space [when Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland was published in 1865, decades before] (…) relativity theory in 1905 announced the dissolution of uniform Newtonian space as an illusion or fiction, however useful. Einstein pronounced the doom of continuous or “rational” space, and the way was made clear for Picasso and the Marx brothers and MAD. (UM 162-163)

WHY THE TV CHILD CANNOT SEE [LINEARLY] AHEAD: The plunge into depth experience via the TV image can only be explained in terms of the differences between visual and mosaic space. Ability to discriminate between these radically different forms is quite rare in our Western world. It has been pointed out that, in the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is not king. He is taken to be an hallucinated lunatic. In a highly visual culture, it is as difficult to communicate the non-visual properties of spatial forms as to explain visuality to the blind. In the ABC of Relativity Bertrand Russell began by explaining that there is nothing difficult about Einstein’s ideas, but that they do call for total reorganization of our imaginative lives. It is precisely this imaginative reorganization that has occurred via the TV image. (UM 332-333)

A number of critical insights may be noted in these passages:

  • Einstein’s ideas play a role in history about history 
  • extending relativity theory to human experience requires the specification of ‘visual’ and ‘acoustic’ space as “radically different forms” — ie, not (or not only) of senses as found in experience, but as co-variable elementary factors within a topological equation about experience
  • certain axial periods in history like that of fifth century BC Greece, the Renaissance and the birth of the electric era (in which we are still immersed) give important information about the valence (aka, the measure of combining power) of such experiential forms

In ‘Television in a New Light’ (1966), Einstein’s theories are used to illustrate the “momentous” explosive power of “electric speeds”:

The [Gutenberg] public is a world in which everybody has a little point of view and a little fragment of space all his own, private. In the [electric] mass audience everyone is involved in everybody and there is no fragmentation and no point of view. The mass is a factor of speed, not of quantity. This is literally and technically true. The mass is created by speed and everyone reading the same thing or doing the same thing at the same time. It is like Einstein’s idea that any kind or particle of matter can acquire infinite mass at the speed of light. Any minute, trite bits of news acquires infinite potential at the speed of electricity. Anything becomes momentous at electric speeds. And a mass audience is an audience in which everyone experiences and participates with everybody and in which nobody has a private identity. So the psychiatrist’s couches today are groaning with the weight of people asking, “Who am I? Please tell me who I am.” There is no identity left. At electric speeds nobody has a private identity. Don’t ask whether this is good or bad. It is an inevitable function of electric speeds.

In the later 1960s McLuhan continued to bring Einstein together with Alice:

Lewis Carroll looked through the looking-glass and found a kind of space-time which is the normal mode of electronic man. Before Einstein, Carroll had already entered that very sophisticated universe of Einstein. Each moment for Carroll had its own space and its own time. Alice makes her own space and time. Einstein, not Lewis Carroll, thought this was astonishing. (Stern Interview, 1967)

The discontinuities of the electric “space-time” had received much advance billing in the arts before Einstein. Lewis Carroll’s Alice flipped out of the hardware world of visual space, of visual uniformity and connectedness, when she went Through the Looking-Glass. (Include Me Out, 1968)

Leaving aside the posthumous Laws of Media (requiring separate treatment), it is in Take Today (1972) that Einstein receives most frequent mention from McLuhan:

As the electric environment increasingly engulfed the old Greek “Nature,” it became apparent that “Nature” was a figure abstracted from a ground of existence that was far from “natural.” Greek “Nature,” which sufficed until Einstein, excluded most of the chaotic resonance of the great Sound-Light Show of existence itself. Most of the pre-Socratic magic and ESP and all the Oriental and “Primitive” Natures were pushed into the “subconscious.” Civilized man exists by dumping most of his experience into that convenient bin. Electric man has discovered that it is his major resource centre. (TT 7)

Once science went through the vanishing point into acoustic or resonant space, (…) economists were left on the wrong side of the looking glass, because they were mostly unable to make what Bertrand Russell cited (on the first page of his ABC of Relativity) as the indispensable preliminary act needed for grasping Einstein: “What is demanded is a change in our imaginative picture of the world…” (TT 69)

There are, in fact, no connections in the material universe. Einstein, Heisenberg, and Linus Pauling have baffled the old mechanical and visual culture of the nineteenth century by reminding scientists in general that the only physical bond in Nature is the resonating interval or “interface”. Our language, as much as our mental set forbids us to regard the world in this way. It is hard for the conventional and uncritical mind to grasp the fact that “the meaning of meaning” is a relationship: a figure-ground process of perpetual change. The input of data must enter a ground or field or surround of relations that are transformed by the intruder, even as the input is also transformed. (TT 86)

In his preface to Where Is Science Going?, Albert Einstein insists: “There is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition, which is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance.” (TT 128)

Finally, as noted in the posthumous Laws of Media:

Part of the confusion of Einsteinian four-dimensional space-time results from the figure of abstract visual space suddenly acquiring a ground of ‘relativity.’ The visual figure now relates to the speed of light as its ground…(23)

The acoustic figure, too, has this same difficult ground in simultaneity and, therefore, relativity.

But while “the speed of light as (…) ground” and the resulting “relativity” may indeed produce great “confusion”, so may they also enable in the domain of experience (as Einstein demonstrated in the physical domain) a new intelligibility.

  1. Culture Without Literacy, Explorations 1, 1953
  2. McLuhan to Walter Ong and Clement McNaspy, December 23, 1944, Letters 166. Giedion referred to “the sun in the egg-tarnished spoons” four years later in Mechanization Takes Command. Especially since McLuhan names Giedion in this same letter, it is probable that he got the phrase from Giedion somehow rather than Giedion from him.
  3. See From vision to ‘vision’.
  4. In the terms of McLuhan’s topology of the senses, “the isolation of the visual sense by means of alphabet and typography” means the relative “emphasis” or “stress” on vision within the matrix of the senses.

Relativity in The Mechanical Bride

The Mechanical Bride 3

Discontinuity is in different ways a basic concept both of quantum and relativity physics. It is the way in which a Toynbee looks at civilizations, or a Margaret Mead at human cultures. Notoriously, it is the visual technique of a Picasso, the literary technique of James Joyce. (…) Quantum and relativity physics (…) have provided new facts about the world, new intelligibility, new insights into the universal fabric. Practically speaking, they mean that henceforth this planet is a single city. Far from making for irrationalism, these discoveries make irrationalism intolerable for the intelligent person. They demand much greater exertions of intelligence and a much higher level of personal and social integrity than have existed previously. In the same way, the technique of Toynbee makes all civilizations contemporary with our own. The past is made immediately available as a working model for present political experiment. Margaret Mead’s Male and Female illustrates a similar method. The cultural patterns of several societies, quite unrelated to one another or to our own, are abruptly overlayered in cubist or Picasso style to provide a greatly enriched image of human potentialities. 

The Mechanical Bride 22

the dream of relativity physics is not of centralism but of pluralism. It is not centralist but distributist in the matter of power and control. And to see this new vision at work side by side with the old one is to permit the reformer a sure method of diagnosis and therapeutic suggestion. It permits the reformer to co-operate with the same forces that have produced the disease, in order to point the way to health.

Field theory

McLuhan’s central suggestion is that all human experience may be studied as situated within a “unified field” of different patterns of “homeostasis of the perceptual factors” — aka different patterns of “relative interplay of the optical and the auditory modes” as modulated by touch. These patterns, in turn, may be characterized as different forms of “distribution of emphasis [or stress] among the senses“.

Gutenberg Galaxy 63
The increase of visual stress among the Greeks alienated them from the primitive art that the electronic age now reinvents after interiorizing the unified field of electric all-at-oneness.

Gutenberg Galaxy 71
“For religious man, space is not homogeneous; he experiences interruptions, breaks in it”
(Eliade). Likewise in time. For the modern physicist, (…) space is not homogeneous, nor is time. By contrast, the geometrical space invented in antiquity, far from being diverse, unique, pluralistic, sacral, “can be cut and delimited in any direction; but no qualitative differentiation and, hence, no orientation are given by virtue of its inherent structure.” (Eliade) The next statement applies entirely to the relative interplay of the optical and the auditory modes in the shaping of human sensibility: “It must be added at once that such a profane existence is never found in the pure state. To whatever degree he may have desacralized the world, the man who has made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely doing away with religious behavior. This will become clearer as we proceed; it will appear that even the most desacralized existence still preserves traces of a religious valorization of the world.” (Eliade)

McLuhan to Chuck Bayley, December 16, 1964 (Gordon 150)
His [Innis’] great insight was that every situation can be studied structurally by asking the question: ‘What is the primary stress or action that holds this whole structure in place?’ I think he got this approach from Max Weber. Weber had used it for institutions. Innis extended the approach to media. This structural approach tends to dispense with the accidents of ‘content’.

MM to Hans Selye, July 25, 1974 (Gordon 150)
My own approach (…) is a transformation theory, thus homeostasis of the perceptual factors in a rapidly changing environment requires much redistribution of emphasis among the senses. For example, a blind or deaf person compensates for the loss of one sense by a heightening of activity in the others.  It seems to me that this also occurs in whole populations when new technologies create new sensory environments.

 

The mosaic in A Faculty of Interrelations

McLuhan regularly invoked the mosaic as displaying the sort of coherence which he took to be the form of reality itself — and therefore of that type of human awareness most fitting to it.1 Famously, he does so at the beginning of The Gutenberg Galaxy:

The Gutenberg Galaxy develops a mosaic or field approach to its problems. Such a mosaic image of numerous data and quotations in evidence offers the only practical means of revealing causal operations in history. The alternative procedure would be to offer a series of views of fixed relationships in pictorial space. Thus the galaxy or constellation of events upon which the present study concentrates is itself a mosaic of perpetually interacting forms that have undergone kaleidoscopic transformation — particularly in our own time.

Like much else, this image was given to McLuhan for his further reflection by Sigfried Giedion in ‘A Faculty of Interrelations‘ from 1942:

In line with the whole structure of present-day knowledge we have to continue to train specialists. We do not want to educate dilettanti. There should be no popular courses on astronomy, on painting, on physics, literature, or ethnology. Rather should there be given an insight Into the methods and the interrelations of present-day knowledge [as practiced across all these fields by their best representatives]. In this way the mind of the coming specialist may be trained so that he will be able to conceive his own problems in relation to the whole. To make order, as I said at the beginning, is the first step towards a new universal. According to the structure of our period, the renascent universality has to be built up gradually. Like a mosaic, it has to be put together, piece by piece, by specialists of the new type. 

 The Gutenberg Galaxy was published twenty years later, in 1962. 

 

  1. Cf, The Beginnings of Gutenberg Galaxy 2 – Carothers: “The mosaic form in which I present the Galaxy has baffled some readers. It is a form that permits a considerable degree of natural relating of matters that cannot be presented in ordinary lineal exposition.” (Letter to Carothers, December 20th, 1963)

Schafer — The Tuning of the World

….a new Orpheus could be born

…the world as a macrocosmic musical composition

…to investigate the possibilities of orchestral harmony in the multi-levelled drive towards pure human expressiveness

At a UNESCO Symposium in 1976, ‘Place and Function of Art in Contemporary Life‘, McLuhan cited R Murray Schafer1 extensively (with Schafer, in turn, citing Whitman, Carr and Huizinga):

In a recent book, The Tuning of the World, Murray Schafer begins by saying:

Now I will do nothing but listen . . .
I hear all sounds running together, combined, fused or following,
Sounds of the city and sounds out of the city, sounds of the day and the night
(Walt Whitman, Song of Myself)

When so much of the sound in the world is of human origin, it is natural to conceive of the possibility of orchestrating these sounds, and such is the concern of Murray Schafer:

Orchestration Is a Musician’s Business. Throughout this book [The Tuning of the World] I am going to treat the world as a macrocosmic musical composition. This is an unusual idea but I am going to nudge it forward relentlessly. The definition of music has undergone radical change in recent years. In one of the more contemporary definitions, John Cage has declared: “Music is sounds, sounds around us whether we’re in or out of concert halls: cf. Thoreau”. The reference is to Thoreau’s Walden, where the author experiences in the sounds and sights of nature an inexhaustible entertainment. 

We are moving into a time when a new Orpheus could be born. Schafer offers a large inventory of the natural sounds of the earth which had preceded the industrial time, beginning with the phases of the sea and of the waterfall (including falling rain). There are the phases of the wind and of the forest. The Canadian writer Emily Carr speaks of the forest [as cited by Schafer]:

The silence of our Western forests was so profound that our ears could scarcely comprehend it. If you spoke your voice came back to you as your face is thrown back to you in a mirror. It seemed as if the forest were so full of silence that there was no room for sounds. The birds who lived there were birds of prey – eagles, hawks, owls. Had a song bird loosed his throat the others would have pounced. Sober-coloured silent little birds were the first to follow settlers into the West. Gulls there had always been; they began with the sea and had always cried over it. The vast sky spaces above, hungry for noise, steadily lapped up their cries. The forest was different — she brooded over silence and secrecy. (Hundreds and Thousands — Journals of Emily Carr)

Schafer contrasts the visual profiles of the mediaeval and the modern city:

Looking at the profile of a mediaeval European city we at once note that the castle, the city wall and the church spire dominate the scene. In the modern city it is the high-rise apartment, the bank tower and the factory chimney which are the tallest buildings. This tells us a good deal about the prominent social institutions of the two societies. In the soundscape also there are sounds which obtrude over the acoustic horizon: keynotes, signals and soundmarks; and these types of sounds must accordingly form the principal subject of our investigation. 

In terms of human scale, Schafer reminds us that the sound of the church bell is coextensive with the community, and he appends the memorable opening of Johan Huizinga’s The Waning of the Middle Ages:

One sound rose ceaselessly above the noises of busy life and lifted all things unto a sphere of order and serenity: the sound of bells. The bells were in daily life like good spirits, which by their familiar voices, now called upon the citizens to mourn and now to rejoice, now warned them of danger, now exhorted them to piety. They were known by their names: big Jacqueline, or the bell Roland. Everyone knew the difference in meaning of the various ways of ringing. However continuous the ringing of the bells, people would seem not to have become blunted to the effect of their sound. Throughout the famous judicial duel between two citizens of Valenciennes, in 1455, the big bell, “which is hideous to hear”, says Chastellain, never stopped ringing. What intoxication the pealing of the bells of all the churches, and of all the monasteries of Paris, must have produced, sounding from morning till evening, and even during the night . . .2

One of Schafer’s themes concerns the “Quiet we call ‘Silence’ — which is the merest word of all”. What interval, or gap, is to space, silence is to sound, and the Chinese and Japanese painters work by means of these carefully ordered gaps. Today it is the same with silence:

Because it is being lost, the composer today is more concerned with silence; he composes with it. Anton Webern moved composition to the brink of silence. The ecstasy of his music is enhanced by his sublime and stunning use of rests, for Webern’s is music composed with an erasure. 

McLuhan had long been concerned with the orchestration of the world. He had read Giedion’s ‘A Faculty of Interrelations in the early 1940’s:

As I tried to say in Space, Time, and Architecture, our culture is like an orchestra where the instruments lie already tuned, but where every musician is cut off from his fellows by a sound-proof wall.

And then McLuhan himself had written in the first two issues of Explorations:

our need [is] to discover [a] means (…) of seeing that modern physics and painting and poetry speak a common language and of acquiring that language at once in order that our world may possess consciously the coherence that it really has in latency, and which for lack of our recognition has created not new orchestral harmonies but mere noise. (’Culture Without Literacy’, Explorations 1, 1953) 

Every medium is in some sense a universal, pressing towards maximal realization. But its expressive pressures disturb existing balances and patterns in other media of culture. The increasing inclusiveness of our sense of such repercussions leads us today hopefully to investigate the possibilities of orchestral harmony in the multi-levelled drive towards pure human expressiveness. (‘Notes on the Media as Art Forms’ Explorations 2, 1954)

The orchestration of the world envisioned by McLuhan is decidedly not the sort of total-mobilization-of-the-world-as-a-resource foreseen and criticized by Heidegger. Instead, as reflected in the appeal to music and silence and to the bells of the middle ages, McLuhan envisioned the conscious orchestration of “interrelations” whose existing half-conscious and uninvestigated deployment in industry, entertainment, broadcasting and warfare has produced our contemporary waste land. Thus far, humans have learned only enough of these interrelations to misuse them to misuse their fellow humans and the planet itself.  This is to enter a cul-de-sac. The only way out is so to investigate these “interrelations” that their effects become known (and therefore objects of choice) before they cause them — which is just how we study anything that is important.

Here is McLuhan in ‘New Media as Political Forms’ from Explorations 3 in 1954:

Siegfried Giedeon has given exact procedures for how the modern painter or poet should conduct himself in the company of scientists: Adopt and adapt their discoveries to the uses of art. Why leave this solely to the distortions of the industrialist? 

 

  1. Also see McLuhan to Schafer (McLuhan 1974 letter to Murray Schafer), which is where Schafer may have obtained reference to Huizinga.
  2. See the previous note. McLuhan wrote to Schafer: “I have a recent essay explaining in what senses the medieval period was acoustic right up to the edge of the Gutenberg, or visual, revolution. Huizinga, in The Waning of the Middle Ages (1954), explains some of it…”.

Sigfried Giedion — A Faculty of Interrelations

— It’s a question of nothing less than to pursue and to define the Unity of Nature . . .
— But what’s to prove to me that there is any unity in nature?
— That’s exactly the question I put to Einstein. He answered: It’s an act of faith.    (Valéry, L’Idée Fixe)1

McLuhan had initially informed Tyrwhitt that the Rockefeller Foundation wanted to fund a research center at the University of Toronto in commemoration of the communications scholar Harold Innis (1894–1952), who had died in November 1952. The way McLuhan talked about the proposed center to support the sorts of interdisciplinary studies Innis had done, sounded a lot to Tyrwhitt like Giedion’s ideas for a Faculty of Interrelations.2

McLuhan and Sigfried Giedion3 met in 1943 in St Louis.  According to Shoshkes, Giedion was there doing research for Mechanization Takes Command (which would be published in 1948, with a review by McLuhan the following year under the fitting title of ‘Encyclopaedic Unities’). In 1943 McLuhan immediately read Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture,4 which he later described as “one of the great events of my lifetime”,5 and he must have studied some of Giedion’s papers at that time as well, especially ‘A Faculty of Interrelations’ — an article Giedion considered important enough to have issued in three separate journals between 1942 and 1944.6 McLuhan, too, thought an inter-departmental ‘Faculty of Interrelations’ critically important and he doggedly pursued the idea himself with, eg, proposals to the University of Chicago7 and to the Dean of Graduate Studies at the University of Toronto, Harold Innis.8 The Explorations seminar (Culture and Communications) and the Centre for Culture and Technology, both at the University of Toronto, eventually represented different realizations of the notion.9

What may have immediately attracted Giedion and McLuhan to each other was the fact that each saw in modernism the potential to reestablish a spiritual balance that had been lost, or at least deeply distorted, in the world (ie, the European world) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his ‘Faculty of Interrelations’ paper (in which his English could have used the touch-up later provided to his writing by Tyrwhitt), Giedion refers to “the lost equilibrium between feeling and thinking and between an external world which has gone wild10 and the basic nature of man”.  This “lost equilibrium” is elaborated as follows (with changes for gender neutrality): 

A period which regards art as a plaything, as a luxury, or as unnecessary, a people who believe that research which does not pay can be ignored, has signed therewith the death warrant of culture, and has revealed its own inner breakdown. Behind this misunderstanding lies the [disjointed psychic] structure of the human being today. The representative human of our period is the unevenly developed, the maladjusted human being, thinking and feeling divorced, a split personality. The human being today has one organ developed at the expense of another, or has some organs hypertrophied.11

Both Giedion and McLuhan insisted, however, that this “lost equilibrium”, although terribly real and no illusion, was not definitive:

in spite of seeming confusion, there is nevertheless a true, if hidden, unity, a secret synthesis, in our present civilization. To point out why this synthesis has not become a conscious and active reality has been one of my chief aims.  (Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture, 1941, foreword to the first edition.)12

There is a real, living unity in our time, as in any other, but it lies submerged under a superficial hubbub of sensation. (McLuhan to Harold Innis, March 14 1951, Letters 223)

In Giedion’s paper, a ”Faculty of Interrelations” is discussed mainly as an interdepartmental institutional setting where scholars from different fields would attempt to find and to elaborate common ground:

Our task and our moral obligation is to make order in our own field, to establish the relations between the sciences, art, and the humanities. This Is what is lacking today. To build up the interrelations between the different branches of human knowledge (…) a faculty must be created In the universities which functions as a sort of coordinator between the sciences and the humanities. Scholars will not only have to teach on such a faculty; each of them will have to learn as well. There must be built up a knowledge of methods, the beginning of a common vocabulary. Scholars must have systematic contact with one another.

But it is clear from the citations from ‘A Faculty of Interrelations’ and from Space, Time and Architecture given above that such an institutional “faculty” could function only within a set of further “faculties of interrelations” in the individual human being, in culture and society and, in the last analysis, in existence itself (what has elsewhere in this blog been called, following Jackson Knight, ‘the main question‘). For unless existence itself had (or is!) some grounding “Faculty of Interrelations”, how could there remain some “hidden unity, a secret synthesis”, some “real, living unity in our time, as in any other” given “the death warrant of culture” and the “inner breakdown” of the human psyche? Given “an external world (…) gone wild” (WW2 was raging) and a resulting disconnect between it and “the basic nature of man”?13 

The “Faculty of Interrelations” may be seen to have a series of different, so to say,  theatres of operation — like an embedded set of Russian dolls. Such a “faculty” is operative in what Giedion calls the ever-changing equilibrium within the human soul“. But it also has social operation in Giedion’s “cultural structure” and “present civilization” (extended by McLuhan to “in our time, as in any other“). Ultimately, it has (or is) an ontological operation such that real change in what is therefore genuine history does indeed unfold — Giedion observes that “there is no reason whatever to expect that the road which knowledge will follow will refrain from even greater differentiation” in the future than is already occurring in the present — and yet, despite the inevitable “loss” implicated in such historical change, “a secret synthesis” or “interrelation” remains, according to Giedion, fundamentally at work at the deepest — that is, at the ontological — level.

Each of these individual and social “faculties” below the level of “life” itself functions as a dynamic Gestalt or variable “equilibrium” which may be balanced or utterly distorted — or situated at any point between these extremes. But what is the relation between these various “faculties” themselves — how are they distinguished and related? What is Giedion’s proposal for “taking hold of them organically“?14

In McLuhan’s March 14, 1951 letter to Innis, already cited above, the claim is made that it is language that has this key role:

Many of the ancient language theories of the Logos type which you [Innis] cite for their bearings on government and society have recurred and amalgamated themselves today under the auspices of anthropology and social psychology. Working concepts of “collective consciousness” in advertising agencies have in turn given salience and practical effectiveness to these “magical” notions of language. But it was most of all the esthetic discoveries of the symbolists since Rimbaud and Mallarmé (developed in English by Joyce, Eliot, Pound, Lewis and Yeats) which have served to recreate in contemporary consciousness an awareness of the potencies of language such as the Western world has not experienced in 1800 years. (Letters 220, emphasis added)

The same central role of language is to be seen in Giedion’s ‘Faculty of Interrelations’ paper from almost a decade before:

Great changes are foreshadowed in our cultural structure. The elements of this change already exist in science, whether biology or physics, in art, in architecture and in many other fields. But these elements are unrelated; they have no inner contact with one another. (…) This Is what is lacking today. (…) To make order in our own field we have to restore again the lost contact between the different sciences, between sciences and humanities, and then this interrelationship with human expression. We have to create a new vocabulary. This is not easy. Anyone who has tried to place representatives of different disciplines at the same table in order to elucidate the methods each follows in his own sphere will have encountered at once this obstacle — each representative seems to speak a language of his own. The extreme specialization of the sciences has led to the loss of a common vocabulary based on mutual understanding. (…) The specialist has destroyed that common consciousness which we call culture. It is the specialist who has to restore it again.15

Giedion concludes “A Faculty of Interrelations” with an image which McLuhan would repeatedly take up in his own work: 

As I tried to say in Space, Time, and Architecture, our culture is like an orchestra where the instruments lie already tuned, but where every musician Is cut off from his fellows by a sound-proof wall.16

“The [individual] instruments lie already tuned” through the “faculty of interrelation” native to each of them. But their common orchestral tuning depends upon “ever greater (…) insight into the moving process of life” itself. This is the “wider field” of an ontological “faculty of interrelations”.

Something must be changed. And this is the type of specialist.17 His activity has to be founded on a wider field. There is no reason whatever to expect that the road which knowledge will follow will refrain from even greater differentiation. And there is no contradiction in saying that at the same time an ever greater urge toward breadth of outlook must be developed. (…) The mind of the coming specialist may [ie, must] be trained so that he will be able to conceive (…) problems in relation to the whole.  (Emphasis added)

 

 

  1. 1932. Translated by Eleanor Wolff, whose abbreviated translation of L’Idée Fixe appeared originally in Meja, Number Two (Autumn 1946), edited by Herbert Steiner. It was reprinted in ETC, ed S.I. Hayakawa, 6:1, 1948. For Hayakawa as a member of the Winnipeg School of Communication see here.
  2. Jaqueline Tyrwhitt: A Transnational Life in Urban Planning and Design, Ellen Shoshkes, 2013.
  3. Giedion was a champion of modern architecture and modern art and, as McLuhan wrote Wyndham Lewis, October 26, 1943 (Letters, 136) “a great friend of the Stars”:  Giedion knew, and worked with, among many other luminaries, Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Hans Arp, Piet MondrianPaul Klee and James Joyce.  It was Giedion’s wife, Carola Giedion-Welcker, who arranged Joyce’s return to Zurich in late 1940 and for Joyce’s death mask when he died there shortly thereafter in January 1941. McLuhan reviewed her 1952 study, Paul Klee, in Shenandoah, 3:1, 1953.
  4. 1941; McLuhan’s copy at Fisher Library UT is from the 1943 printing — a testament to their meeting that year.
  5. Stearn interview (1967): “Giedion influenced me profoundly. (Reading) Space, Time and Architecture was one of the great events of my lifetime”.
  6. Education, in 1942, Weekly Bulletin of the Michigan Society of Architects in 1943, and Architect And Engineer in 1944.
  7. Proposal to Robert Hutchins 1947.
  8. In McLuhan’s letter to Innis of March 14, 1951: “I think there are lines appearing in (your) Empire and Communications (…) which suggest the possibility of organizing an entire school of studies. (…) It seems obvious to me that Bloor Street (where Innis’ Political Economy Department was located) is the one point in this University where one might establish a focus of the arts and sciences. And the organizing concept would naturally be “Communication Theory and Practice”. A simultaneous focus of current and historic forms. Relevance to be given to selection of areas of study by dominant artistic and scientific modes of the particular period.” (Letters 220ff)
  9. For further discussion, see Faculty of Interrelation in Toronto.
  10. ‘Wild’ in German and English largely overlap but, of course, have their particular ways of being used.  Probably Giedion had in mind here something like ‘has become unbound’ for ‘has gone wild’.
  11. ‘A Faculty of Interrelations’. McLuhan would take up a series of questions implicated in Giedion’s analysis here: how to specify the different structures and adjustments which are possible for human beings? Especially, how to do so in terms of the way one “organ” (or “faculty” or sense) might be “developed at the expense of another” and even become “hypertrophied”? And how to relate these different structures as both cause and effect to social and cultural developments? His general answer would be that focus must be made on the internal and external senses and that their various modes of “interrelation” or “equilibrium” be investigated scientifically with this focus.  Since these modes might be called ‘media’ — precisely because their possibilities depend upon the particular sort of “interrelation” operative in them — the discipline could be termed that of “understanding media”.
  12. Compare, 20 years later, Gutenberg Galaxy 254: “And it has been the effort of this book to explain how the illusion of segregation of knowledge had become possible by the isolation of the visual sense by means of alphabet and typography.”
  13. Cf Giedion, The Eternal Present: The Beginnings of Art (A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1957): “We have become worshipers of the day-to-day. Life runs along like a television program: one show following relentlessly upon another, barely glancing at problems with never a notion of taking hold of them organically. This has led to an inner uncertainty, to extreme shortcomings in all essential phases of life: to what Heidegger calls ‘a forgetfulness of being’.” (7-8)
  14. See the previous note.
  15. Emphasis added throughout.
  16. Compare McLuhan in ‘Culture Without Literacy’, Explorations 1, 1953: “our need (is) to discover means (…) of seeing that modern physics and painting and poetry speak a common language and of acquiring that language at once in order that our world may possess consciously the coherence that it really has in latency, and which for lack of our recognition has created not new orchestral harmonies but mere noise.” Also: ‘Notes on the Media as Art Forms’ Explorations 2, 1954: “Every medium is in some sense a universal, pressing towards maximal realization. But its expressive pressures disturb existing balances and patterns in other media of culture. The increasing inclusiveness of our sense of such repercussions leads us today hopefully to investigate the possibilities of orchestral harmony in the multi-levelled drive towards pure human expressiveness.”
  17. “The type of specialist”: if ‘type’ is understood as the printer’s letter ‘type’, and ‘of specialist’ as a dual genitive (so that a certain kind of specialist is an effect of ‘type’ as its object) Giedion’s unusual English phrase here may be taken to indicate McLuhan’s position that the monocular culture of print — the ‘Gutenberg galaxy’ — must give way to ‘understanding media’, plural, not the singular literary medium. “His activity has to be founded on a wider field.”

What is coherence?

Coherence: the state or power of ‘sticking together’ … ‘to cohere’, compare ‘to adhere’, ‘to inhere’…

coherence (n.) late 16c., from Middle French cohérence,1550s, from Middle French cohérent (16c.), from Latin cohaerentem (nominative cohaerens), present participle of cohaerere “cohere”, from com– “together” + haerere “to stick” (see hesitation);
hesitation (n.) c. 1400, from Old French hesitacion or directly from Latin haesitationem (nominative haesitatio) “a hesitation, stammering”, figuratively “irresolution, uncertainty”, noun of action from past participle stem of haesitare “stick fast, remain fixed; stammer in speech”, figuratively “hesitate, be irresolute, be at a loss, be undecided,” frequentative of haerere “stick, cling,” from PIE root *ghais– “to adhere, hesitate” (source also of Lithuanian gaistu, “to delay, tarry”).1

the need (…) of seeing that modern physics and painting and poetry speak a common language and of acquiring that language at once in order that our world may possess consciously the coherence that it really has in latency… (Culture Without Literacy, Explorations 1, 1953)

There is a real, living unity in our time, as in any other, but it lies submerged under a superficial hubbub of sensation. (McLuhan to Harold Innis, March 14 1951, Letters 223)2

the gold thread in the pattern (Pound, Canto CXVI)

When he started at Cambridge in 1934, age 23, McLuhan already had the conviction that “a real, living unity” runs through even “the horror of (…) life” like a “gold thread”:

Of late I have been wayfaring among the work of T.S. Eliot (…) the poems I am reading have the unmistakable character of greatness. They transform, and diffuse and recoalesce the commonest every day occurrences of 20th century city life till one begins to see double indeed — the extremely unthinkable character, the glory and the horror of the reality in life (yet, to all save the seer, behind life) is miraculously suggested.3

In the 45 years he had yet to live, McLuhan would continue to consider and refine many of the topics raised here, often in specific relation to Eliot. The last essay he published in his lifetime was ‘Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land’ (1979). Over these decades, he would be particularly preoccupied by two of these topics: what does it mean “to see double” and what does it mean for an age when only “the seer” can (or at least will) do this?

The two sorts of relation posited in McLuhan’s letter between “the glory and the horror” are what he would later style (following Ogden and Richards) as inclusive (“the glory and the horror of the reality in life”) and exclusive (“the glory” only “behind life”, if at all).  For “the seer”, a “gold thread” holds “the glory and the horror” together, despite “the extremely unthinkable character” of this juxtaposition; for “all” the rest, “the glory” is thinkable, if at all, only if it is held apart from “the horror”, somewhere beyond and “behind life”.

Now this is a perception and a problem that has hung over western and now world civilization like the sword of Damocles at least since Heraclitus:

τοῦ λόγου δ’ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν

Though the logos is common to all, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own.4

McLuhan felt a calling to address this problematic perception, once again.  Its difficulty lies in the further question: is the relation between the perception of “the seer” and that of the “many” inclusive or exclusive? If the latter, if it is exclusive, then it is not the case that “the logos is common to all” and it is not the case that “the extremely unthinkable character” of the “gold thread” has any application here.  In this case, Heraclitus’ dictum would be false. But if it is inclusive and the dictum therefore true, how so?  How can it be an aspect of “the logos (…) common to all” that it is not “common to all”? That it is not only not seen by “the many” in “the commonest every day occurrences of 20th century city life”, let alone in “the horror of (…) life”, like war — but also, and above all, that this lack of vision of “the many” (οἱ πολλοὶ) has ‘nothing in common’ with “the logos [that] is common to all”?

As reflected in his religious persuasion, and consequently in his literary and social criticism, McLuhan held that a fundamental coherence, “the logos”,5 orients the world like a “gold thread in the pattern” — even when it doesn’t. This orientation in absence, or what seems for all the world to be absent orientation, is the great mystery: “true strength is that strength which, mobile as it is hidden, concentrates on the work without being outwardly visible”.6

But how to articulate such a difficult coherence for a world in which orientation is so utterly “hidden” that it is indistinguishable from its complete absence? How unveil or dis-cover a power that on its side operates, essentially, “without being outwardly visible“? And, considered on our side, how in any case communicate such a dis-covery to a world in which communication has died in the perceived absence of grounding orientation? 

McLuhan felt called to this task of articulation “in order that our world may possess consciously the coherence that it really has in latency”.  But what is “latency”?  The great question here, as he came increasingly to appreciate in the last decade of his life, concerns time.  Is “latency” something that expresses itself in and through linear time? Something which struggles to unfold from latency to actuality?  Or is “latency” fundamentally synchronic such that it is in some way higher, or more grounding, than any actuality?

McLuhan tried in a whole series of ways to articulate (or dis-cover) this latent coherence: especially in terms of history (in, eg, the perennial struggle of grammar with logic and rhetoric) and in terms of the cubism, syncopation and symbolism of modern art. Hence, in regard to the latter, his suggestion in his letter to Innis (immediately following his observation that “ancient language theories of the Logos type (…) have recurred (…) today under the auspices of anthropology and social psychology”):

But it was most of all the esthetic discoveries of the symbolists since Rimbaud and Mallarmé (developed in English by Joyce, Eliot, Pound, Lewis and Yeats) which have served to recreate in contemporary consciousness an awareness of the potencies [aka, “latencies“] of language such as the Western world has not experienced in 1800 years.

But none of this worked: the only people who understood much of what he was up to, like Giedion or Brooks, already suspected themselves what was at stake and were themselves struggling with its articulation. Finally, at the end of the 1950’s, McLuhan hit on the idea that coherence could be expressed as the topological covariation of the senses and that communication of it could be achieved in the same way as the hard sciences had learned to communicate themselves: through demonstrable prediction and practical application.   

That was almost 60 years ago. At just that time, however, McLuhan began to experience “occasional blackouts”7 and in 1960 experienced a major stroke serious enough that the last rites were administered. Although he was able to develop aspects of his coherence-as-topology insight in the remaining two decades of his life, he never (as Carpenter has described) regained the focus he had had prior to 1960. As a result, the insight remained — perhaps fittingly in some harsh sense — more latent than actual.

It is the goal of this blog to attempt its further dis-covery.

But to affirm the gold thread in the pattern

(Torcello)

al Vicolo d’oro

(Tigullio).

To confess wrong without losing rightness:

Charity I have had sometimes,

I cannot make it flow thru.

A little light, like a rushlight

to lead back to splendour.8

  1. Compare ‘James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial’: “In the Wake the origins of speech as gesture are associated with ‘Bigmeister Finnegan of the stuttering hand’. This seems to tie up with Vico’s view that the earliest language was that of the gods of which Homer speaks: ‘The gods call this giant Briareus’ of the hundred hands. The idea of speech as stuttering, as arrested gesture, as discontinuities or aspects of the single Word, is basic to the Wake and serves to illustrate the profundity of the traditional philological doctrine…”.
  2. Compare Sigfried Giedion, ten years before, in Space, Time and Architecture: “in spite of seeming confusion, there is nevertheless a true, if hidden, unity, a secret synthesis, in our present civilization. To point out why this synthesis has not become a conscious and active reality has been one of my chief aims.”
  3. McLuhan to his family, December 6, 1934, Letters 41; emphasis in the original; brackets have been added to “yet, to all save the seer, behind life”.
  4. Heraclitus DK B2. Eliot uses this fragment as one of the two epigrams for the Four Quartets from Heraclitus.
  5. Cf, McLuhan to Innis: “I think there are lines appearing in Empire and Communications, for example, which suggest the possibility of organizing an entire school of studies. Many of the ancient language theories of the Logos type which you cite for their bearings on government and society have recurred and amalgamated themselves today under the auspices of anthropology and social psychology. Working concepts of “collective consciousness” in advertising agencies have in turn given salience and practical effectiveness to these “magical” notions of language.” (March 15, 1951, Letters 220)
  6. Ching, as cited in Take Today, 22.
  7. See the note, doubtless from Corinne McLuhan, that prior to McLuhan’s brain tumour operation in 1967 “for eight years before (ie, since 1959) he had been afflicted with occasional blackouts and dizziness” (Letters, 175).
  8. Pound, Canto CXVI

From vision to ‘vision’

….acoustic space has unique physical prop­erties (a perfect sphere whose center is everywhere and whose margins are nowhere). [But] quantum physicists con­tinue to make efforts at visualizing the nonvisual… (Cliché to Archetype, 154)

The more that one says about acoustic space the more one realizes that it’s the thing that mathematicians and physicists of the past fifty years have been calling space-time, relativity, and non-Euclidean systems of geometry. And it was into this acoustic world that the poets and painters began to thrust in the mid-19th century. Like Coleridge’s Mariner, they were the first that ever burst into that silent sea. This was the world of experience emerging to Keats when he spoke of “magic casements opening on the foam of perilous seas in faerie lands forlorn”. It was to be a world in which the eye listens, the ear sees, and in which all the senses assist each other in concert. (Counterblast, 114)

The visual world has very peculiar properties, and the acoustic world has quite different properties. The visual world which belongs to the old nineteenth century, and which had been around for quite a while, say from the sixteenth century anyway, has the properties of being continuous and connected and homogeneous, all parts more or less alike. Things stayed put. If you had a point of view, that stayed put. The acoustic world, which is the electric world of simultaneity, has no continuity, no homogeneity, no connections, and no stasis. Everything is changing. To move from one of those worlds to the other is a very big shift. It’s the same shift that Alice in Wonderland made when she went through the looking glass. She moved out of the visual world and into the acoustic world when she went through the looking glass. (Living at the Speed of Light, 1974)

It is striking that Hayakawa in ‘The Revision of Vision’ not only manifestly appeals to different notions of vision via its revisioning, but in doing so at the same time specifies vision — doubtless following Kepes here — as the required focus for the study of individual and social experience. Indeed, he seems to equate vision with experience at large:

He [Kepes] gives us the “grammar” and the “syntax” of vision: what interplays of what forces in the human nervous system and in the world outside it produce what visual tensions and resolutions of tensions; what combinations of visual elements result in what new organizations of feeling… (9)

Up to some point in the 1950’s (although he would later characterize such emphasis on vision as typical of the Gutenberg galaxy) also McLuhan tended to privilege the role of vision himself. Here he is in his programmatic essay in Explorations 1, ‘Culture Without Literacy’ (1953; all emphasis added):

  • all art and all language (!) are techniques for looking at one situation through another one
  • it is hard for us to see the printed page or any other current medium (!) except in contrast to some other form
  • the curious thing is that Spaniards like Picasso or Salvador Dali are much more at home amidst the new visual culture (!) of North America than we ourselves
  • This division between visual and literary languages (!)
  •  we are unable to read the language of technological forms
  • seeing our old literary culture in the new plastic terms in order to enable it to become a constitutive part of the new culture created by the orchestral voices (!) and gestures (!) of new media
  • seeing that modern physics and painting and poetry speak (!) a common language 
  • Perhaps we could sum up our problem by saying that technological man must betake himself to visual metaphor (!) in contriving a new unified language for the multiverse of cultures of the entire globe. 
  • The language of visual form is, therefore, one which lies to hand as an unused Esperanto (!)  at everybody’s command. The language of vision has already been adopted in the pictograms of scientific formula and logistics. These ideograms transcend national barriers as easily as Chaplin or Disney and would seem to have no rivals as the cultural base for cosmic man.

The way to a topology of human experience based on the co-variance of the senses was blocked by such decided emphasis on visual form, visual metaphor and visual language. McLuhan would have to come to an appreciation of the difference between the senses, and especially vision, used in all sorts of different particular and general ways — and the ‘senses’ used in a technical way as a ground of all human experience (aka a “cultural base for cosmic man”) via a topology of their dynamic co-variation. (It may be that McLuhan came to use the word ‘space’ to indicate this technical use of the ‘senses’. “Acoustic space”, for example, could be engendered by things seen, like a newspaper or television.)1

More, he would have to learn the particular virtues of acoustic experience both in order to valorize the ear on a par with the eye and in order to formulate a “unified field” of all experience — something that could not be achieved on the basis of any sort of perspective with its correlative absolute space and inertial system.

McLuhan himself had to learn what he described in Take Today (69):

Once science went through the vanishing point into acoustic or resonant space, both scientists and economists were left on the wrong side of the looking glass, because they were mostly unable to make what Bertrand Russell cited (on the first page of his ABC of Relativity) as the indispensable preliminary act needed for grasping Einstein: “What is demanded is a change in our imaginative picture of the world…” 

 

 

  1. The word ‘formal’ can have this same function: “Since the telegraph, then, the forms of Western culture have been strongly shaped by the sphere-like pattern that belongs to a field of awareness in which all the elements are practically simultaneous. It is this instantaneous character of the information field today, inseparable from electronic media, that confers the formal auditory character on the new culture. That is to say, for example, that the newspaper page, since the introduction of the telegraph, has had a formally auditory character and only incidentally a lineal, literary form.” (Myth and Mass Media, 1959)

Hayakawa — The Revision of Vision

S.I. Hayakawa’s short (3 page) essay, ‘The Revision of Vision’, appeared as one of two introductions to Gyorgy Kepes’ 1944 The Language of Vision.  At the time, Kepes and Hayakawa were colleagues at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. There is little doubt that McLuhan knew of Hayakawa’s essay since:

  • the other, even shorter, introduction — titled ‘Art Means Reality’1 — was written by Sigfried Giedion who became McLuhan’s mentor and friend after they met in St Louis in 1943.2 McLuhan read everything he could find by Giedion and may well have come to Kepes’ book via him.
  • in any case, Kepes’ own text in the book is cited extensively in McLuhan’s 1953 essay ‘Culture Without Literacy’ from Explorations 1 and then again, repeatedly, in The Gutenberg Galaxy (126-127) 

McLuhan must have studied Kepes’ book at some point, or points, between its publication in 1944 and his citation of it in 1953. When he did so he must have read Hayakawa’s introductory essay and not only on account of its bare presence there.  For McLuhan knew Hayakawa from Winnipeg when they lived on the same street3 and he must have heard of him again repeatedly when he taught in the English Department at the University of Wisconsin in 1936-1937. Hayakawa had obtained his PhD in English there the previous year. As  a fellow Winnipigeon, UM English grad and published Eliot scholar, Hayakawa would have been the first thing that came to mind when people heard of McLuhan’s very similar background.

After a year away from Madison, Hayakawa returned in 1937 to marry and to teach for the university in its satellite locations: it is not impossible that he and McLuhan met there just as McLuhan was leaving UW. Later, it was probably through Hayakawa’s 1941 Language in Action that McLuhan was introduced to the general semantics of Alfred Korzybski, which he cited approvingly in a number of early texts, including his Nashe thesis.4

‘The Revision of Vision’ sets out, in startling clarity, a number of points to whose investigation McLuhan would dedicate himself in the 1950s:

The Gutenberg galaxy vs electric allatonceness:

We attempt to visualize the eventfulness of a universe that is an electro-dynamic plenum in the representational clichés evolved at a time when statically-conceived, isolable “objects” were regarded as occupying positions in an empty and absolute “space”. (9)

The drama of cognition5:

He [Kepes] gives us the “grammar” and the “syntax” of vision: what interplays of what forces in the human nervous system and in the world outside it produce what visual tensions and resolutions of tensions; what combinations of visual elements result in what new organizations of feeling… (9)

The medium and the message:

Mr. Kepes’s endeavor may perhaps best be characterized by the following analogy. To a Chinese scholar, the pleasure to be derived from an inscription is only partly due to the sentiments it may express. He may take delight in the calligraphy even when the inscription is meaningless to him as text. Suppose now a singularly obtuse Chinese scholar existed who was solely preoccupied with the literary or moral content of inscriptions, and totally blind to their calligraphy. How would one ever get him to see the calligraphic qualities of an inscription if he persisted, every time the inscription was brought up for examination, in discussing its literary content…? (9-10)

The practical need for insight into “the meaning of meaning is relation”6:

To cease looking at things atomistically in visual experience and to see relatedness means, among other things, to lose in our social experience, as Mr. Kepes argues, the deluded self-importance of absolute “individualism” in favor of social relatedness and interdependence. When we structuralize the primary impacts of experience differently, we shall structuralize the world differently.7 (10)

The quest for a topology of experience:

The reorganization of our visual habits so that we perceive not isolated “things” in “space,” but structure, order, and the relatedness of events in space-time, is perhaps the most profound kind of revolution possible — a revolution that is long overdue not only in art, but in all our experience. (10)

Importantly, the quest for a topology of the human domain ties back to the recognition of multiple galaxies of experience, at least one of which might be able to conceive “an electro-dynamic plenum” of relative spaces:

We attempt to visualize the eventfulness of a universe that is an electro-dynamic plenum in the representational clichés evolved at a time when statically-conceived, isolable “objects” were regarded as occupying positions in an empty and absolute “space”. (9)

 

  1. Giedion’s 2-page text: “This book, written by a young artist, bears witnessthat a third generation is on the march, willing to continue and to make secure the modern tradition which has developed in the course of this century; or, as Gyorgy Kepes states it: ‘To put earlier demands into concrete terms and on a still wider social plane’. It was not the rule in the nineteenth century for younger generations to consciously continue the work of their predecessors. To do so is new; it means that we are in a period of consolidation. The public, including those who govern and administer it, is still lacking the artistic, that is, the emotional training corresponding to our period. Both are plagued by the split which exists between advanced methods of thinking and an emotional background that has not caught up with these methods.. The demand for continuity will become more and more the key word of this period. ‘Every day something new’ is the inheritance of the last century’s disastrous urge. It still persists in many ways. Continuity does not mean standstill or reaction. Continuity means development. Every period changes, as the body does, from day to day. Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque were, in all their phases, constantly developing. But these changes have to be rooted in other than purely materialistic considerations. They have to grow from other sources: the medieval Kingdom of God, the absolutism of the seventeenth century, a political faith, or even an artistic credo. ‘Every day something new’ reveals helplessness combined with lack of inner conviction, and always eager to flatter the worst instincts of the public, it means change for change’s sake, change for the sake of high-pressure salesmanship. It means demoralization. Public taste today is formedmainlyby publicity and the articles of daily use. By these it can be educated or corrupted. Responsible are the art directors in industry and advertising firms and the buyers for department 5 & 10 (cent stores) and drugstores, who act as censors and level down the designs of the artists to their own conception of the public’s taste. They are supposed to feed the assembly line in the speediest way and as a safeguard they judge the public taste lower than it really is. Their educational responsibility seems to have no claim to existence. Who still believes that art, modern art, has to be defined as a mere luxury or something far-away, remote from real life, unworthy of the respect of a ‘doer’, had better not touch this book. Gyorgy Kepes, as we all do, regards art as indispensable to a full life. His main object is to demonstrate just how the optical revolution — around 1910 — formed our present-day conception of space and the visual approach to reality. He shows how this development was differentiated in many ways of expression, from cubism to surrealism, forming together the multi-faced image of this period. He shows why modern artists had to reject a slavish obedience to the portrayal of objects, why they hated the trompe-l’oeuil. The different movements have a common denominator: a new spatial conception. They are not outmoded when they become silent. Each of them is living in us. Step by step, Kepes follows the liberation of the plastic elements: lines, planes, and colors, and the creation of a world of forms of our own. The spatial conception interconnects the meaning fragments and binds them together just as in another period perspective did when it used a single station point for naturalistic representation. We have to note the great care with which Gyorgy Kepes shows the contact of modern art with reality, and how paintings which, at first sight, seem remote from life, are extracted from its very bloodstream. This book seems to be addressed to the young generation which must rebuild America. This rebuilding will be realized only in future years. But the book could have an immediate influence if those who command public taste in the many fields of present-day life would take time on a quiet week-end to read its pages and think it over. New York, June 12, 1944.”
  2. In the Stearn interview, McLuhan specifies that “Giedion influenced me profoundly. (His) Space, Time and Architecture (1941) was one of the great events of my lifetime. Giedion gave us a language for tackling the structural world of architecture and artifacts of many kinds in the ordinary environment. (…) Giedion began to study the environment as a structural, artistic work — he saw language in streets, buildings, the very texture of form.”
  3. See McLuhan, Hayakawa and Allison.
  4. See Hayakawa and Alfred Korzybski.
  5. James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial, 1953: the “age-old adequation of mind and things (…) the drama of the endless adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world. The drama of cognition itself.”
  6. Like McLuhan, Hayakawa was greatly influenced by the Cambridge English school. Language in Action lists the works of Richards, Ogden and Queenie Leavis as supplying important contributions to a new theory of language and meaning.
  7. This insight was central to the work and teaching of Henry Wright at the University of Manitoba.  McLuhan certainly studied with Wright and ‘heavily annotated’ Wright’s 1925 The Moral Standards of Democracy which is still to be found in his library preserved at UT. At a guess, Hayakawa also studied with Wright during his years at Manitoba, 1925-1927. The UM Registrar has been asked to confirm this, but will not release the information due to privacy law.

Relativity and topology

To be aware of the past as presently useful and of much of the present as already irrelevant — this is to be a contemporary mind. And this mode of awareness is itself based on an analogy derived from relativity physics (…) whose usefulness to a society faced with the problems of world government and international community is as immense as it is as yet unexploited. (McLuhan’s Proposal to Robert Hutchins, 1947)

…”the meaning of meaning” is a relationship: a figure-ground process of perpetual change. The input of data must enter a ground or field or surround of relations that are transformed by the intruder, even as the input is also transformed. Knowledge, old or new, is always a figure that is undergoing perpetual change. (Take Today, 86)

McLuhan’s work applies relativity theory to all human experience to achieve a topological formulation of the entire experiential domain.

In his dialogue, L’Idée Fixe (1932), Valéry considers Einstein‘s relativity as the “physics of physics” or the geometry of geometries:

– it’s a question of disengaging what would be left of our physics if one were to make the observations (…) moving ad libitum in the Universe. It’s supposed that something, some residue of our laws — which were discovered and formulated under local conditions — would subsist in spite of the [arbitrary] motion of the observer (…) Relativity Theory wants to free him completely from all appearances due to local determinants of his measurements and to his [associated] state of motion. This Physics of Physics was conceived and constructed by Einstein as a Geometry (…) [To] take a crude illustration, imagine a flat sheet of rubber (…) Draw a figure on the sheet [like a triangle](…) Your triangle has [certain] properties (…) Now fold your elastic sheet, twist it, pull it any which way. What’s left of those properties? (…) Something remains. If you’d built a geometry on the plane triangle you [first] drew, and if  you make another [geometry] that corresponds to one deformation of the rubber, and another to another—
 What a lot of geometries!
– It’s not absurd to look for axioms or propositions that—
– That won’t be subject to deformation.
– That’s it.1

Einstein himself is cited in Laws of Media from his foreword to Max Jammer’s Concepts of Space:

The victory over the concept of absolute space or over that of the inertial system [fixed frame of reference] became possible only because the concept of the material object was gradually replaced as the fundamental concept of physics by that of the field. Under the influence of the ideas of Faraday and Maxwell the notion developed that the whole of physical reality could perhaps be represented as a field whose components depend on four space-time parameters. If the laws of this field are in general covariant, that is, are not dependent on a particular choice of coordinate system, then the introduction of an independent (absolute) space is no longer necessary. That which constitutes the spatial character of reality is then simply the four-dimensionality of the field.2

Each of the geometries from Valéry’s example might be expressed as a particular application of three-dimensional covariance where, for example, the total surface area of the rubber sheet would be constant but the parameters constituting that total would all be variable.3 Or, rather, co-variable! Stretching the sheet would increase its length but decrease its width and thickness such that its total surface area would remain constant. The different geometries resulting from its deformation could then be defined as expressions of this covariance, as could any particular property of any of its particular geometries.

For Einstein, space-time itself is such a flexible matrix of four-dimensional covariance: an alteration in time results in a corresponding warping of the dimensions of space.  Physical laws can then be reformulated not in relation to “an independent (absolute) space” and time, but in relation to that “four-dimensionality” itself — a “four-dimensionality” which, as the generator of all space-time possibilities, “constitutes the spatial character of reality”.4

McLuhan imagined himself as witnessing the strange spectacle of the generative ground of all the modalities of experience, like Alice:

Lewis Carroll looked through the looking-glass and found a kind of [hyper] space-time which is the normal mode of electronic man. Before Einstein, Carroll had already entered that very sophisticated universe of Einstein. Each moment, for Carroll, had its own space and its own time. (Gerald Stearn Interview)

In comparable fashion to Einstein, McLuhan wanted to know what “won’t be subject to deformation” across all the possible modalities of experience. The goal was to formulate something like experientiality — what it is that “constitutes the [non-deformative] character of [experiential] reality”.

McLuhan’s suggestion was that experience is the product of the co-variance of the visual and the acoustic senses as modulated by touch. “Common sense” or “synesthesia” or the “sensorium” remains constant, but its component “senses” co-vary.  Stretch or twist or amplify one of them and the others change proportionately with it.

As he neared the end of his life, McLuhan became anxious to stress this aspect of his thinking. Apparently he felt that failure to understand it was one of the factors in the general failure to understand him. It is emphasized repeatedly in the posthumous Global Village:

  • In our desire to illumine the differences between visual and acoustic space, we have undoubtedly given a false impression: and that is that the normal brain, in its everyday functioning, cannot reconcile the apparently contradictory perceptions of both sides of the mind. (GV 48)
  • every artifact of man mirrors the shift between these two modes. (GV x)
  • within each of man’s inventions (extensions of himself) left- and right-hemisphere modes of thought struggle for dominance (GV 102)
  • No matter how extreme the dominance of either hemisphere in a particular culture, there is always some degree of interplay between the hemispheres… (GV 62)
  • visual and acoustic space are always present in any human situation, even if Western civilization has (…) tamped down our awareness of the acoustic. (GV 55)5

It is imperative to note that the senses and hemispheres are used here in a technical sense that has little to do with our usual notions of them.6 Hence it is that McLuhan did not consider television a visual medium, but he did consider symphonic music to be visual. A great many critics have laughed up their sleeves at this, of course.  But consider Einstein’s use of ‘space’ and ‘time’. For him, these are not, or are not only, what we see when we look out a window or check our watch. Instead, ‘space’ and ‘time’ for Einstein are co-variable factors in an equation constituting dimensionality. Our usual experience of them is simply one modality of that equation.

So with McLuhan.  The visual and the acoustic and touch (to which he assimilated smell and taste) are not captured in our usual experience of them (although it is important to note that ‘our usual experience’ is very far from being the singular, clear, matter it may thoughlessly be taken to be). Instead, these are co-variable factors in an equation constituting experientiality, ‘Our usual experience’ must be understood in terms of it, not it in terms ‘our usual experience’. As Minkowski specified in his Space and Time lecture from 1908: “three-dimensional geometry becomes a chapter of four-dimensional physics”.7

McLuhan could therefore have reformulated the passage from Einstein’s foreword to Jammer’s Concepts of Space as follows:

The victory over the concept of absolute experience or over that of the inertial system became possible only because the concept of the experiential object was gradually replaced as the fundamental concept of psychology and sociology by that of the field. Under the influence of the ideas of Faraday and Maxwell and Einstein the notion developed that the whole of experiential reality could perhaps be represented as a field whose components depend on three sensual parameters. If the laws of this field are in general covariant, that is, are not dependent on a particular choice of coordinate system, then the introduction of an independent (absolute) experiential space is no longer necessary. That which constitutes the character of reality in experience is then simply the three-dimensionality of the field.

McLuhan seems to have come clear about these ideas through the writing of Project in Understanding New Media in 1959 and 1960.  Here he is writing to Walter Ong on November 18, 1961 (Letters, 280-281):

My theory is only acceptable to Thomists for whom consciousness as analogical proportion among the senses from moment to moment is quite easy to grasp. But print technology actually smashes that analogical awareness in society and the individual. (…) I can now explain these matters very much better than I did in [The Project in] Understanding [New] Media. But no more evidence is needed of the hypnotic aspect of all media in human history than the absence of awareness among those who underwent [subjection to] them. Each is invested with a cloak of invisibility. I am naturally eager to attract many people to such study as this and see in it the hope of some rational consensus for our externalized senses. A sensus communis for external senses is what I’m trying to build.

With the terms “externalized senses” and “external senses” McLuhan was referring not only to the devices we have learned to build to enhance or mimic human senses like the telephone and television.  He was also indicating that just what the “senses” are is a question and not at all something obvious. The “external senses” are “external” to us not only in a spatial sense; they are  also “external” to our usual ‘sense’ of them. So, as treated above, McLuhan’s “hope of some rational consensus for our externalized senses”, aka of a new sort of exterior “sensus communis”, was predicated upon on the revision of the visual and the acoustic and touch in their covariance.  And the resulting operating system, although it would recall the ‘natural’ physiological sensorium of the individual human being, would be neither individual nor autonomic. Instead, like any hard science (but built just as much on the “orchestral” principles of art), it would turn on an evolving “consensus” achieved through open investigation and would be both social and conscious.8 

Now McLuhan and Ong had known each other for twenty years by this time, ever since McLuhan had directed Ong’s M.A. thesis on Hopkins at St Louis University and suggested to Ong the topic for his later PhD work at Harvard on Ramus.  But McLuhan’s relationship with Bernie Muller-Thym at SLU was even older than this and was more profound both on a personal level (Muller-Thym was the best man for McLuhan’s wedding and the Godfather of both Eric and Mary) and on an intellectual one (for here McLuhan was the student of Muller-Thym’s knowledge rather than Ong’s teacher of his own). And it was with Muller-Thym that McLuhan had deeply considered the analogical proportion among the senses in Aristotle and Thomas.9 So it was to Muller-Thym that McLuhan owed the announcement of his breakthrough to topology:

The break-through in media study has come at last, and it can be stated as the principle of complementarity10: that the structural impact of any situation is subjectively completed as to the cycle of the senses. (McLuhan to Muller-Thym, February 19th, 1960, cited by Gordon, 313.)11

Again to Muller-Thym a few weeks later:

any [increased] intensity in the (…) input (ie. High Definition) completely alters the over-all structure [of the sensorium] as compared with Low Definition. So that, for example, manuscript is low definition for the visual part of writing and the speech within the code, as it were, is in relatively high definition. So that a manuscript is read aloud and in depth. The same materials put in print have the visual (…)  in high definition and the speech goes into very low definition and print is read silently… (McLuhan to Muller-Thym, March 7, 1960, Letters, 262)12

What may be seen in these letters to Muller-Thym is the dis-covery of the “complementarity” or covarience of the senses and of media (conceived as promoting, or even instantiating, specific structural patterns of the senses). Change in any one sense “completely alters the over-all structure” (aka, the sensus communis or sensorium) in a rule-governed way. High Definition and Low Definition of any sense are correlated like a string pulled back and forth around a nail such that the more string on one side of the nail, the less on the other.

The sensory system, in turn, may be imagined on the same model but with multiple strings and multiple nails. Imagine that two strings of equal length are joined together by a knot.  Then imagine 4 nails hammered into a board in a row. Imagine that the knotted string is put over the first nail, under the second, over the third and under the fourth again.  Imagine that the knot joining the two strings is located between the second and third nails and that these nails constitute a kind of gate preventing the knot of the string from being pulled beyond the second nail in the direction of the first or beyond the third nail in the direction of the fourth. McLuhan’s suggestion is simply that the two strings may be taken as the visual and the acoustic senses and touch or tactility as their knot with its gates. The more the string is pulled in the visual direction, the less there will be of it in the acoustic one. McLuhan’s further hypothesis is that the ratio of these two lengths is the atomic structure of experience. But since these correlated distances may simply be read by the place of the knot within the space of the gates (where its location determines the two lengths outwards beyond the second and third nails respectively), experience may be said to be fundamentally structured by those points that the knot can assume along the distance between the second and third nails.  (See here for further elaboration.)

The fundamental importance of such a coded definition of experientiality for McLuhan was that it would allow communication between cultures and the formulation of common values between them without the assertion of some purported absolute experience or accepted inertial system. He could see, on the one hand, that modern media force such relativity on us:

Total global coverage in space, instantaneity in time. Those are the two basic characters that I can detect in a (…) mass medium. (Culture Without Literacy, Explorations 1, 1953)

It is the relativity of all space and all time resulting from the simultaneous co-presence (“allatonceness”) of ‘mass media’ (plural) in their multiple “total global coverage” that forces our recognition of a

need to discover means for translating the experience of one medium or one culture into another, of translating Confucius into Western terms and Kant into Eastern terms. Of seeing our old literary culture in the new plastic terms in order to enable it to become a constitutive part of the new culture created by the orchestral voices and gestures of new media.13 Of seeing that modern physics and painting and poetry speak a common language and of acquiring that language at once in order that our world may possess consciously the coherence that it really has in latency, and which for lack of our recognition has created not new orchestral harmonies but mere noise.14 (Ibid.)

Such a “means for translating” what McLuhan elsewhere called “the entire world of language and consciousness”15 could naturally not be achieved within a single modality of experience. And besides:

Already in the sciences there is recognition of the need for a unified field theory which would enable scientists to use one continuous set of terms by way of relating the various scientific universes. (Ibid.)

Only in an analogous “unified field theory” of all human experience could the confounding situation be addressed in which

Are we not still inclined to suppose that our former objectives are still valid even though all of our assumptions and parameters have changed?  (NAEB Project, 1960, ”Materials Developed By Project”)

  1. Translated by Eleanor Wolff. Her abbreviated translation of L’Idée Fixe appeared originally in Meja, Number Two (Autumn 1946), edited by Herbert Steiner. It was reprinted in ETC, ed S.I. Hayakawa, 6:1, 1948. For Hayakawa as a member of the Winnipeg School of Communication see here.
  2. Laws of Media, 41
  3. This example is greatly simplified. The topology of the rubber sheet would. of course, be much more complicated, as would its geometries, once it were considered as, eg, tightly twisted.
  4. ‘Constitutes’ here should be taken in a verbal sense as ‘generates’, not, or not primarily, in the sense of ‘is the stuff of’.
  5. Compare already in 1955: “In examining the historical development of the media of communication it is necessary to consider this type of evolution that occurs in a single visual area, because it is inseparably linked to the auditory and other senses. The peculiarity of language, as Paul Elmer More observed, is that it is the medium ‘by which we undertake to convey experience completely and directly rather than as divided and refracted by a particular organ of perception’ (‘The Drift of Romanticism’, 1913). Words are an orchestral harmony of touch, taste, sight, sound and kinaesthesia” (‘A Historical Approach to the Media’). Compare McLuhan’s close friend and co-author, Barry Nevitt: “whatever the eye receives is modified by the ear” in ‘Pipeline or Grapevine: The Changing Communications Environment’, Technology and CultureVolume 21, 224, 1980. For “orchestral harmony” see note #14 below.
  6. Cf the first sentence of ‘Myth and Mass Media‘ from 1959: “When an attempt is made to bring the relatively articulated concept of “myth” into the area of “media”, a concept to which surprisingly little attention has been given in the past, it is necessary to reconsider both “myth” and “media” in order to get at relevant data.” This follows immediately from ‘the medium is the message’ since every object, including “myth” and “media”, is only what it is taken to be via some medium. To take that medium into consideration is to “reconsider” its contents.
  7. Raum und Zeit:  “Die dreidimensionale Geometrie wird ein Kapitel der vierdimensionalen Physik.”
  8. McLuhan in The Medium Is the Massage: “Joyce could see no advantage in our remaining locked up in each cultural cycle as in a trance or dream. He discovered the means of living simultaneously in all cultural modes while quite conscious” (120). See note #15 below.
  9. In 1940 Muller-Thym published ‘Common Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure Sensibility’ in The Thomist, 2:315–343. Long before this, at Cambridge, McLuhan had been exposed in the work of I.A. Richards to the idea that the sensorium might supply the structural key for the analysis of language and meaning. (See the concluding ‘Synaesthesis’ chapters of The Foundations Of Aesthetics by Richards, Ogden and Wood from 1921.) And in the work of Maritain, Gilson and Phelan, he had read brief theological treatments of the notion. But with Muller-Thym and his ‘Order of Pure Sensibility’ paper, McLuhan had the unique opportunity to work on this topic with a person who was at once his closest personal friend and one of the leading experts in the world on its history and implications.
  10. ‘Complementarity’, ‘hendiadys’, ‘paradox’, etc do not name particular sorts of relation for McLuhan; they name the topological “principle” that all ‘poles’ exist in a dynamic matrix constituted by co-variance
  11.  A 25 January 1960 letter to Harry Skornia (the president of the NAEB who had secured the US Dept of Education grant for McLuhan’s study of new media, with whom McLuhan was constantly in touch during the study), described the “cycle of the senses” as follows: “The last few days have seen a major breakthrough in media study. Working with the fact that each medium embodies one or more of the human senses, it struck me that we are impelled in perceiving each medium to complete the scale or spectrum of our sensorium. So that, radio impels us to provide a visual world moment by moment, and photography, which is so adequate in visual terms, compels us to complete the tactual and kinesthetic part of the sensorium. Thus the degree of sensuous completion is one way in which the lines of force in any medium are structured.” (Gordon, Escape into Understanding, 399-400, n99)
  12. Emphasis added; the insertions in square brackets have also been added, but the insertion in round brackets stems from McLuhan.
  13. Andrew Chrystall cites from an unpublished and untitled essay preserved in the Ottawa archive beginning “My last three books”: “knowing, as we do, the constituents of both civilized and tribal cultures, of both private, rational, individual and corporate, mystical, tribal man, it becomes our privilege and responsibility alike to mix and harmonize these factors even as the Greeks chose to alter the Dionysian fury with Apollonian detachment.” (Thesis, 187-188)
  14. Of course, “mere noise” is itself an experience and no “unified field theory” of experience is possible that would ignore or exclude it. Indeed, the ability to demonstrate the relative coherence of the experience(s) of “mere noise” is the single most important test such a theory would have to meet. In this way, the prospect of a “unified field theory” would signal, like a cock crow, the coming of light again to the world’s night. McLuhan’s later friendship with artists like Sorel Etrog and John Cage might be considered in this context. And readings of McLuhan, like that (or those) of Arthur Kroker (which are certainly among the best we have) would need to be investigated with the question: has “victory over the concept of absolute experience” been abdicated here in favor of an uncorrelated  series of unaccountably privileged perspectives? For McLuhan on noise, see his letter to Tyrwhitt, December 23, 1960 (Letters 278): “Noise is of course just any kind of irrelevance, and yet irrelevance is a needed margin for any kind of attention or center. In the field of attention, a center without a margin is the formula for hypnosis, stasis and paralysis.” The figure of “not new orchestral harmonies but mere noise” was a tip of the hat to Giedeon’s Space, Time and Architecture: “our culture is like an orchestra where the instruments lie ready tuned, but where every musician is cut off from his follows by a soundproof wall.” 
  15. “Joyce encompasses Einstein but extends his (…) formula to the entire world of language and consciousness” (‘New Media as Political Forms’, Explorations 3, 1954). See note #8 above.

W.O. Mitchell on Rupert Lodge

I wish merely to introduce myself as one of the products of some of the leanest years of the Manitoba English Department. The last year was somewhat relieved by the presence of Dr. Wheeler, but I had directed my energies to philosophy, and did my best work for Professor Lodge. (McLuhan to E.K Brown1, December 12, 1935, Letters 79)

Rupert C Lodge was co-head with Henry Wilkes Wright of the Philosophy and Psychology Department during McLuhan’s time at the University of Manitoba. Marchand (34) reports that Lodge’s recommendation of McLuhan to Cambridge called him his “most outstanding” student.

W.O. Mitchell took courses from Lodge at this same time2 and was greatly taken by him. As described in Mitchell’s son’s biography of him:

Bill (…) had begun to enjoy philosophy and his arts courses more than the sciences. This was largely due to Professor Rupert Lodge, who taught him philosophy. (…) Lodge made a lasting impression on him and was instrumental in altering his career direction [from medicine]: “It was Lodge who introduced me to the excitement of the inquiring mind, who helped me to discover that, philosophically speaking,  I am an idealist.” Lodge was a Platonist who (…) told his students that they had to choose a stance, that they could not (…) adopt more than one [fundamental] philosophy [at a time]: “He [told] them that there were three broad ways to approach life in this universe, that they had their choice of the materialist, the phenomenalist, [and] the [Platonic] realist” (…) [Mitchell] described  himself as a “Lodge boy” in the larger sense of having adopted a passion for philosophical inquiry. (…)
Lodge had definite views on the role of the university in educating the imagination. In the fall of 1931 various people debated in the editorial pages of the Winnipeg Free Press whether or not science and literature were “parallel functions of the human mind”.
Some argued that science was a body of fact to which new information can be added as acquired, but that literature was something else and that new writing did not make older authors obsolete. Another debater argued that literature courses at the university should not deal with older writers but with new writers in the way that science deals only with the newest ideas. Lodge disputed that science was simply a body of fact: “Science thus represents an adventure of the spirit, quite as much as poetry, and has quite as much power to thrill the imagination and liberate the mind from instinctive and local prejudices.” He believed that a student of science should study the history of science in order to “acquire background and culture”.  He did not believe that either Science or Arts departments at universities should turn out technicians, but that “the primary function of our university departments is, surely, to enlighten and liberate the minds of our students so that, whatever their professions or interests in after-life, they may be able to bring an educated and cultured outlook to bear on their problems”.3

Lodge’s contribution to the Free Press debate was titled ‘Science and Literature’ and appeared in the Manitoba Free Press, Oct 10, 1931, p11.4 McLuhan would naturally have followed this debate and doubtless discussed it with his father and with friends of his (and future UT colleagues) like Tom Easterbrook and Carlton Williams.

 

  1. At this time E.K Brown was the head of the English Department at UM, having come from UT as McLuhan was leaving Winnipeg for Cambridge.  Brown stayed only 2 years at UM before returning to UT. Later, he was the chair of the English Department at Chicago when McLuhan was attempting to land a job there in the middle 1940’s. But McLuhan does not seem to have contacted him then — he was apparently interested in the sort of position at Chicago that only Robert Hutchins and John Nef might have provided.  See Marchand 98-99.
  2. Mitchell attended UM from 1931 to 1934 and his biographers report that he took his first course with Lodge in 1933 and his second in 1934. McLuhan worked with Lodge in this same 1931-1934 period.
  3. The Life of W.O Mitchell 1, 1914-1947, Mitchell and Mitchell, 1999, 161-163. Mitchell’s recollections of Lodge in 1933-1934 were recorded more than 60 years later in 1996, just two years before Mitchell’s death. It is understandable that they were a tad hazy.  But it is also impressive that he remembered Lodge this fondly after such a long time.
  4. Some weeks later, on December 2, 1931, The Manitoba Free Press was renamed as The Winnipeg Free Press.

W.O. Mitchell and the quest to “embody insight”

W.O Mitchell (1914–1998) was at the University of Manitoba, a couple years behind McLuhan, from 1931 to 1934.  The two published together in the short-lived UM literary review ‘toba1 and certainly knew each other at the time.2 Later, Mitchell became one of the few Canadians in McLuhan’s generation whose fame as a writer and observer of the social scene rivaled his, at least in Canada.

Mitchell characterized his writing method as follows:

There is a special kind of truth that is the writer’s truth. It is not so much so much a scientific truth or an economic truth, a sociological or a political one, as it is a human truth. There are actually certain of these human truths which can be communicated in no other way than through the creation of characters, their conflict and their success or failure, because only after the reader has identified himself with them can he receive the particular truths to be communicated. . . . The artist must manipulate the characters, their sights, sounds, tastes, feelings, wonderings, hopes, disappointments in such a way that they embody insight into [particular sorts of] order and significance.3

Elsie McLuhan could easily have maintained the exact same position with the change of only a few words:

There is a special kind of truth that is the elocutionist’s truth.  It is not so much so much a scientific truth or an economic truth, a sociological or a political one, as it is a human truth. There are actually certain of these human truths which can be communicated in no other way than through the creation of characters, their conflict and their success or failure, because only after the listener has identified himself with them can he receive the particular truths to be communicated. . . . The performer must manipulate the characters, their sights, sounds, tastes, feelings, wonderings, hopes, disappointments in such a way that they embody insight into [particular sorts of] order and significance.

Elsie in particular, and by extension all artists in general, supplied McLuhan with what he called in ‘Canadian Poetry’ (1965) “equations for inner mental states”.  The idea (termed by McLuhan “the drama of cognition itself”) is that any mental state results from a (usually unconscious) selection of one “adequation of mind and things”, one “adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world”, from among the rainbow array of them available to us simply  as human beings — an array exposed and illuminated in modern times by literary criticism, anthropology, linguistics, psychology, sociology, etc, as well as by exploration, world commerce and entertainment.4

In an analogous way, language may be conceived as the selection of certain sounds and certain grammatical forms from the array of all possible sounds and forms. In neither case does this ‘action’ take place consciously or in linear clocktime or as performed by an identifiable ‘manager’.  Still, it is natural to humans not only to put onmental states”, but also to take them off and to try on others. This is what happens when a child first learns to speak and what happens continually throughout life (such that McLuhan calls the action “endless”5). But only artists take up (and down) this somersault action as a vocation and only some of them realize what they are up (and down) to.

Everything depends, for McLuhan, on our learning, at last, what it means to be a human being as a maker of culture and value through “the endless adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world”.  But this does not at all mean that humans do this ex nihilo, like little gods (as Nietzsche definitively demonstrated and as Beckett reiterated). Instead, as can be seen only when “the endless adjustment” is at last itself adjusted to reveal what is to be revealed, the possibility and conditions of such making are given.

It is the uttermost gift of this giving that it itself may be overlooked and for the most part is overlooked — “true strength is that strength which, mobile as it is hidden, concentrates on the work without being outwardly visible6. But it is equally an aspect of its uttering-outering that it may be seen!

Lps. The keys to. Given! (Finnegans Wake 628.15)

The giving is like a true kiss/kees7/keys in which there is no ‘I’, so the kiss/keys is given by ‘Lps’ which lack an ‘i’. The absence of the ‘I’ in the kiss/keys of giving is what enables it to express itself “without being outwardly visible”; but also, exactly because this loosing has no ‘I’ and therefore no withholding, this is just as much what enables it to express itself also as “outwardly visible“!

Since this invisible visibility or visible invisibility is “true strength“, it stamps all being with its form.  So it is that humans spend half of life in the “nightworld” of sleep “abced” to themselves; and even when they are supposedly awake they are under-going “the endless adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world” by taking the labyrinthine way to and among the diverse possibilities sleeping in their soul.  

It is a nightworld and, literally, as Joyce reiterates, is “abcedminded”.8

McLuhan was given a model of this synchronic up/down9 action of the human soul first of all by his mother, Elsie. What she presented on the stage, as “a one woman theater” who “played all the parts”, he came to see as what everybody does all the time.10 Through a series of mentors — Rupert Lodge, I.A. Richards, Wyndham Lewis, Étienne Gilson, Sigfried Giedion, T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Harold Innis, and James Joyce — he was introduced to ways along which he, practicing this same action himself, sought to articulate it for himself and for others.

  1. McLuhan published in the first two issues of ‘toba in late 1933 and early 1934 (1:1 and 1:2); Mitchell published in these same two issues plus the next one (1:3) later in the spring of 1934. All of Mitchell’s pieces (together comprising ‘Panacea for Panhandlers’) reported on his summer trip to Europe in 1933, while one of McLuhan’s (‘A Grand Tour for $300‘) described his trip to England with Tom Easterbrook in 1932. So McLuhan and Mitchell appeared together in the same issue of ‘toba twice, and in one of these wrote on the same topic.  McLuhan’s other piece in ‘toba was ‘Heavens Above‘.
  2. Mitchell worked in Toronto from 1948 until 1951 (at a time when both he and McLuhan were doing side-work for the CBC) and was later a writer in residence in the English department at the University of Toronto for 6 months in 1973-1974.  Indeed, he was very often in Toronto working for the CBC and for Maclean’s, accepting awards, and giving speeches and lectures. McLuhan must have known about Mitchell’s frequent presence in Toronto, especially (of course) when Mitchell worked in the UT English department. Just as Mitchell must have known of McLuhan’s presence in the department. But there does not seem to be any record of their meeting there. Perhaps McLuhan didn’t know that W.O. Mitchell was the Billy Mitchell he knew from Winnipeg. Or, more likely, there may have been some kind of issue between the two. For one thing, both required most of the oxygen in a room and may not have been able to breathe satisfactorily in the presence of the other.
  3. ‘Grace and Illusion’, in The English Teacher 3.2, June 1963, cited in The Life of W.O Mitchell 1, 1914-1947, Mitchell and Mitchell, 1999, 315.
  4. All quotations in this sentence are taken from McLuhan’s ‘James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial’, 1953.
  5. Ibid.
  6. I Ching, cited by McLuhan, Take Today 22.
  7. ‘Kees’ is the pronunciation of ‘kiss’ in much of Ireland and Scotland.
  8. ‘James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial’, 1953.
  9. Heraclitus, ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω DK B60. This fragment is one of the epigrams for Eliot’s Four Quartets.
  10. See The put-on.

The put-on

My mother, by the way, was a one woman theater. She travelled from coast to coast from year to year putting on plays and acts. Single. Yes, she put on whole plays single.  Played all the parts, yes. (McLuhan interview with Nina Sutton, 1975)1

McLuhan the entertainer is in fine form — changing viewpoints as often as a quick-change artist changes hats. (‘Change itself has become the main staple.’) McLuhan is an actor — at least that’s my working hypothesis. This is not to devalue philosophy but to raise the currency of acting. In a day when understanding roles is essential and when one must fill several roles oneself, the art of the actor becomes the art of living. (Mavor Moore, 1972)2

A report from The Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 1929-10-18 (Page 4):

FINE RECITAL GIVEN BY NOTED ELOCUTIONIST

Impersonating over twenty characters of varied nationalities, times and places, Elsie McLuhan, reader and impersonator, at Greenwood United Church Wednesday night provided a large audience with a most interesting entertainment.

Comedy predominated throughout [one of her presentations,] the one act play, “The Florist Shop“. Six distinct characterizations were given, the Jewish proprietor; the gum-chewing Henry; the spinster Miss Wells; her fifteen year fiance Mr Jackson, who added a bit of the hurrying-up process; and Maud, the romantic saleslady, who was instrumental in bringing about the usual happy ending.

Elsie McLuhan publicized herself as an “impersonator”.3

This was a skill she demonstrated in her one-woman shows both by playing multiple characters in sketches like The Florist Shop, but also in the readings she did from high and low literature from “varied nationalities, times and places” (as the Trib report has it).  The elocutionist aim was to enunciate the particular point of view evidenced in a poem (or of any literary composition) like the nationality and period of the author or the individual circumstances displayed in different works. For McLuhan this meant that an elocutionist had to dis-cover, and find the means to present, the sort of effect an author intended via the language he or she had “put on” — as a “put-on”.

The content of these readings was not some message which a poem or story clothed in fancy language for some reason and which an elocutionist then would then ‘read out’ like a living teletype machine.4 Far rather, the content, as McLuhan would later insist, was the user. The particular language of a poem was used, or “put on”, by the poet in “the presentation of self”5 in his or her particular individual and social circumstances — including an estimate of the possible audience and of the means to communicate with it. And then this first level use by the poet or other producer could be used again by an elocutionist in presenting such poems in her “presentation of self” to audiences of users with their complex “assumptions” and “investments”. All were “put ons”.

In sum, Elsie specialized in “putting on” different points of view in a situation where success depended entirely on a related ability to “put on” the role of “impersonator” before people who had “put on” the role of an audience. There is a house of mirrors effect here where points of view are reflected within points of view reflected within yet further points of view.6

McLuhan’s whole career may usefully (not to say exclusively) be understood as the attempt to understand this phantasmagoria — an attempt he himself often likened to Alice’s adventures behind the looking glass and to Joyce’s adventures in that other literary isolate, Finnegans Wake.

This interest in the “put on” and its modalities was already reflected in McLuhan’s M.A. thesis on George Meredith written in 1933-1934:

The poet plants himself upon his instincts and permits his temperament sovereign sway. And he has quite as much right to do this as the philosopher has to trust his thought processes. In his table talk, Coleridge noted that all men (…) are born either Platonists or Aristotelians. There are similarly, in all times and places, definite types of temperament displaying consistency of conformation. The literary or artistic expression of such temperaments has properly the same validity as has the philosophizing of the Idealist and the Realist.7

“The (…) expression of such temperaments”, of such “definite types of temperament displaying consistency of conformation”, is just how McLuhan would come to study literature and, indeed, all experience, individual and social. “The medium is the message.”

From very early on in McLuhan’s life, Elsie’s vocation must have been a topic of intense discussion and, indeed, of controversy within the family. As McLuhan grew, and particularly after he changed his university concentration from Engineering to English at age 18 in 1929, this interest grew with him and exchanges about it on a theoretical level became common between mother and son.  These were conducted orally when both of them were in Winnipeg, and by letter when Elsie was on tour and especially after she left for Toronto in 1933 and McLuhan began his studies in Cambridge in 1934. Indeed, their correspondence in Letters broaches the subject of elocution over and over again. In a letter to his family from Cambridge on November 3, 1934, for example, McLuhan offered Elsie this advice about a talk she was to give to the English-Speaking Union in Toronto:

I would elaborate the theme that elocution has suffered, more than singing, from its seeming proximity to common parlance. Point out that excellence therein is as far removed from the flowers and intonations of rhetorical oratory (with its narrow compass of tones and showy emphasis) as is excellence in poetry (with its organic relation or interdependence between content and tone and material patterns). (Letters, 34)

Such “interdependence between content and tone and material pattern” was just what Elsie strove to present in her readings and would become the basis of McLuhan’s understanding of literature as a wildly heterogeneous collection of “voices”. With his colleague Robert Schoeck, McLuhan would later, three decades in the future, edit a two volume anthology, Voices of Literature (1964/5).

Already in his first month in Cambridge , McLuhan had reported back to his family:

I heard Mr [Mansfield] Forbes [1889-1935] of Clare this morning who lectures (…) on “metre rhyme, rhythm, and the reading (aloud) of poetry with spec. ref. to the ages of Pope and Wordsworth.” It was the biggest intellectual treat of my life. (…) There is great variety in tone and accent among lecturers here [in their ordinary conversation, yet] (…) all of them try to read poetry (…) without any transitions of manner to suit the poem (…) This standard way (….) lags miles behind your [technique of variable elocutionist] interpretation, Mother, and I simply must get a background of [such] technique [myself]. (Oct 16, 1934, Letters 24-25.)8

Again some months later (in another letter to his family from February 7, 1935, Letters 58):

I spoke about Ruth Draper to Forbes (…) her ability to hold an audience for 2 hours he considered very remarkable (…) Forbes was impressed by Ruth D’s capacity to present “two or three different people” (consecutively) …

The duration of McLuhan’s interest in this topic, his continuing intense preoccupation with it, may be seen from a typical passage, almost 40 years later, in Take Today:

When we read a poem or listen to a song, we put on an extension of our language. Such extensions bring into relation to us the experiences of multitudes of lives. These experiences can be the means of enlarging or sharpening and enriching our private perceptions. However, when we “put on” an entire service environment, such as radio or TV, something more seems to happen than in the case of the individual means provided by a poem or song or book. There is a strange character in electric media, which we encounter even in the daily newspaper. The daily paper says in effect: “This is your world for today.” It has been pointed out that by some miracle, just enough happens every day to exactly fill all the newspapers. It is the simultaneity of news coverage that makes possible this mosaic experience of the world for today. No connections are sought or found amidst the innumerable items. Everything is unified under date line rather than story line. (146)

“Relation to (…) the experiences of multitudes of lives” (often put by McLuhan using Yeats’ phrase, “the experience of multitude”) occurs with language not only because language is the incalculably complex product of untold generations.  It also occurs with language because the choice of words requires at the same time a choice of persona: just who will speak the words (which includes an assessment of whom they will be spoken to) is one of the most important considerations in the decision of how to say what is to be said. Some persona must be “put on” both in speaking and in understanding (with each of these experiencing a ping-pong feed-back effect from and to the other).

Now the array of the personae (or points of view) who might be “put on” is just what McLuhan called ‘the unconscious’. And just as a language may be considered as a synchronic pattern of choice of significant sound and significant grammatical marker (among all possible sounds and all possible markers), so may experience be considered in terms of a synchronic pattern of choice of point of view (or human type) among all possible human types. As McLuhan put it already in his MA thesis (in the passage given above):

Coleridge noted that all men (…) are born either Platonists or Aristotelians. There are similarly, in all times and places, definite types of temperament displaying consistency of conformation. The literary or artistic expression of such temperaments has properly the same validity as has the philosophizing of the Idealist and the Realist.

These types and temperaments have to do with the “organization of experience”.9 But, of course, also the experience or understanding of the “organization of experience” must itself be organized in some fashion (aka, according to some further type).  On the one hand, this again introduces the house of mirrors effect where any point of view is reflected endlessly in further points of view. And this endless mirroring, which seems never to come into contact with the objectively real or even with its own subjective reality, is, in turn, exactly what led Nietzsche to nihilism.10 On the other hand, however, these threats to the integrity of experience, which promise to undermine it from within, also supply proof-stones for its rigorous investigation. For if someone like McLuhan claims to have uncovered a scientific way to investigate individual and social experience, proof or disproof of the claim will implicate the question: does the analysis come to an end in such a way that real contact with the real is really achieved?  More particularly, for McLuhan, does his suggestion that investigation focus on “the activity of the exterior and interior senses” fulfill an ontological criterion in such a way as to enable both new sciences in the domain of human experience and thereby reveal, once again, foundation and ground for an age in which “all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned”?11

McLuhan was beginning to come clear about these matters around 1950 (in a labyrinthine search which would culminate in 1958). Here he is (in a passage discussing Joyce which will require detailed examination elsewhere) claiming that the consideration of the modalities of the “adequation of mind and things”, modalities to be specified in terms of “the exterior and interior senses”, can itself uncover/recover relation to the prior “the dance of being” aka “the gestures of being itself” (by finding itself being them):

Whereas the ethical world of Ulysses is presented in terms of well-defined human types the more metaphysical world of the Wake speaks and moves before us with the gestures of being itself. It is a nightworld and, literally, as Joyce reiterates, is “abcedminded”. Letters (“every letter is a godsend”), the frozen, formalized gestures of remote ages of collective experience, move before us in solemn morrice. They are the representatives of age-old adequation of mind and things, enacting the drama of the endless adjustment of the interior acts and dispositions of the mind to the outer world. The drama of cognition itself. For it is in the drama of cognition, the stages of apprehension, that Joyce found the archetype of poetic imitation. He seems to have been the first to see that the dance of being, the nature imitated by the arts, has its primary analogue in the activity of the exterior and interior senses. (James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial, 1953)

 

  1. Cited by Gordon, Escape into Understanding, 1997,357n10.
  2. Mavor Moore, ‘The Prophet as Performer’ (review of Take Today), Toronto Globe and Mail, June 3, 1972, cited in Gordon, Escape into Understanding, 1997, 260.
  3. Letters, 89.
  4. Compare McLuhan’s letter to his family (cited in this post) from Cambridge in October 1934, where he writes of the manner in which “lecturers here (…) try to read poetry (…) without any transitions of manner to suit the poem”.
  5. Cf, Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956). Goffman has been called the most influential sociologist of the twentieth century. He was born in Mannville, Alberta in 1922, went to high school in Winnipeg and took his first years of undergraduate study at UM (1939-1942). He then graduated from UT before pursuing his further educaton and career in the US at Chicago, Berkeley and the University of Pennsylvania. Now Mannville with its mostly rural population in the early twentieth century barely reaching into the hundreds was the place where, in 1907, McLuhan’s grandfather, James McLuhan, came west to homestead with his family, including McLuhan’s father, Herbert. McLuhan, born in Edmonton in 1911, was conceived in Mannville before his parents, newly married at the end of 1909, moved from there to the provincial capital in early 1911. The chances of two such influential scholars (along with a future Lord Mayor of London) being associated in the same decade with a remote unincorporated hamlet on the prairies are slim to vanishing. That both McLuhan and Goffman should then have gone on from Mannville to high school and university in Manitoba is, of course, even more unlikely. Future posts will consider McLuhan and Goffman as representatives of the Winnipeg school of communication which also included Rupert Lodge and Henry Wright, in the first generation, and S.I. Hayakawa and W.O. Mitchell, along with McLuhan and Goffman, in the next.
  6. See already in the Nashe thesis: “The metaphor of the mirror comes as naturally to Whitehead as to Bonaventure (…) All specialism in knowledge disappears for Whitehead as for Philo or Hugh of St. Victor: ‘We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics. The private psychological field is merely the event considered from its own standpoint’. (Science and the Modern World, 175). The difference between Whitehead and Bonaventure is that between a man (Whitehead) taking his first uncertain steps into a new world of inexhaustible significance, and a man (Bonaventure) born into that world.” Trivium,144
  7. Compare McLuhan to his family from Cambridge, November 10, 1934: “It is useful broadly to distinguish PI and Arist as tending towards Bhuddism (sic) and Christianity respectively. Plato was an oriental in mind (…) Aristotle heartily accepts the senses” (Letters, 39). McLuhan’s letter is all nonsense, of course, but it does show him beginning to think through the contention of his two philosophy professors at UM, Rupert Lodge and Henry Wright, that all human experience is structured by fundamental types.
  8. The contrast here between a “standard way” of the Cambridge dons and the “great variety” cultivated by elocution looks forward to that later described by McLuhan between the Gutenberg galaxy and the electric universe. Cf, McLuhan to Gerald Stearn in 1967: “Highly literate people speak on one level, in a monotone. ‘Good’ prose is spoken this way.  A (single) level of form, one plane. You cannot discuss multi-relationships on a single plane, in a single form. That’s why the poets of our time have broken all the planes and sequences, forming a cubist prose. ‘I don’t follow you’ — as if that had anything to do with reasoning. It has to do with lineality and visuality. Logical or connected discourse is highly visual and has very little to do with human reasoning.” Note should be made here how McLuhan undermines the easy oral/literate contrast that is often thought to be his topic. His literate forms can just as well describe spoken as written language.
  9. The subtitle of Goffman’s 1974 Frame Analysis is “An Essay on the Organization of Experience.”
  10. “The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we also have abolished the apparent one!!” Reference and German original here. While McLuhan may or may not have read much of Nietzsche, he certainly did read Eric Havelock’s Crucifixion of Intellectual Man (1950) whose long Introduction rehearses the same argument.
  11. Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party. The original reads: “Alles Ständische und Stehende verdampft, alles Heilige wird entweiht…”.

“The main question” in Valéry

In L’Idée Fixe (1932), Paul Valéry observes that

the mind (…) has to be supplied — with disorder! (…) And it takes its disorder where it finds it. Inside itself, outside, everywhere . . . It requires an Order-Disorder difference to function.1

On this view, the crooked timber of human being — the unrivaled source of disorder on the planet (and now beyond it) — may be said to be a prerequisite of mind.  So whereas our 401k nihilists moan about a semantic disorder that threatens to disable the very idea of meaning (or at least their very idea of meaning), in fact disorder and mind are mutually implicating — and are not at all incompatible with meaning.  How have meaning without mind?  And how, asks Valéry, have mind without disorder?

Now McLuhan cited Valéry repeatedly over his career from the 1940s to the 1970s, but especially between 1949 and 1954.2 His friend Allen Tate, whom he visited at home in Sewanee (Tenn) in 1944 and with whom he published many of his early articles in the Sewanee Review, was a leading American champion of Valéry’s work. And Valéry was often discussed by T.S. Eliot, of course, whom McLuhan began studying in Cambridge (if not before) and then intensively read in the late forties with Hugh Kenner when the two were working on a book on Eliot together.

Another source of McLuhan’s interest in Valéry may have been S.I. Hayakawa. Hayakawa was from Winnipeg3 and graduated with a BA in English from the University of Manitoba, six years before McLuhan.  He then preceded McLuhan at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, graduating with his PhD in 1935 — the year before McLuhan arrived. During McLuhan’s one year in Madison, Hayakawa was teaching away from Madison in UW remote locations and it may be that they never renewed their acquaintance there.  But even if they didn’t meet at UW, McLuhan would certainly have heard in the English department of someone he knew from Winnipeg, who had just completed his PhD and had published an interesting article on one of McLuhan’s main interests, T.S. Eliot.4 Later, in the early 1940’s, it may have been Hayakawa who called McLuhan’s attention to Korzybski’s ‘general semantics’ via his popular book, Language in Action (1941).5 Then, in 1943, Hayakawa founded (and edited for decades) a journal for general semantics, ETC, whose fall number for 1948 featured the abbreviated translation of L’Idée Fixe cited above.

  1. Translated by Eleanor Wolff. Her abbreviated translation of L’Idée Fixe appeared originally in Meja, Number Two (Autumn 1946), edited by Herbert Steiner. It was reprinted in ETC, ed Hayakawa, 6:1, 1948.
  2. McLuhan mentions Valéry in all of: Mr. Eliot’s Historical Decorum (1949), T.S. Eliot (1950), Tennyson and Picturesque Poetry (1951), Review of Ruskin and the Landscape Feeling (1952), Network No 2 (1953), James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial (1953), Poetry and Society (1954), Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters (1954) and Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press (1954). In the last essay, McLuhan cites a passage from Valéry which might be thought to characterize his (McLuhan’s) career: “Chacun dit son nom. . . . O langage confus, langage qui t’agites, je veux foudre toutes tes voix / Cent mille feuilles mues font ce que le reveur murmure aux puissances du songe.” (Dialogue de I’Arbre)
  3. Like McLuhan, Hayakawa was born in the far west (in his case, in Vancouver) and moved with his family to Winnipeg when he was in primary school. When Hayakawa’s parents moved back to Japan and he decided to remain in Winnipeg to finish his undergraduate university degree, he was able to board with one of his English professors, William T Allison. Now Allison lived just down the block from the McLuhans on Gertrude Avenue. So McLuhan and Hack, as Hayakawa was known to his Winnipeg friends,  must have known each other from this time in the mid 1920’s.
  4. S.I. Hayakawa, ‘Mr Eliot’s Auto da Fe’, Sewanee Review, 42: 3 (1934), 365-371.
  5. Hayakawa’s book became an academic sensation when it was selected for the Book of the Month Club. McLuhan would certainly have heard of it and thought it fully compatible with his view of the social function of criticism. Further, he would have been intrigued by the authors cited at the start of the book as having contributed to its stance — including William Empson, Ezra Pound, C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards and Q.D. Leavis, all of whom were intensely studied by McLuhan and sometimes known to him personally from Cambridge. (Hayakawa’s acknowledgements included Thurman Arnold’s 1937 The Folklore of Capitalism and may thereby have suggested the subtitle of The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man.) Hayakawa concluded his credits as follows: “My greatest indebtedness, however, is to Alfred Korzybski. Without his system of General Semantics, it appears to me difficult if not impossible to systematize and make usable the array of linguistic information, much of it new, now available from all quarters, scientific, philosophical, and literary.” McLuhan repeatedly referred positively to Korzybski in this early 1940s period, including in his PhD thesis and his 1944 programmatic essay ‘Rhetorical Exegesis: The Case for Leavis against Richards and Empson’.

Henry Wright on Winnipeg in 1920

In 1920, the following announcement appeared in The Philosophical Review (vol xxix):

Professors Henry W. Wright of Lake Forest University and Rupert C. Lodge of the University of Minnesota have been appointed to professorships in philosophy at the University of Manitoba. (508)

Shortly after his arrival in Winnipeg to begin teaching in the fall of 1920, Wright described his new situation for a former colleague at Lake Forest as follows:

H. W. Wright
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Canada

October 3, 1920

Dear Allee, [Warder Clyde Allee]

My thoughts have turned Lake Forest-wards very often during the past few weeks. I have wondered how the year has opened with you and speculated concerning the general situation at Lake Forest this year. But rather than engage in surmises regarding what I know nothing about, it will be more profitable for me to take this chance of telling you about the situation in which I have found myself here.

If I professed enthusiastic satisfaction over every feature of the situation here I should be overstating matters. Houses are scarce, very high [in rent] and poorly equipped. Prices are on the whole higher than in the U. S. and show less indication of yielding. If ever as a good Republican I have lauded the protective tariff, may the Lord forgive me. Then the winters here will doubtless prove a great trial, intensely cold, windy and long drawn out.

But having said that much, I can give free rein to my enthusiasm. Really, I think I was over-ripe for a change away and I greet nearly every detail of this new country and great growing city and promising young University, with a keen, refreshing enthusiasm.

Winnipeg has a population of nearly 300,000. Like most western Canadian cities, as I am told, its public buildings and conveniences far surpass its residential facilities. The stores are finely housed, main streets wide, street car service excellent and new public buildings really splendid. The new capitol building is a veritable dream of beauty, architecturally. In general, business is transacted with greater courtesy than in the average American city.

Of course my interests here center around the promising young University and you may be sure that I entered my work with every faculty alert to new impressions. I had heard how the University of Manitoba was established like Toronto in organic relation with four denominational colleges, as far as Arts and Sciences were concerned, primarily as an examining and degree giving body. I knew that gradually a faculty had been assembled, but knew that the old system of affiliated colleges was in existence. But I have found, rather to my relief, that this system is regarded in university circles as pretty much a thing of the past and the university is developing along independent lines. The University now compares best with some of the American institutions of a municipal type. It is the provincial university, of course, but since Winnipeg contains more than half the people of the province it is in a special sense a Winnipeg institution. It has about 2200 students 600 in Arts and Sciences and the rest divided among Engineering, Law, Medicine, Pharmacy, and Agriculture. The students are predominantly Canadian of English and Scotch derivation, with a goodly number of Jewish boys from the city here. A very likeable lot and pleasant to work with. The Arts and Sciences faculty seem to me, in a surprisingly large proportion, alert and scholarly men free from narrow prejudice and sectional near-sightedness.

All apologize for the present housing of the University. A site has been purchased for the university three miles west of the city, but they do not propose to start until they can appropriate ten millions. This fall the government gave us the old parliament building and here for the present political and social science, economics, philosophy, and architecture will be quartered. I and my junior colleague have offices very generously equipped by the government, seminar room with library shelving, and classroom. The atmosphere is curiously Canadian in many respects — the door-keepers are crippled Canadian soldiers evidently being provided for by the government. The Saturday cleaning is done by files of convicts under charge of a warder. The postman knocks and puts the mail quietly on my desk, acting as if he was a public servant and not a government official as in good old U. S.

The political situation is such as to create uneasiness in propertied circles here. The general strike of 1918 leading as it did to the imprisonment of labor has produced great bitterness in labor circles. Naturally the University keeps out of provincial politics. The labor people profess great friendliness for the university and tell what grand things they would do for it, were they in power. But I presume it would be a university after their own liking that they would support. As far as freedom of teaching is concerned, I imagine it is more secure under the present liberal administration which is well disposed toward the university, supports it moderately well, and leaves it alone.

I have been asked to deliver a course of ten lectures on “Evolution and Religion” at a Sunday afternoon Forum in a downtown Methodist church. I mention this not because it is any particular honor or of great importance, but as an illustration of the kind of connection I believe should exist between university department and community, and of the kind of work which I have always wanted a chance to try.

Well, this letter has spun out to a dreadful length and so I close with best regards to Mrs. Allee and to all Lake Forest.

Sincerely, H. W. Wright

Wright’s letter was published in the weekly Lake Forest College student newspaper, The Stentor, for Oct 22, 1920, p 5:

Elsie McLuhan on the Mastery of Life

On April 2, 1926, the following article appeared in The Winnipeg Evening Tribune (p 3):

Noted Reader Lions’ Guest

Miss Elsie McLuhan Delights with Readings at Weekly Luncheon

Miss Elsie McLuhan, Winnipeg, known from coast to coast as a reader and impersonator, delighted members of the Lions’ club at luncheon in the Fort Garry Hotel Thursday afternoon, with a reading, entitled “Life.”

Introducing her subject, Miss McLuhan said that fear was one of the greatest handicaps of the human race. It ate into the very fibre of a man, blighted his hopes and ambitions, and held back his success, she said.

The allegory presented in a comprehensive manner by Miss McLuhan dealt with life personified as a master of some and slave to others. The characters were Life and two young girls who had yet to taste of life’s bitter cup.

The scenes were laid on a path running through a wood. On either side of the path stood the two girls, each with a crown on her head. One was fearful of Life, the other determined to exact from him everything she could.

Master or slave

The [latter]1 girl stated that if one were master of Life, life would be a beautiful and obedient slave. On the other hand, if Life became the master, he would show no mercy or pity for the fallen who were his slaves.

The [former] girl then asked why she wore her crown, and the other replied that when Life saw it, he would know that the wearer was his master.

Then Life appeared on the scene, first as an ogre, then, when he saw the crowns on the girls’ heads, as a bent man. He asked them what they wanted. They told him and he hurried to carry out their wishes.

Eventually the girl who was unafraid went her way with her crown still on her head and the other girl was forced to fight life alone. Life finally overcame her and slew her because she feared him and did his bidding. He accomplished this first by getting possession of her crown and then forcing her to fear him. Then he killed her.

It is easy to see why life on Gertrude Ave was so difficult for the McLuhans. Elsie was caught up in a life and death struggle and the battle she was waging turned on the mastery of fear — including, fatefully, fear of what she might be doing to her family, fear of what others might think of her, fear of going entirely her own way. If she did not overcome these fears, she felt, she would die (presumably in some figurative sense, but one she may well have thought worse than physical death).2 She was driven to be “the girl who was unafraid [and] went her [own] way with her crown still on her head”.  In fact, there is a wonderful photo of the McLuhan family out for a drive around 1915:3

Elsie and Herb are in the front, Herb’s parents, James and Margaret, in the rear with Maurice.4 Elsie has a stupendous crown,5 twice the size of the men’s bowlers, and she is, naturally, the one at the wheel with the driving gloves.

The meaning of human existence turned on just how “determined” a person was “to exact from him [ie, Life] everything she could”. The gender opposition here is telling: “exact from him everything she could”.  At 507 Gertrude Ave there were, of course, only men along with Elsie6 and Herbert’s initials were H.E.!

Elsie’s compulsion to prove herself aside from them, and if need be against them — a compulsion which found definitive expression in 1933 when she left Gertrude Ave and Winnipeg forever — an event to which she supplied a press release!7 — had long been intimated. When she first began to perform, around 1920, one of her repeated pieces was “Hunting an Apartment”8 and by 1926, as seen in the newspaper blurb above, she was styling herself as “Miss Elsie McLuhan”.9

A 1933 note written to her brother, Ernest Raymond Hall, records her in her first week in Toronto: “I was nearly crazy getting away [from Winnipeg and her family] (…) but I am determined to make this thing go”.10

McLuhan would have imbibed this attitude to life along with his mother’s milk and it must have been drummed deeper and deeper into him over the years through her incessant work on her readings and sketches — and through her equally incessant attempts to beat McLuhan’s father, Herbert, into wanting the sort of mastery she wanted.  Marchand (163) characterizes McLuhan’s relation with her in a wonderful passage as follows:

When she died, McLuhan was grief-stricken. Elsie had been, at best, a difficult parent, spreading unhappiness about her like an aerosol that made it hard to breathe. Yet if McLuhan had inherited his tender conscience and firm morality from his father (…) he had inherited from his mother a spunkiness, an outrageous independence and indifference to what others thought, that set him apart and marked his approach to every project he ever pursued.  He inherited something else as well: an irrepressible verbal aggressiveness. He was more like his mother than he was like anyone else on earth.

Marchand is right to note that McLuhan had also internalized an opposing assurance from his father for whom all was well, even the problems with Elsie, on some “higher plain”.11 For example, Gordon (27) records the following diary note from June 3, 1931:

I am of a critical and inquiring nature but the true Christian experience (…) is a fact that transcends analysis. Once filled with this miraculous spirit one may or may not give up one’s ideals and plans; but whichever happens, there is never a regret. There is absolutely nothing that can disturb the calm poise (…) that is the happy lot of the true Christian.

McLuhan’s life path was established through the solution he found to this struggle which raged in his mother and between his mother and father and, inevitably, in his own soul as well.12 Two central aspects of his solution may be seen in letters he wrote home from Cambridge when he was 23 and 24.  A letter from December 6, 1934 to his family reports

Of late I have been wayfaring among the work of T.S. Eliot. He is easily the greatest modern poet, and just how great he is remains to be seen, because he has not produced his best yet. However the poems I am reading have the unmistakable character of greatness. They transform, and diffuse and recoalesce the commonest every day occurrences of 20th century city life till one begins to see double indeed — the extremely unthinkable character, the glory and the horror of the reality in life (yet, to all save the seer, behind life) is miraculously suggested. (Letters 41, emphasis added)13

For the purposes at hand, the key point in this passage is the denial that “the glory” of life is to be found on some “higher plain” somewhere “behind life”. Instead, if “the glory” were to be found anywhere at all, it must be here and now in “the commonest every day occurrences of 20th century city life”. And, although from some points of view this might seem to “transform and diffuse” those “occurrences” into something else, in fact it represents the reverse action of recalling them from what they are not14 to what they are15 — meaningful entities exactly in their particularity and without cosmetics and fantasies.16

In a later letter to his mother from September 5, 1935 he repeated against his father’s contentment with a “by-and-by” satisfaction that

My hunger for “truth” was sensuous in origin. I wanted a material satisfaction for the beauty that the mind can perceive. (Letters, 73, emphasis in the original)

This much he entirely shared with Elsie. But against Elsie’s Machiavellian drive, “to exact from [Life] everything she could” by becoming “master of Life”, McLuhan began his September 1935 letter by noting “the greatest fact about man, namely that he is a creature and an image, and not sufficient unto himself” (Letters, 72).

These points against both Herbert and Elsie are brought together in this same letter to Elsie through a quotation from Hopkins:

But good grows wild and wide.17
Has shades, is nowhere none;
But right must seek a side
And choose for master one. (Letters, 74)

The good is to be found, if it is to be found at all, not in some “higher plain”, but only in the “wild and wide” of the world as it is encountered in “every day occurrences”.  This does not, however, precipitate a situation of “master or slave” where the only possibility of meaning lies in mastering life to make it “carry out [its master’s] wishes”.  For in this case, where would the reputed “master” first of all find her strength and her rights?  Was she to compose these, too, like Baron Münchhausen extricating himself from a mire, along with the horse he was riding, by pulling up on his own pigtail?

McLuhan knew early on that this was a delusional and hopeless idea. As he wrote to Elsie at this same time (January 18, 1935) concerning lectures he was attending of I.A. Richards:

Richards is a humanist who regards all experience as relative to certain conditions of life. There are no permanent, ultimate, qualities such as [the] Good, Love, Hope, etc., and yet he wishes to discover objective, ultimately, permanent standards of criticism (…) what a hope!… (Letters, 50)

Reality cannot be certified by one who will then apply that certification to herself (in order to be in a position to certify reality). And the same applies to any “permanent, ultimate, qualities”.  All these must either be already the case just where we are — or not at all.  Nihilism is simply the rigorous development of the ludicrous idea that humans, “sufficient unto [themselves]”, might construct reality in art or social life or anywhere else. And of the even more ludicrous idea of constructing their own reality.

The only answer, McLuhan could see, was that of “the glory and the horror of the reality in life” (cited above from Letters, 41). And this implied taking direction (in many senses) from the institution that had been “in life” for two thousand years, and therefore subject to its own glories and horrors, namely the church, for which the relation of “the glory and the horror of the reality in life” was a reflection or “uttering” of the fundamental relation in the Godhead itself — McLuhan’s “the meaning of meaning is relation”, “the medium is the message”. Hence his citation for Elsie from Hopkins:

But right must seek a side
And choose for master one.

Mastery is either in us to be exercised or outside us to be acknowledged. Every human action or perception “must seek a side” of this alternative before it unfolds.  Humans are that peculiar type of animal that is ineluctably ex-posed to the a-priori time of this decision.

McLuhan had learned for himself, and was attempting to communicate to his mother, what Eliot would put in the first of the Four Quartets, ‘Burnt Norton’, later that same decade:

…echoes Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow?
Quick, said the bird, find them, find them,
Round the corner. Through the first gate,
Into our first world, shall we follow
The deception of the thrush? Into our first world.
(…)
Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children,
Hidden excitedly, containing laughter.
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind
Cannot bear very much reality.
Time past and time future
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.

It was the “always present” time of this “first world”, where the question of mastery is deeply posed, that McLuhan would tirelessly attempt to explicate over the next half century. For this multiplication of time, of “time past and time future”, of “what might have been and what has been”, together with that “which is always present”, constitutes the strange environment of human beings — one that is just as little appreciated as water is by fish.

Hopkins, however, did not write ‘master’ in his poem, but ‘chieftain’: “And choose for chieftain one”.  McLuhan’s slip, it may be imagined, went back to his mother’s unhappy quest to become the “master of Life.” McLuhan’s suggestion to her was that he, at least, would complicate and fundamentally revise such notions both of Life and of mastery.

 

  1. The Tribune article mistakenly has ‘former’ here.
  2. McLuhan would later encounter just this same mania in Norman Mailer. It must have been somewhat amusing for him to find in this inveterate wild man what he knew so well from an elderly  woman — his own mother.
  3. The two photos of Elsie here have been posted to the Family Search site.
  4. It is possible that this is Marshall, not Maurice, but this would date the photo to 1912.
  5. Another photo of Elsie (from around 1910) shows her in another crown battle with her mother:

    But here the driving gloves are worn not by Elsie but by her mother! Moreover, although Elsie was taller than her mother, here she is sitting and appears shorter.

  6. For the five year period between Elsie’s father’s death in 1926 and her own death in 1931, Elsie’s mother, Margaret May Marshall Hall, lived with the McLuhans at 507 Gertrude.
  7. The Winnipeg Evening Tribune, September 9, 1933 (Page 4): “Elsie McLuhan Leaving To Take Toronto Post — Elsie McLuhan, well-known local reader and impersonator, has accepted a position as director of Dramatic Art in the Von Kunits academy of Music and Art, Toronto. This academy is being opened by the widow of Dr. Von Kunits, former director of the Toronto symphony orchestra, as a memorial to his memory. Elsie McLuhan (…) will be leaving Winnipeg on Wednesday” (September 13, 1933).
  8. This skit was announced for shows in the Winnipeg Tribune for, eg, February 21, 1921 and later again for November 12 that year.
  9. Miss Elsie McLuhan Delights with Readings at Weekly Luncheon.” To contrast, in her earliest announcements,  she announced herself as “Mrs H.E. McLuhan”!
  10. Her note is online at Family Search.
  11. As reported by Marchand (12) from McLuhan’s Diary in 1930, Herb McLuhan gave a talk that year to the same sort of group Elsie was regularly performing before. His talk was titled “The Higher Plain”.
  12. Some entries from McLuhan’s diary reported by Gordon: “I must, must, must attain worldly success to a real degree. It seems inconsistent I know to wish for such things and yet have your trust in God” (March 19, 1930, Gordon 22); “I have never known what it was to have a mother and Mother maintains that I have never had a ‘man’ for my father” (July 1, 1930, Gordon 22); “cruel fate that ever mated Elsie Hall and Herb McLuhan” (April 1, 1931, Gordon 24). In later life, McLuhan exhibited these bents of both his parents, in spades. While he was driven to communicate his thought in a way reminiscent of Elsie, he was also strangely placid, like Herb, in the face of inanities.
  13. Brackets have been added around the phrase “yet, to all save the seer, behind life” to highlight the contrast, emphasized in the original, between ‘in‘ and ‘beyond‘.
  14. What they are not: either fragments with no intimation of meaning beyond themselves, to be made of what we will; or fragments with intimation of meaning beyond themselves but none in themselves. These ‘wings’ correspond to the bents of Elsie and Herb, of course.
  15. “To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not”, Four Quartets, East Coker — following San Juan de la Cruz, “para venir a lo que no eres, has de ir por donde no eres”.
  16. At the end of the day, this perception depends from “the main question“.
  17. Hopkins: “For good grows wild and wide”, from an untitled poem which the editor of his poems, Robert Bridges, called On a Piece of Music.

Lodge and Wright

The article below appeared in the Manitoban, March 3, 1933 (3-3-33) on page 1:

Manitoba Philosophy Professors Carry On Active Work
in Field of Philosophic Literary Work
Max Diamond

Many students are unaware of the excellent opportunities offered them by the University of Manitoba for gaining practical wisdom and knowledge, yet there are in our University two very able men whose writings have received recognition by leading scholars all over the world. These two men are Prof. Henry W. Wright and Prof. Rupert C. Lodge, both of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology.

Professor Lodge specializes in the History of Philosophy and Logic. He is chiefly noted for his writings on the Philosophy of Plato. Professor Wright’s interest rests mainly in strengthening the work of psychology and in particular (…)1 regarding social and ethical problems.

Another important fact which gives to the Department of Philosophy and Psychology a dual significance is that many of the textbooks used by the students have been written by these two men. Among these writings are Professor Wright’s book on ethics called “Self Realization,” his volume on Social Psychology entitled “Moral Standards of Democracy,” and three of his religious editions called “Faith Justified by Progress,” “The Philosophy of Religion” and “The Religious Response”. Beside his numerous writings on the “Philosophy of Plato,” Professor Lodge has written a volume entitled “Introduction to Modern Logic,” a book now widely used by philosophical students. Yet the writings of these two illustrious scholars does not end here, for even at present there are other volumes in process of preparation.

Until now the Department of Philosophy and Psychology has had no real good location, but with the transferring of the Senior division to the Fort Garry site it has been allotted large and spacious quarters on the third floor of the new Arts building.2

Lodge and Wright were two of McLuhan’s most influential teachers at UM, although he majored in English. Wright’s book, The Moral Standards of Democracy (1925) remains, “heavily annotated”, in the McLuhan collection in the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library at UT.  As described here and here, communication and inter-communication are the central matters in this volume — matters which, of course, McLuhan would pursue for the rest of his life.

In regard to Lodge, on December 12, 1935 McLuhan wrote from Cambridge to E.K Brown, then the new chairman of the UM English Department, wondering about his job prospects there. McLuhan observed that in Winnipeg he had “directed [his] energies to philosophy, and did [his] best work for Professor Lodge” (Letters 79).

 

  1. The printed text of the article seems to be garbled here.  It has: ” many facts regarding social and ethical problems”.
  2.  This paragraph about the ongoing transfer of the University of Manitoba from its original downtown location to its present Fort Garry site shows that McLuhan would have walked to the downtown campus from the family home on Gertrude Ave for his first years at UM. Then, for his last year or two there, he would have commuted by bus or carpool out the Pembina Highway to what is now the main UM campus (around 5 miles south of Gertrude Ave) for at least some of his classes.  According to Professing English, the 2002 biography of Roy Daniells, head of the English department at UM from 1937 to 1946, and a sometime correspondent of McLuhan, Daniells still had his office downtown in the middle forties. So the full transfer of UM to Fort Garry could not have been completed until after WW2. In Through the Vanishing Point, McLuhan cites a substantial passage from Daniells’ Milton, Mannerism and Baroque (1963): “The moment of change was a favourite Baroque theme. Bernini, as we have noticed, represents Anchises and Proserpine at the instant of their being carried off, Daphne as the bark folds round her body and her fingers put forth leaves. The action looks both ways and we know from the extreme and subtle expressiveness of Bernini’s modelling (the anxious old eyes of Anchises, the gripping fingers of Pluto upon Proserpine) both what the subjects have been and what they will be. Milton similarly, and unlike Dante or Spenser, gives us the moment of change — in Satan the moment when the realization of hell bursts upon him, not less than archangel fallen; in Eve when we have been thoroughly prepared to see the moment of eating the fruit as an index pointing to past and future.” (18)

McLuhan vs the Walkathon in 1931

The earliest letter included in McLuhan’s Letters is from 1931 to his mother.  This is the only letter from that year (when McLuhan was 20). Here below is another 1931 letter, written by McLuhan to the editor of the Winnipeg Tribune concerning “Walkathons” (captioned in the newspaper as ‘The “Walkathon” and Other Days‘)1 

“Walkathons” were not the “pedestrianism” races which were popular in the 19th century (providing a nice example of the Gutenberg galaxy), nor were they the later fund-raiser walkathons which seem to have started in the 1950s. Instead, a “Walkathon” in 1931 was a dance marathon as described here. Although McLuhan rightly condemned these events (in terms he would later see as too valuative), he might well have seen the flip from “pedestrianism” to the “Walkathon” as typical of the switchover from the one-at-a-time linear assembly line to the electrical circuit maintaining itself between its two poles.

June 25, 1931

To the Editor of The Tribune.

Sir, — If there is one aspect of the twentieth century [for which it] claims dignity and respect for itself above preceding ages, it is that of its humanity. We pride ourselves upon our intelligence to perceive and our eagerness to correct social abuses wherever they lie. We feel confident that the historian of our times 2000 years hence will be lavish of his eulogies on this point at least, for after years of toil we have ejected the unclean spirit of barbarism.

But the people of America scarcely seem aware how serious are the incursions being made on this ultimate sanctuary of their self respect.

The unclean spirit has returned with seven others fouler than himself and their Winnipeg addresses are the Playhouse and the Amphitheatre.

The venerable fathers of the Inquisition failed to contrive any torture as exquisitely refined as the “Walkathon”. The Colosseum in its goriest days afforded no more disgusting spectacle than now goads the morbid curiosity of our citizens.

No doubt many people have been hoodwinked by the fact that the participants receive excellent care, but beneath this very thin veneer lie the hideous repulsive facts which will be all too evident four months hence.

The “Walkathon” is only a symptom of a society that is very sick indeed, but like most symptoms it aggravates the evil from which it springs.2 The occasion is one for prompt, vigorous and uncompromising action, Such action would receive the unanimous moral support of every intelligent person.

H. M. McLuhan
Winnipeg

  1. Winnipeg Tribune, July 3, 1931, page 9.
  2. Gordon reports an entry from McLuhan’s diary from May 22, 1931 in which unemployment is called “a symptom, though like most symptoms it has aggravated the evil” (360n52).

Teacher with a Heart of Steel

Presumably on account of the narrative role of Winnipigeon Marshall McLuhan (playing throughout with his cigar), the following publicity piece for an upcoming television program appeared in the Winnipeg Tribune (p 45) on Sept 18, 1965:

Teacher with a Heart of Steel

“Programmed instruction” is a new phrase being heard more and more in the field of education. It is used interchangeably with the “teaching machine revolution” to describe experiments in which children learn reading and writing and even algebra, without teacher and textbook.

Although experiments with machines, principally the so-called “talking typewriter”, have been carried out for several years, this revolutionary method of teaching is still tentative, and educators are divided on its long-term wide-spread use.

The program entitled Child of the Future, telecast at 10 p.m. on Channel 6, reviews the United States [experience?] and includes some profound observations by Prof. Marshall McLuhan of the University of Toronto.

The “talking typewriter” — more correctly, the Edison Responsive Environment — is a large steel cabinet incorporating a typewriter with special keys that cannot jam, a window on which letters, words and sentences are shown, a slide projector, a microphone, and a speaker — all connected to a computer. (The figure below did not appear with the Tribune article.  It is taken from this paper describing the development and use of the Edison Responsive Environment.)

ERE

The ERE machine can talk, play games, take dictation. and show pictures, and has been credited with teaching two and three-year-olds to read and type, and even with improving the behaviour of several children afflicted with a severe form of schizophrenia.

While many experts feel that programmed teaching is effective, critics say that such methods can stultify children’s creative thinking. And what the child learns depends on the teacher who programs the machine, therefore they are still open to human shortcomings.

But Dr. O. K. Moore, ERE’s inventor and director of the Responsive Environments Laboratory of Hamden, Conn is optimistic. “For the first time in human history,” he says, “technology allows us to have an educational scheme truly tailored to the individual person — even it we are dealing with millions of people.”

Other leading scholars and educators appearing on the program include: Prof. Jerome s Bruner, director ol the Center for Cognitive Studies, Harvard University; Bartlett Hayes, curator of the Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, Mass; Robert Gardner, lecturer in visual Studies, Carpenter Center, Harvard University; Eleanor Duckworth staff member at the Peabody Public School, Cambridge, Mass; and Dr. H. B. McCarty, executive director of the “Wisconsin School of the Air”, University of Wisconsin.

Child of the Future was produced by the National Film Board of Canada.

T.S. Eliot in Winnipeg

But in 1930 in Manitoba, it was as if Joyce, Eliot, and Pound did not exist. It is possible that their books were not even in the university library at the time or in any of the bookstores in Winnipeg. (Philip Marchand, Marshall McLuhan: The Medium and the Messenger, 23-24)

Marchand’s bio of McLuhan is excellent. But on this point, the question of just how provincial Manitoba and its university English department were during McLuhan’s years there (1929-1934), he is mistaken. On this page from The Manitoban, the UM student newspaper, from March 16, 1934, McLuhan’s 2-column article, ‘An Interview with Dr Johnson’, is on the left.  But on the right is another 2-column article by F.H.D Pickersgill on — T.S. Eliot.

Frank Pickersgill (1915–1944) was born in Winnipeg and attended the same high school as McLuhan, Kelvin. He majored in English at UM, like McLuhan, and the two are reported in the bio of Pickersgill to have taken classes together.1 Pickersgill’s short life ended in execution in Buchenwald in 1944. With several other Canadians he had served with the French resistance during the German occupation and had been arrested. In a remarkable illustration of second sight, Pickersgill’s Eliot article describes the weapons we have against the sort of “limitation” (as he says) portrayed in The Waste Land:

First we must be able to give up all to a cause — without any other stimulus but a generous impulse.

As regards Eliot at UM , Pickersgill’s article compares very favorably to the work McLuhan was doing at the time (and McLuhan was almost 4 years older). He cites all of Eliot’s major poetry to that date — Prufrock, Sweeney, Waste Land, Hollow Men, Ash Wednesday — and ends by bringing Eliot into connection with Chesterton (who is frequently discussed in the letters included in his biography). Eliot’s [Anglo-]Catholicism is broached repeatedly.

There can be no doubt that McLuhan knew Pickersgill’s article and little doubt that Eliot (and likely other early twentieth century literature as well) was avidly discussed in the UM English department — at least among the students. This background would have been one more thing (along with an unusually broad knowledge of English literature) that the relatively mature McLuhan brought with him to his second undergraduate course of study when he entered Cambridge later in the fall of that same year, 1934, as a 23 year old.

Here is McLuhan to Nina Sutton forty years later:

I first encountered the work of I.A. Richards at Manitoba University (…) at first it was shattering. I thought it was the end. 

McLuhan went to Cambridge in 1934 with an agenda. Namely, he had to find a way forward that had ground. But it had to be ground that somehow included the possibility of “shattering”.

  1. The author of the Pickersgill bio, George H. Ford (1914-1994), was another Winnipigeon and a fellow English major with Pickersgill at UM a couple years behind McLuhan. Ford went on to become a distinguished academic and, as his University of Rochester biography has it, he was “an internationally known Dickens scholar and authority on Victorian literature”.  The materials for the Pickersgill bio were assembled by his brother, J.W. (Jack) Pickersgill, who was later a federal cabinet minister in the Pearson era.  On May 25, 1967, McLuhan and Jack Pickersgill were together awarded honorary degrees by UM as reported in the Manitoban here.

Preface to The Mechanical Bride: “provisional affairs for apprehending reality”

One of McLuhan’s persistent questions: how is it that we know so much about the exterior landscape and so little about the interior one?  Isn’t the mind’s relation to reality the same in both cases?  So why should the first be subject to progressive illumination and the second stuck in seemingly intractable confusion? (“Just the fog from a confoosed brain…”, Mechanical Bride, 5)

Part of the answer, he knew, had to do with our seemingly irresistible recourse to the rear-view mirror1. Instead of trying out new approaches (the sort of flexibility that established investigation on new bases in a whole series of physical sciences), we cling to old ones.2 Indeed, a good part of our attachment to old approaches lies in the habitual use of them to dismiss new suggestions out of hand. Hence McLuhan’s acute observation towards the end of his short (2 page) preface to The Mechanical Bride:

Those readers who undertake merely to query the ideas [presented in MB] will miss their use for getting at the material. (vi)

The aim of “getting at the material” is one McLuhan shared with the phenomenologists: back to the things themselves! But in modern times, he saw, the problem was not only philosophical confusion. Deflected perception was first and foremost the result of sophisticated manipulation:

Ours is the first age in which many thousands of the best-trained individual minds have made it a full-time business to get inside the collective public mind. To get inside in order to manipulate, exploit, control is the object now. And to generate heat not light is the intention. To keep everybody in the helpless state engendered by prolonged mental rutting is the effect of many ads and much entertainment alike.3 (Mechanical Bride, v)

the folklore of industrial man (…) stems from the laboratory, the studio, and the advertising agencies.  (Mechanical Bride, v)

symbols have been employed in an effort to paralyze the mind (Mechanical Bride, vi)

It is observable that the more illusion and falsehood needed to maintain any given state of affairs, the more tyranny is needed to maintain the illusion and falsehood. Today the tyrant rules not by club or fist, but, disguised as a market researcher, he shepherds his flocks in the ways of utility and comfort. (Mechanical Bride, vi)

Therefore McLuhan’s goal to investigate the questions: how did this situation come about historically? how does it perpetuate itself? what are its effects today? how might it be reversed?

Since so many minds are engaged in bringing about this condition of public helplessness, and since these programs of commercial education are so much more expensive and influential than the relatively puny offerings sponsored by schools and colleges, it seemed fitting to devise a method for reversing the process. Why not use the new commercial education as a means to enlighten4 its intended prey? Why not assist the public to observe consciously the drama which is intended to operate upon it unconsciously? (Mechanical Bride, v)

Where visual symbols have been employed in an effort to paralyze the mind, they are here used as a means of energizing it. (Mechanical Bride, vi)

But before getting down to the business of mental “energizing” in The Bride itself, McLuhan’s preface sets out the conditions of possibility for this.  They turn out to be familiar from the physical sciences but are somehow left aside as soon as human experience and behavior are in question.

Just as in physics or chemistry, where it is necessary to differentiate between the space-time of physical events and the space-time of their explanatory laws and elements (so that, for example, the space-time in which any particular body of water is situated is never the same space-time as that of the relation of hydrogen to oxygen in chemistry which is always the case, aka “arrested”), so here:

these objects and processes  [in MB] (…) are unfolded by exhibit and commentary as a single landscape. A whirling phantasmagoria can be grasped only when arrested for contemplation. And this very arrest is also a release from the usual participation. (Mechanical Bride, v)

And just as the “arrested” table of chemical elements provides a constant background to the “whirling phantasmagoria” of physical events in the world around us (and, indeed, in us), so McLuhan will direct our attention to a “single landscape” that is always in place:

But amid the diversity of our inventions and abstract techniques of production and distribution there will be found a great degree of cohesion and unity. This consistency is not conscious in origin or effect (…) The unity is not imposed upon this diversity, since any other selection of exhibits would reveal the same dynamic patterns. (Mechanical Bride, v)

The object is to expose a constant background of “the same dynamic patterns”; but it is not hoped to reveal these completely and all at once through some kind of impossible “matching”5.  Partiality is the very motor of science since where something is not the case, this is a sign that a new  discovery is waiting to be made.  This is so, however, only on the basis of some “making [that] comes before”6, some “device (…) for getting at the material”, that has revealed some “degree of cohesion and unity” for our focus. As McLuhan would later (1975) put the point:

Any kind of acquired knowledge naturally creates, or opens up, new vistas of ignorance. Any scientific breakthrough points directly at situations that have been hereto ignored; these situations, in turn, remind us of new worlds to be explored. (At the Flip Point of Time)

Thus it is that McLuhan insists in his preface to The Mechanical Bride that actually “getting at the material” is to be achieved and that the means of doing so will inevitably be partial7:

it is the procedure of the book to use (…) exhibits merely as a means of releasing some of their intelligible meaning. No effort has been made to exhaust their meaning. The various ideas and concepts introduced in the commentaries are intended to provide positions from which to examine the exhibits. They are not conclusions in which anybody is expected to rest but are intended merely as points of departure. (…) Concepts are provisional affairs for apprehending reality; their value is in the grip they provide. This book, therefore, tries to present at once representative aspects of the reality and a wide range of ideas for taking hold of it. The ideas are very secondary devices (…) for getting at the material. (Mechanical Bride, v-vi, emphasis added)

This meeting of finitude and truth lies at the heart of McLuhan’s work.

  1. Cf Beckett in Proust (1930): “the necromancy that sees in each precious object a mirror of the past”.
  2. If the fundamental nature of human beings were not the very opposite of this, namely, adopting new approaches exactly against the old, language could never be learned and scientific discoveries would never be made. So how is it that humans constantly contradict their fundamental nature?
  3. In an “age of advertising”, McLuhan insisted, ads and entertainment engulf education, business, news, politics, even war. None of these can be understood in isolation from the others.
  4. MB has a typo here — “to enlightening”.
  5. McLuhan would soon come to adopt E.H. Gombrich’s “Making comes before matching” from his 1956 Mellon Lectures, Art and Illusion.
  6. See note 5.
  7. Attentive readers have rightly pointed out the constant presence of satire in McLuhan’s work. But they have usually done so at the extreme expense of missing its role in the service of intelligibility and truth.  It is as if a chemist were to be asked: ‘is chemical analysis limited or unlimited?’  ‘Unlimited of course, our analysis never ends.’ ‘So you never get anywhere?’ ‘On the contrary, this is exactly how we somewhere — how we get our results.’

“The main question” in Dostoevsky

In Dostoevsky’s penultimate novel, The Adolescent (earlier translated as A Raw Youth), the first-person narrator and protagonist, Arkady Makarovich Dolgoruky, eventually makes the repugnant finding that he has “the soul of a spider.”1

Salvation is not to be found through an impossible purification or mystical vision.  Instead, in conversation with his legal father, Makar Ivanovich Dolgoruky, and his biological father, Andrei Petrovich Versilov, Arkady is struck by the idea that “true strength” needs its own demise:

[Makar Ivanovich Dolgoruky:] “Well, but how could there not be godless people as well? There are such as are truly godless (…) and I think there must needs be.”
“There are, Makar Ivanovich,” Versilov suddenly confirmed, “there are such, and ‘there must needs be’.”
“There certainly are and ‘there must needs be’!” escaped from me irrepressibly and vehemently, I don’t know why; but I was carried away by Versilov’s tone and was captivated as if by some sort of idea in the words “there must needs be”. (The Adolescent, 1875, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

Humans are the new godlessness needed by God in creating what does not “merely reflect or repeat” an existing (aka “old”) equivalence:

dialogue as a process of creating the new came before, and goes beyond, the exchange of “equivalents” that merely reflect or repeat the old. (Take Today, 22)

  1. “The soul of a spider” links up with the Maelstrom in Dostoevsky through the etymology of ‘spider in Danish ‘spinder’, German ‘Spinner’.  As Arkady notes: “It still seems to me at times that I’m spinning in the same whirl, and that the storm is about to rush upon me, snatch me up with its wing in passing, and I will again break out of all order and sense of measure, and spin, spin, spin…”.

Nihilism in Dostoevsky

Granted, granted I’m a babbler, a harmless, irksome babbler, as we all are. But what’s to be done if the sole and express purpose of every intelligent man is babble — that is, a deliberate pouring from empty into void. (Notes from Underground, 1864, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

And to run around throwing yourself on other people’s necks out of love for mankind, and burn with tears of tenderness — that is merely a fashion. And why should I necessarily love my neighbor or your future mankind, which I’ll never see, which will not know about me, and which in its turn will rot without leaving any trace or remembrance (time means nothing here), when the earth in its turn will become an icy stone and fly through airless space together with an infinite multitude of identical icy stones, that is more meaningless than anything one can possibly imagine! (The Adolescent, 1875, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

Complexity or simplicity, theory or intuition?

“No one ponders” (Dostoevsky, The Adolescent)

The modern world knows that great complexity characterizes mathematical and physical proofs, engagements in war, the workings of DNA, even football plays.  Just getting to work in the morning implicates complicated considerations. But the relations of God to the world and of the individual to God are supposedly simple. Unlike Einstein before his blackboard full of equations, these are matters one supposedly knows off the top of one’s head.

As Heidegger put the matter concisely: “The most thought-provoking thing is that nothing provokes our thought.” 

McLuhan and Heinrich Hertz 1

Between 1968 and 1972 McLuhan cited Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894) multiple times from The Principles of Mechanics (German original 1894, trans 1898):

The pain caused by the new media and new technologies tends very much to fall into the category of “referred pain”, such as skin trouble caused by the appendix or the heart. As with all new technologies, pain creates a special form of space, just a case again of [the] Heinrich Hertz law: “The consequences of the image will be the image of the consequences”. (War and Peace in the Global Village, 1968, 16)

As knowledge replaces experience in human affairs, senior businessmen feel a deep urge to go back to the campus. Having circulated around the world, and having immersed themselves in many problems, they now feel the need to specialize. That is, they are eager to do what the young detest, and the young are eager to do what the elders are fed up with. These inversions, or reversals, result from the exhaustion of the potential of any form, as Aristotle points out in the Physics. (…)  It is also known as the Hertz law: the consequences of the images will be the images of the consequences. (McLuhan to Pierre Elliot Trudeau, April 14, 1969, Letters 366)

the ancients attributed god-like status to all inventors since they alter human perception and self-awareness. Heinrich Hertz stated the same principle of complementarity and metamorphosis of our identity image in relation to technologies in his famous dictum: “The consequences of the images will be the image of the consequences”. It was Aquinas who alerted me (…) to the principle of complementarity inherent in all created forms. (…) Et ideo in toto tempore praecedenti, quo aliquid movetur ad unam formam, subest formae oppositae; et in ultimo instanti illius temporis, quod est primum instans [sequentis temporis, habet formam quae est terminus motus].1 (McLuhan to Jacques Maritain, May 6, 1969, Letters 368-369)

When the secular man senses a new technology is offering a threat to his hard-won human image of self identity, he struggles to escape from this new pressure. When a community is threatened in its image of itself by rivals or neighbours, it goes to war. Any technology that weakens a conventional identity image creates a response of panic and rage which we call “war”. Heinrich Hertz, the inventor of radio2, put the matter very briefly: “The consequence of the image will be the image of the consequences”. (McLuhan to Robert J. Leuver, July 30, 1969, Letters 387)

Ovid’s Metamorphoses follow the complementarity of Hertz’s dictum, “The consequences of the images are the images of the consequences,” illustrating “all growth as destruction”, as both “murdering and creating”. The technique of metamorphosis as a chemical change is by interface of two elements, or two situations. (From Cliché to Archetype, 1970, 50)

“Do-it-yourself” now permits use of the total environment as a private resource. Earlier, it had been an elite that exploited the “public benefits for private vices”. Now it is everybody who gets in on the act. This, naturally, via Hertz Law of Complementarity brings the flip or reversal of effect. Everybody becomes a bureaucrat in some branch of civil service, and this constitutes a police state (…) After increasing beyond some point, any service becomes a disservice. (Take Today, 1972, 82)

It is doubtful that McLuhan ever read anything by Hertz, even the ‘Introduction’ to The Principles of Mechanics from whose opening pages this supposed “Hertz law of Complementarity” was taken.  At a guess, at some point while he was at Fordham in 1967-1968 McLuhan heard or read some variety of the Hertz phrase “the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents” (as the 1898 translation has it).  As seen in the passages above, McLuhan never quoted the translated phrase exactly and seldom cited it in the same way twice even in his own revised versions. However the case may have been in detail, the dictum must have struck him as a fitting formulation of the sort of “inclusive” relation, aka hendiadys, aka metamorphosis, aka synaesthesia3, that he took to be the structure of reality itself: “the principle of complementarity inherent in all created forms” (as he wrote to Jacques Maritain in the letter cited above). It is because reality is fundamentally structured in this dynamic and com/plicated way that, in McLuhan’s view (following Plato, Aristotle and many others) no one form can ever come to dominate all others. Instead, a currently dominant form must come to “exhaustion” at some point and give way to another.  It is this fundamental dynamic that displays itself as (and may therefore be said to ground) “inversions or reversals” — the “Hertz law of Complementarity”.

No single form can ever be more than a figure on this dynamic ground of forms — plural.

Exactly as fundamentally dynamic in this way, ground is itself necessarily subject to the complementarity that it everywhere enacts4: it inherently inverts or reverses itself to figure or cliché.  It follows that the latter are the “inexact” sign of the former.  (Modernity is that time when the signification, or the significance, of the figure or cliché becomes obscured. We lose sight of its sense. And this because we have first of all lost sight of the grounding sensus communis — that which is always beyond any one sense and is always more than any one sense.)

The way forward to McLuhan’s fourfold “Laws of Media” (the interplay of two sets of “inversions or reversals”) was close at hand.  A couple years after his spate of Hertz citations, in February 1974, he would close a lecture at the University of South Florida (‘Living at the Speed of Light’, UMe, 226-243) as follows:

The laws of the media (…) are quite simply that every medium exaggerates some function. (…) They obsolesce another function; they retrieve a much older function; and they flip into the opposite form. The [best example]5 I know to illustrate this principle, which [principle] works for all media whether it’s a teaspoon, a corset or a motorcar, is money. Money increases transactions; it obsolesces barter; it retrieves potlatch or conspicuous waste; and it flips into credit cards, which are not money at all. Now every medium starts off by exaggerating something that we all have before finally flipping into the opposite of itself. (…) The laws of the media (…) are at least a hope that we can reduce (…) confusion to some sort of order.

At this time in the early 1970s McLuhan was attempting to specify “the life of the forms and their surprising modalities” (McLuhan to Joe Keogh, July 6, 1972, Letters 412). In a sense, this was, of course, what he had always been up to. But now, given his dire health outlook and his palpably declining audience, he was particularly concerned to focus his message. The “Laws of Media” represented his hope to order the confusion and despair that modernity finds in “all growth as destruction”.

Hence his citation at this time of his friend William Wimsatt from Hateful Contraries (1965) in From Cliché to Archetype:

the English Augustans were, at their best and at their most characteristic, laughing poets of a heightened unreality. The world which the Augustan wit found most amusing and into which he had his deepest visions was an inverted, chaotic reality, the unreality of the “uncreating word”, the “true No-meaning” which “puzzles more than Wit”. The peculiar feat of the Augustan poet was the art of teasing unreality with the redeeming force of wit — of casting upon a welter of unreal materials a light of order… (109)

 

  1. Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 113, a. 7, ad quintum: “And so throughout the previous period of time in which something moves towards a given form, it is subject to the opposite form; and in the last instant of that period of time, which is the first instant (of the following period, it has the form which is the term of the movement).”
  2. Hertz proved the existence of electromagnetic waves which Marconi and others later used for radio broadcasting. Almost simultaneously with Hertz’s experimental proof in Germany, Oliver Lodge in England was demonstrating the existence of such waves in experiments there. In both cases, a remote response was shown to be elicited by an electric current. That is, the gap between a current and a remote receiver was not empty. Wireless communication was therefore possible if the combination of current, gap and receiver could be appropriately configured. Lodge went on to play a leading research role in the use of electromagnetic waves for wireless communication, aka, radio. Strangely, Oliver Lodge was the uncle of McLuhan’s mentor at the University of Manitoba, Rupert Clendon Lodge. It may well be imagined that Rupert Lodge paid close attention to his uncle’s research and that he and McLuhan had conversations about it.
  3. GG, 230: “inclusive synesthesia (is) an interplay of many levels and facets in a two-dimensional mosaic”
  4. See here for explication.
  5. McLuhan: “simplest form”.

Deutsch on Christian complementarity

An important section of Karl Deutsch’s 1950 paper (originally delivered orally in 1948), ‘Higher Education and the Unity of Knowledge’, is titled ‘Christianity and the Resurrection of Science’. Deutsch was a Jew, but he was a specialist in the middle ages and had an understanding of Christianity that was interesting in itself and especially in the relationship he saw between it and science.

Any revival of the growth of knowledge and science must have been remote from the preoccupations of the early Christians — and yet there is some reason to suggest that the profound reorientation of human motives in the course of the rise of their faith opened the fundamental channels of communication so much more deeply and widely [than before] as to lay the foundations for later centuries of unparalleled intellectual and technological growth.
Christianity implied a new attitude of man to man, a radical acceptance of empathy, a willingness to accept full communication of the fate and experience of other persons, however poor or low, and a feeling: “Here but for the grace of God go I.” This feeling is expressed in Jesus’s saying: “What you have done to the least of these, you have done to me”; in Paul’s conviction that, in the things that truly matter, there is “neither Jew nor Gentile, neither bond nor free,” and that men must come to view themselves as “members of one another.”
Beyond the language of faith, these are statements of essential aspects of communication. Men are viewed as potential substitutes for each other in their external fate, their external interactions with their environment, their experiences of nature and society — to such a degree that “but for the grace of God” the fate of another might be mine. This accepted possibility of substitution implies that the behavior and experiences of other men are relevant for me as potential test cases of my own.
This view embraces operations [research]. A tentative modern definition of the relationship of complementarity — that is, of the relationship between broadcasting and receiving radio sets tuned to each other, or between a key and all the locks which it fits — might be that it consists essentially in the possibility of performing an operation in one set of facilities which is effective in the other, while preserving a significant number of its characteristics in both [otherwise independent] sets. These characteristics of the operation, or chain of events, may be described in statistical terms as a pattern of “yes’s” and “no’s,” and may then be called “information”. Is not this relationship stated in the words: “What you have done to the least of these, that you have done to me”? By restoring and deepening the community of human experience and communication, Christianity restored and deepened one of the essential foundations, not only for common belief (…) but also for every future community of science.
It should be clear that Christianity cannot claim any exclusive monopoly in that contribution. The vision of the Hebrew prophets who took the side of the poor (…), the pity of Buddha, and the trend of some currents of Hellenistic thought, all implied some awareness of men’s relationship as potential substitutes and test cases for each other. What seems to me to have been new in Christianity was the consistency with which this insight was carried toward the conclusions of seeing all human beings as “members of one another,” and of recognizing love to one’s neighbor (…) as the visible test of love to God.
Less directly, and less dramatically, early Christianity laid the foundations of a later restoration of a fuller communication between men and nature. The doctrine of creation and of the fatherhood of God, already found in Judaism, favors the notion of a friendly universe. It implies that the universe is such that men can live in it — that it is not fundamentally hostile to either life or understanding, and indeed that understanding may reveal a friendly wisdom behind it all.1 

This passage incorporates several foundational convictions of McLuhan’s mature project (which was just beginning to come into focus at the time around 1950 when McLuhan obtained Deutsch’s paper).  

First, as McLuhan put the point in a letter two decades later to Martin Esslin: 

One of the advantages of being a Catholic is that it confers a complete intellectual freedom to examine any and all phenomena with the absolute assurance of their intelligibility. (September 23, 1971, Letters 440)

As Deutsch has it: “Christianity laid the foundations of a later restoration of a fuller communication between men and nature. The doctrine of creation and of the fatherhood of God, already found in Judaism, favors the notion of a friendly universe. It implies that (…) it is not fundamentally hostile to either life or understanding, and indeed that understanding may reveal a friendly wisdom behind it all.”

Of course, McLuhan was clear, as Deutsch may or may not have been, that the repeated “friendly[ness]” here in no way excludes tragedy and disaster.  Hence McLuhan’s citation of FW 332 in Culture is our Business (160): “Such was the act of goth”! Ultimate conciliation — or ultimate friendship — is as utterly “inexact” (discussed here) as that between the decrees of God and those of the goths when they sacked Rome. The relation of humans to such “wisdom” as may be “behind it all” is ineradicably limited such that any pretension to an exact comprehension of it (let alone identification with it) is simply laughable.

Second, both McLuhan and Innis must have been deeply struck by Deutsch’s emphasis on communication and complementarity as essential for operations research.  These were already central aspects of their own work in the humanities and now Deutsch was revealing (along with Wiener in his 1948 and 1949 cybernetics books) how they were implicated in the most modern and propitious (for both good and evil) scientific research.2

Third, as indicated by Deutsch, communication and complementarity turn on the relations of centre to margin, on “a radical acceptance of empathy”.  Innis had dedicated his entire life to the study of the (Canadian) history and (universal) theory of centre-margin relations such that Watson’s biography of him would fittingly be called Marginal Man. McLuhan, too, would increasingly come to see that the centre-margin structure (particularized along a spectrum of its possible expressions) is the ‘wobbling pivot’ around which human life and all history can and must be understood.3 Often he put the point, as if it were possible to have a centre without margin:

Speed-up creates what some economists refer to as a center-margin structure. When this becomes too extensive for the generating and control center, pieces begin to detach themselves and to set up new center-margin systems of their own. The most familiar example is the story of the American colonies of Great Britain. When the thirteen colonies began to develop a considerable social and economic life of their own, they felt the need to become centers themselves, with their own margins. This is the time when the original center may make a more rigorous effort of centralized control of the margins, as, indeed, Great Britain did. The slowness of sea travel proved altogether inadequate to the maintenance of so extensive an empire on a mere center-margin basis. Land powers can more easily attain a unified center-margin pattern than sea powers. It is the relative slowness of sea travel that inspires sea powers to foster multiple centers by a kind of seeding process. Sea powers thus tend to create centers without margins, and land empires favor the center-margin structure. Electric speeds create centers everywhere. Margins cease to exist on this planet. (Understanding Media, 91)

As the example of Great Britain and its American colonies shows, McLuhan’s point here is, however, not at all that “margins cease to exist on this planet” in the sense that the former margins entirely cease to be. Instead, such margins are transformed such that they “begin to detach themselves and to set up new center-margin systems of their own”.

What transpires is a change in the recognition, valuation, power and structure of the previously marginalized. These come to be accorded the sort of recognition, valuation, power and structure that characterize a centre. The result is a correlated revolution in both marginality and centrality without, however, the abrogation of the underlying centre-margin structure.

It is not the case that centre-margin structures can ever disappear (since humans and, in fact, the whole universe are definitively marginal).4 All that can happen, all that does happen — and in so doing accounts for historical change — is that the relative weight assigned to centre and margin is modified along a spectrum of possible relations between the two. This is a spectrum stretching between a monopoly of recognition of the centre at one end and a monopoly of recognition of the margin at the other. While this relation can be assigned values at every point along the spectrum (and all these points can combine and recombine in a myriad of different complexes), the centre-margin relation itself is always present.

 McLuhan put this point in a letter from December 19, 1960 to Serge Chermayeff:

When there is no longer a center-margin interplay in a positional or spatial sense5, is it not yet possible to have a more inclusive ecology [of such interplay] than any previously envisaged, and would not such [an ecology of] equilibrium or interplay be capable (…) of [providing the basis for] true freedom? (…) One peculiarity of center-margin relationships is that when freedom of interplay6 between these areas breaks down in any kind of structure, the tendency is for the center to impose itself upon the margin. In the field of attention which we call perception, when the center enlarges and the margin diminishes beyond a certain point, we are in that induced state called hypnosis.7 The dialogue has ended. (…) The problem is the creation of margin that there may be dialogue (…) the [maintenance of that] ratio between center and margin necessary to dialogue.8

Everything in McLuhan’s work depends upon these three interrelated convictions: that dialogue or complementarity is foundational; that dialogue and complementarity exist in, and so require, centre-margin relations; and that the key to insight into such relations is appreciation of their variability along the spectrum of their possible expressions (especially that of their “unequal” balance at the medial point or medium of the spectrum):

dialogue as a process of creating the new came before, and goes beyond, the exchange of “equivalents” that merely reflect or repeat the old. (Take Today, 22)

  1. References for Deutsch’s paper are given here; this passage is found on pp 95-96.
  2. At just this same time, McLuhan was learning from his closest friend, Bernie Muller-Thym, how operations research was revolutionizing modern manufacturing and business in general.
  3. This is exactly the medium that is the message/massage/mess age/mass age.
  4. They are marginal in the sense that they do not have the power of existence within themselves — utter oblivion can, and presumably will at some point, fall on them both.
  5. Cf. UM 94: “The principal factors in media impact on existing social forms are acceleration and disruption. Today the acceleration tends to be total, and thus ends space as the main factor in social arrangements.” McLuhan’s point is that in an age of instantaneous information, history no longer turns on the rise and fall of geographical empires. Hence: “Now that man has extended his central nervous system by electric technology, the field of battle has shifted to mental image making and breaking…” (UM 103).
  6. McLuhan often put this point in terms of “the natural interval between the wheel and axle (…) where action and ‘play’ are one” (Take Today, 4).
  7. As McLuhan did not note here, at the other extreme, where the margin enlarges and the centre diminishes beyond a certain point, we are in that induced state called psychosis. Monolithic enlargement at either end of the spectrum acts as grit in the dialogue of centre and margin, reducing a working two to a dysfunctional one: “A gap is an interface, an area of ferment and change. The gap between wheel and axle can seize up when grit gets in” (Culture is our Business, 70).
  8. This letter is not included in McLuhan’s Letters, but is referenced in a note on 277.  It is in the Chermayeff papers at Columbia and part of it has been published in Chermayeff & Alexander, Community and Privacy, 1963, 102. The last sentences, which have been conflated above, read: For the (space) capsule there can be no margin. Or rather let us consider that for the capsule the problem is the creation of margin that there may be dialogue. You of course are far more familiar than I am with a very great number of occasions in our contemporary world when by inadvertence we have designed environments which lacked the ratio between center and margin necessary to dialogue.”

Nihilism in Turgenev

The tiny space I occupy is so small compared to the rest of space, where I am not and where things have nothing to do with me; and the amount of time in which I get to live my life is so insignificant compared to eternity, where I’ve never been and won’t ever be  . . .
Yet in this atom, this mathematical point, blood circulates, a brain functions and desires something as well . . . How absurd! What nonsense! (Fathers and Sons, 1862, Katz translation)

The Maelstrom in Dostoevsky

His position at that moment was like the position of a man standing over a frightful precipice, when the earth breaks away under him, is rocking, shifting, sways for a last time, and falls, drawing him into the abyss, and meanwhile the unfortunate man has neither the strength nor the firmness of spirit to jump back, to take his eyes from the yawning chasm; the abyss draws him, and he finally leaps into it himself, himself hastening the moment of his own perdition.1  (The Double, 1846, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

I live under the influence of feelings just past, under the influence of fresh memories, under the influence of all this recent whirl, which drew me into that turbulence then, and threw me out of it again somewhere. It still seems to me at times that I’m spinning in the same whirl, and that the storm is about to rush upon me, snatch me up with its wing in passing, and I will again break out of all order and sense of measure, and spin, spin, spin… (The Gambler, 1867, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

In that whirl in which I then spun, though I was alone, without guide or counselor, I swear, I was already aware of my fall, and therefore had no excuse. And yet all those two months I was almost happy — why almost? I was only too happy! And even to the point that the consciousness of disgrace, flashing at moments (frequent moments!), which made my soul shudder — that very awareness — will anyone believe me? — intoxicated me still more: “And so what, if I fall, I fall; but I won’t fall, I’ll get out! I have my star!” I was walking on a slender bridge made of splinters, without railings, over an abyss, and it was fun for me to walk like that; I even peeked into the abyss. (The Adolescent, 1875, Pevear and Volokhonsky translation)

 

  1. Compare Poe’s Arthur Gordon Pym (1838): “The more earnestly I struggled not to think, the more intensely vivid became my conceptions, and the more horribly distinct. At length arrived that crisis of fancy, so fearful in all similar cases, the crisis in which we begin to anticipate the feelings with which we shall fall — to picture to ourselves the sickness, and dizziness, and the last struggle, and the half swoon, and the final bitterness of the rushing and headlong descent. And now I found these fancies creating their own realities, and all imagined horrors crowding upon me in fact. I felt my knees strike violently together, while my fingers were gradually yet certainly relaxing their grasp. There was a ringing in my ears, and I said, “This is my knell of death!” And now I was consumed with the irrepressible desire of looking below. I could not, I would not, confine my glances to the cliff; and, with a wild, indefinable emotion half of horror, half of a relieved oppression, I threw my vision far down into the abyss. For one moment my fingers clutched convulsively upon their hold, while, with the movement, the faintest possible idea of ultimate escape wandered, like a shadow, through my mind — in the next my whole soul was pervaded with a longing to fall; a desire, a yearning, a passion utterly uncontrollable. I let go at once my grasp upon the peg, and, turning half round from the precipice, remained tottering for an instant against its naked face. But now there came a spinning of the brain; a shrill-sounding and phantom voice screamed within my ears; a dusky, fiendish, and filmy figure stood immediately beneath me; and, sighing, I sunk down with a bursting heart, and plunged within its arms.”

“Deutsch’s interesting pamphlet on communication” 1

Early in 1951 (perhaps initiated already in 1950) McLuhan and Harold Innis exchanged letters in which an “interesting pamphlet on communication”1 by Karl Deutsch2 is mentioned. Apparently it had been obtained by McLuhan and then shared with Innis — Innis calls it “your pamphlet”. If both McLuhan and Innis had read the “pamphlet” by February 1951, it is evident that McLuhan must have acquired it in 1950 or, less probably, very early in 1951.

In his March 28, 1951, letter to Norbert Wiener (in the Wiener papers at MIT), McLuhan — apparently referring to the same paper — writes of his “recent encounter with Professor Deutsch’s discussion of communication and education”.

A note to McLuhan’s letter to Innis by the editors of his Letters3 inexplicably identifies this document as Deutsch’s ‘Communication in Self-Governing Organizations: Notes on Autonomy, Freedom and Authority in the Growth of Social Groups’, which he presented at a conference in September 1951 and first published in 1953.4 But this could not have been the Deutsch paper McLuhan and Innis were reading at the start of 1951 — the dates clearly don’t match up. But in this case, just what “pamphlet” was it that McLuhan shared with Innis?

McLuhan’s library at the University of Toronto contains two early articles by Deutsch: ‘Mechanism, Organism, and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science’, published in 19515 and ‘Communication Theory and Social Science’ published in 19526. The second could not have been in “pamphlet” (reprint?) form at the end of 1950, but it is just possible that the first was. However, a footnote to ‘Mechanism, Organism, and Society’ reads:

The substance of this paper was presented to the joint meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science at New York on December 30, 1949, and some passages have appeared in Goals for American Education, New York, Harper Brothers, 1950. (230n)

This note points to the most likely candidate for the pamphlet — Deutsch’s paper in Goals for American Education7, ‘Higher Education and the Unity of Knowledge: An Operational Approach to the History of Thought’.  This was a 1948 seminar presentation which was published in 1950. A reprint of this paper, from which passages were lifted for ‘Mechanism, Organism, and Society’ in 19518, could well have been in McLuhan’s hands at the end of 1950 and its title certainly accords with McLuhan’s description of it to Wiener as “Deutsch’s discussion of communication and education”. Furthermore, just such a reprint exists to this day in the Sigfried Giedion papers archived in the Institut für Geschichte und Theorie der Architektur (gta) in Zurich. 

Now Giedion and McLuhan had been in friendly correspondence since 1943 when they met in St Louis. In 1948 Giedion published Mechanization Takes Command, a book which decisively influenced McLuhan for the rest of his career and which he reviewed in The Hudson Review in 1949.9 Moreover, at just this time, Giedion was in touch with Deutsch and Wiener at MIT and would teach there with them in 1951. It therefore seems likely that McLuhan was sent a reprint of ”Higher Education and the Unity of Knowledge’, either directly by Giedion himself or through his agency, sometime in 1950. 

Another (perhaps complementary) possibility is that McLuhan may have been alerted to Deutsch’s work by his closest friend at this time, Bernard Muller-Thym.  Muller-Thym was a “leading business analyst” (GG 140) in New York with great interest in automation and corporate communications10, who later himself taught at MIT (from 1955 to 1966).11

A footnote (249n24) to Deutsch’s 1951 ‘Mechanism, Organism, and Society’ reads:

On the importance of flow patterns of information and decision in economic or political organization, see K. W. Deutsch, “Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and the Learning Process,” in Change and the Entrepreneur, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p.29; and “A Note on the History of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Decision-Making,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. I., n.5, May 1949, pp. 12–16.

Deutsch’s work on “flow patterns of information” and entrepreneurship would certainly have caught the interested attention of Muller-Thym and his colleagues at McKinsey and Company. But few of them would have had the sort of background — as Muller-Thym did — to understand the wider context of Deutsch’s work. Indeed, Muller-Thym may even have known one of Deutsch’s first papers, ‘Medieval Unity and the Economic Conditions for an International Civilization’ (1944) which was printed, strangely enough, given Muller-Thym’s Toronto PhD in medieval studies, in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (10:1, 18-35). This was a periodical that was published in Toronto and that Harold Innis had helped to found in 1935 — just when Muller-Thym was doing his graduate work there.12 Futher, ‘medieval unity’ and ‘international civilization’ were important implications of Muller-Thym’s PhD thesis (which he was writing in 1935), On The Establishment of the University of Being.

 

  1. McLuhan to Innis, March 14, 1951, Letters 222.  This was a reworked version of an earlier letter to Innis to which Innis replied on February 26, 1951 and in which he apologized for his late reply. See the editors’ note to McLuhan’s letter, Letters 220n1.
  2. Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, 1912-1992, taught at MIT 1943-1956, Yale 1956-1967 and Harvard  1967-1982.  McLuhan reviewed Deutsch’s 1963 book, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, in The University of Toronto Law Journal, 16:1 (1965), pp. 226-228.
  3. Letters, 222n6
  4. In Freedom and Authority in Our Time, ed Lyman Bryson (1953).
  5. In Philosophy of Science 18:3, 230-252 (1951)
  6. In American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 22:3, 469–483 (1952)
  7. Goals for American Education, A Symposium, ed, L Bryson, L Finkelstein and R.M. MacIver, 1950; Deutsch’s paper (‘Higher Education and the Unity of Knowledge’) is located at pp 55-139.
  8. Verbatim passages also appear in ‘Some notes on research on the role of models in the natural and social sciences’ (reprinted as: ‘Toward a cybernetic model of man and society’ in Walter Buckley (ed), Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist: A Sourcebook, 1968), Synthese 7: 6-B, 506-533, 1948-1949.
  9. ‘Encyclopaedic Unities’, a review of Vision in Motion (László Moholy-Nagy) and Mechanization Takes Command (Sigfried Giedion), The Hudson Review 1:4, 599-602, 1949.
  10.  Muller-Thym’s work is discussed by McLuhan in ‘Effects of the Improvements of Communication Media’, 1960; ‘Inside the Five Sense Sensorium’, 1961; ‘The Electronic Age – The Age of Implosion’, 1962; GG, 140-141, 1962; and ‘We need a new picture of knowledge’, 1963. The concentration of these discussions in the early 1960s reflects the fact that Muller-Thym published a series of papers at this time on topics of great mutual interest to McLuhan and him: ‘New Directions for Organizational Practice’, in 50 years Progress in Management 1910-1960, 42-50, 1960; ‘Cultural and Social Changes’, in The Changing American Population, ed Hoke S. Simpson, 85-96, 1962; ‘The Real Meaning of Automation’, Management Review, June 1963, 40-47.  But Muller-Thym had long been McLuhan’s adviser both on scholasticism, particularly Thomas, and developments in business — a strange concoction Muller-Thym explained in this way: “I stopped philosophy to start a new life, he (Muller-Thym) once told me (Richard Kostelanetz), but later I realized that what I did reflected my earlier training. Indeed, he now regards the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, an encyclopedia of information and methods for handling it, as perhaps the best intellectual preparation for understanding the computer; and he once told me that after unraveling the previously unfathomable complexities of Meister Eckhart (in his PhD thesis), I got the feeling that I could penetrate any difficult mystery.” (Richard Kostelanetz, Master Minds, 1969, 159). Exchanges between Muller-Thym and McLuhan went back to their time together at St Louis University between 1937 and 1942 — when Muller-Thym became the best man at McLuhan’s wedding and the Godfather of his first child — so that when McLuhan recommended Peter Drucker’s books to his Jesuit friends, Walter Ong and Clement McNaspy, in a Christmas 1944 letter (Letters 166), this doubtless reflected advice he himself had first received from Muller-Thym. In his 1960 Report on Project of Understanding New Media McLuhan described his appreciation of Drucker and Muller-Thym as follows: “I make numerous trips to Management Training Centers, and (…) these visits coincide with frequent consultations with capable educators in these top management centers. (…) During this past year I have had a dozen sessions with Peter F. Drucker and Bernard J. Muller-Thym. Both of these men, who are considered the greatest management consultants in the world today, are former professors of philosophy. I find it much easier to talk about the meaning of media to such men than to educators. The reason is this: Drucker and Muller-Thym deal daily with management in the world’s largest business organizations. They are acutely aware of the effects of media, new and old, on decision-making in big business.”
  11. Since Deutsch remained at MIT until 1956, his and Muller-Thym’s time there slightly overlapped.
  12. It is possible there was some kind of connection between Innis and Deutsch independent of McLuhan. Innis would certainly have known of Deutsch’s 1944 paper in CJEPS on the interrelation of ideology and economics. It was exactly at this time, of course, that Innis himself was turning to the examination of this topic — communications, plural — as a key to universal history. Then, shortly before Innis’ death, Deutsch published a review of The Bias of Communication in CJEPS 18:3 (1952), 388-390. And two years later, in 1954, he again published in CJEPS — his important paper on ‘Game Theory and Politics: Some Problems of Application’ appeared in 20:1, 76-83.

Jackson Knight on “the main question”

McLuhan mentions reading W. F. Jackson Knight on Virgil (‘Vergil’ in Knight’s spelling) in a letter to Ezra Pound, July 24, 1951 (Letters 228).  He was probably referring to Knight’s 1936 Cumaean Gates since he mentions “the question of the Cumaean Gates, the ring Wall cities, and Peripolesis-periplum, the Troy game etc” in the same paragraph.1 The next year, in another letter to Pound on July 16, 1952, he again mentions the Cumaean Gates in the context of “the whole traditional lore on the diverse labyrinths of the Cumaean Gates. Rock labyrinth. Water labyrinth and so on”. (Letters 231)

It may be, however, that McLuhan also read Knight’s ‘New Principles in Vergilian Commentary‘ which appeared in the 1950-1951 issue of Humanitas (161-174). Here Knight concludes with these observations: 

It is hard to write about Vergil without writing about all Humanity, and about the whole question of man on earth, or even more than that. Nothing, according to St. Augustine, is more beautiful and more divine than equality and even, balanced symmetry; and yet in this life (…) symmetry is at its best when it is inexact, but inexact according to appropriate law. That is very like the main question concerning Vergil; or, indeed, concerning Humanity. (174)

Knight’s deep point here is that equality, balance and symmetry cannot be without difference. All require plurality in order to exist at all. There can be no equality, balance and symmetry of one singular thing alone by itself. But supposing these (equality, balance and symmetry) are foundational, supposing Augustine was correct that “nothing (…) is more beautiful and more divine than equality and even, balanced symmetry”, then they themselves must be plural.2 

The pluralizing terms of equality, balance and symmetry are inequality, imbalance and asymmetry. Similarly, the pluralizing terms of justice and harmony are injustice and disharmony.3

Knight’s dictum that “symmetry is at its best [ie, is at its most fundamental] when it is inexact, but inexact according to appropriate law” points to such fundamental uttering-outering4 into plurality.5

The same point is made by Hopkins in regard to “peace” in his poem of that name:

What pure peace allows,
Alarms of wars, the daunting wars, the death of it?

And by the I Ching in regard to “true strength” as cited by McLuhan:

Thus true strength is that strength which, mobile as it is hidden, concentrates on the work without being outwardly visible.

And by Yoko One in regard “giving” in conversation with McLuhan:

Giving is getting too.

And by McLuhan when in the same conversation:

pouring [out] is also fulfillment, is not emptying but filling. There’s a [fundamental] complementarity here.

“Complementarity” here is the same as equality, balance and symmetry above.

The basic law (Knight’s “appropriate law”) in all these formulations is just that put forward by McLuhan at the end of TT 22:

dialogue [aka equality, balance and symmetry, aka complementarity] as a process of creating the new came before, and goes beyond, the exchange of “equivalents” that merely reflect or repeat the old.

“Came before” = “is more beautiful and more divine” = “goes beyond the exchange of ‘equivalents’ that merely reflect or repeat the old” = “symmetry is at its best when it is inexact, but inexact according to appropriate law”. 

But why is this “very like the main question concerning (…) Humanity”? Because humans cannot relate to truth and goodness through identity with them.  Aside from the fatal circumstance that we lack the timber for this, McLuhan insisted over and over and over again that all human relation to anything at all is made (and not a matter of matching).  Humans cannot escape the fly-bottle of media.  Humans are inescapably finite in a myriad ways and have no purchase on anything infinite that does not trans-late “it” into something finite.6 Taken seriously, a seldom enough occurrence, this reduces to nihilism as Nietzsche tirelessly described.7 Unless, that is, humans are the pluralizing “inexact” finite term of an infinite “symmetry” that “concentrates on the work without being outwardly visible”, a “symmetry” whose “true strength” it is to outer itself into plurality in the unbalanced asymmetry of human beings.  

In this case, the realization of utter finitude would be the condition of a relation beyond ourselves. But since this is something humans can hardly avoid — we do learn to speak and we are going to die and are going to do evil — we exist willy-nilly in a medium of ‘relation beyond ourselves’ that we cannot see and do not acknowledge and certainly do not deserve.  This is the medium that is the message than which there is “nothing (…) more beautiful and more divine”.8

At the turn of the year from 1950 to 1951, in his long letter to Harold Innis, McLuhan wrote. 

Wyndham Lewis’s The Art of Being Ruled (…) is probably the most radical political document since Machiavelli’s Prince. But whereas Machiavelli was concerned with the use of society as raw material for the arts of power, Lewis reverses the perspective and tries to discern the human shape once more in a vast technological landscape which has been ordered on Machiavellian lines. (Letters, 222)

To “reverse (…) perspective” to enable us “to discern the human shape once more in a vast technological landscape which has been ordered on Machiavellian lines” was the goal of McLuhan’s work.  It turned on “the main question concerning (…) Humanity” that is nothing other than the question of “inexact” relation “according to appropriate law”.9

 

  1. Like his reference to “the Cumaean Gates” in his July 16, 1952, letter to Pound, all these (“the Cumaean Gates, the ring Wall cities, and Peripolesis-periplum, the Troy game etc”) are images and themes used to portray “the diverse labyrinths” of epic exploration, of human wit and witlessness, of life and death, and of life beyond death’s “gates”.
  2. The argument here runs as follows: a) if equality, balance and symmetry are simply singular relations between plural terms, there must be some fundamental possibility of such singularity that is deeper than them; b) but if equality, balance and symmetry are subject to a deeper possibility than themselves, it is not the case that “nothing (…) is more beautiful and more divine than equality and even, balanced symmetry”; c) therefore, if “nothing (…) is more beautiful and more divine than equality and even, balanced symmetry”, equality, balance and symmetry must themselves be plural.
  3. ‘Pluralizing terms’ are terms that are needed if a first term (like equality, balance or symmetry) is to be plural. Equality is not plural if it is related only to equality.  To be plural, it must be related to something other than equality, therefore some variety of inequality. Hence McLuhan’s remark concluding TT22: “dialogue as a process of creating the new came before, and goes beyond, the exchange of “equivalents” that merely reflect or repeat the old.”
  4. Gutenberg Galaxy, 35: “Languages being that form of technology constituted by dilation or uttering (outering) of all of our senses at once….”.
  5. The great question implicated here is when this pluralization occurs. If it is a sequential — diachronic — event, plurality must be secondary and singularity primary. In fundamental contrast, if plurality is original, singularity must be secondary and derivative.  In this event, singularity might be termed plurality’s “inexact” way of being plural.
  6. The Indo-European root of  ‘-late’ in ‘translate’, ‘collate’, ‘dilate’, ‘elate’, ‘oblate’, ‘relate’, etc, all from Latin ‘latus’ (‘carried’, ‘borne’) — is *tlatos. And *tlatos is also the root of ‘tele’ as in telescope, telegraph, telephone, television and telos. Perhaps *tlatos may be taken as the original name of ‘relation beyond ourselves’ aka — ‘communication’.
  7. “With the true world we also have abolished the apparent one!” With this demonstration, Nietzsche revealed that nihilism is self-cancelling and therefore, like everything else, points beyond itself. But to see this, it must be taken seriously — a seldom enough occurrence.
  8. Absent such fundamental ‘relation beyond ourselves’, humans could never have begun to use language in the deep past and could not learn language as children even now. The mystery is that a capacity (for relation beyond itself) can be awakened in a child in a process that could not take place unless this capacity were already operative. Here is McLuhan to John Snyder, Aug 4 1963: “…we are already moving in depth into a situation in which learning becomes a total process (…) from infancy to old-age. The pattern by which one learns one’s mother tongue is now being extended to all learning whatsoever. The human dialogue itself becomes not only the economic, but the political and social, fact.”  (Letters 291)
  9. Mathew 3:13-15 may be read as an illustration of “inexact” relation “according to appropriate law”, namely that of righteousness (δικαιοσύνην): “Then cometh Jesus from Galilee to Jordan unto John, to be baptized of him. But John forbad him, saying, I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me? And Jesus answering said unto him, Suffer it to be so now: for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness.” Dostoevsky is reported to have cited this passage just before he died. Cf, in this context 1 Corinthians 11:19: “For there must also be factions among you…”

Eliot’s ‘From Poe to Valéry’

…the poetic process as revealed by Poe and the symbolists was the unexpected and unintentional means of reestablishing the basis of Catholic humanism.
(Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, 1954)

It was the symbolist poets who began the study of effects minus causes. This is a technique indispensable to the developing of perception and the by-passing of concepts. (McLuhan to Jim Davey, March 22, 1971)

T.S. Eliot’s 1948 lecture, ‘From Poe to Valéry’, was published in print in The Hudson Review in 1949 (Vol. 2, No. 3). McLuhan paid close attention to it, of course. He had been intensely interested in Eliot since his first months in Cambridge in 1934. A letter to his family from Dec 6, 1934 records:

Of late I have been wayfaring among the work of T.S. Eliot. He is easily the greatest modern poet, and just how great he is remains to be seen, because he has not produced his best yet. However the poems I am reading [Poems 1909-1925] have the unmistakable character of greatness. They transform, and diffuse and recoalesce the commonest every day occurrences of 20th cent. city life till one begins to see double indeed — the extremely unthinkable character, the glory and the horror of the reality in life yet, to all save the seer, [obscured] behind [the surface of] life, is miraculously suggested. (Eliot is an anglo-Catholic, a theologian and philosopher and one of the best critics who ever wrote in English.) Now there is something ineffably exciting in reading a man, a genius and a poet, who has by the same stages, in face of the same  circumstances (he is an American), come to the same point of view concerning the nature of religion and Christianity, the interpretation of history, and the value of industrialism. (Letters 41)

Fifteen years later, when ‘From Poe to Valéry’ was published, McLuhan was still preoccupied with Eliot. As Hugh Kenner later recalled:

Marshall, at that time pretty much a New Critic, believed with F. R. Leavis that the one major poet of our time was Eliot. (…) The passion (…) with which we two (…) studied Eliot! We penciled notes on the yellow postwar paper of a Faber Four Quartets1

McLuhan also had an established interest in Poe. He had published two early papers on him,2 the second after he had his notice directed to Poe’s Maelstrom in 1946 by his friend, Cleanth Brooks, in a way that would continue to fascinate him for the rest of his life.3

Furthermore, in just this 1948-1949 period when Eliot’s ‘Poe to Valéry’ lecture was delivered and then published, McLuhan and Kenner were working on a book on Eliot. Indeed, Kenner published an essay on Eliot, ‘Eliot’s Moral Dialectic’, in the same issue of The Hudson Review that featured Eliot’s lecture.4 And on his side, McLuhan published an essay on Eliot, and a review of eleven books on Eliot, in Renascence magazine in 1949 and 1950.5

Eliot’s lecture played an important role in McLuhan’s second conversion by reinforcing his attention to two issues: (1) the relationship of the modern English-American tradition in letters (especially Yeats, Pound, Joyce, Eliot and Lewis) to the French symbolist tradition from Baudelaire to Valéry; (2) the critical importance of the process of composition to modern art and science (indeed to all perception of any kind).6

Eliot’s essay highlighted the second of these points and in doing so illustrated also the first:

in the course of an introduction [to his translation of Poe’s tales and essays] (…) Baudelaire lets fall one remark indicative of an aesthetic that brings us to Valéry: “[Poe] believed, (…) true poet that he was, that the goal of poetry is of the same nature as its principle, and that it should have nothing in view but itself. A poem does not say something — it is something.”

That “poetry (…) should have nothing in view but itself” is repeated in the dictum that “a poem does not say something” — something, that is, beyond itself. “A poem (…) is something”, then, that already includes both a composing act and a composed something and understanding the poem means understanding the relation, internal to it, between these. Exactly this is — “its principle”.

McLuhan formulated the point as follows (in what amounts to a close rephrasing of the Baudelaire/Eliot passage):

the symbolist poet makes of the poem not a vehicle for views, ideas, feelings, but a situation which involves the reader directly in the poetic process.7 That is why he [the symbolist poet] will always say that the poem is not about anything; it is something. It doesn’t say anything, it does something. (Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, 1954)

Such understanding was not something that poetry could simply ‘say’.  Instead it was something that poetry could only attempt to activate by motivating the repetition of what had already taken place in its composition.  As McLuhan observed in paradoxical fashion:

We have to repeat what we were about to say. 8

At Cambridge McLuhan had encountered the work of Eliot along with that of Pound, Joyce and Lewis. Now he was working his way through all these figures once again with Kenner, reflecting not only the stimulus of Kenner’s exceptional mind, but also the combined influence of his meeting with Pound in June 1948, his exposure to the cybernetics of Wiener and Deutsch via Sigfried Giedion and his renewed appreciation (seeded already at the University of Manitoba) for communications via Havelock, Innis and Richards. The key point he began to find everywhere (not least in modern management theory introduced to him already in St Louis by Bernard Muller-Thym) was the central importance of the subjective act of perception qua composition. As Eliot translated Baudelaire: “the goal of poetry is of the same nature as its principle” — its “principle” being what has brought it into being, what has eventuated in the fact that “it is something”.

To take a concrete example, Pound’s Cantos manifestly9 requires the participatory work of their readers in order to be understood. But this achieved understanding is exactly of this work as informed by it. By working to understand Pound’s verses, his audience was to come to understand what it was doing as a species of what Pound also was doing in putting them together in the first (“principle”) place —  putting them together as a certain “something”. Readers would “retrace” the labyrinth of the work of composition in order to understand the poetry via what Pound had done in creating it.  As McLuhan would insist for the rest of his life, creation (eg, what Pound had done) and perception (eg, of what he had done) could be understood only together. Communication took place, he saw, only when these unite in some mysterious, magical, way. As he repeatedly cited Blake (although usually negatively): “They became what they beheld”. 10

So the learning of language by a child, for instance, at once socializes the child’s perception by restricting it to a set of particular parameters (this language, this dialect, this place, this time, this family, etc) and initiates it into a transformed and greatly enlarged world.  Similarly with, say, a telegram.  A telegraphic message is subject to a very particular set of parameters  — but the message is delivered and just this is the great mystery.

The great mystery of communication is that what closes — the bound circle of understanding, “they became what they beheld” taken negatively  — is also what opens — “they became what they beheld” taken positively.

Eliot notes this effect in his 1948 lecture:

Poe had, to an exceptional degree, the feeling for the incantatory element in poetry, of that which may, in the most nearly literal sense, be called ‘the magic of verse’. (…) It has the effect of an incantation which (…) stirs the feelings at a deep and almost primitive level.

As very frequently noted by McLuhan, Eliot had described this “magic” as the work of the “auditory imagination” in his Norton lectures at Harvard in 1932-1933:

What I call this “auditory imagination” is the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end. It works through meanings, certainly, or not without meanings in the ordinary sense, and fuses the old and obliterated and the trite, the current, and the new and surprising, the most ancient and the most civilized mentality. (The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism, 111)11

But how does this actually work?  How is this actually done when something is created and when that something is understood by others?

This is the Road to Xanadu, described by Lowes (1927) and Havelock (1946-1947) and then taken up by McLuhan around 1950 when he underwent his second conversion.

  1. 1985 ‘Preface’ to the reprinting of Kenner’s The Poetry of Ezra Pound from 1951.
  2. ‘Edgar Poe’s Tradition’ (Sewanee Review, 52(1), 1944); ‘Footsteps in the Sands of Crime’ (Sewanee Review, 54(4), 1946)
  3. For documentation, see McLuhan on Poe’s Maelstrom.
  4. Around the time of Eliot’s 1948 lecture and its publication in 1949, McLuhan published two reviews in the same journal himself: ‘Tradition and the Academic Talent’ (a title taking-off on Eliot’s 1919 essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’) in The Hudson Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1948) and ‘Encyclopaedic Unities’ in The Hudson Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1949). In addition, Cleanth Brooks, a  frequent correspondent with McLuhan and one of Kenner’s teachers in the PhD program at Yale, also published several pieces in these initial volumes of The Hudson Review. Allen Tate, another of McLuhan’s friends and correspondents, did so as well.
  5. Mr. Eliot’s Historical Decorum’, Renascence 2(1), 1949, 9-15; ‘T. S. Eliot’, Review of eleven books about Eliot, Renascence 3(1), 1950, 43-48.
  6. McLuhan’s Playboy Interview: “I began to realize (around 1950) that the greatest artists of the 20th Century — Yeats, Pound. Joyce, Eliot — had discovered a totally different approach, based on the identity of the processes of cognition and creation. I realized that artistic creation is the playback of ordinary experience…
  7. Cf, McLuhan to Innis, March 14, 1951: “The whole tendency of modern communication whether in the press, in advertising, or in the high arts is toward participation in a process, rather than apprehension of concepts. And this major revolution, intimately linked to technology, is one whose consequences have not begun to be studied although they have begun to be felt.” (Letters, 221)
  8. ‘The Be-Spoke Tailor’, Explorations 8, 1957, #4
  9. Any understanding of anything requires the work of subjective perception.  What particularly characterizes modern art and science (like the theory of relativity) is their fundamental emphasis on this necessity.
  10. McLuhan cites Blake’s line in all of the following: ‘The Electronic Age – The Age of Implosion’ 1962; GG 1962, 265, 272; ‘We need a new picture of knowledge’ 1963; UM 1964, 45; McLuhan to Frank Kermode, March 4, 1971, Letters 426.
  11. Leaving aside McLuhan’s many bare references to “auditory imagination”, this passage from Eliot is cited in full in all of the following essays and books: ‘Coleridge As Artist’ (1957), ‘The Alchemy of Social Change’, Explorations 8 (1957), ‘Environment As Programmed Happening’ (1968), From Cliche to Archetype (1970), Culture is Our Business (1970), Take Today (1972), ‘Media Ad-vice: An Introduction’ (1973), ‘Liturgy and Media’ (1973), ‘The Medieval Environment’ (1974), ’English Literature as Control Tower in Communication Study’ (1974), ‘At the Flip Point of Time’ (1975), ‘Empedocles and T. S. Eliot’ (1976), ’Pound, Eliot, and the Rhetoric of The Waste Land’ (1979). In her thesis (59), Liss Jeffrey cites it from McLuhan’s unpublished note ‘My Last Three Books’.

Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner and Poe’s Maelstrom

Without static you have no continuity. (Theatre and the Visual Arts, 1971)

In a succinct note in the (since defunct) Poe Newsletter, Margaret J. Yonce detailed many of the parallels between Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner and Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom. Both are epyllia which unfold as tales told within a tale. Both are accounts of harrowing events at sea. In both only a single individual of an original ship’s crew survives the experience, or series of experiences, to which their crafts are exposed. Both mariners are rendered unrecognizable by their ordeal. And both are delivered from it by an unlikely mode of conveyance that is super-natural (in Coleridge) or seemingly contra-natural (in Poe).

The ultimate homecoming of Coleridge’s mariner is depicted in a way which could have served as an outline for Poe’s tale:

…a sound was heard.
Under the water it rumbled on,
Still louder and more dread :
It reach’d the ship, it split the bay;
The ship went down like lead.
Stunned by that loud and dreadful sound,
Which sky and ocean smote,
Like one that hath been seven days drown’d
My body lay afloat;
But swift as dreams, myself I found
Within the Pilot’s boat.
Upon the whirl, where sank the ship,
The boat spun round and round;
And all was still…

John Livingston Lowes‘ Road to Xanadu (1927) is an investigation of Coleridge’s imagination as it worked to compose The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. In it, a further highly important relationship of Poe’s Maelstrom to Coleridge’s Mariner, one not noted by Yonce, may be seen. As Lowes points out:

The [ancient mariner’s] ship is at the Equator twice. It crosses it in the Atlantic sailing south, and the equatorial calms of the Pacific are the stage for half the action of the story (…) the course [is] from Equator to Equator round the Horn (115, 122)

If ‘south’ is conceived as ‘down’, as it is on our usual maps and globes, Coleridge’s mariner descends from the Equator in the Atlantic and then ascends again back to the Equator in the Pacific.  This he does in a linear movement on the surface of the sea, horizontally. What Poe does is to present the same figure in the depths of the sea, vertically,  His mariner also descends and ascends, but he does so in place — within the vortex of the Maelstrom

Both tales describe complications of space. Both describe utterly differing regions which are yet accessible to each other — although only with life-threatening difficulty. The ancient mariner faces extreme cold and too much wind, and then extreme heat and too little wind.  Poe’s mariner encounters the strange physics of the whirlpool. These conditions are remarkable both in themselves and in their terrible proximity to the normal conditions at sea from which both set out and to which both finally return.

But what about time? In his poem about the Maelstrom, McLuhan’s close friend Cleanth Brooks described the whirlpool as a kind of clock and suggested that its central protagonist is “time’s enterprise”:

Geared to the whirlpool now, destruction’s dial,
The fool can read (…)
On the dial’s hurrying face, knows what’s o’clock,
Himself the second hand, at first hand reads
The timepiece Braille-wise1

These are a clock and a time which are, however, utterly different from what we know as clock-time. Brooks’ poem begins:

Then when the terror is at its height, you hurl
The useless watch away, fling time away,
Having no more to do with time

The first word, “then” is key. As seen in the next word “when”, the great question is: just when is this then?

Who knows the whirlpool’s season or the hour
That ripens it to peace? Who thinks to catch
Time’s phoenix on her nest?

Brooks describes a situation defined by multiple times. But unlike different regions in space, the relation of times (plural) to each other cannot be one-after-the-other. For this is just what time singular is. Times plural, in contrast, must be simultaneous, two times at once.  And these two times at once must be arrayed vertically, not horizontally, since the latter is ultimately not time at all, but space.

The relationship of The Ancient Mariner to The Maelstrom might thus be put, in McLuhan’s terms, as the movement from the horizontal “diachronique” to the vertical “synchronique”2:

Chronological time yields to time as [simultanious] spaced-out moments of intensity” (Spiral — Man as the Medium’, 1976, 127).

Plurality-of-times succeeds uniformity-of-time. (UM, 1964, 152)3

It is not the case, however, that the horizontal or diachronic dimension is simply negated or lost in this movement from the one to the two. It remains as an irreducible pole of the crossed figure of times, plural. Instead of subtraction, a new dimension is added to the horizontal, complicating it, which is both radically incommensurate with it and yet functions as its strange ground. As such, this new dimension is the very condition of explanation.4

For McLuhan this diachronic/synchronic or figure/ground structure is the heart of all insight and explanation: it is the

principle of a continuous5 dual structure for achieving order. (Spiral — Man as the Medium, 1976, 126)

Structuralism as a term (…) [designates] inclusive synesthesia, an interplay of many levels and facets in a two-dimensional mosaic. (GG, 230, emphasis added)

Adding ground flips the concept approach into percepts… (LM, 10)6

Explanation is therefore characterized, according to McLuhan, by the simultaneous vertical relation of two fundamentally different, but linked, terms7.  This simultaneous vertical relation he called ‘symbol’ or ‘metaphor’. At its heart, he said, is a gap which at once holds the two terms apart as fundamentally different and yet links them together in meaning or significance or explanation. The differentiating-uniting force working across this gap he called ‘resonance’ or ‘echo’ or ‘touch’ or ‘synaesthesia’ or ‘logos’ or — ‘communication’.

Symbolism is the art of the missing link, as the word implies: sym-ballein, to throw together. It is the art of syncopation. It is the basis of electricity and quantum mechanics, as Lewis Carroll under­stood via Lobachevski, and non-Euclidean geometries. The chem­ical bond, as understood by Heisenberg and Linus Pauling, is RESONANCE. Echoland. (From Cliché to Archetype, 39)

the basic mode of metaphor is resonance and interval — the audile-tactile  (LM, 120)

the Stoic (…) logos spermatikos is the uttered logos  (…) embedded in things animate or inanimate that structures and informs them and provides the formal principles of their being and growth (…). This (…) logos is the root of grammar (…) with its twin concerns of etymology and multiple-level exegesis, the ground-search for structure and roots. All of the sciences of the later quadrivium (of music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy) were subdivisions of grammar, as forms of exegesis of the Book of Nature.  (LM, 124)

Passages like these might, of course, be supplied in endless number from McLuhan’s works. These few may be taken simply as illustrative. The central point in regard to his second conversion is that Brooks brought the Maelstrom to his attention not only as the synchronic labyrinthine form of all human perception and creation, but also as an image of the twofold vertical structure of times plural implicated in that form. He began to understand these matters around 1950 and the rest of his life would be spent in further consideration of them. 

  1. McLuhan does not seem to have commented on Brooks’ poem.  Had he done so, he would have appreciated the fact that Brooks’ mariner comes to understand the maelstrom by touch, “Braille-wise”, and not by sight.
  2. “The structural theme of (the film) Spiral presents (…) the synchronique worlds of birth and death. Spiral is not (…) diachronique or lineal (…) but a synchronique and contrapuntal interplay in a resonating structure” (Spiral — Man as the Medium’, 1976, 125).
  3. “Succeeds” here does not mean ‘comes after’ since “plurality-of-times” also precedes “uniformity-of-time”. “Succeeds” in this context means ‘comes to be seen as more fundamental than’.
  4. At the same time, as we say, the horizontal or diachronic dimension is equally necessary such that it, too, can be considered a condition of explanation — without it there would be nothing to explain.
  5. “Continuous” here does not mean ‘diachronic’ in ordinary time, but ‘repetitive’ at the level of principial explanation’.
  6. Explanation or understanding or communication takes place when an initial subjective take (‘concept’) is given up in favor of the reception of an objective meaning that is already there (‘percept’).
  7. ‘Terms’ not as words, or not only as words, but as terms of relation — like two times

The Road to Xanadu

As described in the early history of Eric Havelock and I.A. Richards, Havelock’s 1939 monograph The Lyric Genius of Catullus offers this remarkable observation on Virgil:

Virgil responded to [the novi poetae] readily, not only in his occasional pieces, but in his Ecologues and above all in the great episode of Orpheus and Eurydice which closes the Fourth Georgic. This tale of romantic regions under the sea, of passionate love and tragic separation, is too rarely recognized for what it is — an example of what the epyllion could become in Latin when handled with emotional sincerity and sure taste. Constructed on the sort of mechanical plan perfected by Callimachus, of a plot within a plot, (…), it yet manages to combine romantic mystery, prettiness, passion and pathos in a kind of literary tapestry. (172)

This passage is of great interest to readers of McLuhan in at least three respects.  In the first place, it broaches the topic of the epyllion in a monograph published by a University of Toronto classicist only a few years before McLuhan came to teach there in 1946. (And Havelock would follow this 1939 remark with a detailed study of epyllia in a UT publication in 1946, the very year of McLuhan’s arrival in Toronto.) This was a topic which would come to obsess McLuhan shortly thereafter.  As Marchand describes:

McLuhan’s conversational agenda was based on the themes that obsessed him. In 1948-49 Mallarmé and the Symbolists were such a theme. Shortly thereafter and throughout the early fifties, he became fascinated with the epyllion, the little epic. McLuhan considered the essence of this literary form to consist of the interplay between plot and subplot and was convinced that in that interplay lay the secret to interpreting Western literature. He started, of course, to write a book on the subject — a book he was still working on a dozen or so years later. In the meantime, he began to spread the word about the epyllion through his personal network. (The Medium and the Messenger, 111)

Secondly, the epyllion form, the plot within a plot, is broached in the Catullus passage in specific regard to Virgil. Here again McLuhan would become fascinated and over the first decade of his career in Toronto would record in letters and essays his impressions from a series of Virgil and Virgil-related studies, all of which have to do with labyrinthine journeys in, variously, myth, dream, afterlife, initiation, caves, the underworld — and in artistic creation:

W.F. Jackson KnightCumaean Gates (1936) (mentioned by McLuhan in a letter to Ezra Pound, July 24, 1951, Letters 2281)

R.W. CruttwellVirgil’s Mind at Work (1947) (letter to Pound, July 24, 1951, Letters 228)

G.R. LevyThe Gate of Horn (1948), (mentioned in ‘Maritain on Art’, 1953; ‘Wyndham Lewis’, 1953; ‘Joyce, Mallarmé and the Press’, 1954; ‘The God-Making Machines of the Modern World’, 1954)

G.R. Levy, The Sword from the Rock (1953) (mentioned in ‘Introduction’ to Alfred Lord Tennyson: Selected Poetry, 1955)

Thirdly, Havelock specifies that this epyllion in Virgil concerns actions unfolding in “regions under the sea” — like Poe’s Maelstrom.

McLuhan’s second conversion brought him to a combination of these concerns with his contemporaneous discovery of communications through the work of Innis and, once again, Havelock2. It is the business of these Maelstrom posts to trace how this occurred. But this theme must also be threaded in the writings of Havelock, indeed even of I.A. Richards, because McLuhan’s awareness of the complex — the epyllion, Virgil, the labyrinth, Poe’s maelstrom, communications media — did not stem from The Lyric Genius of Catullus, but from Havelock’s subsequent development of it. And this development, it seems, transpired in interchange with Richards at Harvard.

That Havelock was continuing to consider the matter after his 1939 monograph was demonstrated in 1943 by a short contribution he made to The Classical Weekly (Vol. 36, No. 21, pp. 248-249), ‘Homer, Catullus and Poe’. Significantly, this piece begins:

Readers of [John Livingston] Lowes’ Road to Xanadu are aware that poets sometimes build highly imaginative structures out of miscellaneous materials recollected from the books they have read. Poe’s famous address To Helen seems to be a poem of this order.3

One particular reader of Lowes’ Road to Xanadu was either already in communication with Havelock at that time or very soon would be. This was I.A. Richards at Harvard. And it may be, indeed, that Havelock’s notice of Lowes was brought about through Richards.  For Richards had dealt at length with Lowes’ study in his 1934 Coleridge on Imagination and had been a colleague of Lowes in the Harvard english department since Richards’ arrival there in 1939.

In 1946 Havelock became a guest lecturer at Harvard which would then lead to a full-time appointment in 1947.  The arrangements for this guest lectureship would have been started a year or two earlier, of course, so in 1944, perhaps, conceivably even in 1943. It could be that Havelock had made an appeal to Richards (whom he may have met or even come to know in England at Cambridge in the twenties) because he was increasingly unhappy with his lack of advancement at Toronto and with the resulting financial situation this entailed for him and his wife and their family of three children.4 Or the impetus may have come from the Harvard side and Richards may have had a role in the recruitment process.

In any case, the known facts are these:

a) Richards, who was 10 years older than Havelock, was an influential lecturer in Cambridge while Havelock was a student there between 1922 and 1926

b) Havelock’s 1943 note in the Classical Weekly begins “Readers of Lowes’ Road to Xanadu are aware…”

c) Lowes had been an emeritus colleague of Richards in the English department at Harvard since Richards’s arrival in 1939

d) Richards had treated Lowes‘ 1927 Road to Xanadu at length (in a discussion taking more than 10% of the book) in his 1934 Coleridge on Imagination

e) Havelock would further develop his analysis of the epyllion in a considerable 3-part 1946/1947 essay, ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu‘, for which Lowes was the explicit inspiration and in which Havelock would cite Richards

f) Havelock would join Richards at Harvard in 1946 as a guest-lecturer and in 1947 in a full-time appointment

g) Richards would cite Havelock by name and discuss his orality/literacy work in a BBC broadcast in 1947

h) Harold Innis, in a letter to Frank Knight from May 21, 1951, discussing the problem of “understanding other cultures” would mention in successive sentences Richards’ Mencius on Mind and Havelock’s work on the Greeks — presumably Havelock had suggested Richards’ work to Innis

i) Havelock’s family would become close with Richards and his wife during their common time at Harvard, 1947-1961 

j) Havelock would contribute to the 1973 Festschrift for Richards with a lecture first given in Toronto in 1946 and would dedicate it to “Ivor Richards, revered friend and former colleague, who in all that he has taught and written has held a lamp for us to see by”.

Research in the records of the Harvard classics department and in the Eric Havelock papers at Yale might be able to specify the exact sequence of events here. For the purpose of understanding McLuhan’s second conversion, however, the important point is only that he seems to have started reading Richards again — more than a decade after initially reading him and hearing his lectures in Cambridge (UK) — about the time that he was coming under the influence of Innis and Havelock (who was then in close contact with Richards) and at the same time that McLuhan was coming loose from Leavis. His second conversion might be thought of, then, as a reversion via Havelock from Leavis to Richards, if not in the answers he was to find, at least in the questions he would investigate.

By the time of his 1957 essay ‘Coleridge As Artist’, at any rate, McLuhan had certainly reread Richards’ Coleridge on Imagination and, along with it, Lowes’ Road to Xanadu (which is cited twice in the essay).  But although seemingly never mentioned by McLuhan5 (always pending further findings, of course), the great likelihood (as will be detailed in further posts) is that he was put on this path that would be his life’s work, sometime around 1950, by Havelock’s essay ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’6, perhaps in combination with Havelock’s unpublished 1949 lecture, ‘The Journey of Aeneas through the Waste Land‘.

  1. The editorial notes to this letter mistakenly refer to Knight’s 1939 Accentual Symmetry in Vergil. McLuhan mentions the cumaean gates again in another letter to Pound on July 16, 1952, Letters 231.
  2. It is very much of an understatement to call Havelock in regard to McLuhan ‘a University of Toronto classicist’ who happened to be active there for almost two decades up to the time of McLuhan’s arrival. Nor is it correct to limit Havelock’s direct or indirect influence on McLuhan to his work on media. Instead, Havelock (along with Eliot, Pound and Richards) may have shown McLuhan how to study literary works as a multilevel compositions in which horizontal and vertical labyrinths were of critical note.
  3. McLuhan, still in St Louis, was also working on Poe at just this same time.  His essay ‘Edgar Poe’s Tradition’ was published in The Sewanee Review in 1944.
  4. A remarkable letter in the UT archives from Havelock to Innis, dated April 26, 1946, asks for Innis’ help in dealing with a “crippling” problem with the Canadian income tax authorities.
  5. Even Havelock seems to have felt that McLuhan went overboard in crediting the importance of Preface to Plato for his work. But this might have been a sign of an earlier and more profound unacknowledged debt?
  6. ‘Virgil’s Road to Xanadu’: (1) The poet of the Orpheus-fantasy, Phoenix, Vol. 1, No. 1 pp. 3-8, 1946; (2) The Laboratory of a Poet’s Mind, Phoenix, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 2-7, 1946; (3) The Waters of the Great World, Phoenix, Supplement to Volume One, pp. 9-18, 1947.

Autobiography – the experience of the second conversion

McLuhan’s portrait of Tennyson in his  ‘Introduction’ to Alfred Lord Tennyson Selected Poetry is in many respects a self-portrait.1 For example, he says of Tennyson what he himself learned via his exposure to the Maelstrom in the late 1940s:

the way of escape from the dangers of excessive spiritual isolation was through wholehearted participation in the great stream of human experience and endeavor. (‘Introduction’, Tennyson: Selected Poetry, 1955, vii, emphasis added)2  

McLuhan’s description of Tennyson’s “In Memoriam” in this ‘Introduction’ captures one aspect of the ‘second conversion’ he experienced in the late 1940’s as he approached his fortieth birthday:

“In Memoriam” (…) Tennyson himself described (…) as a “Way of the Soul”, which locates it in the company of the literature of spiritual quests — a record of separate moments of growth and illumination, moving from the early astonishment and confusion of grief through a gradual affirmation mediating between pain and acceptance to the finale of peace and joy. (xi-xii, emphasis added)

But “pain” (our own, but especially what we have caused in others) cannot be forgotten or in any way overcome in some “finale of (…) joy”. These are “separate moments”3 such that the pain is not subject to ‘continuous’ improvement or ablation, but is always simultaneously there  — 

in the uncertainty of the interval between the pram and the coffin, between birth and death. (‘Spiral — Man as the Medium’)4

The crucial question concerns the nature of time — is it chronologically (or diachronically) continuous or simultaneously (or synchronically) contrapuntal?

The structural theme of [the film] Spiral presents (…) the synchronique  worlds of birth and death. Spiral is not (…) diachronique or lineal (…) but a synchronique and contrapuntal interplay in a resonating structure (Ibid, 125)

Chronological time yields to time as spaced-out moments of intensity. (Ibid, 127)

The conversion, then, is between “Way[s] of the Soul”5 — one of them aspiring to be “moving (…) from the  (…) confusion of grief through a gradual affirmation  (…) to the finale“, where the confusion and grief would in some way be brought to conclusion; the other of them finding itself already situated “in a resonating structure” that includes confusion and grief and all other human possibilities of perception and emotion — even joy. Even a painful joy.

The “astonishment and confusion of grief” which McLuhan must have experienced as he found he had to give up his fiercely held literary values — values he had melded with his religious persuasion — would in this case need to be cherished, both as having instigated his awareness of this “resonating structure” and as an ineradicable aspect of its fullness. As McLuhan cited Heidegger in his Man and Media’ lecture from 1975, the pain and confusion and grief and joy are all swept up (and down) in a dynamic vortex of

the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. (‘Man and Media’, Understanding Me, 278-298, here 291)

So it was, to repeat, that

the way of escape from the dangers of excessive spiritual isolation was through wholehearted participation in the great stream of human experience and endeavor.

This is what McLuhan so often called, following Yeats in 1903, “the emotion of multitude”.6 Or, as ‘Spiral — Man as the Medium’ specified — this “multitude” could be designated simply as ‘man’.

  1. See also Autobiography – the experience of Cambridge.
  2. This ‘Introduction’ was written years earlier than its publication date of 1955, probably in 1951.
  3. “In art as in physics fission preceded fusion.” ‘The Aesthetic Moment in Landscape’,1951.
  4. In Etrog & McLuhan, Images from the Film Spiral, 1987, 125-127.  McLuhan’s piece was written in 1976.
  5. This is a conversion from one way of the soul to another, a conversion whose possibility lies in the fact that both are situated in the labyrinthine spiral of the Maelstrom. “In the interval between time the preserver, and time the destroyer, is the creative interval which constitutes both continuity and arrest…” (‘Spiral — Man as the Medium’, emphasis added).
  6. See Lévi-Strauss on method in anthropology. In a 1970 lecture, ‘Discontinuity and Communication in Literature’, McLuhan read the complete 2-page text of ‘Emotion of Multitude’ by way of saying, ‘Here is the font — consider it well’: “I (Yeats) have been thinking a good deal about plays lately, and I have been wondering why I dislike the clear and logical construction which seems necessary it one is to succeed on the modern stage. It came into my head the other day that this construction, which all the world has learnt from France, has everything of high literature except the emotion of multitude. The Greek drama has got the emotion of the multitude from its chorus, which called up famous sorrows, even all the gods and all heroes, to witness as it were, some well-ordered fable, some action separated but for this from all but itself. The French play delights in the well-ordered fable, but by leaving out the chorus, it has created an art where poetry and imagination, always the children of far-off multitudinous things, must of necessity grow less important than the mere will. This is why, I said to myself, French dramatic poetry is so often a little rhetorical, for rhetoric is the will trying to do the work of the imagination. The Shakespearian drama gets the emotion of multitude out of the sub-plot which copies the main plot, much as a shadow upon the wall copies one’s body in the firelight. We think of KING LEAR less as the history of one man and his sorrows than as the history of a whole evil time. Lear’s shadow is in Gloucester, who also has ungrateful children and the mind goes on imagining other shadows, shadow beyond shadow, till it has pictured the world. In Hamlet, one hardly notices, so subtly is the web woven, that the murder of Hamlet’s father and the sorrow of Hamlet are shadowed in the lives of Fortinbras and Ophelia and Laertes, whose fathers, too, have been killed. It is so in all the plays, or in all but all, and very commonly the subplot is the main plot working itself out in more ordinary men and women and so doubly calling up before us the image of multitude.  Ibsen and Maeterlinck have on the other hand created a new form, for they get multitude from the Wild Duck in the Attic, or from the Crown at the bottom of the Fountain, vague symbols that set the mind wandering from idea to idea, emotion to emotion. Indeed all the great masters have understood that there cannot be great art without the little limited life of the fable, which is always the better the simpler it is, and the rich far-wandering many imaged life of the half-seen world beyond it. There are some who understand that the simple unmysterious things living as in a clear noonlight are of the nature of the sun, and that vague, many-imaged things have in them the strength of the moon. Did not the Egyptian carve it on emerald that all living things have the sun for father and the moon for mother, and has it not been said that a man of genius takes the most after his mother?”

Autobiography – the experience of Cambridge

Describing Tennyson’s experience at Cambridge in his 1955 ‘Introduction’ to Alfred Lord Tennyson Selected Poetry, McLuhan characterizes also his own:

After the rural isolation of Somersby [viz, Manitoba], Trinity College [viz, Trinity Hall], Cambridge, was a tremendous experience, and Tennyson wrote:

For I could burst into a psalm of praise

Seeing the heart so wondrous in her ways.

Would I could pile fresh life on life and dull

The sharp desire of knowledge still with knowing.

Art, Science, Nature, everything is full

As my own soul is full to overflowing. (x)

Golden on Innis and Havelock

In ‘The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Canadian Causes: Eric Havelock and Harold Innis1, Mark Golden (University of Winnipeg) presents an extreme2 version of the theory of the Innis-Havelock relation elsewhere urged by Watson, Babe and Carey:   

… there is no denying the similarities [between Innis and Havelock]. What is more, the two men not only overlapped at Toronto for almost 20 years, they even knew each other. Havelock’s reminiscences about his days in Canada (…) came in a pair of memorial lectures  [in October 1978] at Innis College long after the economist’s death [in 1952]. His appreciation of Innis’s achievement remains among the most compelling. Yet he denies any close association (…) and downplays any influence of Innis’s interests on his own work. (…) Havelock, however, is not content merely to assert his independence of Innis. He implies that the current of influence ran the other way: he delivered public lectures at Toronto on orality in Homer in the early 1940s — perhaps Innis heard them. Communication that passed between the two men after he had left Toronto for Harvard leads him to infer that this was so. He sums up the intellectual relationship — “more slight than some may have supposed” (403) — in this way: “In reading Innis, I discover (…) the contiguity between Innis and myself seems to have been, as much as anything, else, a matter of happy coincidence” (424). I [Mark Golden] am reminded of that old classicist’s ploy, anticipatory plagiarism: “I find my conjecture anticipated in the work of so and so.” Curiously coy as it is, Havelock’s account has adherents. For example, Andy Wernick5 regards Havelock’s ideas on Plato as Innis’s starting point [for his late work on communications]. It is true that these ideas [of Havelock] did not see print until 1963 [in Preface to Plato], more than a decade after Innis’s death.  But Innis knew them long before: a letter from Innis to a friend6 in May 1951 mentions a manuscript of Havelock’s “on the question of the shift from the oral to the written in Greek culture.”7 But all this letter really shows, it seems to me, is that even a scholar as gifted and energetic as Havelock didn’t always get his work out as soon as he hoped. Many (…) passages from Innis’s own publications (…) predate this letter. Indeed, his working papers, the so-called “idea file”, include references to the relationship of oral and written language as early as 1944 or 19458; one of the earliest notes, inspired by Ernst Cassirer, asks “how far the clash of written language with oral creates [the abstract] symbolism [needed for algebra]?”9 (…) He was aware of Plato’s relevance to the topic by at least 1946, and speculated, in 1946 or 1947, that civilization is at its peak as the oral tradition shifts to the written. (…) [Such a] mix of literacy and orality seems to have been a crucial element of Innis’s ideas from the start. Havelock, however, came to an appreciation of its importance only late. In his Preface to Plato (1963), Homer represents primary orality and the eventual prevalence of literacy is a triumph of progress. But some 25 years later, in The Muse Learns to Write (1986), “the epics as we know them are the result of some interlock between the oral and the literate”10, “the Muse … learned to write and read while still continuing to sing”11, “the masterpieces we now read as literate texts are an interwoven texture of oral and written”12. This seems to me to be conclusive proof that Innis did not derive his ideas from Havelock… (151-154)

Golden’s “conclusive proof” turns on timing.  If “the mix of literacy and orality seems to have been a crucial element of Innis’s ideas from the start” of his communications work, in 1946 or 1947, and if “Havelock (…) came to an appreciation of its importance only late”, in 1986 or 1987 — a gap of forty years — then it could not be that the former ideas originally derived from the latter.  

However, Golden was apparently not aware that Havelock’s essay in the 1973 Festschrift for his friend and former colleague, I.A. Richards, ‘The Sophistication of Homer’, had already been given as a lecture on January 31, 1946 in Toronto13 and may well have been in circulation there and at Harvard in typescript. Nor that the crucial element of that lecture had been reiterated in a review by Havelock in January 1948 in the University of Toronto Quarterly:

[Owen] plays down the total effect of that enormous weight of tribal baggage, of lore, precept, genealogy, custom, which the [oral] poet has to drag along in his epic. To Owen, Homer the artist is everything; but Homer the encyclopaedist, the didactic recorder of oral tradition, freighted with catalogues and memories, does not exist. This, it seems to me, actually minimizes Homer’s genius, as though he were able to work within the narrower, more controllable limits of a literate method, a Virgil or Dante or Milton armed with pen, picking his themes with nicety, not a bard operating within the great straggling medium of the [oral] saga. If the Iliad is not only astonishing but unique, it is precisely because a controlling perspective, a single point of view, has been imposed upon the most intractable materials. (E.A. Havelock, review of E.T. Owen, The Story of the IliadUTQ, January 1948, 17:2, 211.)

Then, in his 1950 The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, Havelock put his appreciation of the “mix of literacy and orality” explicitly:

There was a golden age in Athens, when men as they walked the streets lived in two minds at once, guided by the unconscious heroisms of an epic tradition, yet roused to vivid thought by the science of an awakening intellect. (13-14)

So it is not the case “that these ideas [on orality and literacy] did not see print until 1963” or that Havelock “came to an appreciation of [the] importance [of the mix of the two] only late” . More, Havelock’s general thesis was clearly abroad in both Toronto and Harvard at just this crucial time of the middle 1940s through his lectures, earlier publications14 and typescripts. Hence the anecdote told to John Watson by Ernest Sirluck, later Dean of Graduate Studies at UT and the President of the University of Manitoba15:

At this period there was much discussion among classicists concerning the use of epic poetry as a technique for inter-generational communication of the ‘cultural baggage’ of a non-literate people. Sirluck recalls a stimulating conversation with [E.T.] Owen on this subject, with Innis as a quiet, note-taking witness.  Since Innis had contributed little to the conversation, Sirluck was taken aback to see him that same afternoon borrowing from the library all the authorities Owen had cited. When Sirluck expressed his surprise that Innis should be interested in this area, Innis replied emphatically that he thought the subject was of fundamental importance. (Watson, Marginal Man, 297)

And here is Richards in a BBC Third Programme broadcast in October 1947:16

Professor Havelock has suggested that we may see in Plato’s rejections of Homer the revolt of the writing mind’s mode of apprehension against the pre-literate mind’s other, less abstract and intellectual, ways of ordering itself.

While the staple theory of Innis (followed by Havelock at least since 1930)17 illuminated the concrete dynamics of any society (and therefore also of pre-literate Greece), the notion that information storage performs a central (or staple) organizing role in the formation of psychological and social functions certainly came from Havelock.18

 

  1. In Daimonopylai: essays in classics and the classical tradition presented to Edmund G. Berry, ed Egan and Joyal, 2004, 143-154.
  2. Golden even suggests Havelock may have committed what Golden calls “anticipatory plagiarism”.
  3. Page reference to Harold Innis: A Memoir, 1982
  4. Ibid
  5. Golden references Wernick’s ‘The Post-Innisian Significance of Innis’,  Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 10:1-2, 1986, 128-150, esp 141.
  6. This was Frank Knight, the distinguished economist who was a young instructor at the University of Chicago when Innis and his wife were studying there just after WW1.  Knight and Innis became friends then and remained friends until Innis’ death 35 years later. As he reported to Innis, Knight was asked to play a role in the attempt in the 1940s to lure Innis from Toronto back to Chicago. Knight declined to do so, other than telling Innis that he would certainly welcome him if he decided on the move.
  7. Quoted from a letter of Innis from May 21, 1951 to Knight, as cited in Graeme Patterson, History and Communications (1990), 65.
  8. Golden plainly takes the dates assigned to the ‘idea file’ as reliable.  But their editor, William Christian, specifically warns against this.  He notes: “The advantage of this form (= chronological order) was that it would allow the reader to see development in Innis’s ideas and concerns. However, and this is a very important reservation, the reader is warned that this chronological ordering is tentative at best. There are some clues such as internal dates, publication dates of books Innis used, and (the date of the) use of the material (by Innis). Indeed some of the sections cannot be dated with any certainty at all. In the absence of more information about the original form of the notes, when they were typed and how they were assembled, the present arrangement must stand as one order among many, though I hope it is a broadly reliable one.” (The Idea File of Harold Innis, 1980, xx)
  9. Golden refers here to William Christian, The Idea File of Harold Innis, 1980, 1.8, p 4.
  10. The Muse Learns to Write, 13
  11. Ibid, 23
  12. Ibid, 101, cf. 124, 126
  13. While there were certainly additions to the lecture as published in 1973, like the allusion to the 1969 moon landing, it is remarkable that the examples of ‘the sophistication of Homer’ detailed in it are also cited in Havelock’s 1948 Owen review.
  14. See Sirluck on Innis, Owen and Havelock.
  15. Sirluck was in the military until 1945 and then left UT for the University of Chicago in 1947. E.T. (Eric Trevor) Owen, longtime professor of Greek in Toronto, died in 1948. This anecdote may therefore be dated with confidence to the 20 or so months between the fall of 1945 and the summer of 1947.
  16. For discussion, see Havelock, Innis and Richards in 1947.
  17. For discussion, see Innis and Havelock – 1930 and beyond.
  18. As Havelock was the first to emphasize, his ideas were, of course, importantly influenced by the earlier work of Martin Nilsson, Milman Parry and his teacher at Cambridge, F.M. Cornford. He came to his ideas, he explained, “after encountering the work of Milman Parry, guided also by a reading of Martin Nilsson’s Homer and Mycenae (1933; for me — EAH — still the classic work on the subject), and following (…) intuitions born of (my early) pre-Socratic studies (with Cornford at Cambridge)…” (The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity, 1986, 17)

Heyer on Innis and Havelock

In his 2003 book, Harold Innis, Paul Heyer describes the relation of Innis and Havelock as follows:

Havelock’s importance [for Innis] was due to the interdisciplinary vision he shared with Innis, which eschewed any hard-and-fast division between the humanities and the social sciences, and because of his interest in the interplay between power and and knowledge in historical change. It has been argued [Heyer cites Watson here] that Havelock eventually became more indebted to Innis than vice versa and that his work is an extension of Innis’s take on Greek civilization, the alphabet, and the social consequences of technological change in communication media. Since Innis’s death Havelock has written extensively on these subjects — in ways that have significantly influenced Marshall McLuhan — but he has attributed  the similarity between his project and Innis’s to “a matter of happy coincidence”. (42)1

Like Watson, Babe and Carey, Heyer sees no significant tie between the communications work of Innis and Havelock while Havelock was at UT and any influence between the two as extending from Innis. And like Babe, he sees the influence of Havelock on McLuhan operating only “since Innis’s death”. Neither view seems tenable.

  1. The closing quotation is from Havelock’s 1982 (originally a 1978 lecture) Harold Innis: A Memoir.